

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

GoogleTM books

<https://books.google.com>





THE ARMY QUARTERLY

With which is incorporated

The United Service Magazine

Edited by

Major-General G. P. DAWNAY
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.

and

CUTHBERT HEADLAM, D.S.O., O.B.E., T.D., M.P.
(late Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff, B.E.F.)

VOLUME XII
(APRIL and JULY, 1926)

London :

WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, LTD.
94, Jermyn Street, St. James's, S.W.

NO. 1111
ADDITIONAL

411
R.8
V.12

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY
WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, LIMITED,
LONDON AND BECCLES.

INDEX TO AUTHORS. VOL. XII.

AUTHOR.	SUBJECT.	PAGE
BAIRD SMITH, Lieut.-Colonel, D.S.O.	Marshal Saxe's Mule; or, Practice v. Theory	338
BANNERMAN, Lieut. D. A. G., The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders.	Strategy and Class Warfare	120
BEWSHER, Capt. F. W., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., The Devonshire Regiment.	Cooperation between the Royal Air Force and Irregular Troops in the Desert	64
BULLOCK, Capt. H., Indian Army.	The Summary Court-Martial	142
CHARLES, Major E. E.	Reminiscences of Russia, 1917	378
COLLIN DAVIES, Capt. C.	The Amir and the Frontier Tribesmen of India (<i>with Map</i>)	44
COOPER, Lieut. H. J., R.A.S.C.	The Fuel Problem	347
DENING, Brevet Major B. C., M.C., R.E.	Transportation Problems of the Next Great War on Land	293
DEWING, Major R. H., D.S.O., M.C., R.E.	War Games on Sand Models (<i>with Sketch</i>)	397
EX-YEOMAN	Horses, L.D.	371
FRITH, Captain O. T., R.A.	Territorial Field Artillery and Mechanical Draught: An Experiment with Fordsons	390
FULLER, Colonel J. C. F., D.S.O.	Major-General Henry Lloyd, Adventurer and Military Philosopher	300
GATTIE, Capt. K. F. D., South Wales Borderers.	Bertrand Stewart Prize Essay, 1926	238
GRIMSDALE, Capt. G. E., R.E.	The Functions of the Territorial County Associations	127

AUTHOR.	SUBJECT.	PAGE
HANBURY PAWLE, Capt., The Royal Berkshire Regiment.	Regimental History: A Method of Teaching it	132
HOOPER, C. A.	The Anatolian Revolt. Translated from the Turkish (<i>with Map</i>)	106, 323
MACMUNN, Major-Gen. Sir George, K.C.B., M.K.C.S.I., D.S.O.	The Old Brown Battlefields	261
MAY, Captain H. W. M., The Hampshire Regi- ment.	The Lewis Gun in the Infantry Platoon .	138
PEFFERS, Capt. A., The Cameronians (Scot- tish Rifles).	The Inevitability of War	55
PEMBERTON, Capt. A. L., M.C., R.A.	Triphibious Warfare. A Study in Rela- tivity	74
REYNOLDS, A. J.	The Anglo-French Occupation of Togo- land (<i>with Map</i>)	315
ROUTH, Major G. M., C.B.E., D.S.O., R.A., Indian Army Ord- nance Corps.	The Need for Economic Intelligence .	273
ROWAN-ROBINSON, Col. H., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.	Ensign, Cornet and Brigadier	399
SMIRNOFF, Alexander	A New Light upon the Invasion of East Prussia by the Russians in August, 1914 (<i>with Map</i>)	96
SYKES, Major-Gen. Sir F. H., G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.P.	Reduction of Armaments, Economy and Imperial Defence	13
THACKERAY, Lieut.-Col. C. B., D.S.O., R.A.	A Republic in the Making	29
WATTEVILLE, Lieut.-Col. H. de (late R.A.)	The Employment of Troops under the Emergency Regulations	283

INDEX TO ARTICLES. VOL. XII.

	PAGE
Amir and the Frontier Tribesmen of India, The (<i>with Map</i>). By Captain C. COLLIN DAVIES	44
Anatolian Revolt, The. Translated from the Turkish (<i>with Map</i>). By C. A. HOOPER	106, 323
Appendix	191
Armaments, Reduction of. Economy and Imperial Defence. By Major-General Sir F. H. SYKES, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.P.	13
Battlefields, The Old Brown. By Major-General Sir George Mac- Munn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.	261
Cooperation between the Royal Air Force and Irregular Troops in the Desert. By Captain F. W. BEWSHER, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., The Devonshire Regiment	64
Court-Martial, The Summary. By Captain H. BULLOCK, Indian Army	142
East Prussia by the Russians in August, 1914, A New Light upon the Invasion of (<i>with Map</i>). By ALEXANDER SMIRNOFF	96
Economic Intelligence, The Need for. By Major G. M. ROUTH, C.B.E., D.S.O., R.A., Indian Army Ordnance Corps	273
Editorial	1, 225
Emergency Regulations, The Employment of Troops under the. By Lieut.-Colonel H. de WATTEVILLE (late R.A.)	283
Ensign, Cornet and Brigadier. By Colonel H. ROWAN-ROBINSON, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.	399
Foreign War Books, Notes on	146, 401
Fuel Problem, The. By Lieut. H. J. COOPER, R.A.S.C.	347
Gallipoli, The Turkish General Staff History of the Campaign in (<i>with Map</i>). Part II.	88
German Parliamentary Inquiry into the Loss of the War, The	84
Horses, L.D. By EX-YEOMAN	371

	PAGE
Lewis Gun in the Infantry Platoon, The. By Captain H. W. M. MAY, The Hampshire Regiment	138
Lloyd, Major-General Henry, Adventurer and Military Philosopher. By Colonel J. C. F. FULLER, D.S.O.	300
"Officers' Strike" in Bengal, 1766, The	362
Parliamentary Notes	186, 446
Regimental History : A Method of Teaching it. By Captain HANBURY PAWLE, The Royal Berkshire Regiment	132
Republic in the Making, A. By Lieut.-Colonel C. B. THACKERAY, D.S.O., R.A.	29
Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	165, 422
Russia, 1917, Reminiscences of. By Major E. E. CHARLES	378
Saxe's Mule ; or, Practice <i>v.</i> Theory, Marshal. By Lieut.-Colonel BAIRD SMITH, D.S.O.	338
Stewart (Bertrand) Prize Essay, 1926. By Captain K. F. D. GATTIE, South Wales Borderers	238
Stewart (Bertrand) Prize Essay, 1927. Subject selected and Rules of the Competition	449
Strategy and Class Warfare. By Lieut. D. A. G. BANNERMAN, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders	120
Territorial County Associations, The Functions of the. By Captain G. E. GRIMSDALE, R.E.	127
Territorial Field Artillery and Mechanical Draught. An Experiment with Fordsons. By Captain O. T. FRITH, R.A.	390
"The Foundations of the Science of War," The Value and Originality of	354
Togoland, The Anglo-French Occupation of (<i>with Map</i>). By A. J. REYNOLDS	315
Transportation Problems of the Next Great War on Land. By Brevet Major B. C. DENING, M.C., R.E.	293
Triphibious Warfare : A Study in Relativity. By Captain A. L. PEMBERTON, M.C., R.A.	74
War Games on Sand Models (<i>with Sketch</i>). By Major R. H. DEWING, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.	397
War, The Inevitability of. By Captain A. PEFFERS, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	55

The Army Quarterly

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. Editorial	
II. Reduction of Armaments, Economy, and Imperial Defence. By Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.P.	1 13
III. A Republic in the Making. By Lieut.-Colonel C. B. Thackeray, D.S.O., R.A.	29
IV. The Amir and the Frontier Tribesmen of India (with Map). By Captain C. Collin Davies	44
V. The Inevitability of War. By Captain A. Peffers, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	55
VI. Cooperation between the Royal Air Force and Irregular Troops in the Desert. By Captain F. W. Bewsher, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., The Devonshire Regiment	64
VII. Triphibious Warfare: A Study in Relativity. By Captain A. L. Pemberton, M.C., R.A.	74
VIII. The German Parliamentary Inquiry into the Loss of the War	84
IX. The Turkish General Staff History of the Campaign in Gallipoli. Part II (with Map)	88
X. A New Light upon the Invasion of East Prussia by the Russians in August, 1914 (with Map). By Alexander Smirnoff	96
XI. The Anatolian Revolt. Translated from the Turkish. Part I (with Map). By C. A. Hooper	106
XII. Strategy and Class Warfare. By Lieutenant D. A. G. Bannerman, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders	120
XIII. The Functions of the Territorial County Associations. By Captain G. E. Grimsdale, R.E.	127
XIV. Regimental History: A Method of Teaching It. By Captain Hanbury Pawle, The Royal Berkshire Regiment	132
XV. The Lewis Gun in the Infantry Platoon. By Captain H. W. M. May, The Hampshire Regiment	138
XVI. The Summary Court-Martial. By Captain H. Bullock, Indian Army	142
XVII. Notes on Foreign War Books	146
XVIII. Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	165
XIX. Parliamentary Notes	186
XX. Appendix	191

LONDON:

WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, LTD.

94, Jermyn Street, St. James's, S.W.

Price Seven Shillings and Sixpence net.

HOLIDAYS at SEA BY P&O

PLEASURE CRUISES

From London by the new oil-burning twin-screw steamship,

RANCHI

16,600 Tons

From Cruise London			Minimum Fares.
A. May 1	Venice, Dalmatia, Sicily, &c. ...	30 days	45 Gns.
B. June 3	The Azores, Madeira, Morocco, &c. ...	19 days	27 Gns.
C. *June 26	Trondhjem and the Fjords ...	16 days	20 Gns.
D. *July 17	Trondhjem and the Fjords ...	17 days	21 Gns.
E. *Aug. 7	Norway, Sweden, Finland ...	23 days	30 Gns.
F. Aug. 31	Greece, Constantinople, &c. ...	29 days	45 Gns.

* Calling at Leith one day later.

*For Illustrated Programme, Cabin Plans and
Reservations, apply P. & O. House as below.*

GIBRALTAR, MARSEILLES AND EGYPT

Weekly departures on Fridays by P. O. Mail Steamers

AT REDUCED SUMMER FARES

Descriptive Handbooks on application as below.

Frequent and regular Passenger Services from London and Marseilles (P. & O. and British India Companies' Lines) to Egypt, India, Ceylon, Straits, China, Japan, Burma, East Africa, Australia, New Zealand, &c.

Chief Passenger Office :

(F. H. Grosvenor, Manager)

14-16, COCKSPUR STREET, LONDON, S.W.1.

City Office (P. & O. and B.I. Companies) : 122, Leadenhall St., London, E.C.3

B.I. Agents: Gray, Davies & Co., 122, Leadenhall Street, E.C.3.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. XII. No. 1.

APRIL, 1926

EDITORIAL

THE announcement made by the Prime Minister in answer to a question put to him by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in the House of Commons on the 25th of February, that "in accordance with the policy of successive Administrations, the Government have no intention of re-opening the question of a separate Air arm and Air Ministry" was generally expected. The decision is probably in accordance with public opinion, but none the less it has come as a disappointment to many close students of our defensive organization who realize the essential weakness of a military system that lacks an independent coordinating authority and places the control of the necessary air requirements of the Navy and Army in the hands of a different Department. For the time being, however, it is clear that the country is to continue to have an Air Ministry and three co-equal Services, and, in the circumstances, there is no doubt that the Prime Minister was well advised when he urged that in the interests of the three Services controversy on the subject should now cease. It is obvious that the closer cooperation which is so urgently required between the Navy, the Army and the Air Force cannot be brought about unless there is "a greater community of feeling between the Services themselves." * Although, therefore, our own views upon this important matter remain unchanged, we do not propose to keep on reiterating them; but we shall not cease to urge the necessity for the establishment of a

* See the speech of the Secretary of State for Air when introducing the Air Estimates, 25th of February, 1925. "Parliamentary Debates," Vol. 192, No. 18, p. 865.

Combined General Staff, and for a closer coordination between the administrative branches of the three fighting Services.

Recent debates in the House of Commons have made it amply clear that considerable uneasiness prevails amongst members belonging to all political Parties with regard to the lack of cooperation which would appear to exist in the framing of the Estimates of the three Departments responsible for the defence of this country. It was hoped that the intimate relationship which is now supposed to exist between the three Chiefs of Staff would have resulted in the foundation of a common defence policy, and that, as a corollary to such a policy, the competition for money between the three Services would cease. But the Estimates laid before Parliament this year show few, if any, signs that the understanding between the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry is any closer than it has been in the past—indeed, it is hardly unfair to suggest, as has been suggested in the House of Commons, that each of these great Departments is still basing its Estimates on its own particular needs in view of its own particular defence preparations. If this uneconomic and inefficient competition is to cease, and if a common policy is to be adopted by the three Services, there must be some better form of cooperation between the professional advisers of the political heads of the three Departments than exists to-day. It is earnestly to be hoped that the Government will pay attention to the growing force of public opinion, and will, before next year's Estimates are framed, take steps to bring about a really effective coordination in our defensive organization.

Unfortunately we are obliged to go to Press before any discussion of the Army Estimates has taken place in the House of Commons, and, therefore, we are not able to comment on the Secretary of State for War's explanation of the Government's Army policy. On the whole, however, it would appear from a study of the Estimates that the Army Council has done the best that it could in a difficult situation. It has effected a net reduction of £2,000,000 on its budget for the coming financial year, and it has done so without reducing the fighting strength of the Regular Army. The main economies are brought about in the following ways :—£332,000 is saved as a result of the reduction in the rates of pay ; £200,000 is saved owing to the abolition of the Corps of Accountants ; £271,000 is saved by means of a reduction in terminal charges, and £400,000

by means of a reduction in munitions. This last-named economy has no doubt been decided upon after very serious consideration, as, in addition to other obvious objections, it will entail the discharge of about 900 men from Woolwich Arsenal during the course of the financial year—a step which in the existing state of unemployment is likely to encounter considerable opposition. It is regrettable that the War Office should have to discharge its workmen, but it is difficult to see what other course could be adopted in view of the calls that are being made upon it to cut down its expenditure. It is unfortunate, too, that it has been found necessary to postpone the purchase of the land on Salisbury Plain which is so urgently needed as a training ground, and still more unfortunate is the heavy decrease in the vote for the Territorial Army. The estimated decrease in the cost of the Territorials for the coming financial year is £204,200, and, although it is understood that this decrease has been amicably agreed upon between the Army Council and the County Territorial Associations on the understanding that the annual Training Grant is to suffer no reduction, it is yet difficult to see how the steady development of the Territorial Army as our second line of defence is to proceed if its financial resources are so rigorously curtailed.

* * * * *

The Air Estimates for the coming financial year amount to £16,000,000 and thus show an increase of £487,000 over those of last year. The Secretary of State for Air, however, is careful to point out that there is a decrease in the gross Estimates of his Department "owing to a reduction of that part of air expenditure which falls finally on the Middle East vote in respect of Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and on Navy votes in respect of the Fleet Air Arm." *

To the taxpayer it really is a matter of slight importance whether the money provided by him for the defence of the country is expended by one Department or another. The only thing that really concerns him is that the money extracted from his pocket is spent to the best advantage. He is so constantly being told that any future war will be waged almost entirely in the air that he may not unnaturally ask himself whether those who are primarily responsible for the air defence of this country and its dependencies are making adequate provision for eventualities. Two years ago he was frightened out of his wits by lurid descriptions of the fate that awaited him in the event of war owing to our numerical weakness in air squadrons.

* See "Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air to accompany the Air Estimates, 1926." Command 2589, 1926.

To satisfy public opinion the Government then in power decided to increase the strength of the Home Defence force to 52 squadrons (39 Regular), and it was contemplated that this increase in strength could be achieved by the year 1928.

But the Home Defence Force consists now apparently of only 25 Regular air squadrons, including 1 Special Reserve and 4 Auxiliary Air Force squadrons, and "In view of the international and financial situation," we are told that His Majesty's Government has decided "to relax the efforts which have hitherto been made to complete the authorized programme at the first possible date." The development of our air strength to the extent laid down in 1923, therefore, has been postponed, and is, we are told, to be "gradual and deliberate." As a consequence of the better feeling in Europe which is supposed to have resulted from the Locarno Treaties, and in view also of the coming discussions on international disarmament, His Majesty's Government is perhaps justified in its air policy. At the same time, the British taxpayer may well scratch his head and ask himself three questions. First, "Am I much safer now than I was in 1923, if it is really true that the next war will be almost entirely fought in the air?" Secondly, "Is it wise to postpone the formation of the new squadrons when apparently their formation takes so much longer than was expected?" And thirdly, "Why is it that I am called upon to provide £16,000,000 a year if, as a result of this great expenditure, Great Britain possesses but 61 air squadrons, only 56 of which are maintained on a Regular basis?"

* * * * *

No official Report upon the Army Manœuvres which took place last September has yet been issued by the War Office, and, as so long a time has now elapsed since they took place, it is presumably not the intention of the Army Council to enlighten the public as to its judgments respecting the conduct of operations in the recent war in Hampshire. This official reticence would appear to be a mistaken policy because the more the people of this country can be induced to take an intelligent interest in the training of their defence force, the more likely are they to be willing to provide the money necessary for that training. But unless the military authorities themselves think fit to publish their views on the lessons learnt in manœuvres, the public is left in the dark or is liable to obtain a wholly wrong impression of what actually took place. The man in the street should not be allowed to draw his conclusions regarding such matters as the efficiency of the staff, the training of the troops, the cooperation of land and air forces, the influence of new weapons and

new forms of transport, merely from such reports as usually appear in the Press.

* * * *

The first and most encouraging aspect of the recent Manœuvres, by common agreement, is that the spirit of the young troops is fully equal to that of their predecessors of 1914; they supported the discomforts caused by nearly continuous rain, muddy bivouacs and strenuous marches with cheeriness and fine discipline. As the *Morning Post* said of the inter-divisional manœuvres of the 3rd and 4th Divisions, 1913, "It may have been a sham fight, but there was no sham rain, sham hunger and sham marching." There is a tendency to seek for "lessons of manœuvres"; it is doubtful whether under the conditions of peace really important lessons can emerge. Manœuvres are the culmination of the year's training, and the staff obtains much valuable experience in handling troops and transport. But events move too quickly for regimental officers to practise their particular functions, and what the commanders of the two sides decide and do might just as well be worked out at a war game. In the recent Manœuvres it was discovered that in practice mobile forces on horses, lorries and tanks do not move so fast as they should theoretically—this is hardly a new discovery. On the other hand, a small mobile force was not able to delay a larger force as it undoubtedly would have done had its guns and rifles been supplied with live ammunition.

Our manœuvres are always "free," that is, they are as far as possible a genuine encounter between two sides. They are the alternative to the staged pieces which the old German Army usually produced. When, however, Moltke, junior, became Chief of the General Staff in 1906, he tried "free" manœuvres for two years, but reverted to the old controlled system, as giving more value in training for the money. In free manœuvres there is too much waste of time, too many impossible situations, and too much unnecessary discomfort—and yet they are not like war. In controlled manœuvres the general course is planned long beforehand, but is only known to the two commanders and the chief umpire. The two commanders are tested at war games. In a country like England, where there are so many "out of bounds" areas, it would seem worth trying the German system.

* * * *

The article entitled "The Inevitability of War" which appears in this number of the *Army Quarterly* is likely to attract attention,

and possibly a certain amount of criticism. The views expressed by its author probably do not represent the attitude of mind of "the man in the street" in this country at the present time, and most assuredly they do not represent the opinion of those who are responsible for the Government of this country. There is no doubt that in Great Britain, at any rate, the feeling of those in authority as well as that of the great mass of the population is in favour of a general disarmament. There is a confident belief among the people of this country that the institution of the League of Nations and their own determination to refrain from war should result in the maintenance of peace. Captain Peffers, on the other hand, belongs to a band of realists who cannot shut their eyes to facts which seem to them obvious. He considers that "Deep down in the hearts of the nations surge the rancour of past defeat, the fear of future catastrophe or the hope of ultimate revenge," and that consequently the recurrence of war is inevitable. "War," he goes on to explain, "is coeval and coexistent with human nature, and until men attain angelic wings, force, in its widest sense, and force alone, will remain not only the foundation of intellectual, moral and political progress, but the ultimate arbiter of human relationships." This view of the situation before us is not encouraging nor is it one with which a believer in human progress would willingly agree. At the same time, those of us who are most anxious for this country "to make a gesture" to the rest of the world by adopting a policy of disarmament and acting upon it in the hope that other nations may follow our example, would do well to read Captain Peffers's article. They might study, too, with advantage Major-General Sir Ernest Swinton's inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Military History in the University of Oxford. They would then realize that their earnest desire for universal peace and goodwill among the nations is no new thing in the history of the world. A longing for tranquillity is the usual consequence of a period war. But a too abrupt disarmament by one or two nations carries with it a risk of the renewal of war because, as Sir Ernest Swinton points out, "there is the danger that the States which disarm may be lulled into a false sense of security while other States are still struggling in the birth-pangs of a new social system." In the world to-day there are unfortunately not lacking signs that a spirit of unrest is abroad which certainly does not make for peace. "Our object," as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has recently explained, "is not merely that there should be peace, but that all should feel that peace is secure. Disarmament through

security, security through arbitration ; arbitration, security, disarmament are the common platform of the whole League of Nations." But although such undoubtedly is the policy of the British Empire, its citizens would be unwise if they failed to bear in mind that no policy of disarmament is a practical possibility until there is a better state of feeling in Europe. There is another form of disarmament that, as Sir Austen Chamberlain explained in the same speech to which allusion has already been made, " is the necessary preliminary to the physical disarmament of the nations. It is the moral disarmament of the world. It is the need for creating a new international soul and a new international morality."

• • • • •

Our readers, whether or not they agree with his arguments and conclusions, cannot fail to be interested in the long and exhaustive article on the "Reduction of Armaments, Economy and Imperial Defence" which Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes contributes to this number of the *Army Quarterly*. He points out that as armaments exist for three purposes—the preservation of internal peace, the defence of dependencies and defence from external aggression—universal total disarmament is not practicable, even if M. Briand's hope of "blotting out the particularism of nations" is an ideal that should be aimed at. He considers that the Locarno Treaties "involve certain risks . . . and weaken the links in the unity of Imperial foreign policy," and that "to meet this danger it is necessary to unify Imperial foreign policy, both in its broad principles and upon specific issues, and to set up a standing machinery which will ensure the maintenance of that unity." In view of our responsibilities all over the world, few soldiers will dispute his plea for a unification of our Imperial defence policy and for the gradual consolidation and combination of the three fighting Services under a supreme defence staff. In principle there is little divergence of military opinion regarding the desirability of the establishment of a Ministry of Defence. But when it comes to the working out in detail of the constitution of such a Ministry even military opinion is divided. Sir Frederick Sykes is well advised, therefore, to advocate the formation of a combined General Staff before any attempt is made to set up a supreme Defence Minister. The establishment of the former in course of time should lead to the institution of the latter—it is not the bitter lessons of the past, or the urgent needs of the present, or the possible dangers of the future that bring about far-reaching reforms

in this country—but we should not forget “the inevitability of gradualness.”

* * * *

The retirement of General Lord Cavan from the Army will be regretted by all soldiers. His four years' term of office as C.I.G.S. has been a period of great difficulty and anxiety, during the course of which he has been called upon to face a succession of difficult problems. Among these, there was first the awkward situation existing in Ireland between the signing of the agreement with the Sinn Feiners and the evacuation of the British troops in December, 1922, and there was also the critical period at Constantinople and Chanak during that year; then in 1923 came the problems attendant on the occupation of the Ruhr by the French and the control of German armaments; then came the sudden crisis in Egypt and the Sudan, which followed the murder of the Sirdar, and the military problems connected with our occupation of Iraq and the controversy regarding the Singapore base.

Throughout these years, too, Lord Cavan has been called upon to carry out the reorganization of the Army to meet the requirements of Imperial and national defence within the limits of decreasing military budgets. He has steadily refused to be hurried into any radical reforms without a thorough and continuous investigation of the proposed changes, and neither in the task of the reorganization of the Army nor in the matter of its scientific and mechanical development has he been deflected from his policy by the voice of criticism. He has the satisfaction of knowing that during his tenure of the office of C.I.G.S. the training policy of the Army has been clearly defined and coordinated, and that the training regulations have been brought into line with this policy. If he did not possess the commanding ability and the staff experience of his two immediate predecessors, there is no doubt that his power of quick decision, his knack of putting his finger at once on the vital point in any problem submitted to him, his ability to explain his views either in speech or in writing, his readiness to shoulder any amount of responsibility, and his splendid record as a commander in the field, earned him the respect and confidence of the Army.

* * * *

The appointment of General Sir G. F. Milne at the age of fifty-nine to be Chief of the Imperial General Staff in succession to Lord Cavan is a selection that at once commanded the approval of the Army; for he possesses the confidence of all who have served under him. Known to them as “Uncle George,” the name carries

with it a subtle respect as well as affection, a note of the austere and discipline-exacting, he is yet still nearly related to, and not altogether really different from, the humans under him. They know that not only is he past master of every branch of the military art, and of the duties of command and the work of the staff, but also that he is up to all the tricks of the trade.

Whilst his predecessors in his great office have either been commanders, without staff training, distinguished for their practical abilities in the field, or eminent staff officers of orthodox Camberley training, who have never exercised any important command, Sir George Milne has all of these qualifications, being eminent both as a commander and a highly trained staff officer. A regimental captain of field artillery in the Khartum campaign and in the opening part of the South African War, having passed through the Staff College, he was from February 1900 to August 1922, on the Intelligence Staff in South Africa, ending up as senior assistant to the late General Sir David Henderson at Pretoria. Then came four years on the Intelligence Staff at the War Office, under the late Field-Marshal Lord Nicholson, the late Lieut.-General Sir James Grierson and Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson. This period of service was followed by eighteen months as the G.S.O. of the North Midland Territorial Division, and four years as the G.S.O. of the 6th Division at Cork. October, 1913, saw him as Brigadier-General, commanding the artillery of the 4th Division, with which he went to France, taking part in all its actions in 1914 : Le Cateau, the Marne, the Aisne and Armentières. In January, 1915, he was Brigadier-General, General Staff, in the III. Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir W. Pulteney, his old chief in the 6th Division, for one month, being then sent as Major-General to be the Chief General Staff Officer to General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien in the Second Army. Thus he found himself engaged in the five weeks' battle of "Second Ypres." In February, 1915, he was given command of the 27th Division, eventually taking it to Salonika, where in December he was promoted to command the XVI. Corps in succession to General Sir Bryan Mahon. In May, 1916, he was appointed to command the Salonika Army, as a quasi-subordinate first of General Sarrail, then of General Guillaumat and finally of General Franchet d'Espérey. He held this most difficult post to the end of hostilities, though changing his title towards the close to that of G.O.C. British Army of the Black Sea.

No one has worked harder at his profession than General Milne, and few can compete with his varied abilities, both in the field and

in the office. He has had very great predecessors in the late Field-Marshal Lord Nicholson and Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, and, having served under both of them, inherits part of their experience. His tact in dealing with foreign colleagues is evidence that he should understand the equally delicate task of cooperating with politicians. He has risen by his abilities without the powerful support of any individual or clique, and is the practical and scientific professional soldier whom the Army desired to have, and whom the nation should have, as its chief military adviser in these days of change and novelty in the instruments of war.

* * * * *

The death of General Sir Francis Lloyd, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O., Colonel of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, a Commissioner of the Duke of York's School, which occurred on the 26th of February, deprives the British Army of a distinguished soldier who served his country long and faithfully. He was born in 1853, and in 1874 was gazetted to the old 33rd (Duke of Wellington's) Regiment. Almost immediately after joining the Army, however, he was transferred to the Grenadier Guards—and with the Brigade of Guards he was closely associated for the remainder of his life. He served as signalling officer to the Brigade of Guards in the Suakin Expedition in 1885, and commanded a battalion of his Regiment in the campaign in the Sudan in 1898, being awarded the D.S.O. for his services after the fall of Khartum. His next experience of active service was in the South African War, in which he served for two years and was severely wounded. He was awarded the C.B., and promoted Colonel for his services in this campaign. From 1904 to 1908 he commanded the Brigade of Guards, and in 1909, on being promoted Major-General, was given the command of the Welsh Division of the newly formed Territorial Force. After completing his term of service in this command, he was appointed to the command of the London District—a position that he was destined to fill until 1919. His period of command was one of great difficulty, and the problems that he was called upon to solve were many and various. But his training and temperament fitted him for his task, and he rose magnificently to the occasion. The rules and regulations which he devised for the maintenance of the discipline and moral of the countless officers and men who were quartered in or passed through London during the war were sometimes criticized, but there can be no doubt that they served their purpose admirably and were in the best interests of the Army.

We have received from the Earl of Cavan the following short appreciation of the late General :—

“ I was gazetted to the Grenadier Guards vice Frankie Lloyd promoted captain. I was posted to his company, and I got my captaincy vice Frankie Lloyd promoted lieutenant-colonel of my battalion, so my early soldiering was very closely associated with him.

“ He was deliciously snappy, revelled in feigned wrath, but was just and fearless and a great teacher. All our company loved him.

“ In South Africa the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, commanded by Frankie, detrained at a place called Edenburg and was told to march to Reddersburg. There was no road, and maps consisted of large spaces called ‘ Defective Compilation,’ so Frankie ‘ marched to the sound of the guns,’ and on reaching a river found it was fordable and ordered the drums to play the ‘ March Past,’ and, if any man got out of step, his name was to be taken. All soldiers are far more terrified of wet feet than of wounds.

“ Later in the South African War, after his very severe wound, Frankie did a brave thing. He returned to duty on a day when the battalion was trekking through a nasty bit of the country near Vrede. After a certain amount of sniping he rode up to the second-in-command and said, ‘ My nerves are not in a fit state yet to command a Guards battalion ; please take charge. I am going back to hospital.’ This was characteristic of his great moral courage.

“ In the winter of 1912 I met Frankie in Pall Mall. I had just finished my four years in command of a battalion, and was about to retire in order to become a Master of Hounds. He walked me up and down Pall Mall for half an hour, cajoling as he could so well, and finally telling me I was a bigger fool than he thought if I persisted in leaving. I was obstinate and left, but Frankie did his best for me.

“ At Aldershot in the early nineteen hundreds Frankie was the first brigadier to take Field Training really seriously, and the Brigade of Guards owe a very great deal to his teaching.

“ Unfortunately I saw little or nothing of Frankie during the Great War, but I know that he ruled London firmly, and with tact, in those difficult times.

“ There was no better host at a dinner party, and nobody who enjoyed talking to young officers about fox hunting and field sports more than he did. He liked good food, and when I was his Mess

President in South Africa he was not easy to satisfy, but he gave me leave to go and 'get what I could find and not get shot in doing it,' so it was good fun trying to keep the commanding officer's digestion in order.

"I remember the famous Point-to-Point race between the Grenadiers and the Coldstream on the 12th of March, 1890, near Swindon, when Frankie was one of our team. None of your modern cut-fence round-a-ring steeplechases, but a real Point-to-Point. The starter said, 'You all see Swindon Steeple? Well you've got to get there. Go!'" We beat the Coldstream by twenty points, though they produced the first past the post.

"I can't remember any particular horse of Frankie's that was a very good one, but his white entire Arab pony was as well known as that of Lord Roberts.

"I am very very sorry he has gone, and I am still more sorry that he suffered so much pain. I loved him—we all loved him.

12th of March, 1926

REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, ECONOMY AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK SYKES, G.B.E., K.C.B.,
C.M.G., M.P.

THE reduction of armaments, together with the problems of Imperial foreign policy, economy and defence, is the greatest and most difficult question before the country. Hitherto the subject of academic discussion, three factors are drawing it into the light of necessity : Locarno, financial stringency, and air-power. A future war is inevitable if armaments are piled up nation against nation, and, though of small beginnings, will spread to world dimensions, effect unexampled misery, and probably destroy the civilized world. Meanwhile, the maintenance of great forces involves expenditure intolerable in the industrial struggle. Defeated disarmed nations are favoured, and successful armed nations are handicapped as trade competitors. Reasonable world opinion must understand these facts and enforce its views while yet there is time.

There have been many schemes for the furtherance of peace, but none embodying practical suggestions to overcome the immense difficulties. The Geneva Protocol, for instance, depended on securing compulsory arbitral decisions, and on enforcing them by undefined forces. Compulsory arbitration may come, but not until armaments have first been reduced. The Locarno Treaties are an advance, however, in that they are based on agreement in regard to specific regional problems. They also work with the recognition that security is a vital common interest ; they accept existing frontiers, the principle of arbitration, and the objective of an all-round reduction of armaments. This is the best attempt that has yet been made, but it has many weaknesses and lacks that definition of responsibility essential to those framing defence arrangements under its clauses.

Nor does it give any clear indication as to how arbitration can be rendered effective or what the British Empire may be called upon

to do. Clarity as to national liabilities is essential if the unity of effort of the British States, which has been the mainstay of international stability, is to continue. That unity has been based on consistency of purpose without which disintegration is inevitable. Locarno has again shown the weakness in Imperial foreign policy and defence. Isolated action in any part of the world by any individual nation of the Empire might mean disruption and disaster. If, then, we are to realize the value which every one hopes may be obtained from Locarno, it can only be by the support of a concerted Imperial mandate in foreign policy and definite steps towards disarmament.

How do matters stand ? Imperially : Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India have accepted an invitation to take part in an Imperial Conference next October ; Canada has not yet answered. Internationally ; a disarmament Conference is proposed to collect data and lay down general principles on which disarmament may be successfully based. Though the troubles at Geneva have reminded us of the difficulties of giving application to goodwill, it is still hoped that Germany will eventually be included as a member and the United States cooperate in the preliminary commission. The Soviet, but not Turkey, has also been invited to take part. German equality of representation will raise many basic difficulties, and she will be well advised not to press these at the outset, but she cannot be expected to accept a permanent subordination, and no solution seems possible without a decision as to whether she may be permitted to raise forces from her enforcedly disarmed condition, or whether those of other nations shall not be reduced to her proportions. On the other hand, the reciprocal and responsible cooperation of the United States will be valuable, for, though endeavour must primarily be directed to European difficulties, disarmament is not a problem of the Eastern hemisphere alone.

The way would, of course, be eased were France able to reduce her armaments without endangering her security, and without the pressure of financial chaos and unbalanced Socialistic measures. To the obstacle raised by French security there must be added the new Italian imperialism, and the antipathy of the Soviet to the British Empire, the League and Locarno. There are also Turkey ; and the Balkan rivalries. The Red armed forces are being strengthened and large sums spent in the endeavour to destroy internal and external peace and to instigate widespread revolutionary action. Nevertheless, the results of the preparatory Commission should be more important than anything of the sort which has yet occurred,

though, obviously, the greater its size the greater the difficulty in arriving at unanimous decisions.

But is there any practical alternative to the maintenance of crippling armaments? Can the political and technical aspects, military, financial and economic, be segregated? Or, if the problem as a whole is insoluble, what gradual steps can be taken towards its eventual attainment? We are pledged to work for a general scheme and our interests demand it. But vague theoretical suggestions would merely cloud a great ideal; and the aftermath of an abortive conference would be very disadvantageous.

Armaments exist for the preservation of internal order, the defence of dependencies, and protection from external aggression. Universal total disarmament is inconsistent with orderly Government, whether at home or in dependencies. Nor would it give freedom from external aggression. A nation's well-being may be sapped by unarmed hostile action; and, whilst international good feeling is of immense value, M. Briand's hope of "blotting out the particularism of nations" is unpractical even if it is an ideal. Membership of the League of Nations does not change national instincts, remove national interests or eliminate racial pride and traditions. Moreover, complete disarmament necessitates a universally accepted arbitral body—a condition which does not exist; and it requires a willingness to give decisions on any and every matter that may be brought before that body—a responsibility the League has avoided. Until willingness to give and to accept arbitral decisions are ensured beyond possibility of breakdown, physical forces must exist, for the moral support of the League cannot alone ensure national security.

An alternative to total national disarmament is the maintenance of an international armed force under the control of the League. Such a force would, however, require not only an impeccable justice in its employment, but a strength which would necessitate the training of its arms and the maintenances of bases, lines of communication, powers of expansion and the like throughout the world. This is impossible, and in any case, the force could not exist independently of, and leaving national independence to, the Governments of the territories it occupied. Moreover, extemporary outside control of national forces would certainly not permit the further reduction of British armaments. And, having regard to financial and industrial circumstances, the stronger nations are unlikely to secure a more pacific future if their armaments can be deployed by nations less subject to these responsibilities.

Another suggestion is that modern warlike inventions—aero-planes, tanks, submarine vessels, gas, etc.—should be abolished or vested in the League. But the limitation of particular arms could not be equally applied, for no nation would give up the form of weapon in which its requirements were most economically and efficiently met. Moreover, if nations were satisfied to leave their security to Geneva, there would be no need to develop modern armaments, and if, on the other hand, they were not so satisfied, they could not neglect any form of defence. No wars are similar except in general principles; weapons and methods change completely; and use involves preparation. Furthermore, with the exception of the submarine, these inventions are closely related to industrial products, and their manufacture is impossible to restrict, for nations could not accept a League veto over industrial research and production. International inspection composed of foreign *personnel* would, for instance, clearly be intolerable in the research and experimental departments of a manufacturing undertaking.

The proposal that the League should adopt economic force has possibilities if all the great producing nations united in employing it against a recalcitrant country. But even if the desire to impose it were universal, not all States are equally sensitive to economic pressure, and not all States exerting economic pressure would bear an equal burden. These factors are intensified when no assurance exists of complete cooperation, and, if one nation alone retained freedom of action, physical force would have to be employed in support of economic force or its effects would be lost, and an incomplete trade boycott would merely divert the advantages of trade and injure those who employed the weapon rather than those against whom it was directed.

The precedent of Washington offers little hope of reapplication. Far-reaching agreements were indeed arrived at there, but except by our own country, they have not been fulfilled. Nor are the circumstances of Geneva and Washington the same. The latter concerned the great naval Powers only. The present problem is one of all Powers, great and small: naval, military and air. And with land forces, in which mechanicalization is included in more varied and smaller units, and in air-power which is readily derived from civil sources, application of this form of restriction presents difficulties absent from the naval problem.

One is often asked why, if, internationally, the difficulties in the way of disarmament are so great, Great Britain cannot advance matters by disarming independently of other nations? The answer

is that she has already given a clear lead wherever possible. A naval standard opposed to her traditions has been accepted and acted upon; with increased responsibilities her land forces have been cut to below pre-war level; and she has reduced her air-power to an extent which leaves her fourth amongst the nations. She has, in a word, shown herself ready to take risks in a lead towards reduction of armaments; but risks can only be justified by the success of their objects. Little more can be done on the existing organization, but the proposal adds a special reason why effective but sound steps in disarmament should be adopted. A traditional feature of Conservatism is the jealousy with which it watches any interference with the machinery of national security. In such degree as considered action can be taken now, the risk of unweighed and injudicious cuts in defence forces by future governments will be reduced.

The forbidding of the private manufacture of armaments is also advocated as a step to peace: obviously, if there were no profit in war, a considerable step forward would have been taken. But, whatever its merits, it is not yet practicable. It would mean the setting up or the extension of governmental machinery for manufacture: machinery which, unable to turn readily to pacific production, would have to be maintained either uneconomically or at a certain output. It would in many cases mean the buying out of private enterprises. And in the smaller countries, dependent on foreign sources of armament supply, it would involve capital outlay in production facilities because the laws of neutrality prevent purchase from other governments in time of war. On the other hand, the growing tendency to an international grouping of resources of great commercial undertakings or of international trading agreements should be helpful where conceived and received in the right spirit, though such combinations can easily lend themselves to the appearance of a menace.

The Locarno policy, the study and solution of definite regional problems in defence, offers hope. Reduction can only be gradual, but it may be progressive if the will to disarm is applied to concrete questions and assessed accordingly. But it must be exercised with restraint. A step from which much was hoped was attempted by the League in 1921-1922, but the results were disappointing. It was to ask the nations to state their needs under preservation of order and protection from aggression, and under general and special requirements. It was thought that the way would thus be opened for considerable reductions; the armaments of any one nation

depend materially upon those of its possible enemies and the equivalent of a reduction in the forces of one country should be assessable in those of another. But it is frequently impossible for a country to state specifically why any particular force is essential. There is the danger, too, that a demand for detailed information might engender suspicion and complicate the issues: it will be very difficult to arrive at an international common denominator from statistics which embrace population and economic and industrial resources.

Of the remaining possibilities, a limitation based directly on the numbers of *personnel*, which must provide for both numbers entered annually and period of service, would necessitate a standing investigation and control that would be very irksome. It would also invite an intensification of mechanical means of slaughter and is complicated with questions of auxiliary forces.

Any limitation on financial quotas has been impossible since the war by reason of variations in rates of exchange and in *personnel* and material costs. But these are gradually becoming balanced, and herein possibly lies some opportunity for action. Difficulties in arriving at the scale upon which such national expenditures should be based must be faced, and a consideration of this aspect immediately brings to light the ease with which military expenditure can be camouflaged and the problem of defining in detail what expenditure on such matters as roads, railways, fuelling facilities and air strength is military and what is not. And, nationally, the proposal entails a joint consideration of the three arms—sea, land and air. Joint plans of defence must be considered before possible individual naval, military and air reductions can be assessed and no basis of reduction can be effected if any of these are ruled out of the scope of international discussion.

These, then, are the conclusions one reaches. Both the cry of humanity and the need for a drastic reduction in national expenditure make the reduction of armaments imperative. It must come sooner or later, and would probably come soon were a plébiscite of the civilized world to be taken and acted upon. In any case, it can only come as the result of national wills convinced of its necessity. Difficulties of practical application are great, but, though the possibilities of result may appear small, they may be made to respond to increasing international will.

The League of Nations cannot enforce disarmament in advance of public opinion. It has done a good deal in furthering pacific methods, and its success is not dependent on securing immediate

reduction in armaments. Its more immediate task is to develop the desire to disarm, to ripen public opinion and dissect and reduce the causes of international friction. Increased publicity is important. We can neither hope for that which is impracticable, nor accept the fact that the problem is so difficult that nations must and will be annihilated. And though the League could be the fount of that publicity, the nations must develop, apply and organize their internal affairs to further its objects.

Against these possibilities, however, must be recognized the danger, already partly effected, of a disunity in our Imperial foreign policy and defence. This tendency must at once be countered. A British Imperial defence scheme is the soundest policy in British interests, as a basis for an eventual reduction in armaments, and the best deterrent to war. Policy, including reduction of armaments, and defence measures must go hand in hand, and in this country policy and defence must be Imperial policy and Imperial defence ; which again must both be based on concrete plans and control.

This necessitates a re-examination and a re-welding of Imperial foreign policy, and a reform and simplification of the present machinery of Imperial defence. There must be recognition that, whilst a stabilizing of unity in Imperial foreign policy presents great difficulties, yet lack of policy to work upon has always been a service obstacle ; with a resultant inadequacy or unnecessary margin of force. The detail of necessary defensive measures is, of course, a matter for experts, but experts can do little without a policy to work to, and this policy must be based on public opinion. Nevertheless, the Service departments in their own and national interests, must make a very serious direct effort to utilize the present opportunity for a considered reduction under a Government given to more careful weighing of future effects in national security than any alternative administration.

Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the varying points of view of all the units of the Empire in framing Empire policy, and there must be coordination, not only between the three fighting Services, but between different parts of the Empire if it is to remain one of the soundest world guarantees of peace. To effect this there must be an established machinery for systematic and continuous review in place of the present spasmodic reference to the Dominions. And the financial condition of the country makes it equally necessary to turn to the machinery of defence and to see if and how it can be reduced in size and cost, and increased in efficiency.

The third important factor is that the advent and growth of air-

power have effected a revolution in the relations of land and sea forces which involves the necessity for an increased cohesion in the planning of defence. While formerly the Services could be segregated with a small degree of coordination, now neither Navy nor Army is self-dependent: neither source can operate without integral air units and in an extended use of air units exists a great opportunity for their tactical development. Furthermore, navies and armies can now be attacked at their bases, at the industrial source of their supplies, and at the civil moral sense which sustains them in war; and air attack may descend from a single enemy source on naval, military, air and civilian targets alike. It can only be countered by strategic air action, defensive or offensive, and strategic air-power, therefore, is essential to defence.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that air-power has not made sea or land-power obsolete. Sea communications are of the first importance to the Empire, and the Navy alone for a long while yet can secure them. The Army remains the holding force, and its protection of the bases of the Royal Air Force is the bedrock of fighting aerial strength. The three arms are inter-related and inter-dependent, and it follows that an assessment of *minima* defence requirements involves a conjoint consideration of sea, land and air forces.

The sources of saving in this year's Estimates emphasize the inadequacy of our present machinery for balancing the three arms. While the Admiralty's economies are largely those of administration, those of the Air Ministry are confined to a specific fighting strength or development services, such as the retarding of the re-expansion scheme and the delay in airship development. Yet, in fact, extravagance in administration is the less active in the Navy, and the need of development the greater in the Air Force.

Whether to assist the reduction of armaments in the future, or to reduce expenditure in the present, what is undoubtedly necessary for the avoidance of triplicated margins and efforts in defence, is the setting up of a permanent machinery adequate for the continuous study, review and realignment of the arms of defence as a whole in consonance with the armaments of other Powers, and with the needs and resources of the Empire. Neither past nor present systems meet these requirements. The organization, a Navy and an Army each controlling its own Royal Flying Corps wing, under which military air-power made its initial development, broke down: partly owing to the weakness inherent in duplicated and competitive organizations, but in greater degree because it failed to envisage

and utilize the power of independent air action in attack and defence.

The organization which took its place, evolved during the war, was based on triple control. It was continued after the war with one important alteration : the single-minded purpose of a War Cabinet was no longer directed to compounding its efforts. The system has since had time to show its merits and to consolidate its demerits. It recognizes the necessity for strategic air-power, and it concentrates research and experimental effort and allies it to operation. On the other hand, there is much triplicated expenditure ; there is dissatisfaction in the Army, no less than in the Navy, as to the way in which its tactical air needs are met, and there is a lack of development in the tactical employment of aircraft in the senior Services. In an effort to compete with the older Services, the appurtenances of military power have been established by the Air Ministry at the cost of air development and an excessive proportion of air funds are devoted to purely ground services. Advance in commercial flying, whether for its own undoubted Imperial value, or as the only economic and sound basis of military reserve, and outlet for trained time-expired *personnel*, is stagnant. And the three Services work under different disciplinary codes, and on conceptions of defence possibilities which are directly antagonistic and subversive of cooperation. Controlling personalities may accentuate these differences, but no change, merely of chiefs, could eradicate them.

How, then, can the defects of these past and present systems be eliminated and greater efficiency per head and per pound be attained ? The objectives of a reformed organization must be : to maintain Imperial security with a minimum of armament and with a capability of scientific reduction or expansion in response to the movement of foreign arms ; and to achieve that purpose with the utmost economy. The possible alternatives include a continuance, with a realignment of duties, of a three-department system ; a return, with modification in the light of experience, to a two-department system ; the addition to the present three departments of a fourth, coordinating and advising ; and the merging of the three departments into a triple-branched combination under a single control.

The first of these envisages the Navy and Army controlling their own tactical air units, and an Air Ministry responsible for developing strategic air-power, and for all aerial supply, research, and civil development. The limited advantages of this system in fulfilling the tactical requirements of the Navy and Army are apparent.

But it offers no economy ; it would hinder the technical development of naval and military aircraft by separating the user and the producer ; it would do nothing to rectify the present inadequate development of flying ability ; it would increase rather than mitigate the Air Ministry's proportion of ground to air expenditure, and would fail to advance a common point of view and a strategic cooperation in defence. The adoption of this alternative would, in fact, merely crystallize existing evils.

For a two-department system, if, as one must, one provides for the exercise of strategic air-power, there are two suggestions. The first is that the Navy and Army should each control their own tactical units and one or the other take over the remaining Air Ministry responsibilities. This arrangement would either duplicate services, such as research, or divorce one of the users from those services. But more serious would be its effects on strategic air action. This, as I have shown, is a matter of equal moment to the Navy and Army, and as it may be necessary to employ it in conjunction with either naval or military operations, the control of strategic power by one department to the exclusion of the other would be a source of constant irritation. Again, the senior Services think that the Air Ministry is inculcating unsound doctrines in regard to the degree of necessity for naval and military action. On the other hand—schooled in a primary objective of destroying opposed military forces—the Army or Navy would tend to the error of attaching insufficient importance to the new power of independent attack. The neglect of this power, and its diversion to purely tactical needs, before and during the formation of the striking Air Force in 1918, supports this view.

Nor is the alternative two-department suggestion possible. This comprises a return to naval and military control of tactical air functions with the addition of both the Navy and the Army conducting strategic air operations. The objections to this organization which previously caused its abandonment still apply. It reinstates the danger of neglect of strategic air action. In addition, undefined dual control of this power would clearly be both uneconomic and inefficient, and to define spheres of its operation by separate departments would be quite impossible.

Clearly, the above alternatives, while disrupting the present system, would fail to achieve the material improvement essential to efficiency and economy. Another suggestion has been that a four-department system should be formed by the addition to the three existing departments of an independent, purely coordinating

authority. This exists, in some degree, at present in the Salisbury Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, but it has been able to do little to eradicate the defects of triple control. Its functions are largely those of arbitration where amalgamation is what is required. Each of its professional advisers is concerned in supporting the claims of his own arm and comparatively indifferent to those of the other arms : unless they clash with his own. When they do so clash, there is a tendency to avoid issues. The proposal is also open to the objection that an exceptional personality as head of the Admiralty, War Office or Air Ministry, would manage to get his department strengthened at the expense of one, or both of the others.

The position would certainly be somewhat improved by the addition to the Committee of Imperial Defence of a permanent professional combined General Staff. But experience of the Supreme War Council at Versailles in 1917-1918, and of other advisory bodies, demonstrates the fact that responsibility, to be effective, must be accompanied by control. And control cannot be divided between a General Staff and individual Service boards. The members of such a staff would inevitably tend to become little more than liaison officers ; as such of some value, but in a very limited sphere. This applies equally to any arrangement, desirable as it would be in theory, under which Chiefs of Staff accepted responsibility for the Estimates of other departments. The responsibility could only be purely nominal : those who exercised it would not have the specialist education necessary for criticism, they would not have opportunity of full investigation, and they would lack executive force.

Nor would it be possible, with three separate controlling bodies, satisfactorily to unify the present triplicated administrative services. Even services with objectives presumably so single-minded as those of chaplains are not deemed capable of amalgamation under such conditions. In short, then, what may be called coordinating schemes without unity of purpose and control could only effect a small degree of possible financial saving and of cooperation.

We reach, therefore, two conclusions : first, that both the limitation of armaments, and the reduction in the cost of maintaining them, call for a scientific re-assessment of defence liabilities, a revision of the existing machinery for devising and maintaining unity in Imperial foreign and defence policies, and a reformation of our present defence organization. And, second, that with one exception, alternatives to the present machinery could do no more

than mitigate individual defects while creating fresh difficulties or deficiencies.

The exception is an organization designed to provide a unified consideration and application of defence policy, under a single control, and closely correlated with foreign policy. This system, as compared with the existing advisory functions of the Committee of Imperial Defence, involves the destruction of the breeding-ground of disintegrating factors instead of swotting them after they have become individually intolerable. If this can be done without jeopardizing the power of any of the three arms, it would clearly be the means of securing the greatest reduction of expenditure and the closest copartnership in defence. It would also secure, by the simplest and the most effective means, the representation of Dominion views in the framing of defence policy and Dominion cooperation in its administration.

The pivot of this ideal is a homogeneous body able to frame defence policy and to enforce it. Such a change would certainly involve a considerable dislocation of existing interests. It could be brought into being only after careful preparation as regards material things and, as regards frames of mind, by means which mitigate the differences of thought which have grown up between the Services and are the cause of much that is unsatisfactory in present defence arrangements.

Schemes for a single Defence Ministry have been criticized on various grounds. One is the weight of responsibility which would be placed on the minister. Difficulties of management or control, however, depend, not on the numbers employed, but on the simplicity and the efficiency of the administrative machinery. It is the Prime Minister who, by virtue of his full knowledge and responsibility on the innumerable subjects which effect the drawing up of policy, would clearly have to control the organization. But, as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, his responsibility for the three arms exists at present, and with efficient, simplified machinery, his control would be facilitated rather than hindered. A second objection is that the power of the responsible minister would be too great. But it cannot be contemplated that, in this country in the twentieth century, the control of military forces would be used as a weapon of political strength; and if it means that the bulk expenditure would give an undue weight in Cabinet Councils, it should be noted that, except where Service interests are definitely antagonistic, it is almost invariable for Navy, Army and Air ministers to support each other in the Cabinet.

Another criticism is that a unification of the fighting departments, however desirable, is impracticable owing to the radical nature of the change and the vested interests which would be opposed to it. To this the answer is that past and present schemes have failed ; that it offers the only remaining opportunity for real improvement ; that the necessity for national economy, on the one hand, and the international will to organize for peace, on the other, give it impetus ; and, finally, unless it is done, the national defences will become ineffective, or the burden on the national exchequer unbearable. And if the opportunity to remodel and reduce is not taken now, there can be no doubt that those who obstruct reformation will find even the Service interests they seek to safeguard decimated by the less considered action of future Governments.

The objection recently raised by the Secretary of State for Air, that of the incompatibility of views in the *personnel* of the three arms, is clearly a ground, not for continuing present conditions, but for reforming them. The *personnel* difficulty is admittedly serious. It is, indeed, the key to success in any re-organization. But the difficulty is not insuperable, nor does it depend on the selection of supermen ; its solution lies in the education of suitable senior officers of the three arms for a supreme joint-policy staff, and while this is progressing, there are preliminary steps in organization which can be made. Procedure would follow these lines :—

First, the institution of an embryonic defence staff manned by officers of the three arms (and providing for Dominion representation) organized in sections dealing with the customary staff duties, such as Operations, Intelligence, War Organization, etc., and assisted by an attached advisory finance staff. This would be independent of Admiralty, War Office or Air Ministry control, and would operate under the Prime Minister who would be assisted by a deputy of Cabinet status, such as the Lord President of the Council. The chief of this preliminary staff, the heads of sections, and the subordinate staff would, of necessity, be chosen in the first place from *personnel* who, in addition to ordinary staff capabilities, had the greatest possible breadth of recent practical experience of the three arms, and the capacity and will to apply it.

The second stage would operate under their control. It would consist, on the one hand, of the institution of a Joint Staff College, and the graduation thereat of suitable officers in defence subjects as a whole, as distinct from individual naval, military and air subjects, and upon a syllabus designed expressly to develop fitness for duty on the unified defence staff. On the other hand, it would comprise

the collection of data and a preparation of preliminary plans for coalescing defence services.

On the completion of the first course at the Joint Staff College, the first supreme executive defence staff would be formed by selection from those who had passed the course, and others who had served on the staff in its embryonic stage. This strengthened staff would carry out the third stage ; the completion, independent of the existing Service departments, of progressive schemes of defence based on Imperial requirements and resources and available for general international reduction of armaments ; of plans for carrying out those schemes under a homogeneous control and administration ; of schemes for consolidation of services now triplicated and for the abolition of obsolete and redundant establishments.

There would follow the abolition of the naval, military and air policy staffs, and the taking over of their responsibilities by the defence staff, the enactment of the latter's schemes under their direction, the administration of responsibilities in *personnel*, material, etc., each under a single direction for the three Services ; and the institution of a Defence Council consisting of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Minister and three or four Parliamentary Assistant Ministers, the Chief of Staff and the heads of the administrative services, each one of whom, again, would be responsible within the particular sphere of his duties, for all the three arms.

A process such as the above would create an independent, knowledgeable body with a definite objective of cooperation in defence, and with a reduced interest in the aggrandizement of the individual arms of its members. The preparatory nature of its initial work would allow opportunity for a careful selection of the first executive general staff upon whose whole-hearted belief in the scheme and its objects a great deal would depend. It provides for its definite objectives by considered steps, it avoids the dangers of dual control and of hiatus in control at every stage in which its effects are being achieved, and it offers an alternative to reductions in costs imposed irrespective of efficiency, or indeed, of real economy : a danger increased by Locarno and by present national economic conditions.

This scheme is the one which gives the maximum simplicity in organization and the maximum saving in expenditure ; which gives the greatest opportunity for research and experiment ; and which gives the maximum degree of cooperative effort humanly possible. Not least amongst its merits is that it would go part way to solve the difficulty of a unified Imperial foreign policy by providing continuity of review of Imperial foreign and defence policies.

To summarize : a study of the situation leads to the following conclusions :

That the Locarno Treaties, which in themselves constituted a certain step towards peace, involve certain risks and can only be satisfactorily sealed by an international reduction of armaments.

That of the many proposed systems of applying disarmament those to which further effort should be applied are the international solution of problems of security in defined areas and limitation of national expenditures on defence. In both, however, the difficulties are considerable.

That the recent trend of our foreign policy weakens the links in Imperial foreign policy, and that it is necessary to unify it, both in its broad principles and upon specific issues, and to set up a standing machinery for its maintenance.

That this must be accompanied by a unification of Imperial defence policy on its broad lines and upon the same specific issues, and that this, in turn, demands a revision of existing machinery.

That Imperial unity in foreign policy would be assisted, and unity in defence secured, by a supreme defence staff with executive powers, acting directly under the Prime Minister.

That the full effects of such a staff can only be reached gradually and by a process of education, but from the outset its concrete objective must be the consolidation and combination of the three arms of Imperial defence ; ensuring Imperial security with minima forces and at the lowest possible cost.

That, to this end, the supreme staff would prepare draft plans in regard to the three arms on a reduced basis as a lead for reciprocal international action ; and after due preparation would establish : first, an organization which would take over and unify staff duties (Intelligence, Operations, etc.) now carried out by each of the three Services ; second, a similar organization for the control of administrative services (*Personnel*, *Material*, etc.)—the heads of these sections forming, with the chief of the supreme staff and Parliamentary representatives, the defence council of a Ministry of Defence.

The opportunity to utilize the anticipated ten years' peace after the Armistice for reorganization, and consolidation, and for research and experiment, was neglected and the delay has intensified the difficulties. On the other hand, the necessity has grown and the

impetus to act has been increased. These and a recognition of the future horrors of war are the moving causes towards the greatest undertaking to which man can put his hand : the next few years will undoubtedly witness a great change, and, if unity of Imperial purpose and unity in the arms of defence are achieved, economy, efficiency, and the advancement of peace and security will be the reward.

A REPUBLIC IN THE MAKING *

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL C. B. THACKERAY, D.S.O., R.A.

Mustapha Kemal and the Assembly.—The personality of Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha is the outstanding feature of the New Turkey. He has been throughout, and is still, the moving spirit of the successive revolutionary movements. His is the will, the brain and the hand. The common comparison with Napoleon is too trite and obvious. He has certainly given proof of military skill of a high order, great organizing ability and a remarkable grasp of civil administration—qualities which he combines with a powerful and impelling personality. But it remains to be seen whether he has the supreme genius of a Bonaparte, and is capable of carrying his reforms through to their conclusion ; or whether he will, early in his career, meet the same fate as many other dictators. He has great tact and an unobtrusive firmness that have stood him in good stead, and he has also shown that he knows how to strike—swiftly and surely.

The Turkish nation is mainly represented in its Parliament at Angora by a number of deputies who have, to all intents and purposes been selected by the Government—that is, by Mustapha Kemal—although they are ostensibly nominated and elected by the people. The stock argument of the reformers is, that the people

* France is one of the three greatest Mahomedan Powers, the others being Great Britain and Turkey. The views of our Ally on near Eastern problems have, therefore, especial interest. The present writer has to acknowledge his indebtedness to many valuable French sources of information, in particular to an admirable series of articles that have appeared from time to time in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, in which M. Maurice Pernot has given a comprehensive and statesman-like review of conditions in Turkey.

M. Pernot's judicial and not unfriendly attitude towards Great Britain is in marked contrast to that of some French writers. M. George Gaulés, for instance, attributes the anti-foreign Turkish Nationalism to British perfidy, and represents France as playing the part of the credulous and unsuspecting simpleton. He has harrowing tales of the intrigues of British officials, from the highest to the lowest, "men of mediocre intelligence and very doubtful integrity." Happily anti-British diatribes of this kind are now on the wane. The appointment of M. de Jouvenel to Syria is of good augury, and the utterances of Marshal Lyautey and General Weygand more than outweigh the hostility of men like M. François Bouillon.

have not yet sufficient secular or political education to exercise the vote with discrimination. The Pasha made his choice mainly among the young intellectuals, with the deliberate intention of introducing a more capable and better instructed element into the Assembly, and of raising the social and intellectual level of the national representation. The result is that until lately there has been no opposition worthy of the name. Its absence is a source of weakness to the Government. Electoral struggles, such as they are, are between two parties, of which one, so to say, has the right to speak, the other to be silent.

The Grand National Assembly nominally holds all power, executive and legislative. It delights in calling itself the veritable incarnation of the national spirit, the soul of Turkey. Kemal has, with consummate skill and tact, left it, on the whole, with this comfortable impression. But all office-holders are, in effect, his nominees. The country lacks the corps of experienced servants, regularly and well paid, which is needed for an efficient administration. An honest *vali* is a rare phenomenon, and he suffers for his honesty. But all this is not realized by the population, which at present is content with the two inestimable benefits which have been conferred upon it—comparative peace and demobilization. There is one thing, however, that may still have to be reckoned with—the eventual disillusionment, and possible resentment, of a people to whom all has been promised and very little given.

Many of the changes, for instance the overthrow of the Sultan-Caliph, have done violence to Turkish sentiment and tradition. There may yet well be some latent hope of a monarchic restoration, if not of an Islamic revival. In fact, Turkey is still far removed from a Republican *régime* or a democratic government in the Western sense. The authority of Mustapha Kemal, discreet but absolute, was, until lately, unquestioned. Under these conditions it matters little that the Turkish State has ceased to be a Monarchy in order to become a Republic, almost at Kemal's dictation. For the manner of its declaration was, put briefly, as follows. Owing to some indiscreet revelation of a journalist, a debate on the question was precipitated in the Assembly. The President of the Chamber sent hurriedly for Kemal, who, at once, speaking from his place, said simply, "Turkey must be a Republic." The matter was ended, and Kemal was speedily elected President of the Republic. He was already President of the Assembly, an office which he was loth to resign. But his position is consolidated by a convenient clause in the Constitution, which empowers the President to preside

on critical occasions both over the Assembly and the Cabinet. The Ghazi is also head of the Popular Republican Party, an anomalous and much criticized position for a Constitutional President.

His power as President is almost autocratic. Sir Henry Maine wrote that, whilst the King of England reigned without governing, and the President of the United States governed without reigning, it had been left to the Third French Republic to invent a President who neither governed nor reigned. But the new Turkish Republic has rounded off the epigram by creating a President who both reigns and governs. His supremacy has now been challenged.

Eighteen months ago a new Party sprang up, with responsible leaders. The principal plank in its programme was an attack on the constitutionalism of the Government. The wind was to some extent, however, taken out of its sails by Kemal, who appropriated, on behalf of his own Party, a second epithet, "Republican," which the new Party had intended to assume; whilst the Government's line of attack against the seceding deputies, who were stigmatized as reactionaries, was an assault upon their republicanism. The Ghazi thus showed his political generalship by carrying the war into the enemy's camp. The first exchange of shots was mainly in the nature of personalities. The embryo opposition hotly defended its loyalty to the Constitution, and declared that the existing artificial system was a parody of true national sovereignty, and, in practice, nothing but a thinly disguised oligarchy. It is significant that the revolt had its focus in Constantinople, whose four deputies formed the nucleus of the new Party—a distinguished quartette, including General Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha and two ex-Premiers—and the Constantinople Press plucked up courage to support them stoutly. The Angora republicans may yet have cause to regret their contemptuous attitude towards Constantinople.

Mustapha Kemal threw down the gauntlet in certain fiery speeches, declaring that his Party alone embodies the true republican spirit of intellectual and social progress, and that the formation of other parties must be adjourned until the Republic rests upon a surer foundation. It was at about this date that the Kurdish insurrection broke out. Military measures were taken on a large scale. Angora was thoroughly roused. Fethi's cabinet fell. Out of the welter the Ghazi, "the Ever Victorious," emerged triumphant. Certain humorously styled "tranquillity laws" were quickly put through, perhaps so-called because they enacted that a number of civil offences, which might disturb the tranquillity of the President and his Government, became treasonable.

The present situation is interesting, and it remains to be seen how long the President will be able to hold his own. The abortive Opposition seems to have been constitutional, non-reactionary, and loyal to the Ghazi, so long as he refrained from playing the joint rôle of Party leader and President.

Is Mustapha Kemal right? There would already appear to be too strong a tendency among the new Turks to force the pace. A wise and tempered despotism may be in the best interests of the people themselves. The real significance of the opposition movement lay in the revolt against the personal ascendancy of Kemal. Already, to his chagrin, the veto and the power of dissolution have been denied to him.

Lausanne and Western Tendencies.—The Treaty of Lausanne had a most profound effect upon Turkish opinion. It caused the Turks to alter their whole attitude both at home and abroad. The Treaty was regarded as the most decisive and brilliant of victories, more important and far-reaching in its effects than a victorious ending to the Great War. Ismet Pasha, now Premier for the third time, on his return in 1923 was hailed hysterically as the "Victor of Lausanne," the hero who had made the will of Turkey prevail over the united forces of Europe. The nation felt that for the first time it had been treated as an equal, and the result has been to encourage the Turkish people to take up an intransigent attitude in their international relations. They forget that at Lausanne a war-weary Europe, beset with internal differences and external jealousies, would not set herself whole-heartedly to the task of putting them in their place and keeping them there.

The Greek mandate in Smyrna in 1919, followed by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, with its wholly pro-Hellenic bias, were the most disastrous blunders that have ever been perpetrated in the Near East. The natural and inevitable consequence was the Greek débacle and Lausanne.

In the view of Mustapha Kemal, the whole tendency of modern Turkey is towards the West, where the true lessons of civilization are to be learnt. Her national consciousness has been born of contact with the West. In his own words, "If our bodies are in the East, yet in spirit we look westward. We aspire to modernize our country." All serious thinkers and statesmen, including even the ultra-national Turks, concede that reform must be on Western lines, with little or no admixture of Oriental sentiment. They admit that they cannot restore and organize their country by themselves. They need foreign capital and foreign expert assistance. They

invite this assistance, but they hamper their appeal by limiting freedom of action, and imposing restrictions and "discipline," in order, as they say, to remain masters in their own house. They fondly believe that after some ten or fifteen years of this *régime* Turkey will be sufficiently trained and educated entirely to manage her own affairs. It is an optimistic view.

M. Pernot draws attention to the inherent antagonism of the two tendencies : on the one side, a sincere desire to open the country to civilization and progress ; on the other, a restless jealousy, pre-occupied with preserving intact political and economic independence—in short, all that is Turk, from the riches of the soil to the original traits of the national character. He thinks that this antagonism between energies and sentiment can be reconciled. But for the moment sentimental factors carry the day, and there is no equilibrium.

Another distinguished French writer, M. Henry Bidou, in the *Figaro*, takes a very different and less charitable view, *à propos* the unjustifiable and cruel treatment by the Turks of the Greeks still remaining in Constantinople.

"France makes a great mistake if she thinks that the new masters of Turkey will found a State on a western model in Anatolia. . . . The new Turkey is a needy, ambitious and unscrupulous State. She seizes all that falls into her hands : ecclesiastical property, Greek property, the property of the Imperial family. The spirit of the old conquerors is revived."

Kemal and the more enlightened of his associates will do well to remember that French and British opinion, which is beginning to find common ground in regard to their Mahomedan possessions, is waiting for this ideal State to justify its ideals by its actions.

Mosul and the Fighting Forces of Turkey.—The Mosul question, vital as it seems, is but an indication of Turkish aspirations and Turkish diplomatic methods. The Turkish stand for Mosul is not made, as Mr. Dudley Heathcote has pointed out, on ethnographical, nor yet economic, nor even sentimental grounds. It is based on the underlying principle that is at the root of all post-war peace-making, a strategic principle—security. The possession of Mosul will give the control of all the Kurdish tribes and overawe the whole province. Incidentally, it is a step on the way to the recovery of Iraq, and through the oil-fields, a menace not only to India, but to the British Empire. The word "Oil" is suspect nowadays. But, nevertheless, it is not merely an equivalent for Mammon, as some people think. Oil is fast becoming the life-blood that runs in the veins of industrial and maritime nations.

Turkey covets it less for herself than to cut off this supply from others, at its source. Has she a greater right to it than any other nation?

However that may be, Turkey desires, and Kemal means, to recover Iraq, beginning with Mosul, if he can. He has talked so big that he would appear to be bound to make the attempt, in order to save his face before the Turkish people. He would probably be glad to find a peaceful way out of the *impasse*, without too much loss of prestige. He knows that the Turkish Army is a good one. He spends on it every penny he has, or has not, to spare, out of his depleted Treasury. But he knows perfectly well that his troops could not force a military decision in a month or two, and that Turkey could not finance a war for longer. Every Turkish move is about three-quarters bluff and one-quarter stuff. It was a Turkish statesman who said, "The greater the man, the greater the liar." Are we going to "see" this Turkish bluff? The President is an astute statesman and a good general. He "banks" on the ever-increasing aversion of European Powers to fighting. Encouraged by Lausanne, he realizes that truculence wins diplomatic victories. He is ready to disregard agreements—mere scraps of paper—and to flout any decision of the League of Nations, up to a certain point. For every Poker player must have some limit to his bluff. Irremediable disaster is the alternative.

It is important to bear in mind that Mustapha Kemal is, *au fond*, not so sure of his position that he can afford to put aside the possibility of meeting the same fate as many another Turkish potentate. He has smothered, but not quite killed, opposition. He has his enemies. His best way is to entrench himself securely, and not to invite possible disaster, by any reckless or adventurous move, that might bring about his fall.

Particulars regarding the Turkish forces are jealously guarded. Military and naval emissaries of foreign Powers are not *bien vus* at Angora. At the Armistice, the Turkish forces were said to number 400,000, together with 130,000 prisoners of war and 52,000 armed *gendarmes*. But these figures were purposely exaggerated. The Great War left the Army completely disorganized, with the notable exception of the Ninth Caucasian Army, which was actually never defeated. This body supplied the nucleus of the new armies, and its influence and traditions still permeate them. The Turkish Army was reformed between 1919 and 1922, then numbering some 200,000, and was demobilized and placed on a peace footing at the end of 1924. It is now about 118,000 strong, and comprises 18

infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions, organized in 9 army corps, reasonably well found. There are nominally two classes of conscripts, but the whole machinery of calling up recruits is out of gear, owing to the complications ensuing on the successive wars.

The Turkish Navy is insignificant as a fighting force. It is understood to contain some 21 antiquated vessels, consisting of the pre-war German *Goeben*, now *Yavuz Sultan Selim II.*, of 22,500 tons, with ten 11-inch guns, a mere hulk, with unrepaired boilers and large holes in her hull; one old battleship, now a training ship, of 9,900 tons; 2 light 1903 cruisers; 8 gunboats of 400 to 1,000 tons, 3 destroyers and 6 torpedo boats, built between 1901 and 1907. The new naval base has been transferred from the Golden Horn to Ismid. There are no funds for repairs or new construction, though there was lately much talk of tenders invited from British and German firms, and said to have been given to the latter, for the repair of the *Sultan Selim II.* There are rumours of a Japanese mission to reorganize the fleet.

The Air Force is negligible. There are few pilots or mechanics, and those they have are bad. The intrepidity of the airmen does not make up for their inefficiency. The Turks have never shown any aptitude for the air.

Turks are, of course, of the best fighting material when well led. The stand against, and final victory over, the Greeks, with a hastily raised and badly equipped army, was a triumph of military skill and patriotic effort. Ordnance and transport were improvised, the women taking their part, in the corner of Anatolia left unoccupied by the Greeks and Allies, though cut off from the capital and from all seas, except the Black Sea. The Turkish cavalry did particularly good work against the Greek communications, and its action led in great measure to the débacle of the Greek retreat. We are inclined to forget that the Greeks were no mean foes. They fought very well in the earlier campaign, and their final rout was mainly due to political causes. But even so, some Greek divisions fought well and stubbornly.

The Turkish Army is an army of veterans, tried in continuous campaigns during more than a quarter of a century, the Great War being merely a major incident. Ever since the Armistice it has been engaged in external and internal wars against Greeks, Armenians, Kurds and various frontier nations and tribes. It is a fine instrument of war. But it is unlikely that this instrument will again be used voluntarily, in the near future, against a Great Power.

It is questionable whether Constantinople, that is to say, the

Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, will remain the key of the strategical and political position in any future struggle with a European Power. The Straits are demilitarized under the Treaty of Lausanne, whatever that may be worth. As Turkey has so small and inefficient a navy, she is, if not at the mercy of the big fleets, at any rate very vulnerable from the sea. But a naval blockade of the Turkish littoral, from and including the Black Sea to the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean, would be hazardous and difficult for any Power not holding the Asiatic hinterland of the Straits. In any case, blockade would be bound to be incomplete.

Pan-Turkism.—At Angora, anti-clericalism denotes progress, and monarchy and autocracy are looked upon as the last derisory vestiges of vanished or vanishing civilizations. What was the dynasty? Why, no Turkish woman had ever reigned as Sultana in an Imperial harem—so how much of Turkish blood can flow in the veins of the later princes? It was the same with the Government. Hardly a Turk figures in the long succession of Grand Viziers, who for centuries have been Arabs, Scythians, Albanians, Bulgars, Circassians, often slaves or the sons of slaves. The Sultan, his Court, and his ministers at Constantinople knew little or nothing of Asia, or even of the Turks. Under the Osmanlis the poor Turkish peasant had been oppressed and maltreated by inhuman and avaricious masters, who only turned to him to demand his money or his blood. The people now see before them the hope of a better lot, and the past has left them no regrets. So thinks the school of modern Turks, which has spent its youth in Russian colleges and French universities, fought alongside the Germans, travelled in America and England, and frequented the “salons” of progressive ladies in many countries.

The New Turkey undoubtedly draws its inspiration from the liberal traditions of the West, rather than from the example of the French Revolution of 1789, or the demagogic Russian terrorism of 1917. Her course is tempered accordingly. Most revolutions are a more or less violent reaction against existing or imaginary evils. Their full effect cannot be seen for a generation or two. Steam must be let off, or there will be an explosion. In Turkey it takes the form of an outburst of Chauvinism—an excellent safety-valve, far less dangerous than any inter-nationalism.

For Nationalism runs riot at Angora. “We were but Mussulmans, now we are Turks.” “Turkey for the Turks.” The war cry of the Turkish National Pact was “*L'Empire ottoman est mort. Vive la Turquie.*” Pan-Islamism, and pan-Turanianism have

merely a moral value as stimulants. As long ago as 1897 Marshal von der Goltz, the head of the German military mission, wrote in favour of "pan-Ottomanism" in opposition to the system of Abdul Hamid, who held that Turks were firstly Mussulman, and Ottoman only secondarily. (The term "Ottoman" includes not only Turks, but Turkish subjects of all races.) The Sultan valued his own title of Commander of the Faithful more than that of Sovereign of the Osmanlis, in the cynical belief that, of the two, it was the more powerful political instrument in his hands. Von der Goltz's pan-Ottomanism was adopted by Enver and the men of the Union and Progress. But the geographical and ethnical break-up of the Turkish Empire has caused a pan-Turkish to succeed a pan-Ottoman theory. By a decree of the Assembly Turks are no longer to call themselves Ottomans.

In the economic sphere, hitherto abandoned to non-Mussulman minorities, Jews, Greeks, Armenians, the Government is determined to substitute an entirely Turkish *personnel*. This policy is being rushed with imprudent haste. It cannot be too often reiterated that soldiers, farmers and State functionaries cannot convert themselves into industrial and commercial experts at the nod of a few deputies at Angora. Yet it is fine and stimulating to note the pathetic faith in the Turkish people that inspires these ambitious programmes. It is based on the splendid effort, the unstinting self-sacrifice and versatile ingenuity, displayed by the Anatolians during the Greek campaign. But there is a great difference between this special effort in a national emergency for a particular purpose, and the replacement of all foreign labour, in order, as Ismet Pasha has vowed, to render Turkey entirely self-sufficient. M. Pernot says :

"Outside the Army there are few men capable of conducting an industrial enterprise of any importance ; and the first desire of these men is to leave the Army and Government service, in order to enter that of some foreign firm. The Government of Angora has seriously compromised the economic future of the country, in obliging these firms to employ an exclusively Turkish *personnel*." *

Foreign Trade and Turkish Justice.—Mustapha Kemal Pasha regards the abolition of the Capitulations as his greatest victory, "the most precious result of our efforts." It consummated his ideal of a sovereign independence, and equality of rights with other

* The exigences of space forbid the discussion of many important matters which should be included within the scope of this article. The attitude of the State towards such matters as Education, Islam, and the placing of the capital at Angora is governed by the same uncompromising Nationalism.

nations. In this he perhaps forgets that in return, other nations have a right to expect the same just treatment, which was, in reasonable measure, safeguarded under the Capitulations. Turkey wishes to live on good terms with all the world. With the Mussulman States of Central Asia, her relations are sentimental and religious rather than political or economic. With regard to other countries, the Pasha is optimistic, and thinks that outstanding differences are only matters of adjustment. His observations about Russia are interesting. The obstacle to the close friendship which he desires is the campaign of Bolshevik propaganda, which his Government, in common with those of Europe, is determined to resist, and which has no chance of success in Turkey. He disclaims any hostility towards foreigners. Xenophobia, he says, only exists in Turkey in the sense of a horror of any possible meddling with her dearly won independence, externally or internally.

All foreign influence is suspect. There is no sympathy with England at Angora, and the traditional friendship between the two countries is a thing of the past. The Turks have been disillusioned, and no longer look upon the Englishman as, *par excellence*, a gentleman in war as in peace. This idea appears to be based on our indefensible treatment of certain influential political prisoners at Malta after the war, including, unfortunately, some who, though well disposed to England, were kept herded together with common criminals. But the less the Turks say about prisoners of war the better. Recriminations over the war do no one any good. The 130,000 prisoners of war were, on their return, enthusiastic over their treatment by us. Our vacillating policy since the Armistice is another and more real grievance. The British Government of the day, in violent opposition to expert opinion on the spot, as well as to public feeling at home, played, and lost, the Greek card. Since then the new Turkey mistrusts our olive branches. Judging by the available trade returns, Italy has within a year or two overtaken Great Britain as Turkey's best customer, and is forging ahead, whilst Great Britain has lost ground, and for the first time takes an inferior place. The difference is sensational and disquieting. Many orders go to German and Mid-European firms. Unlike the Western Powers, Germany has ceased to be suspected of land-grabbing propensities. The inefficiency of the inter-Allied civil control of Constantinople during the occupation, in contrast with the German, is another cause of our loss of prestige.

The condition and treatment of foreigners in Turkey has undergone a complete change. Whilst the Capitulations, which protected them, have been abolished, the new Civil Code, so long laboured at, is not yet completed. The reformers claim that in a year or two Turkey will have the most perfect system of laws in the world, giving complete protection for the rights of foreign nationals. In the meantime European jurists, with, as it were, watching briefs, have been imported in a purely consultative capacity. It may be noted that, internally, there is one good result of the new Turkish rule. Brigandage, which was formerly endemic, has almost ceased.

For the moment, however, the civil, legal, and fiscal position of a foreigner in Turkey is unfavourable. The European negotiators at Lausanne were hoodwinked by the Turkish parade of good intentions. The sovereign power of the new Government may be well intentioned. But it will not be able to guarantee perfect justice until it has suppressed old abuses, which are the legacy of centuries of cynical misuse of power. No friend of Turkey can overlook the fact that in one respect—the brutal treatment of minorities—her conduct is far removed from the standards of humanity and morality of civilized nations. Massacres and atrocities still go unrepudiated and unpunished.

Foreign Contracts and Reconstruction.—The Americans were not slow to take advantage of their privileged position as the principal neutral country in the war with Turkey. The first step was to consolidate themselves as the special technical advisers of the new Republic, and to inaugurate certain vast commercial undertakings, of which the Chester Convention, gigantic as it was, was but an incident. The construction of 3,000 kilometres of railways and the exploitation of mines, etc., within 20 kilometres of the railway, formed part of this great concession. But as no start was made, it was annulled within nine months. American missionaries and diplomatic officials have been not less busy than their commercial agents. As Europe, so to speak, put Turkey in quarantine, and would not come to her help, she was obliged to fall back on the United States.

Some surprise is expressed in governmental quarters that the agricultural exploitation of Turkey, which is certainly capable of rapid and profitable development, should not have attracted foreign industrialists. The Turks have only themselves to blame. The reservations and restrictions, the dependence and control, which they impose, are enough to frighten any business man. There are better chances of quicker profits with fewer risks in the newly

created or re-formed countries of Europe, such as Poland, Austria, Tcheco-Slovakia. But it is generally admitted by the most intelligent Turks that Turkey has neither the means, nor the brains, nor the experience to dispense altogether with foreign assistance. Until her budget is stabilized, she is in danger of falling into the hands of adventurers. America is only waiting a more favourable opportunity. When the air is clear of outstanding questions—in particular the difference with England over Mosul—she will know how to act ; she is well prepared. Loud as are her protestations in favour of a policy of the open door, in actual practice, she trades upon her own favoured position and the prestige of the dollar. M. Pernot is of opinion that her efforts are directed less against French competition than against British hegemony.

Turks make a virtue of necessity when they pretend that they can be independent of foreign technical and financial assistance. Their recent attitude has not restored the confidence enjoyed under the international administration of the Debt. It is no use announcing periodically this and that financial reform. Turkey must meet her creditors honestly and show that she has a sincere intention to pay. In order to exploit her immense resources, she must borrow, and this will only be possible when the *Bourses* and markets of the world have confidence in her. She must make her choice. The other course that is open to her is "to vegetate, hopeless and helpless, until she sinks into the slough of social and political impotence," which is the end of degenerate and non-progressive races. However, it is greatly to the credit of the Angora Government that it has not been stampeded by the fall in the exchange into the pitfalls of inflated paper currency. There has been no new issue since the Great War, in spite of the war with Greece.

The losses and devastations sustained by Turkey, during and since the two wars, are terrible. Both Turkey and Greece have before them the tremendous problems of reconstruction, the repopulation of their countries, and the rehabilitation of their nationals, due to the deportations and exchange of populations—that inhuman consequence of the war, for which Turkey and the Governments of the world must answer to posterity. These poor people arrived penniless, unemployed, unacclimatized, strangers in their own land. In Turkey there are some half-million of them, in Greece about a million and a quarter. The cost to Turkey is estimated at 20 millions sterling.

"Turkey for the Turks" has not, in practice, led to any profitable results for Turkey. The despised Greeks brought prosperity.

If their expulsion has not meant economic suicide, as some predicted, it has had the effect of a drastic surgical operation, which has left the patient weakened. The most remunerative and best managed industries were in the hands of Christians, who have been driven out, and replaced by inefficient Turks. It is, however, only fair to add that the economic situation is steadily improving. Harvests have been good, and the prospects for 1926 are favourable. It augured well that the defunct Opposition indicated its readiness to welcome foreign capital. Vast programmes of public works have been proposed, requiring foreign capital, but under Turkish management. It is not likely that foreign enterprise will be attracted under these conditions, while, without it, Turkey will not find it easy finally to absorb her unfortunate compatriots.

There are two alternatives : either the new Turkey can refuse all foreign cooperation, and remain fettered within her own narrow intellectual and material limits ; or she can have recourse freely to other nations, and without losing any of her independence, gradually attain the same degree of culture and economic development as other civilized nations. The one way points to decline, the other to progress.

Conclusion.—No one can predict what the Turkey of to-morrow will be. But one begins, as M. Pernot says, to perceive what the Turkey of to-day is, a strange and disconcerting mixture " of the very ancient and the very modern, of tradition and revolutionary spirit, of a return to Oriental origins, and of attraction towards the West, of narrow Nationalism and aspirations towards progress." The past is over, never to return. There are already signs that the breath of a yet newer spirit—or rather a revival of the old—is animating the New Turkey, faint mutterings and murmurings against the methods of the men of Angora, in their self-appointed Olympus, dingy and remote. With a fresh and less bigoted outlook, the need for new friendships will be felt. Opportunities will come to those who know how to take advantage of the next developments in the situation. The young Republic is learning that feverish and hasty protective legislation is not a short cut to the millennium.

There is, at any rate, one direction in which we need not fear comparison with France or the United States. Neither country has ever occupied the intimate place in the hearts of the Turks, the peculiar personal ascendancy that England held in the direction of Turkish affairs, for the greater part of the last century, and yet earlier in history. We were, and some believe still are, looked upon by

the steadier and more conservative politicians in Turkey, who will in due time make their voices heard again, as the natural allies of the Turks, linked in a friendship born of many curiously similar traits in the national characters, as well as by many other moral and material bonds. Admiral de Robeck, General Milne and General Harington did more than any statesmen since Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to increase the prestige of England, and place it on its former level. But they did not see eye to eye with Mr. Lloyd George. It is our business to forget and to heal the differences of recent years, and to re-establish ourselves in our ancient position. This is not incompatible with other friendships in the Balkans and the Near East. We are losing time. The French and the Americans are not waiting on events. We do not hear that Great Britain is putting forth any similar effort. In finance, diplomacy and commerce our interests in Turkey need the best brains that we can spare, and immediate and energetic action.

But we must face the fact that, for the moment, British prestige in Turkey is at a discount. We are hated, and, one must confess it, despised by the ruling classes of to-day. The Turkish Government thinks Great Britain has not the courage to exact respect. She sits down tamely under any affront; the fear of war is her only ruling principle. We have lost sight of the elementary fact that bluff is the very essence of Oriental diplomacy. Like all Orientals, Turkey most respects the hand that holds the biggest stick, particularly when the other hand is held out in friendship.

The tale of Turkish arrogance is incredible to those who know anything of Turkey before the Revolution. One could multiply recent instances of contemptuous aggressiveness. Yet Great Britain holds the future of Turkey in the hollow of her hand, so long as she has a fleet ready to anchor off the Golden Horn.

Let us not disguise from ourselves that there is a steadily growing opinion throughout the world, that we have passed the zenith of our power as the greatest of world forces. It is futile complacently to pretend that this is mere jealousy. Rumour, even when not sedulously fostered, finds a particularly congenial soil in Oriental minds. The new Republic of this regenerated Turkey aspires to the highest power, if not to hegemony, in the near and middle East, the position she once held. British and Imperial interests demand that we should not lethargically stand aside whilst other nations make headway. Turkey is ready to accept any disinterested assistance.

But there is another new and very suggestive point of view

that is gaining ground in France, though it appears to be insufficiently appreciated in England. The French Press shows a decided tendency to urge Franco-British cooperation in Turkey. It is often overlooked that France and the British Empire are the two greatest Mahomedan Powers, both in Africa and Asia. Their interests must often harmonize, and it should be the duty of the statesmen of both countries to take advantage of this *approchement*, which is the more welcome among so many unfortunate divergencies of interest and sentiment. Marshal Lyautey in Morocco has expressed this view in the strongest terms. So did General Weygand in Syria. M. de Jouvenel, the new Governor-General of Syria, is even more emphatic. There is room for our French and American friends in Turkey, and competition need not degenerate into rivalry. A firm Franco-British front, *vis-d-vis* Angora aggressiveness, would have a most salutary and steadying effect upon the hot heads of the new Turkey.

THE AMIR AND THE FRONTIER TRIBESMEN OF INDIA

(*With Map*)

BY CAPTAIN C. COLLIN DAVIES

THE recently-completed Khyber railway, which, in the unavoidable absence of Lord Reading, was opened by Sir Charles Innes on the 2nd of November, 1925, has once more brought the problem of the Indian Frontier before the public eye. To what extent this railway will affect Anglo-Afghan relations remains to be proved. Whether the present Amir, Amanullah, will be prepared for its extension to Jalalabad, or whether he will regard it as a "knife in his vitals," which interpretation his famous ancestor, Abdur Rahman Khan, was pleased to put upon the extension of the Quetta railway to New Chaman, time alone can show. I have considered the present time opportune for a short review of the disturbing influence the Amirs of Afghanistan have exerted from time to time upon the turbulent tribesmen inhabiting that intricate maze of mountains and valleys, known as the North-West Frontier of India.

These independent or semi-independent tribesmen, whose habitat lies between the Durand and Administrative boundaries, have been forced, because of their geographical position, to play an important part in the drama of Anglo-Afghan relations. From remotest antiquity their independence and freedom from foreign control have been their boast, and, because of the inaccessible nature of their stony holdings, they have never been conquered. Alexander the Great only temporarily subdued certain tracts which lay across or were contiguous to his line of march; the war-like Sikhs were able to collect tribute only in the presence of armed forces; and the British are still striving to solve this most thorny problem.

The politicians of the Lawrence or "Stationary" School argued that this Yaghistan, or land of the unruly, if allowed to remain in an undeveloped state, would serve as a bulwark and protection against any invasion from the direction of Central Asia. They, therefore, attempted to erect a sort of Chinese Wall, with the result

that tribal territory within a day's march of our outposts became an absolute *terra incognita*. The "Forward School" wished to take over and to administer the area in question, but the greatest argument against accepting this responsibility was based on financial considerations. This article is not concerned with the various policies which have been adopted by the Government of India, but with the use the Afghan Amirs have made of these wild caterans, both in peace and war. The Ruler of Afghanistan is in an infinitely better position than the Government of India, for the frontier tribesmen, with rare exceptions, are orthodox Mahomedans of the Sunni sect. In war, there is always the danger of large bodies of tribesmen joining his forces as soon as he proclaims a *jihad*; in peace, the British have found to their cost that the smouldering fires of fanaticism can be fanned into a terrific conflagration, if the Amir be so inclined.

To a large extent the Khyber area is at the mercy of the Mohmand tribes of the hilly country to the north and north-west of the Peshawar district. During the First Afghan War (1839-1842) one of their chiefs, Saadat Khan of Lalpura, had been deprived of his position by the British. Therefore, when Dost Muhammad, the Amir, thought it necessary to harass the British borders in the years following the annexation of the Punjab, he found a willing ally in the person of this discontented chief. There was, however, no great danger until the Mutiny of 1857. Fortunately for the British, diplomatic negotiations had resulted in the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1855. Without underestimating the work and efforts of Sir Herbert Edwardes, one of the greatest frontier administrators of his time, the Amir's influence over the border tribes can be gauged from the peaceful state of the frontier during this critical period. Dost Muhammad was succeeded by Shere Ali, the opening years of whose reign were spent in suppressing internal revolts and in consolidating his authority. As long as Shere Ali remained friendly the condition of the border was normal, and only occasional raiding took place. From 1877 onwards, however, relations became very strained, and owing to Shere Ali's intrigues the frontier was abnormally disturbed. The British occupation of Quetta in 1877 was considered by the Amir to be a stepping-stone towards Kandahar, and led to his fomenting discontent amongst the Kakars and other tribes in the neighbourhood. Even the Khan of Kelat carried on a secret correspondence with the ruler of Kabul. The commencement of the Second Afghan War (1878-1880) was the signal for increased disturbances throughout the tribal zone. During the war, the Hazara

border was in a perpetual ferment ; the Khyber was constantly raided by Zakkas and Mohmands ; Zaimushts harassed the Kohat line of communications ; the Mahsuds from the heart of Waziristan raided and laid waste the country in the vicinity of Tank. The first phase of the war ended with the treaty of Gandamak (1879). The assassination of Sir Louis Cavagnari once more set our avenging armies in motion. When our honour had been sufficiently vindicated, Abdur Rahman Khan was installed as Amir.

For many years the Turis of Kurram, who were Shias and not orthodox Mahomedans of the Sunni persuasion, had been subjected to oppression by Afghan officials and governors. For this reason the persecuted Turis had hailed with delight the arrival of British troops during the Second Afghan War. By article IX of the Treaty of Gandamak, Kurram was declared an assigned district, to be administered by the Government of India. On his accession, Abdur Rahman was informed that, whereas the Jagi *ilaka* of Hariab was to be considered Afghan territory, Kurram proper, the dwelling-place of the Turi and Bangash tribes, was to be independent of his control. As a result of complaints on the part of the Amir regarding Turi feuds with the neighbouring tribes of Afghanistan, a British delegate was sent to the valley to confer with the Amir's representative. This resulted in an amicable settlement of outstanding disputes. At length, in the year 1892, at the request of the Turis themselves, the British occupied their country.

Between 1890 and 1898, Anglo-Afghan relations were so much strained that on several occasions war seemed imminent. For some time before the dispatch of the Durand Mission to Kabul, it had been rumoured abroad that the British desired an exact demarcation of the respective spheres of influence of the Amir and themselves over the so-called independent tribal area. Perhaps it was the knowledge of this which caused Abdur Rahman to increase his intrigues amongst the various tribes with the object of securing some of their territory before it was too late. In 1892 a detachment of his troops under Sardar Gul Mahomed arrived at Gustoi in the Zhob district. At the same time another agent, Mansur Khan, commenced intriguing in Waziristan. The advance into Zhob constituted a distinct threat, for that district had only recently been annexed by the British. Waziristan became divided into two opposing camps, the Kabul and Loyal factions. Representatives of the former were received with great honour by the Amir at Kabul. At last the Government of India became alarmed, and a strong remonstrance on its part led to the recall of these agents.

Throughout the years 1892 and 1893, a state of unrest and disquietude continued to exist along the whole frontier from the snow-capped peaks of Chitral to the barren deserts of Baluchistan. To quote a contemporary Government report :

“ A general uncertainty prevailed as to the limits of the two Governments, and the tribesmen constantly took advantage of this uncertainty, playing off the one against the other. In Chitral apprehension of aggression under cover of Afghan protection stood in the way of any settled Government. The people of Bajaur and Swat were in uncertainty whether they might not any day be exposed to an Afghan invasion. There was anarchy in Kurram, where the Turis were kept in fear by local disturbances fomented by Afghan officials, and by raids carried on by Afghan subjects. And, south of Kurram, the whole Waziri tribe was in a state of ferment, and outrages were frequent in the Zhob and Gomal Valleys.” *

Before the Durand Mission reached Kabul, the Amir had written a letter to the Viceroy stating his opinion as to the best method of dealing with the tribes, and warning His Excellency of the results of a more forward policy. Because it is one of the few existing records of the Afghan side of the question, I have considered the following quotation justifiable.

“ . . . If you should cut them out of my dominions they will neither be of any use to you nor to me. You will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your Government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders of India, these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies. . . . In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my weakness is injurious for your Government.” †

The Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, was desirous that something should be done to settle the frontier problem, and, with this object in view, invited the Amir to visit India. Abdur Rahman replied that the disturbed condition of Afghanistan prevented him from accepting this invitation. The Viceroy's next step was to inform the Amir that Lord Roberts, the hero of the Second Afghan War and the champion of the “ Forward Policy,” would visit him at Jalalabad. Eventually, it was decided to dispatch an unescorted civilian Mission to Kabul. On the 19th of September, 1893, the

* See “ Moral and Material Progress of India,” 1892-93, p. 156.

† See “ Abdur Rahman Khan ”—Sultan Mahomed Khan, 1900, vol. ii, p. 157.

Durand Mission set out from Peshawar. That part of the Durand Agreement which affected the Indo-Afghan frontier resulted in the delimitation of a line, afterwards known as the Durand Line, across which neither the Amir nor the Government of India was to interfere in any way. The results of this hasty agreement have been rather overrated. It is perfectly clear that the new boundary line was not based upon sound topographical or ethnological considerations, for it was subsequently discovered during the process of demarcation, that it had been based upon inaccurate topographical information. When the various boundary commissions proceeded to the frontier, it was found that certain places, which were marked on the Durand Map, did not exist on the actual ground. This was one of the causes of the wearisome discussions which took place before the actual setting-up of boundary pillars was commenced. Many ethnic absurdities were perpetrated, such as the handing over to the Amir of the Birmal tract of Waziristan, which was peopled by Darwesh Khel Waziris, the majority of whom was included within the British sphere of influence. The worst blunder of all was the arrangement by which the boundary line cut the Mohmand tribal area into two separate parts. It could not have been a tripartite agreement. The tribesmen knew little of what was taking place, until their *mullahs* or proclamations informed them on which side of the boundary line they were, in future, to consider themselves. In all probability the political issues at stake were behind this sacrifice of ethnological requirements. If the Amir had not been promised the Birmal tract, it is quite likely that he would have refused his consent to the inclusion of Wana within the British sphere of influence.

The demarcation of the new boundary took place between the years 1894 and 1896. By the year 1895, that part of the frontier lying between Nawa Kotal on the outskirts of the Mohmand country and the Bashgal valley on the borders of Kafiristan had been demarcated, and an agreement concluded on the 9th of April, 1895, between Mr. Udny and Ghulam Haidar Khan. A similar agreement, as far as the Kurram frontier was concerned, had been completed on the 21st of November, 1894, the contracting parties being Mr. J. Donald and Sardar Sherindil Khan. The Afghan-Baluch boundary, from Domandi to the Persian frontier, was not finally demarcated until 1896. A small portion of the line, in the Khyber area, remained undemarcated until the conclusion of the Third Afghan War of 1919.

Although the Amir signed the Durand Convention, his intrigues

and obstructing attitude, both during the process of demarcation and throughout the remaining years of his reign, convince one that he was by no means favourably disposed to this partition of Yaghistan.

Before proceeding to discuss Afghan intrigues since 1893, some reference to the Amir's policy in Kafiristan is necessary. Kafiristan, the land of the unbelievers, is bounded on the north by the Hindu Kush ; on the south by the Kunar valley ; on the east by the eastern watershed of the Bashgal river ; and on the west by the ranges above the Nijrao and Panjshir valleys. The origin of the Kafirs is lost in the mists of obscurity, but what directly concerns the point at issue is that they were non-Mahomedan tribes, who, throughout the ages, had successfully resisted all attempts at conversion, until, in 1893, for political reasons, they were sacrificed to the tender mercies of the Amir and militant Islam. It was from this secluded spot in the Hindu Kush that Afghan nobles obtained their household slaves, and Abdur Rahman his concubines. When the news of the Amir's forcible conversion of these so-called infidels reached England, the Secretary of State for India received numerous petitions from the Anti-Slavery Society and the Aborigines' Protection Society, beseeching the Government of India to use its influence to protect these defenceless Kafirs. It was obvious that the poor Kafir stood no chance with his rude weapons against Afghan regular troops armed with Martini-Henry rifles. Although the Government of India stated in reply that the Amir's action was not a direct result of the Durand Agreement, yet many authorities, whose opinions carried great weight, held that it was British encroachments and British actions which had sacrificed these rude savages to the Amir.

Quickly following in the wake of the process of demarcation came a period of dynastic struggles in Chitral. The Mehtar (ruler) of Chitral had scattered his Maker's image throughout the land. His death was the signal for fratricidal conflicts between his numerous offspring. His brother, Shere Afzal, was allowed to escape from Kabul, where he had been living as a pensioner of the Amir. Shere Afzal held the reins of government until he was ousted from his position by his nephew, Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was recognized by the Government of India. Shere Afzal fled for protection to the camp of the Afghan commander-in-chief at Asmar. This interference in Chitral by an Afghan pensioner was resented by the authorities in India, who remonstrated with the Amir, with the result that, towards the end of 1893, the British Agent at Gilgit was able to report :

“The Amir has given a written assurance that he will keep Shere Afzal under surveillance within Afghanistan, and he will not be able again to disturb the peace of Chitral.” *

How far this promise could be relied upon, future events will show. In January, 1895, Nizam was murdered, and Shere Afzal once more appeared on the scene. This time he was supported by Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, who appears to have been, to a large extent, under the influence of the Afghan commander-in-chief. A British detachment was besieged in fort Chitral until relieved by Colonel Kelly from Gilgit. A few days later a British column arrived from India, peace was restored and Shere Afzal taken prisoner. Umra Khan fled into Afghan territory, which has ever served as an asylum for border malcontents. Sir Thomas Holdich, in his “Indian Borderland,” contends that Afghan troops were present at the siege of Chitral.

The echoes of the Chitral expedition had no sooner died away than the frontier was abnormally disturbed by the conflagration of 1897.

The charges brought against Abdur Rahman were, that he had received deputations from the British tribal zone; that he had failed to prevent his regular troops and subjects from joining tribal forces; and that he had granted an asylum to the enemies of the Government of India. It is a well-known fact that he addressed an assembly of *mullahs* from all parts of Afghanistan and the Indian frontier, and impressed upon them that it was the duty of all true believers to wipe out the infidel. It is significant, too, that at the same time he assumed the title of Zia-ul-Millatwa-ud-Din, the “Light of the Nation and Religion.” The publication of the Amir’s book entitled “Twakim-ud-din,” † which dealt with the question of a *jihad* or holy war, was, to say the least, inopportune. A correct interpretation of the book may have been perfectly harmless, but the construction placed upon it by frontier *mullahs* and malcontents, and its distribution within the British tribal zone, were not calculated to promote peaceful relations. During the struggle the anti-British intrigues of local Afghan officials, combined with the actual support afforded to the insurgents, called forth a sharp remonstrance from the Viceroy. The following statement, which I have been allowed to quote from one of the Government of India’s confidential publications, throws considerable light on the question of Afghan complicity.

* See Blue Book 1895, lxxii, (c. 7864), p. 31.

† Viz. Catechism or Almanac of Religion.

"Yet another factor, and one of whose importance we have the most ample proof, was the universal feeling amongst the tribesmen that they could rely not only upon the approval and moral support, but also upon the active intervention in their favour, of the Amir of Afghanistan." *

In the Tochi, where the first outbreak occurred, the attitude of the Afghan border officials and the safe retreat that Afghan territory afforded fugitives from justice only encouraged the Madda Khels, who were the chief offenders, to persevere in their hostile attitude. From the Tochi the revolt spread to Swat and the Mohmand hills. The situation became extremely critical indeed when contingents from Afghan territory, including Afghan sepoys in plain clothes, joined the rebel forces. Reports were also received of Afghan cooperation in the attack on the British post of Shabkadr and in the burning of the village of Shankargarh. Abdur Rahman was ordered to take immediate steps to recall his subjects and was warned that, unless he controlled his commander-in-chief or withdrew him from his command on the frontier, he would be held responsible for this official's actions. Abdur Rahman persistently refused to entertain any suggestion of Afghan complicity in the risings, but qualified his remarks as follows :

"No tribesmen from my territories can do such an act in an open manner. Some of them, however, have great faith in Mulla Hadda, and it is possible that they may have joined him during the night, travelling like thieves by unfrequented roads. How is it possible to keep watch on thieves during nights along such an extensive frontier? My kind friend, such an arrangement could only be possible by posting about ten thousand soldiers on all the mountain-tops and at all the fords in that district." †

In 1901 Abdur Rahman was gathered to his fathers, and his son, Habibullah, reigned in his stead. The accession of the new Amir was followed by a curious wave of fanatical unrest, which swept along the frontier from Buner to the confines of Baluchistan. This can be accounted for in many ways. A new province had been carved out of the frontier districts towards the end of 1901; there was a widespread belief in the ultra-religious attitude of the new Amir; Habibullah was influenced, to a large extent, by his fanatical brother, Nasrullah Khan; fanatical preaching was very prevalent; and lastly, the construction of the Thal-Kohat railway had been

See "Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India," vol. ii, p. 65. Simla, 1908, Confidential.

† See Blue Book, 1898, lxiii, (c. 8714), pp. 122-123.

misunderstood. The conduct of the Amir was the reverse of friendly, for not only had he received tribal deputations from British territory, but he had also coquetted with frontier fanatics and freebooters.

From 1900 to 1902, the British were engaged in punishing by means of a strict blockade, varied by sudden punitive sallies, the Mahsud tribe inhabiting the mountain fastnesses in the heart of Waziristan. Here again they were faced by Afghan intrigues, especially those of the local Governor of Birmal. In April, 1903, disturbances occurred on the confines of the Shilmani country, where the Sartip of Dakka, who was notorious for his open hostility to the British, insolently punished certain villagers for cooperating with the British authorities in the construction of a new road within their limits. During 1904 and 1905 gangs of outlaws, Afridis and Afghan subjects, committed a series of dacoities within British territory. At the same time large numbers of representatives from nearly every Afridi and Orakzai clan visited Kabul, where they were favourably received by the Amir and Nasrullah Khan. Two years later, while the Sufi Sahib was wandering through Tirah for the purpose of preaching a *jehad*, Lala Pir, a secret agent from Kabul, was busily engaged in carrying on intrigues in Waziristan. When one considers the fact that the border tribes have ever been prepared to follow the example of the Afridis, one must confess that it was fortunate for the British Raj when the majority of the tribes of Tirah remained uninfluenced by the preaching of the Sufi Sahib. Had he achieved his purpose the British would have been faced by a series of risings, compared with which, the disturbances of 1897 would have paled into insignificance.* The contumacious attitude of the Zakka Khels and Mohmands, during the year 1908, necessitated punitive operations on the part of the Government of India. During the course of operations, hostile *lashkars* composed of Mohmands, Shinwaris and Ningraharis, all Afghan subjects, hovered around ready to join in the fray. On the 17th of April, 1908, the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India, that reports had been received of the presence of about two thousand Afghan subjects amongst the Mohmand gathering.

From 1908 onwards the peace of the border was seriously disturbed by large raiding gangs from Afghan territory. The Afghan Government, while professing complete ignorance of the presence of these bands of outlaws, covertly assisted them in every way.† By 1910 the situation had become so critical that the Viceroy

* See Confidential Border Report, 1908-09, p. 2.

† *Ibid.* p. 3.

was forced to remonstrate with the Amir. It was in this year that the Hindustani fanatics visited Kabul, where they were treated with great honour by the anti-British Nasrullah. Copies of a very inflammatory pamphlet teaching *jehad* were distributed amongst them, and at the same time they were warned that, "unless they performed service by extending Afghan influence among the tribes, they would not be invited to Kabul again or be helped in any way." *

It was extremely fortunate for the British in India that Habibullah, the first years of whose reign were marked by extensive intrigues on the Indian side of the border, remained faithful to the British alliance during the Great War. Towards the end of his days he appears to have freed himself from the pernicious influence of his fanatical brother, Nasrullah, and to have become very European in tastes, dress and customs. This resulted in his becoming extremely unpopular with the Young Afghan party at Kabul. They especially objected to his rejection of the overtures of the Turko-German mission, the object of which was to induce the Amir to undertake offensive operations against India. As in the Mutiny of 1857, the influence of the Amir over the frontier tribes can be gauged from the peaceful state of the border during the years of the Great War. According to Dr. Abdul Ghani, although the assassination of Habibullah in 1919 appeared unexpected to the outside world, it was eagerly awaited in Afghanistan.†


The accession of Amanullah and the Third Afghan War of 1919 marked an epoch in the history of Anglo-Afghan relations, for by the peace Treaty, which was ratified in February, 1922, the Government of India relinquished its right to control the foreign affairs of Afghanistan. The abnormal state of affairs on the frontier during the last five years has been, to a large extent, the aftermath of the Great War. There are of course other causes of unrest. Poverty still forces the tribesmen to raid the settled districts, and the voice of the anti-British *mullah* is by no means silent. How far Bolshevik propaganda affects the border tribes it would, in the absence of any direct evidence, be difficult to state. So far as the Central Asia question is concerned, the Russian menace of the nineteenth century, when it was feared by some that Cossack hordes would eventually wage war with Indian sepoys on the banks of the Indus, has given way to a new menace against which no lofty

* See Confidential Border Report, 1910-1911, p. 2.

† See "A Review of the Political Situation in Central Asia," 1921, pp. 92-93.

mountain barriers or impassable deserts can be regarded as bulwarks of defence.

The object of this article has been to show that the Amir of Afghanistan has always exerted, or been able to exert, a powerful influence over his co-religionists, the tribesmen of the North-West Frontier of India. Whenever he has thought it necessary, he has been able to induce them to commit raids and depredations along the British borders. At last our path seems clear. Our policy should be to maintain a friendly and close alliance with the Afghan Amir, in whose hands, I am firmly convinced, lies the key to the local problem of tribal politics and also to the larger question of imperial politics. The danger to our Indian frontier is not from Russian hordes, and not from Bolshevik propaganda ; it lies in the possible break-up and disintegration of Afghanistan.



THE INEVITABILITY OF WAR

BY CAPTAIN A. PEFFERS, *The Cameronians* (Scottish Rifles)

OSTENSIBLY the civilized nations of the world now profess a desire for universal peace. Humanity is indulging in a certain beautiful and unworldly dream, wherein swords are hammered into ploughshares, and wolves amicably frolic with lambs. But, in the opinion of the writer, it is only a dream, and he considers that the professions of the respective national leaders are either the picturesque rhetoric of visionaries or a cloak for ulterior motives of self-interest and self-seeking. Deep down in the hearts of the nations surge the rancour of past defeat, the fear of future catastrophe or the hope of ultimate revenge.

War is coeval and coexistent with human nature and, until men attain angelic wings, force, in its widest sense, and force alone, will remain not only the foundation of intellectual, moral and political progress, but the ultimate arbiter of human relationships. During the Great War propagandists on both sides talked a great deal about the struggle being between "Right" and "Might," or, as it was put a little more elaborately, between the "will to security" and the "will to power." Actually the war represented a conflict of divergent human beliefs. In the present Lilliputian state of knowledge, the rightness or wrongness of a concept is essentially comparative. Thus it is that, where two great ideas come into conflict—and men are so constituted that never for long do their ideas coincide—sooner or later there comes an end of peaceful argument and recourse is made to the sword. The milestones of human progress throughout the ages are spattered with the blood of opposite idealists. Has the sword been justified? But for its influence or the threat of it, would "Magna Carta" or "The Renaissance" illumine the pages of history and measure man's political and æsthetic upliftment? And would the accumulative progress of nations, as embodied in public and common law, be possible at all, were there not behind the law the certainty of physical force? If, through some immense cataclysm in human nature, war were to be eliminated on earth,

mankind, so strong are its instincts towards combat, would, in the opinion of the writer, hurl its blood-lusty hordes against the suppositious inhabitants of Mars.

History, then, and experience afford conclusive proofs that the *causa causans* of all war is the universal existence of the combative spirit and that, so long as human nature persists in its present condition, war will not only be probable but inevitable.

If the foregoing preamble is true, it is apparent that the British Empire may be involved in war at any moment. The Empire constitutes one of many national and human groups compelled to rivalry from divergent interests and ideals. Recent experience of the horrors of war and the efforts of diplomacy for a time may restrain such rivalry to peaceful paths, but the continuance of peace must be uncertain and at most a breathing space between wars.

Despite the operation of this general inclination of mankind to war, it is customary for historians to urge that nations drift into conflict for certain particular causes. It is with these causes, which should in reality be described as the occasions of wars, that the writer proposes to deal in this article.

The following is an attempt at a classification of the reasons which lead to an outbreak of hostilities and an indication of their likely operation in the future : (1) Religious differences. (2) Insults to the dignity of a nation. (3) The interests of civilization. (4) Political differences. (5) Self-defence. (6) Commercial reasons. (7) Colonial expansion. (8) Racial animosities. (9) Revenge. (10) Civil war.

(1) *Religious Differences*.—In medieval times, religious wars were of common occurrence both between rival religions and between rival sects of the same religion. Indeed, some one has declared that of all human conflicts, those waged about creeds and dogmas have been the most sanguinary and destructive. A war between Christian nations at the present time over purely religious matters is not likely to be fought ; but Great Britain, as a great Imperial Power with Eastern possessions, must take cognizance of three mutually antagonistic religions—Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. Is there any one so foolish as not to realize the significance of Hindu-Moslem disturbances in India and of seditious uproars generated by Buddhist priests in Burmah ? As the Power responsible for the preservation of peace and the orderly government in these lands, can we hope to avoid interference in movements which may subvert the whole edifice of law and order ?

But apart altogether from its significance internally, the existence

of a large Moslem population in the Empire leads to political entanglements with external Moslem races, particularly with those which, like the Afghans and the Turks, from their position and strength have actual or potential influence on British subjects. In this respect, it is necessary to remember that the most probable religious war of the future will be a struggle between Islam and European Christianity. Throughout the Moslem world, both within and without the Empire, there exist numerous and fanatical devotees of Pan-Islam, a policy which, though rather obscured at the moment by an epidemic of nationalism, is designed to federate all existent Moslem States into one league or commonwealth. Before and during the Great War, Turkey was a keen and the most powerful protagonist of this movement, and it is conceivable that with the resurrection of her political and military fortunes, she may again kindle from Moscow to Shanghai the flame of a Pan-Islamic crusade. The chief stumbling-block to Pan-Islam at the present time lies in the divergent political aims of the States concerned, but the strength of the religious bond between Moslem peoples must always be borne in mind. Even in countries which are ostensibly friendly to and apparently anxious to cooperate with Great Britain, the nationalist aspirations of their inhabitants cannot yet be dissociated from the hierarchic principles of Islam. Many ardent nationalists in Baghdad, especially those who favour the continuance of the British Mandate, have told the writer that the influence of Turkey can only be excised from Iraq when the government of the country is completely secularized and removed from the domination of the Mosque.

So far as Great Britain is concerned, she can but view with alarm any attempt at Moslem political unity, since it would not only undermine her position in India, but also throughout her Moslem possessions, as well as in Iraq, Palestine and Egypt. That Britain has recognized the danger of Pan-Islam is evident in her support of Arab nationality and the adoption of an Arab, as opposed to a Turkish, policy in the Middle East. But the contumacy of the Turks and the subversive genius of Islam are ever present and potent factors against the preservation of peace.

(2) *Insults to the Dignity of a Nation.*—Nations, like individuals, are peculiarly sensitive whenever their dignity or self-respect is touched. It is right that this should be so, since a man gets no more respect than he exacts, and a nation without prestige is the laughing-stock of mean peoples. The classical example of a war the immediate reason for which was an insult to the *amour propre* of a

nation is the Franco-German war in 1870. There were, of course, other and deeper causes behind that conflagration, but the match which kindled the pile was the Prussian King's cavalier treatment of Benedetti, the French Ambassador. We have little grounds for believing that international manners have improved in the meantime. It was only a month or two ago that sensitive ears might have heard the sword rattle in our scabbard, when the Government of Mexico chose to insult the accredited representatives of Great Britain in that country of political bubble and froth. Is it safe for us to forget that nations can lose their temper, that passion is a very human frailty and that some insults can only be wiped out in blood?

(3) *The Interests of Civilization.*—"The interests of civilization" is a specious phrase which, in the past, has served to cloak with some success the selfish designs of the great Powers. The glib political moralists of the nineteenth century applied the term to the hectic scramble for territory, concessions and trading rights which began in 1884 in Africa. This acquisitiveness was laudably designed to suppress the slave trade, to uplift the native and to develop virgin lands for the benefit of humanity. Ostensibly the great Powers of Europe had all become philanthropists. In reality, this philanthropy wore a little thin wherever two Powers coveted the same concession. And so the hunt for territory involved not only expeditions against recalcitrant natives, but also caused friction between the Powers themselves. Philanthropy of the above nature is not yet in abeyance. It would seem, however, that most of the desirable tracts in the world have been brought under the direct or indirect sway of civilization, and, unless there is some catastrophic reversion to cannibalism, or a dangerous increase in still existent slavery, such so-called wars in the interests of civilization will be few and far between. Statesmen may, perhaps, realize the need for honesty and call them by their true name—colonial expansion.

Nevertheless, wars with some claim to be in the interests of civilization are of certain occurrence. There does exist among the civilized Powers, at least of Europe and America, not only a certain criterion of conduct, but a common impulse towards orderliness and a common realization that chaotic conditions in another part of the world tend to act as a hindrance upon civilized progress. Sooner or later the Powers must recognize that, however much they may apotheosize war, wholesale murder and massacre, as lately practised by the Ottoman Turks, are hardly a proper weapon for furthering political measures. It may yet be necessary in the interests of

civilization to step in and save Armenian, Assyrian and Nestorian minorities from extermination in Anatolia.

There is no need here to describe the disruptive tendencies with their resultant chaos in modern China. Sufficient to say that the possibility of a Bolshevik exploitation of this chaos, the necessity of the Chinese market and raw materials to the world as a whole and the fear of contamination in the oriental possessions of the Powers, must, if the Chinese themselves fail to stabilize their tottering institutions, lead inevitably to military interference by the Powers.

And of Bolshevism what need is there to write? Civilization, as we know it, stands for all that is anathema to Bolshevism. Whatever may be said to the detriment of our civilization, our fondest dream, though it is only a dream, is of a universal brotherhood, wherein there will be neither class nor tyranny. The proud claim of Bolshevism is that it stands for a class war, for the ascendancy of the proletariat and the perpetuation of hatred. We grope for a heaven that was born on the lips of Christ. The Bolshevik establishes a hell, born in the brain of a Jewish murderer. War, in the opinion of the writer, must come, the most deadly of all wars—the conflict between an ideal and a negation.

(4) *Political Differences*.—Self-interest, as a motive power, is analogous to the generative instinct and essential to the preservation of both individuals and States. Political interests are simply those of self-interest and are concerned with the study of, and the efforts to meet, exigencies. Necessity compels us to mould circumstances so as to rob the future a little of its uncertainty and to concert measures to avoid dangers likely to threaten our national existence. And our existence, so far as can be learnt from history, depends on the maintenance of the balance of power among the great nations. At present the focal points of power are located in Europe and the Pacific. In both these regions Great Britain occupies the unique position of holding the scale. So long as the balance can be maintained by political action, so long will war be avoided. But the time will come, as it came in 1914, when the balance can only be retained by the sword. Our diplomacy must aim not only at the preservation of the balance of power by peaceful means, but at preparing the conditions of decisive success, should peaceful methods fail. Neither in Europe nor in the Pacific, nor for that matter in any part of the world, must we allow any Power so to dominate others as to threaten our existence or prestige. The western aggrandizement of Russia at the expense of Poland and other States on her south-western borders, the "Rhine-frontier" policy of French militarists, the

resurrection of a Junker Germany, French designs on Tangier, irredentist claims of Spain to Gibraltar, Italy's naval ambitions in the Mediterranean and her designs on Malta, and the freedom of the Straits at Constantinople indicate briefly where our political interests are involved in Europe and also the potentialities of war. In the Pacific the problem consists in holding the balance between an expansionist Japan with eyes focussed on Australia and a United States of America that has discarded its traditional policy of isolation to participate in the scramble for a place in the sun. For a space this problem has been solved by the Four Power Pact—but it is a far cry from Pacific pacts to pacificism.

In the Middle East, it is evidently our interest, as expressed in our policy, to support the establishment of autonomy in Iraq, Palestine and the Hedjaz. In Iraq our policy has brought us to grips with Turkey, keen to retrieve an essential part of Iraq, the Mosul vilayet. In Palestine the task of conciliating the Christian and Arab factions to the establishment of a Jewish national home is by no means an easy one. In the Hedjaz we are faced with the necessity of adjusting our ideas to the destruction of the Hashimite rule in Mecca and the disruptive potentialities of Ibn Saud and his hunger-driven Akhwan.

The conclusion emerges clearly that wherever our political interests lie, and they are world-wide, there lie also the seeds of war.

(5) *Self-defence*.—The present state of national morality is not such as to warrant an altruistic belief in the honesty of our neighbours. Nations, as well as individuals, have itching palms. We still require policemen to cope with burglars, and even more do we need means to circumvent burglarious nations. Self-defence is merely the sum of our measures to hold what we have. The problem, however, is rendered difficult by our scattered possessions and the dangerous proximity of rival Powers to the routes between them. Security implies not only the defence of our territories, wherever placed, but the assurance of adequate protection to our sea, land and air routes to these territories. Necessity, then, has compelled us at one time or another to seize strategic points, our possession of which is resented by various States. Spain grudges us Gibraltar; Italy propounds shadowy claims to Malta; an independent Egypt disputes our rights to protect the Suez Canal; Japan is jealous of Hong Kong and Singapore, and the United States of America is reported to be keen to buy our West Indian islands. Dare we contemplate the passive possession either of our great colonies or of unassailable communications to them?

(6) *Commercial Reasons*.—If one outstanding fact more than another has emerged in recent years, it has been the almost complete dependence of Great Britain for her food and industrial needs on overseas trade. And this dependence is not likely to diminish in the future, owing to our persistence in a free trade policy. Whether or not this economic policy is a sound one is immaterial to the argument. It operates, and thereby compels us not only to maintain old markets, but also continually to seek new markets in which to exchange our manufactures for supplies of raw material and food. We may thus find ourselves more and more involved in countries which, though rich and fertile, are undeveloped or which from their instability render commercial enterprise difficult or futile. Allusion has already been made to the present state of China, which constitutes one of the largest fields in the world for future commercial endeavour. Large sums of British capital have been expended on its development, and the security of such depends on adequate precautions against Chinese anarchy, and the prevention of Japanese, Russian and American usurpation of political power in China.

It is evident, then, that our commercial interests are world-wide and may lead us into conflict with the possessors of raw materials, such as backward native populations or with commercial rivals. In short, the Flag must be prepared to follow commerce.

(7) *Colonial Expansion*.—Possibly the day of colonial wars has passed. The larger part of the earth has been claimed and settled by one great Power or another. Now, also, any effort at territorial annexation must be made, not at the expense of barbarous and ill-armed natives, but of powerfully armed States. Nevertheless, the expansionist idea persists, especially in those countries whose population live in a restricted national territory and are increasing beyond the means of sustenance. Such conditions applied in part to Germany before 1914 and certainly helped to shape that policy which eventually plunged the world in war. To-day they apply more truly to Japan, which has been termed not ineptly the Germany of the East. Her population continues to exceed her productive capacity, and has led her to adopt the dangerous Germanic doctrine of "defensive war." To her, economic salvation lies by way of territorial expansion, and territorial expansion is likeliest of achievement in a disorganized and weak China or in the undeveloped lands of isolated Australia. With the passage of the years Kodama's clear-cut schemes for expansion in China, French Indo-China, and ultimately towards Burmah and India, have lost neither their feasibility nor attraction for the Japanese. While it may be admitted

that an armament-war for the mastery of the Pacific—the necessary corollary of Japanese aims—has been checked at least temporarily by the Four Power Pact, it is wise to reflect that treaties are only political makeshifts, neither binding nor durable, and, at best, are only a temporary insurance.

(8) *Racial Animosities*.—Despite the widespread prevalence of ideal conceptions of a world inhabited by a universal brotherhood, the instinctive hatred of race for race remains a potent factor for evil. The admission must be made, albeit with reluctance and misgiving, that between the three great divisions of mankind there are irreconcilable differences in their physical, moral and social outlook. If we believe the latest theory of man's descent, that humanity springs not from a common but from a triple origin, the hatred between its sections is susceptible of explanation as instinctive and inherited from anthropoidal progenitors. However that may be, the truth cannot be ignored that hatred does exist. Various reasons have been adduced for the exclusion of orientals from America, South Africa and Australia, but the fundamental reason is simply the mutual incompatibility of the white and yellow races. That the yellow and black races realize the existence of this hatred and resent the apparent superiority of the white, is manifest in the recent and regular appearance of propagandist books designed to foster racial pride and to instigate efforts to overthrow the white supremacy. Can we neglect the possibility of negro agitation in Africa?

(9) *Revenge*.—Revenge can only affect us indirectly. We have lost no great territory from the Empire since the loss of the American colonies in the eighteenth century, and we have forgotten the bitterness of that severance. But the issue of the Great War has left in the hearts of the vanquished a bitter legacy of shame and the desire for vengeance. "*La Revanche*" before 1914 was always, despite the disavowals of politicians, a powerful motive in the direction of French foreign policy. Is this motive likely to have less influence in Germany and Austria? Had we, like the Germans, suffered the humility of defeat and the ignominy of disruption, should we have rested until the shame had been extinguished and our territories retrieved? "The peace," writes Rathenau, "will be merely a brief truce. The series of future wars will continue indefinitely."

(10) *Civil War*.—Civil war strikes deepest at the heart of a nation. Of all disasters it is the most catastrophic morally and materially. It corrupts justice and loyalty, breeds sickening treacheries and sustains itself on fratricide. Can we imagine tranquil English lanes

filled with the fury and horror of internecine feud? Can time obliterate from our minds the recent savagery in Ireland? The spirit of revolution has come to Great Britain and sober heads reel with its hocussed wine. The possibility of civil war is manifest in the activities of the communist organization, pledged to revolution and to the disintegration by force of existing institutions.

It is not only in Britain that the prospect of civil war must be faced. Whenever the natives of our African dependencies come under the influence of revolutionary agitators there is always a grave danger that the political shibboleths of Europe will attract them and will lead to outrage and rapine. And in India what real promise is there of permanent stability and quiet? Each year increases the number of political agitators whose only stock in trade is to fan the spirit of revolt against British rule, while the reforms that have been made to placate them, when they have not evoked unmitigated contempt, have served merely to intensify the unrest.

The writer's purpose in this article has been to lay stress upon the inevitability, and possibly upon the imminence of war. The accusation can no doubt be levelled against him that such an opinion implies a gross and de-vitalizing materialism contrary to the spirit of the times and unappreciative of man's tendency to seek far horizons. Might he point out in reply that ideals are capable of attainment only through suffering, that there is nothing that the body suffers by which the soul may not profit? Therein alone lies some justification of war. But will mankind as a whole ever induce in itself the belief that war is abhorrent, unendurable and obscene? Dare we ignore the existence of contradictory and irreconcilable ideals and the aptitude of men to fight for their beliefs? War has been indicted as the supreme source of moral obliquity. May we not find some truth in the words, "Terrible as is war, it yet displays the spiritual grandeur of man daring to defy his mightiest hereditary enemy—death." Finally, whatever its moral status, war is a fact, and facts in a busy world, must be faced. And so the lesson for Great Britain is short and plain to read—untiring preparation. "It is not enough to know, we must apply; it is not enough to will, we must always do."

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AND IRREGULAR TROOPS IN THE DESERT

BY CAPTAIN F. W. BEWSHER, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.,
The Devonshire Regiment

As a preliminary to discussing the directions in which cooperation with the R.A.F. has been applied, the value of such cooperation should be emphasized as a principle.

In a country the military resources of which consist chiefly of R.A.F. units, and which contains amongst the civil population elements liable to cause internal disorders, such as Bedouin tribes and gangs of absconded offenders recruited from the peasant population, it is a matter of the first importance that the population should regard the potentialities of aircraft with considerable awe. If a healthy respect for aircraft and armoured cars is engendered in the minds of the civil population, the presence of aircraft or armoured cars should produce the necessary results by intimidation and not by definite action.

The importance that success should be achieved by intimidation alone, is greater than would appear at first sight, because any fire action taken from the air, either with bombs or machine guns, is, when employed against the civil population, at best indiscriminate action and may lead to a loss of life amongst people who are not guilty of any breach of the peace. Thus, if the mere presence of aircraft has sufficient moral effect to produce the result desired without the necessity of having recourse to weapons, a considerable success has been achieved.

It should be a matter of policy, therefore, to inspire in the minds of the civil population, this awe of aircraft on which the moral value of the aeroplane depends. By the maintenance of the closest cooperation between locally raised ground troops and the R.A.F. and by accustoming the ground troops never to move out on an operation unsupported by aircraft, by rationing and foraging ground troops from the air, by delivering their mail to them in places far

distant from the amenities of civilization, by bringing to them comforts and stores by air, the ground troops come to regard the aeroplane as a necessity to them, and as something which places the odds enormously against their opponents who are without aircraft. They speak of aircraft in these terms in the bazaars and in their villages when on leave, and in Bedouin tents when on patrol, and spread by their conversation this respect for aircraft on which intimidation by aircraft is based. In other words, by close cooperation in the field, between the ground troops and the R.A.F., the ground troops become the agents who unconsciously carry out the necessary propaganda to establish in all classes of the social scale a respect for the air.

Thus as a preface there would appear to be at any rate an admirable reason why opportunities for cooperation between the two forces should be actively sought for.

As regards cooperation in desert reconnaissance, the deserts of Southern Palestine are of a character not usually associated with a desert country. They are mapped to a certain extent, some portions of them with meticulous accuracy, some with fair accuracy, while in some cases the map bears but little relation to the topography of the country.

The deserts of Southern Palestine as they gradually begin to assume their descent into the great depression south of the Dead Sea, the Wadi Araba, are torn and seared by immense wadis, apparently of some volcanic origin. These wadis may be ten, twenty, even thirty miles in length, and seem to be quite haphazard in the course which they take ; some have no outlet in the nature of a wadi connecting them either with the Mediterranean or the Wadi Araba. They can all be crossed, but the crossing places are few and far between, and except at these crossing places they are impassable obstacles.

The population of the deserts is sparse and very shy, a shyness possibly born of a guilty conscience. The inhabitants prefer to hide rather than to engage in conversation. They hide by disappearing completely from the face of the globe by means known only to themselves. Guides, therefore, are not easy to come by and are frequently very unwilling workers.

Water, as one moves southward and south-eastward from Bersheba, becomes less and less in its distribution and its whereabouts forms a secret, which the Bedouins are unwilling to disclose. They know that knowledge of the whereabouts of water is the key which opens their country to enterprises which may be distasteful to them.

The problem of water and routes, therefore, has to be considered ; indeed, it is the all-important problem, as a route without water would not be a route.

It may be asked, what is the value of penetrating considerable distances into deserts sparsely populated, too distant to be effectively controlled by police, too distant to be administered? The answer to this question is, first, that it is a matter of great importance from the point of view of ordinary public security to demonstrate to sheikhs who may be guilty of harbouring absconding offenders or highway robbers in their tribal area that the forces of law and order can visit them and arrest them if they are under suspicion of harbouring, since it is only by this means that the highway robbers can be compelled to seek sanctuary in places far distant from the settled population.

Secondly, and of more importance from an Imperial point of view, ground reconnaissance in the desert is an essential preliminary to effective aerial reconnaissance, for this reason :—should there be a threat of large tribal movements, of mounted men capable of a speed and of forced marches incredible to a person accustomed to regulation paces and care of animals,* such movements, if hostile, must be sought out and located by aircraft. The supply of aircraft is limited, while the area to be covered is enormous. An area with great depressions, affords abundant opportunity for large bodies of men and animals to remain undiscovered, even if no effort is made to conceal them. This is particularly the case, as has been disclosed by cooperation with aircraft, when a wadi is narrow and precipitous and the sun is low enough for its bed to be in shadow.

Ground reconnaissance has now established that routes leading through the desert are determined by (a) water points, and (b) the passages round or across these great depressions. Far the greater proportion of the desert country, consequently, can be regarded as impassable and aerial reconnaissance can be restricted to certain definite avenues of approach limited in number. By this knowledge, an adequate aerial reconnaissance can be made with a vast saving in flying energy, and definite lines may be established to be followed up in case of a pursuit.

In the days of the first reconnaissances, with no previous recorded information available, the degree of reliability that could be attributed

* The Wahabi Force which was driven back from a landing-ground a few miles from Amman in 1924 is reported to have covered without a halt over forty miles between 8.30 a.m. and 4.0 p.m.

to the map had first to be recorded. Losing one's way in the desert is often accompanied by losing one's life, so that this was an important matter. It was useless to plan a distant operation until successive water points were assured for the earlier stages. It was dangerous in the extreme to rely on information given by Bedouins.

While the map was being tested, it was found that in preliminary reconnaissances without troops, observers from the air could not locate such features as were marked on the map other than the great depressions, owing to the fact that the country was so similar in appearance over wide expanses, and that the place-names on the maps often do not refer to a conspicuous feature. For example, places indicated on the map by the word " ruins " had nothing about them to identify their location to a pilot of an aeroplane, and the smaller wadis, of which only a certain proportion were named, could not be satisfactorily identified from the air.

It was agreed, therefore, in the first instance that when a point named on the map was reached according to programme, this fact should be made known to pilots by signals fired from Very's pistols. By this arrangement pilots of aircraft learned to distinguish features on the map from the air, which were known to the ground troops, and were able in some measure to check the accuracy of the map.

These preliminary reconnaissances were also used to note down suitable places for landing-grounds, and for that reason an R.A.F. officer always accompanied the ground troops.

In the true desert country there are no railways and no roads. Communications largely consist of tracks, often of a breadth only sufficient for one camel, often with the wadi side close on the one hand and a sheer drop into the wadi bed, sometimes of two or three hundred feet, on the other.

The establishment of advanced landing-grounds was, therefore, a matter of considerable importance. If a column was to be maintained in the field under its own resources for forage and rations, it would require a considerable train of baggage camels, beasts which themselves require to be foraged, and which reduce the pace, and therefore the distance, of a day's march considerably. In view of these conditions a policy has been adopted of carrying with a column only sufficient rations to enable it to reach one or other of the advanced landing-grounds, and thenceforward to draw rations and forage transported by air.

The advantage of having rations landed by aeroplanes on an aerodrome as opposed to the use of parachutes dropped in the course

of numerous relays, or over the employment of a large, cumbersome and vulnerable baggage train are of course immense.

During the earlier reconnaissances, before the water had been thoroughly explored, there was always a danger of being led astray by the map, with the possibility of consequences which would be disastrous without cooperation with aircraft. On one occasion a column halted for the night near a spring which was used by the troops that night for the first time. Here no information could be obtained of the water ahead of the column although a certain *Ain Ghattar* was shown boldly on the map as a reliable spring. It was determined, therefore, to fill every form of water-holding vessel available before moving off in the morning and to forbid entirely the use of water until the situation had developed. The column moved at 05.30 hours with forty gallons of water for seventy horses. *Ain Ghattar* was reached at midday and found to be completely dry. This was in March after a winter of plentiful rains, and it has since been established that this particular spring is a most unreliable one. The question then was, should the column push on to another well of uncertain reliability, or should it retrace its steps to the water already known? It was decided to water horses from the men's water bottles and push on. The officer in charge of the advanced landing-ground, by means of a message picked up by a Bristol Fighter on patrol from the lip of a steep wadi, was informed what the circumstances were, and was requested to be ready to drop water by parachute or by landing, the following morning.

The column then pushed on down a track shown on the map as *Darb Sultana*, "The King's Highway," which is in some places ten inches broad and others two feet. The going proved so bad that night came on before the farther well had been reached. The column then halted until 04.00 hours on the following morning, when the cavalry moved off, the camels having to remain halted until daylight as some of the civilian baggage camels were suffering from night-blindness. The spring was reached at 08.10 hours, and was found to contain abundant water. The men had by the time they arrived at the spring been twenty-seven hours without water and had been marching for sixteen hours. The exhaustion of men and animals delayed the march and it was clear that the programme would be exceeded by a day, so that, by means of another message picked up, it was arranged to make a forward dump of water, forage and rations, as far along the route as motor cars could get.

Air Force cooperation in this case enabled the march to be continued even after water had failed, because the gravity of the risk

was lessened by the possibility of water being dropped by parachutes or landed. When twenty-four hours' marching time was lost, the resulting deficiency in rations was made up by means of picking up messages, thus it was no longer necessary to march horses and men in an exhausted condition. This could only have led to casualties to horses, which would in turn have led to some of the men having to march on foot, long day's marches, many feet below sea-level.

Thus without cooperation with the air, the process of checking the map, and establishing water points, with a view to making subsequent more extended operations, would have been a laborious business and would have occupied a considerably longer period.

Even with the problems of the map and of water solved and in addition to the transport of rations by aircraft, air cooperation is invaluable in other respects. It has the moral effect on the Bedouin mind which enables a force accompanied by aircraft to move in considerably less strength than a force not so accompanied : aircraft are the only means of getting a sick or badly wounded man back to hospital : without aircraft any change in the programme introducing delay with its consequent increased expenditure of rations would be a serious matter.

Changes in plan which cannot be foreseen occur for many reasons. The weather is an important factor, as if the wadis fill from heavy rain, although the water problem is thereby immediately solved, yet, on the other hand, camels must halt until the mud is dry enough to prevent them from slipping under their loads. Camels become terrified by mud : their pads are anything but non-skid, and if pressed to continue the march their legs slip in all directions ; they fall heavily and break their peculiarly brittle bones. If they can be persuaded to march at all after rain, they move reluctantly and stubbornly very slowly and methodically, complaining perpetually. In a mixed column when the mud is partially dry the passage of the cavalry over the ground will often give it a surface sufficiently dry for camels. But on account of the camels' fear of, and their helplessness in, slippery mud, rain must always cause some delay to them. Secondly, the day's march and its pace may be much reduced by the capture of a number of dismounted prisoners, who cannot keep up with their mounted escort. Unforeseen delays may also occur from the inaccuracy of maps. In one case a road known to exist was shown on the map as a perfectly straight track about three and a half miles in length, *i.e.* an hour's march. When it was investigated, however, this particular track was found to run along the bed of a deep wadi, which twisted and

turned to such an extent, that the march took three and a quarter hours. Instances of this kind are common. Delay may always occur when dealing with a nomadic population, by finding many more tents in an area than was expected. These have to be visited to see if any undesirables are about, and these visits lead to interminable delays punctuated by numerous cups of coffee. Coffee drinking, and Arab hospitality in general, are to a person fully occupied one of the menaces of the East. It is extremely difficult to refuse a welcome without giving grave offence, and yet with a people to whom time is a matter of no account, to accept hospitality is to lose at least one hour's riding time even if only coffee, cheese, olives, dates, etc., are consumed, while four hours are required if a sheep is killed.*

It will thus be seen that changes in plan must be of frequent occurrence, but they are of no real importance provided that aircraft are at hand to redress the ration balance, whereas in dealing with a desert country in which rations cannot be procured locally, the ration programme has to be adhered to absolutely if the assistance of aircraft is not available.

The risk of non-flying days occurring in the desert is not apparently great, as although at certain seasons of the year there are days when wind and rain and, more frequently, sandstorms occur which make it impossible to distinguish landing-grounds and are therefore unfit for flying, the duration of these storms is as a rule short, and the effects of rain quickly disappear in the sand.

The coordination of the movement of two columns by air is a matter of some importance. If two or more columns are sent out with trackers to locate any band of brigands, etc., it is impossible to lay down prescribed routes. They must follow the tracks. Without support from the air each column would be detached on an independent and more or less unknown mission. With air support, if one column is successful in locating the enemy, the other columns can be directed to places where they can join in the pursuit and so cut off the enemy from his water or attack him in rear. This is clearly of immense assistance in this kind of warfare, which could not be effected by mounted orderlies, owing to the uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the other columns.

If baggage camels are employed—and in the country under review in addition to forage camels enough baggage camels are as

* From visits of this kind work quite unexpected may result. On one occasion the brother of a man wanted for the murder of a *gendarme* two years previously was found after dark at a water-hole. He disclosed the whereabouts of his brother, whose arrest led to a diversion which lost a complete day.

a rule required to carry sufficient water to give horses one drink per day owing to the distance separating wells—the baggage column should always halt before dark. The reason for this is that apart from the desirability of watering horses before dark, amongst civilian transport camels there are always some that cannot see in the dark and so come to grief with their loads if kept on the march for long after sunset.

The usual procedure is for the main column to move off at the trot. It then carries out whatever duties it has to perform and the baggage column moves independently, with its escort following the tracks of the main body. If the ground is hard and does not show camel tracks clearly enough for an amateur tracker, a half-section mounted on horses is usually put in rear of the camels to cut a clearer track, and the presence of English horse-shoes as opposed to Arab shoes is a clear indication that the baggage train is following the column and is not diverted by the tracks of other camels.

The main body has to halt in sufficient time to allow the baggage train to close in before dark. If touch is maintained by connecting files, an enormous number of men is required to connect up the main body moving sometimes at six miles an hour with the baggage train moving always at three miles an hour. If communication is not maintained, there is a danger of the main body getting too far ahead as the baggage train may be delayed by some cause or another, and be left on the move in the dark. The camels then often become blind, with the result that the pace is reduced to a crawl, water reaches the horses after dark, forage and rations have to be issued in the dark, and the men are still making their bread when they ought to be sleeping.

On the other hand, by arranging that the last air patrol in the afternoon should indicate to the main body the position of the baggage train, a halt can be made at an appropriate place and none of the difficulties mentioned above is encountered. They are difficulties which may appear small on paper, but which are very real. A sick animal or a sick man is a real embarrassment to a force working with none of the amenities provided by the R.A.M.C. and the R.A.V.C.

Considerable experiments have been made with camel-borne wireless pack sets. The problem that has to be solved arises from the necessity for arranging an equal load on both sides of the pack saddle and from the undesirability of lashing any bulky package, such as the engine, above the camel's hump. The greater the height

given to a load over the hump, the more is the lateral play of the pads of the saddle developed by a camel's action, *i.e.* sore backs.

It has finally been arranged that by using spare accumulators instead of an engine, and by using a hard generator an admirably distributed load is obtained, and a highly efficient one-camel load wireless set capable of being unpacked and erected in fifteen minutes has been evolved. It makes, however, a heavy load, and in practice it has been proved more satisfactory, on account of the necessity for equal distribution of the load, to keep the set as a one-camel set, but to have a spare camel and to transfer the load from one to another from time to time, a matter of a few moments. Palestinian *personnel* are now being trained as wireless operators.

The services of an R.A.F. officer with the column on the ground when aircraft are cooperating is invaluable. The decision as to whether an aeroplane should be called upon to land must rest with him, and he should be in charge of all work connected with the clearing and marking out of landing-grounds, etc. He knows which pilots are flying, and being acquainted with their individual capabilities, can select the landing-grounds accordingly. It is also at present necessary for the R.A.F. wireless *personnel* to work under his command.

Moreover, the R.A.F. undoubtedly benefits from the knowledge of the country which is obtained by its officers accompanying a column on the ground. They can map out air routes, which, if followed, would enable ground troops to reach aircraft, if compelled to make a forced landing. This is a matter of some importance in a country as broken as the desert of Southern Palestine. A cross-country air route may necessitate a forced landing in an area inaccessible to any ground troops except to slow-moving infantry, who in such an emergency would need to have all its own emergency requirements in the way of rations and water carried on foot.

Message picking up is normally called for by the R.A.F. liaison officer, but officers and men are trained to call for message picking up and to arrange the gear on their own initiative and without assistance from the R.A.F.

When trying to attract the attention of aircraft, it has occasionally been found that the smoke of a smoke bomb closely resembles the sulphurous colour of the sand, sometimes making it impossible for a pilot of an aeroplane to locate the ground forces. In such circumstances the flash from the mirror of a helio directed upwards towards the aeroplane has been rapidly picked up by pilots,

particularly when the aeroplane is flying between the sun and the mirror.

Cooperation with aircraft has been highly successfully employed in another direction, namely in locating the fords of the Jordan. It was discovered that on no map is the Jordan traced in a manner which bears the slightest resemblance to the actual course of the river, except in the centre section, where on one sheet of the map the true course, determined during the war from air photographs, has been superimposed over the inaccurate course. No new names had, however, accompanied the superimposed course. The fords as shown on the map are in many cases—probably in the majority of cases—wrongly located or wrongly named, or both. An adequate knowledge of the fords is a matter of some importance as it affects contraband, evasion of passport and quarantine regulations, and the holding of the fords may prevent the exit or entry of a raiding party.

The Jordan, therefore, was photographed from the air ; it was then reconnoitred by officers equipped with air photographs. All the fords were located and their most commonly used names established after exhaustive inquiries, and a mosaic of air photographs has now been made showing the true trace of the river, the fords and their approaches. Previous to this reconnaissance it was so difficult to find out the truth concerning the fords that on the 21st of March, 1918, troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force carried out feint attacks at five fords, namely Auja, Mendessi, Enkhola, Yehud and Henu. Of these five fords the first two are really the same ford, and the last three have certainly not existed since 1919, nor can any evidence be produced from the Adwan Arabs, who are permanently resident along the eastern bank of the stretch of the Jordan concerned, that such fords ever existed. The names, to-day at any rate, would appear to be the names of districts and not fords.

The results, then, of systematic cooperation between the R.A.F. and local ground troops over a period of two years has been to reestablish knowledge over a wide expanse of unknown and difficult desert, and to carry out a complete and accurate reconnaissance of a river the banks of which are heavily hemmed in by dense undergrowth, and which is twisted in its course into a series of most intricate loops. These results would not have been achieved by either of the two forces acting independently.

TRIPHIBIOUS WARFARE: A STUDY IN RELATIVITY.

BY CAPTAIN A. L. PEMBERTON, M.C., R.A.

I

IN a recent number of the *Army Quarterly** there appeared an article on land and sea warfare, in which the author seemed to imply that in future wars sea-power would be robbed of much of the importance which it has held in the past. With the development of air-power, so the argument ran, blows may be rained with such rapidity upon the nerve centres of a hostile nation that a decision will have been reached before any of the older methods of offensive action will have had time to operate. The conclusion, therefore, seemed to be that whilst on a land frontier there might still be some use for a highly mechanized field army, in the case of a sea Power the action of its navy would be confined to a futile bombardment of the enemy's coastline. Possibly I have misinterpreted the author's meaning, and he is lying in wait under the guise of his anonymity for just such a criticism as this. One is always a little suspicious of anonymous articles as a means of baiting the unwary critic. However, once one's mind has become set upon the idea of putting its thoughts upon paper, it is of little consequence what previous writers have meant, so long as what they have written is open to misinterpretation.

There is, of course, no doubt that the author of the above-mentioned article did not intend to imply that the need for a navy would entirely disappear, for he refers in his concluding paragraphs to the desirability of a "unity in trinity" of the three great fighting Services. Nevertheless, there is that statement about the bombardment of the enemy's coastline, which, however lightly it may have been intended, cannot fail to evoke a protest from a conscientious reader.

* See "Air and Land Warfare. An Examination of the Reasons for the Divergence of Opinion between the Army and the Royal Air Force." *Army Quarterly*, July, 1925.

In a discussion of this nature, where primary strategical objectives alone are worthy of consideration, it seems a pity to drag in such obviously trivial details. It gives the impression that the author himself suspects some of his readers of being ignorant enough to imagine that that is not the purpose for which a navy might have been built.

Now any one with the most elementary knowledge of the principles of war will realize that the primary objective of any instrument of war is the destruction of the fighting forces of the enemy. The only useful form of fleet, therefore, is a battle fleet, and its military object is the destruction of the enemy's battle fleet. If it so happens that the enemy has not got a battle fleet, then this object will have been achieved without fighting, and theoretically the necessity for any form of offensive naval action disappears. Only in the case of a military landing having been decided upon will the guns of a fleet be supplied with a legitimate military objective. For the rest, a navy might well be put away in cold storage, so to speak, and money and men be concentrated against the armed land and air forces of the enemy which do exist.

One must beware, however, of being carried too far by this idea of the offensive, for every offensive is based upon the desire to defend something, and in the case of a navy the thing to be defended is the mercantile marine. Admiral Mahan has written that "a navy without merchant shipping is like a tree without roots," but one would probably be nearer the mark if one likened it to some monstrous parasite that saps the energy of the parent plant without giving anything in return. The vital object of the mercantile marine is to fill the people's bellies, and it is this fact alone which entitles it to protection against attack. Take away this life-giving property and the necessity for a navy is at once removed.

It is this economic factor which is really at the root of all national wars, and in the light of which any discussion of military policy should be approached. In employing the simile of the two boxers the author of the article under discussion implies that it is possible for one nation to deliver a knock-out blow to its adversary by physical violence only. He has thus invested war with something of the artificial atmosphere of the prize ring. But is it really possible that a healthy, vigorous nation will allow itself to be terrified into surrender by the massacre of a certain percentage of its women and children, or the destruction of some of its most cherished public buildings? That is surely the way to rouse, not to quell,

the fighting instinct of a warlike people, provided always that they have got something for which it is worth fighting.

Herein lies the whole crux of the problem. What is the object for which a first-class modern war is going to be waged? Obviously not for the mere fun of the thing. Probably not even for some high-sounding principle of international procedure. There is the authority of so eminent a soldier as Marshal Foch for stating that "war, to-day, is a commercial enterprise undertaken by the whole nation. It concerns the individual more closely than did war in the past, and therefore appeals much more to individual passions." * The Marshal lays stress, it will be seen, upon the economic aspect of the problem. War is a commercial enterprise, a business which is concerned first and foremost with the national food supply. This is in line with Napoleon's famous remark that "an army marches on its belly." It is also in line with the teachings of Admiral Mahan with regard to naval warfare, and of Major-General Sir F. H. Sykes with regard to aerial warfare. "In the future our security will depend upon superiority in the air as it has depended in the past upon our superiority at sea. And this superiority in the air can only be attained in the same way in which we secured our supremacy at sea. That supremacy was not really gained by developing great navies. It was gained by our mercantile marine, which made the great navies possible. Our future security can only be gained by the development of commercial aviation." †

Clearly, then, this problem should be approached upon a truly business basis, and what better basis could there be for this purpose than the well-known economic law of supply and demand? War, it is admitted, is based upon the self-assertive instinct, or the will to live, call it what one likes, and military, naval and aerial armaments are but the reaction of this instinct to the environment. They have been called into being by the necessity of ensuring the supply, or of enforcing the demand. The relative importance of each will depend entirely upon the circumstances of the moment. I say circumstances of the moment advisedly, because this action between man and his environment is a thoroughly reciprocal one. By working he changes his environment, which in turn changes him, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus there is seemingly an endless process in which man is continually solving old difficulties only to find that he has thereby created new ones.

But although the outward form of man's activities is thus con-

* See "Principles of War," by Marshal Foch, p. 37.

† See "Aviation in Peace and War," by Major-General Sir F. H. Sykes, p. 139.

stantly changing, the principles which guide these activities remain the same. Other instincts may be added to the will to live, gentler manners may mask the savage selfishness of earlier times, but the source of man's energy still springs from vitamins, proteins, fats and carbohydrates. The British Dominion in India, it is said, is based upon a seventeenth-century desire for more vitamins, or whatever it is that is lacking in a winter diet of dried beef.

The whole problem can be resolved, therefore, into the one great question of supply and demand, and its corollary, communications. Admiral Mahan was of the opinion that "the history of the sea-board nations has been less determined by the shrewdness and foresight of governments than by conditions of positions, extent, configuration, number and character of people—by what are called, in a word, natural conditions." * Had I the space at my disposal, I might show that the military greatness attained by any state has varied directly as its accessibility to the main trade routes of the world—accessibility be it noted, not merely proximity. Switzerland lies very close to many of the central European trade routes, but she has never become a great military Power, owing to the inaccessibility of her frontiers. Persia occupies a commanding strategical position upon the waters of the Persian Gulf, but she has not been able to make it a Persian gulf in anything but the name, owing to the absence of good natural harbours and the lack of a sea sense amongst the people.

It is remarkable how often such a coincidence as this occurs. Persia has a lengthy coastline, favourably situated, but is blessed with no good natural harbours. The Persians, so their historians tell us, show a rooted dislike for the sea. Switzerland is surrounded on all sides by a barrier of inaccessible mountains. The Swiss are a peace-loving nation, whose name has become associated with works of mercy and international arbitration. England is rich in good natural harbours, and occupies a commanding strategical position at the western entrances to continental Europe. The English possess a sea sense and a trading instinct that have given rise to a mighty Empire. France, with a coastline of 1,760 miles, as opposed to a land frontier of 1,665 miles, has her best harbour on the Mediterranean more than 300 miles from the main trade routes through that sea, three naval harbours on the Atlantic, which have to be approached through the heavy seas and westerly gales of the Bay of Biscay, and one port only on the English Channel and that

* See "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," by Capt. A. T. Mahan, p. 28.

an artificial one. The French, "as compared with other historical sea-peoples, have never held more than a respectable position." *

One might multiply such examples, but enough has been written perhaps to give what "Pooh-Bah" would have called "artistic verisimilitude to a bald and unconvincing narrative." With the philosophical problem of ultimate responsibility I am happily not concerned. It may be that historians, hypnotized as it were by the pleasant doctrine of free will, have given undue prominence to the parts played by kings and princes, and not enough to environment and the action of the, so-called, silent masses. But one will have learnt his lesson if he has seized upon the one outstanding feature, to wit the relativity of the forces that play about the trade routes of the world. Military success is not to be attained by the magnification of one arm out of all proportion to the importance of the interests that it guards.

In our own case, if the day ever comes when the mouths of our people can be adequately filled by the efforts of air-borne commerce, then, and then only, is the Royal Air Force likely to oust the Royal Navy from the first place in the affections of the masses. In the meantime, no minor military achievements, such as that of the Royal Air Force in Iraq or on the North-West Frontier of India since the war, should be allowed to dim our sense of proportion or to blind us to the economic principles on which a national war is based. Without wishing to disparage the fine work that has been done in these countries, and whilst admitting that it has been done as efficiently and perhaps more economically than ever the Army was able to do it before, I would draw attention to the fact that it is police work rather than serious warfare. To argue therefrom that an air force alone could win a war is like saying that the London Police Force could, if it wished, exercise a military domination over the whole of the rest of the population of that city. It might, so long as the food supply of the people was not interfered with. We are naturally a law-abiding race, and the sight of a blue uniform is enough to make most of us assume a correct and conventional manner. But a man must eat to live and there comes a point when hunger must break through the bonds of discipline. That is the time when real war begins and man-power is the only thing that matters.

This is what history has taught us in the past, and I can see

* See "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," by Capt. A. T. Mahan, p. 53.

no reason why it should not repeat the same lesson in the future. Man is the centre of the business and it seems illogical to make him the servant, instead of the master, of his own machines. It is not the aeroplane that matters so much as the man in the aeroplane, and in the last resort that man has got to come out and use his fists if need be. Otherwise, he becomes a sort of human lobster, powerful only by reason of his shell.

To summarize, the really successful nations have always been the well-balanced nations, and, if we are to maintain our Empire, we must cling above all things to our sense of proportion. "It is not necessary to meet all others combined, as some Englishmen have seemed to think; it is necessary only to be able to meet the strongest on favourable terms, sure that the others will not join in destroying a factor in the political equilibrium, even if they hold aloof." * A one-Power standard upon the sea, therefore, should suffice since we have a seaborne commerce to defend. Likewise we should have a one-Power standard in the air, since we have also an airborne commerce to defend. On the land we require a police force only, with just the spear-head of a greater formation, round which to group a national army when the crisis comes. "A policy which involves the provision of an army permanently organized in large formations, complete in every respect, and adequate to meet the requirements of a great war, is neither practicable nor advisable for the British Empire." †

Finally, there is the political factor to be considered. In the end, for aught we know, disintegration may come from within and not from without. If we would guard against this, we must ensure that our military policy is based upon sound psychological foundations.

II

It is not always easy to strike a balance between naval, military, air and political considerations. It is even less easy to devise an organization of the Services involved which shall combine the rigidity necessary to ensure speed and concentration of effort with the elasticity required to meet a change in circumstances. Unity of control is one of the five principles of war organization, and unity of control, applied in this instance, points indubitably to a National

* See "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," by Capt. A. T. Mahan, p. 156.

† See F.S.R., s. 2, para. 3.

Defence Ministry and what may be termed a "Triphibious Staff," capable of coordinating, under the direction of that Ministry, the efforts of all three fighting Services. This, however, represents an ideal which is generally believed to be beyond the immediate grasp of the human mind. The soldier does not believe that the sailor could ever be made to understand a problem from the purely military standpoint, and the sailor harbours similar thoughts about the soldier. Moreover, they are both agreed that the other is right, which is of course an excellent state of affairs, and so they decide to work upon a friendly, rather than upon a family, basis. And so it is with the airman. He too feels that he must have a Ministry of his own, which can protect his interests from those who, however friendly they may be, cannot be expected to appreciate his requirements at their true value.

This is a perfectly natural attitude of mind, if we consider the particular stage of evolution in which we happen to find ourselves to-day. Cooperation, if it is to be lasting, must proceed from below and not from above, and war in the modern sense—*i.e.* national war—is of too recent a birth to expect much in the way of national cohesion and unity of control. But now that the idea of a National Defence Ministry has been shelved for the time being, there is a danger of our losing sight of the ideal, and resting satisfied with the makeshift. Because it is impossible, or because it is now believed to be impossible, for one brain to cope with the details of triphibious warfare, there is no reason why such a view should continue indefinitely. And, if history is any guide, the necessary brain-power will certainly not fail to be evolved.

Let us take a glimpse at history and see. Four hundred years ago there was little or no distinction between the control of the fighting Services ashore and afloat. Military leaders, like Monck and Prince Rupert, would think nothing of a sudden venture upon the high seas. But with the increase in size of sailing ships, and the consequent complications in navigation, there came a cleavage between the fighting and navigational staffs, which resulted in the gradual elimination of the soldier from the sea. And with separation came bitter jealousies and misunderstandings. General Callwell has presented us with a melancholy list of examples of disagreement and lack of cooperation between armies and navies, both British and foreign. There were Drake and Norreys, Penn and Venables, Vernon and Wentworth, Nelson and Moore, and many others to prove the difficulties of collaboration. Naturally, so long as such misunderstandings persisted, "there was dislike

between the Services in the upper ranks and in the lower ranks." *

Gradually, however, there came the reaction towards a closer understanding and sympathy. Mutual recriminations, at least in public, were laid aside, and a genuine effort was made to work together in cooperation. By the end of the nineteenth century the hatchet was already more than half buried. It needed only a common crisis and common sufferings to seal the bonds that peaceful cooperation had been forging. These came with the Great War, and with the finish of that war ended the controversy that had embittered for so long the relations between the "dry land" and the "blue water" schools of thought. Is it, then, too much to expect that the two Services—and the air arm—will one day work amicably together under the direction of a single chief and a triphibious staff?

Mention of the staff should remind us that it is only within the past twenty-five years that soldiers themselves have so far composed their differences as to combine together under one General Staff. Yet see what has been done in that comparatively short space of time with the help of that blessed word, cooperation!

Most interesting of all in this respect is the recent history of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. Here we have a complete evolutionary cycle, the whole occupying the space only of about twenty-five years. In 1901 there occurred a typical cleavage of the kind we have been considering, when the artillery was divided into two branches, not very happily designated as "field" and "garrison." The cause of the split was, as it always is, complication of matériel. Its result was to produce a segregation of *personnel* into two groups, one of which tended to concentrate on mobility of body and to neglect the mind, whilst the other tended to concentrate on mobility of mind and to neglect the body. Neither party would concede the possibility of its place being successfully filled by the other. Both tended to exaggerate their differences, as if determined to maintain the gulf that yawned between them. Then came the Great War and all these differences disappeared in the melting-pot of suffering and sacrifice. To-day we see again a united Regiment of Artillery, with one aim and one method of attaining it.

It is not that artillery equipment has been simplified by the colossal upheaval through which we have just been passing. The

* See "Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance," by Colonel C. E. Callwell, p. 15.

problems that the gunner may be called upon to solve are much more varied now than they were at the beginning of the last decade. Yet in spite of this the re-amalgamation of the artillery has produced no difficulties beyond our mental grasp. How then can it be that the previous separation was necessitated by the limitations of our mental powers?

The truth seems to be that these periodic disintegrations are the result of some deep disruptive force within us, rather than the carefully considered plans of consciousness. They remind one of the eternal conflict that goes on in the world around us between the atomic forces of attraction and repulsion. The positive charge, or proton, builds up its satellite electrons into the atom. The atom unites with other atoms to form the molecule. The molecule unites again with other molecules to form the compound. Sometimes, when the environment changes, the bonds that hold the parts together are severed, and disintegration follows. But always, side by side with this tendency to dissipate, there is the opposite and even stronger tendency to combine and cooperate. The energy of the world is continually being organized into more complicated and less accessible forms. To use the scientific jargon of thermodynamics, the energy of the world remains constant, whereas its entropy is continually on the increase.

Man is admittedly not on the same level as inorganic matter, but, if one is to believe what the psychologists tell one, he is largely impelled by instincts, and there is to be found amongst his instincts the same conflict that exists between the forces of the physical world. There is the primitive "ego" instinct, which prompts us to assert ourselves and to be different to our fellows; and there is the "herd" instinct, which prompts us to sink our differences and to obey the common law.

No matter where one turns, in fact, one is confronted by this same idea of conflict, or the interaction of opposites. In war itself there is the conflict between the necessity to concentrate and the necessity to disperse. One must disperse to protect oneself. One must concentrate to fight. And since there is no victory without battle, it is concentration that must end the tale.

It looks, therefore, as if concentration must be our final goal, and if that be the case, it is well that our thoughts should be bent upon the idea of cooperation. Our artillery to-day is re-united, but in other directions disruptions have occurred which seem likely to require a long period for their reconstruction. Take, for example, the Royal Tank Corps. Whatever the immediate future of this

corps may be, it seems certain that its ultimate fate must be as follows—either it must be absorbed into the artillery, or it must itself absorb the whole of the rest of the Army. In the latter case we should be provided with a simple solution to our difficulties, for warfare would then have become crystallized into the manœuvring and engagement of fleets on the land, at sea and in the air.

Till then, perhaps, it may be wise to postpone any attempt at common leadership. But a start might be made by laying the groundwork for the formation of a triphibious staff. After all, the principles of war are the same, wherever it is fought, and differences in procedure are often more apparent than real. "Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all who seek it."* It is not mental incapacity, however, that thwarts cooperation so much as mental inertia, or the tendency to follow blindly along the paths of prejudice and passion.

* See "Principles of War," by Marshal Foch, p. 103.

THE GERMAN PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO THE LOSS OF THE WAR

IN 1919 the German Reichstag appointed a Parliamentary Committee to inquire into the causes of the outbreak of the war, its long duration and its loss. Recently one of the sub-committees of this body, the fourth, issued a lengthy report in three volumes. This, so far, is the only result of the labours of the Committee. Fully aware that its length would militate against many of the public making themselves acquainted with its contents, Dr. Albrecht Philip, president of the fourth sub-committee, has prepared an authoritative summary, entitled the *Ursachen des deutschen militärischen Zusammenbruch*, 1918—the Causes of the German Military Collapse, 1918—from which the following particulars are taken.

The original Committee, appointed in July, 1919, for the purpose of inquiring into the loss of the war, was directed to report the names of persons who came under suspicion of having a share in bringing about, prolonging or losing the war, so that they might be tried by court martial. It was the outward sign of the wrath of the Republic against the old Army. Through fear of this wrath Ludendorff had taken refuge in Sweden. But the military party regained much of its old power, owing to the assistance it gave in suppressing the Communist risings; Ludendorff returned; and the scope of the Committee was gradually watered down. It was instructed not to look for guilty persons, but merely to find the facts. The very inconvenient inquiry into the causes of the outbreak was entirely dropped; other equally inconvenient subjects went the same way, such as: the failure to take opportunities of making peace, the treatment of Belgians (with the sub-headings, *franc-tireur* war, destruction of localities, shooting of civilians, economic damage, espionage, removal of civilian population, violations of the Hague Conventions); the relations between officers and men; the effects of disorders in the Homeland on the Army and Navy; the influence of revolutionary propaganda.

On the dissolution of the Weimar Constituent Assembly, the

Inquiry was started anew in July, 1920, but the fourth sub-committee, the only one that seems to have survived, was merely given, first, three questions, and later two others, to investigate : (1) the origin, execution and collapse of the offensives of 1918 ; (2) whether the defeats at the front in 1918 could be attributed to disorders in the Army ; (3) the reaction of economic, social and moral disorder in the Homeland on the Army and Navy ; (4) whether internal politics affected the resisting power of front and Homeland ; (5) how far propaganda (revolutionary and annexionist) had a disintegrating effect.

The sub-committee proceeded by rather curious ways : it called in three experts, Professor Delbrück, the historian, Colonel Schwertfeger, a well-known authority on the history of the Hanoverian Army, and General von Kuhl, Kluck's and later Prince Rupprecht's Chief of the Staff, to tackle and report on the first question, and employed Herr Simon Katzenstein, a publicist, to deal with the second and third questions. It left questions (4) and (5) alone, and substituted an inquiry as to whether the Army received a " stab in the back," and this was handed over to a lawyer, Dr. Herz. The inquiries into questions (2), (3), (4) and (5) have not yet been concluded, and no results as regards them have been published.

The reports of the experts on question (1) about the 1918 offensives were published in 1923 ; they formed, the author thinks, only a " torso " ; and the draft of the conclusions to be drawn from them prepared by the " reporter " of the sub-committee, Dr. Deermann, member of the Reichstag, was not accepted, as it put the moral blame on General Ludendorff.

The powers of the fourth sub-committee were renewed by the new Reichstags of May and December, 1924, and it proceeded to send Deermann's draft report to Ludendorff for criticism. On his declining and replying that his views were well known, it employed General Wetzell, Ludendorff's Chief of the Operations Section, to express his views on it, and he wrote a long irrelevant memoir on 1918.

To sum up the four documents before the Committee : Professor Delbrück makes out a strong case against Ludendorff, and is of opinion that a peace of understanding would have been possible had the men of the Supreme Command desired it and renounced all idea of annexations. Colonel Schwertfeger regards the course of events as inevitable, thinks no one was to blame and that Germany was the victim of fate. General von Kuhl considers that the guilt

of the Supreme Command is not proved, and that the causes of the military collapse were beyond its control. General Wetzell only produced a statement of the course of events of technical value.

On the above reports the sub-committee produced its own conclusions and "whitewashed" everybody. It declared that the "system" was not to blame, it was the same as in previous wars; that there was no failure of connection between the civil and military authorities, and between them and the Kaiser; but by a majority it declined to say that

"the mutual connection between the Kaiser, the Government and the Supreme Command was assured by carefully selected persons, in every way equal to their task."

It thought, however, that equilibrium was upset towards the end of the war by the stronger personality of the military chiefs.

"After the fall of Bethmann-Hollweg, the supremacy of the Supreme Command continually increased. . . . This upset of equilibrium was undoubtedly due to the great faith of the German people in the military leaders as opposed to the Chancellor and his assistants."

The Kaiser recognized the change, and had the "good will" but not the personality to put things straight again.

As regards the possibility of peace, the sub-committee was unanimous that there was no agreement in Germany as to what the war aims were, and confirmed this practically by the fact that its own members were unable to agree among themselves on any other point except that the Allies never wanted a peace of understanding, and "as Germany was not victorious, she was not in a position to dictate a peace" (of understanding?).

As regards the decision to take the offensive in 1918, the sub-committee considered that the situation required an offensive, that American assistance was taken into account, and that the Army was fit and not physically and morally worn out. It further found that all possible troops were employed, that there was plenty of material, and that the transfer of more Austrian troops in view of the general situation was not possible. It admitted that there were not sufficient back positions prepared, but with Ludendorff's elastic defence such positions had lost in tactical importance; there were not enough tanks, but they could not have been built except by sacrificing something else, *e.g.* aeroplanes; the physical endurance of the troops in 1918 was naturally not the same as in 1914, but it was not true

that the offensives came to grief because the troops were given too much alcohol.

The sub-committee also agreed that the Foreign Office was clearly warned that the military operations might fail, and there might be need of diplomatic weapons. The defeats of the 15th of July and of the 8th of August were due to the troops, not to the incompetence of the Supreme Command. The failure of the offensive was not, however, the loss of the war; the collapse of Bulgaria and Austria made the continuance of fighting useless. The demand for an armistice was not due to defeat, but to fear of defeat, and it has been established that the Government did all it could to delay the sending of the demand for an armistice; so that finally Hindenburg-Ludendorff dispatched the message to President Wilson on their own account. The sub-committee concluded, however, that the Supreme Command always acted in good faith, and with a view to serve the common good of the Fatherland; and it found that it was expressly established that the Supreme Command did not consciously work for a "sabotage" of peace. As regards the Army, the sub-committee thinks that it "held out to the utmost of its powers." "Also no guilt can be assigned to the Imperial Government for the German accident of 1918." The dismissal of Ludendorff is "proof that the civil power was completely victorious over the military." Naturally, the general conclusion is that "nothing justifies an unfavourable verdict against any one." With this result of an Inquiry lasting six years all concerned must be highly satisfied. That wrongdoing by a nation is sometimes punished and right sometimes wins in this world does not seem to have occurred to the sub-committee. Colonel Schwertfeger gets near to it when he attributes Germany's defeat to fate and bad luck, for she had "all the aces" and ought to have won; and it is this that puzzles the simple Teuton and leads him to look for scapegoats.

THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN IN GALLIPOLI *

PART II—(*With Map*)

THE LANDING AT SUVLA ACTIONS AT CHUNUK BAIR, ARI BURNU AND SEDD-UL-BAHR THE EVACUATION OF GALLIPOLI

BETWEEN the 10th of July and the 9th of August Sir Ian Hamilton received strong reinforcements, the IX Corps (10th, 11th and 13th Divisions), and the 53rd and 54th Divisions. His plan for the utilization of these was to attack the Turkish right in the Ari Burnu area on the heights of Chunuk Bair and Koja Chemen Tepe, and simultaneously to effect a new landing at Suvla; subsequently, a combined advance was to be made against the defenders' communications at Maidos. The principal attack at Ari Burnu was to commence on the night of the 6th–7th of August to facilitate the disembarkation at Suvla. Diversions were also to take place in this sector and at Sedd-ul-Bahr, whilst a feint landing was to be made in the Gulf of Saros.

Information that fresh hostile enterprises were in preparation reached the Turks in mid-July; 50,000 men were said to be collecting in the island of Lemnos, and a general attack, combined with demonstrations in the Gulf of Saros and against the Asiatic coast, was expected early in August. The G.O.C. Fifth Army, therefore, felt little anxiety about the Suvla area, and directed his vigilance mainly to the coast about Kum Tepe, between Sedd-ul-Bahr and Ari Burnu, notwithstanding the fact that the Northern Group commander was convinced that Suvla was the point of danger. The Saros Group was increased to three divisions (6th, 7th and 12th), and the Asiatic Group to three divisions (2nd, 3rd and 11th), while the remaining division (9th) was stationed at Kum Tepe. The Sedd-ul-Bahr Group comprised three divisions (10th, 13th and 14th) in line and two (1st and 4th) in reserve; the

* Part I of this article appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, January, 1926.

Northern (Ari Burnu) Group two (16th and 19th) in line and one (5th) in reserve.

1. *The Fighting at Sedd-ul-Bahr, 6th-7th of August*

In the afternoon of the 6th of August the British attacked and took part of the line of the 10th Division, but were later expelled. Similar attacks the next day against the 11th and 14th Divisions met with no better success. Fighting of a sporadic and indecisive nature continued until the middle of August. Between the 6th of August and the 13th of September the Turkish casualties in this sector totalled 7,600.

The Battles on the Ari Burnu Front, 6th-10th of August

In the evening on the 6th of August the British opened their main offensive with the capture of Lone Pine, which the Turks were unable to regain, despite repeated efforts lasting for over three days ; only on the 9th was a part of the lost position wrested at last from the enemy's hands after fierce fighting. In these combats the 15th Division lost close on 7,000 men, and the assailants' object of drawing in and pinning down the defenders' local reserves in the northern sector was fully achieved.

Between the 4th and 6th of August the British farther to the north had been reinforced for the decisive attack by five brigades, bringing their total forces to 37,000 men, of whom 20,000 were to assault Chunuk Bair and Koja Chemen Tepe. At 11 p.m., on the 6th, the former of these peaks was fiercely assailed, while holding attacks were delivered farther south against the line of the 19th Division. The crest line was only weakly held by one and a half Turkish battalions, and the advance made rapid headway. Early on the 7th the ridge west of the Aghil and Asma Deres was captured and the defenders of Chunuk Bair were for a time hard pressed, the situation being saved only by the self-sacrifice of their supporting artillery and the opportune arrival of reinforcements. The attack was renewed under cover of the fire of the British naval guns early on the morning of the 8th, and on their right the British succeeded in establishing themselves on the crest of Chunuk Bair and maintained their position all day ; farther to the north the centre and left of the British attack was checked on the line of the Aghil and Asma Deres. Next day the British endeavouring to extend their success by the seizure of Besim Tepe to the north were repulsed with loss, and Mustapha Kemal, the newly-appointed commander of the Northern Group, resolved to drive them out of the positions

they had gained by a large-scale counter-attack, to be executed next morning by three regiments. This proved completely successful; the British were driven in disorder from Chunuk Bair, and the Turks recovered and consolidated the lost heights. They were unable, however, to exploit their victory owing to the effective fire from the British ships, and from machine guns posted on the ridge to the south.

From the 6th to the 10th of August the comparative losses in the Ari Burnu fighting had been 17,000 Turks as against 12,000 British.

The Landing at Suvla and the Subsequent Fighting, 6th-27th of August

The British had meanwhile dispatched the 10th and 11th Divisions (IX Corps) to land and seize the line of heights Ismail Oglu Tepe—Chocolate Hill—Kiretch Tepe. At 11.30 p.m. on the night of the 6th the disembarkation of the 11th Division commenced on a wide front on either side of Suvla Bay, and by dawn all the troops were ashore. In face of them were only one Turkish battalion and half a battalion of Gendarmerie, but so slow was the British advance that Chocolate Hill fell to them only on the evening of the 7th, although by noon the two brigades of the 10th Division had also completed their disembarkation.

No Turkish reinforcements were at hand to assist the weak forces at Suvla, but the 7th and 12th Divisions were at once ordered forward from the Saros Group, with orders to counter-attack early on the 8th. This operation had later to be postponed, first until the evening of that day, and subsequently until the next morning, owing to the late arrival of the troops and their exhaustion after a long and hurried march, of twenty-five miles in the case of the 7th Division and of close upon forty miles in the case of the 12th Division. For his decision to postpone this attack Feizi Bey, the Group commander, was relieved of his command, and replaced by Mustapha Kemal. On his arrival the latter found the troops of the 7th Division assembled east of Little Anafarta, and those of the 12th Division west of Turkhun, the objective for the attack being the line Sulajik—Chocolate Hill—the heights on either side of the Asmak Dere. The British had made no general forward movement on that day, only detachments having been pushed out to Scimitar Hill and towards Tekke Tepe, and not even the personal intervention of Sir Ian Hamilton had been able to bring about a resumption of the attack.

Early on the 9th, the 12th Division moved forward and recovered and held Chocolate Hill, in face of repeated British counter-attacks, while the 7th Division penetrated south of the Asmak Dere as far as Damakjelic Bair, from which position, however, it was later forced to retire. The 4th Division on its left made no headway. On the northern flank the British moving on Kiretch Tepe were checked about Sivri Tepe. On the 10th, and again on the 12th, partial British attacks on the sector held by the 12th Division were repulsed with severe loss. During the period from the 9th to the 13th of August the British had suffered over 8,000 casualties * as against some 3,500 among the Turks.

On the 15th and 16th of August the British resumed their attempts to penetrate along the northern coast towards Arslan Tepe. They secured and held this position for over twenty-four hours, and, on the 16th, made further progress, but eventually lost all the ground they had gained as the result of a powerful Turkish counter-attack.

Meanwhile, a new general attack by the British on Scimitar Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe was in preparation. The main effort was to be made in the centre by the 11th and 29th Divisions (the latter of which had been brought round from Helles), while a subsidiary attack in the valley of the Asmak Dere was to be launched in order to secure their right. The Turks in this sector now had three divisions (5th, 7th and 12th) to oppose to the six British divisions. On the afternoon of the 21st of August the British facing the 12th Division seized part of Chocolate Hill and some trenches to the south ; but both these gains were of short duration. On the front of the 4th Division the attack was in the main unsuccessful, but the British managed to secure and to hold Kaiajik Tepe. This was the only permanent gain made by them on this day. The British losses, moreover, amounted to 6,500 as against the defenders' 2,600. A renewal of the offensive on the 27th of August brought the attackers only petty local gains, for which they paid disproportionately in casualties. With this action operations on the Suvla front came to an end.

*The Evacuation of Gallipoli by the British, 20th of December,
1915-9th of January, 1916*

The menacing situation in the Balkans resulting from the decision of Bulgaria to join the Central Powers at the end of September, 1915, caused the dispatch of an Allied expedition to

* The actual losses were much in excess of this figure.

Salonika, and the question of abandoning the Gallipoli campaign soon became a matter for discussion. After General Monro and Lord Kitchener had both reported in favour of this course, the British Government resolved to abandon Suvla and Anzac, and to retain only a small force at Helles. The evacuation of Suvla and Anzac was successfully accomplished on the night of the 19th of December. Shortly afterwards, owing to the arrival of heavy guns and ammunition from Germany and the concentration of all the Turkish forces in the Peninsula on the Sedd-ul-Bahr front, the British evacuated Helles also on the night of the 8th-9th of January, 1916.

The Price of Victory

During the period of three hundred and twenty-four days from the first bombardment of the Dardanelles fronts, and of two hundred and fifty-nine days from the British landing, the Turkish Empire had engaged its best troops in Gallipoli and suffered its heaviest losses. By the end of September twenty-one divisions, in all over 310,000 men, were fighting in this theatre. The casualties suffered were, as far as can at present be estimated, as follows : killed, 55,127 ; wounded, 100,177 ; missing, 10,067 ; died of disease, 21,498 ; evacuated sick, 64,440 ; total, 251,309. The Allied losses were as follows : * British, 216,000 ; French, 115,000 total, 331,000.

Comments

The British plan for a holding attack at Ari Burnu combined with a landing at Suvla, to be followed by a general offensive against the flank and rear of the Turkish Northern Group, was judicious and well conceived ; had it been equally well executed, the assailants should easily have overrun the weak resistance in their front, and penetrated as far as Bighali, where they would have severed the Turkish communications and commanded the Narrows. Want of coordination between the two attacks, and lack of vigour and speed on the part of the corps disembarking at Suvla, deprived them of this decisive success.

* The actual losses, as officially given by the British and French Governments, were :

British	119,696
French	27,004
Total	146,700

These are battle casualties only, but the losses from sickness were probably less than the battle casualties.

The G.O.C. Fifth Turkish Army, as has been seen, did not expect the new landing at the spot where it actually took place and had distributed his forces so as to leave them weakest at the true point of danger. He had to guard against five possible eventualities :

(a) A new landing on the Asiatic coast. This could be met by placing one division around Eren Keui, with two others on either side of the Narrows at Chanak and Kilid Bahr ; both these latter could be concentrated in ample time to meet and check the advance of any enemy north-eastward from the Menderes.

(b) The reinforcement of the hostile fronts of Helles or Anzac—not a very probable or promising move from the enemy's point of view.

(c) A disembarkation in the area between these fronts, which could be met by the reserves of the Northern and Southern Groups in previously prepared positions.

(d) The course actually adopted by the British, of a landing to the north of the Ari Burnu front, where no defences had been erected, and where it was easy for them, securing their southern flank, to push forward by Koja Chemen Tepe against Bighali and the Narrows.

(e) A landing in the Gulf of Saros, which could have no decisive effect in its early stages, and would, moreover, be easily dealt with by the reserves of the Fifth Army in this area.

In place of the dispositions actually adopted, the following would have been more judicious :—

One division on the Asiatic shore around Eren Keui.

Two divisions in the Gulf of Saros area.

Four divisions in Army reserve, disposed at Chanak, Kilid Bahr, Kum Tepe and Turkun Keui, and available for use either on the Asiatic shore, in the interval between the northern and southern fronts, or in the Suvla area.

The preliminary operations of the British against Lone Pine on the left of the Southern Group sector, were well conceived and succeeded in their object of drawing in the reserves of that Group prior to, and in an area far from, the main attack. The defeat of that attack was due mainly to the energy and activity of the Turkish troops in the Northern Group, and to the opportune arrival of reinforcements from their comrades in the south.

General Conclusions

At the time of the opening of the Dardanelles campaign the situation in the main theatres of war was generally more favourable for the *Entente* than for the Central Powers. In those theatres in which Turkish troops had been fighting, their offensive in the Caucasus had definitely failed with very heavy losses ; the operations in Iraq had come to a pause after the first British successes ; and on the Sinai front contact had been lost after the repulse of the expedition against the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, six army corps were retained in Thrace to meet an attack against Constantinople, which was expected at any time.


The occupation of this city, which would at once have driven Turkey to make terms, or at any rate have incapacitated her for operations in Europe, was certainly one of the *Entente's* primary military objectives. It would have facilitated the supply of arms and munitions to Russia and permitted the utilization on a large scale of that Power's resources in man-power and foodstuffs—an object which could be achieved in no other way than by the opening of the Straits. A naval attack executed with rapidity and vigour at the outbreak of the war might have been successful ; the operation was in actual fact carried out by too small forces, and was not persisted in after the first failure and its resulting losses. The attack by land was in itself more promising, but the method of execution by small forces, subsequently reinforced as need arose, foredoomed it to a less measure of success than would have been achieved by a stronger and better-equipped army, which could from the first have sustained a vigorous offensive.

The *Entente* Powers were for the moment secure in the West, as the bulk of the German forces were preparing for an offensive campaign against Russia ; they had repulsed the attack on Egypt, and held the upper hand in Iraq. They might well, therefore, have sent to the Dardanelles considerably more than the 90,000 men actually dispatched, against whom the defence could deploy 84,000 (six divisions and one cavalry brigade) in a very short space of time. Had they, as they might well have done, landed an army of some 225,000, they must have achieved a speedy and complete victory, with military and political consequences of vast importance.

Among the minor causes of the *Entente's* failure may be mentioned :

- (1) The omission to make extensive use of submarines against

BURNU and SUVLA



[To face page 94.]

1
1
1
1
1

the Turkish communications by sea, and of their fleet against those by land by way of the isthmus of Bulair.

(2) The lack of heavy artillery, without which the attacks at Helles and Anzac had little hope of success, and which the guns of the fleet could not adequately replace.

(3) The prudence and fear of casualties shown in many of the infantry attacks.

(4) A lack of vigour in their operations which became more and more evident as time went on, owing no doubt to inadequate training and lack of experience among the newly-arrived troops.

(5) The increase of epidemic diseases, especially dysentery, which could not be checked, despite the high degree of excellence attained by the medical services.

The Turkish High Command, by its failure to reinforce the Dardanelles Army, after the repulse of the first naval attack, from the mass of ten divisions standing idle around the capital, committed a grave error, for which the necessity for watching Russia and Bulgaria was no sufficient excuse. It was believed that the force on the spot was adequate to defend the coast against any attempt at a landing, whilst if the worst happened reinforcements could always be dispatched, as and when need arose. The full importance, both political and military, of the Dardanelles was not realized, and the hypothetical attack from the north was more dreaded than the one actually impending in the south. Possession of the Dardanelles was a vital matter for Turkey, and too many troops could not have been devoted to securing it; whilst if the *Entente* Fleets had appeared before Constantinople, the eight divisions retained there would have been impotent to defend it. An army of four corps should have been organized to defend the Dardanelles and the coast-line of Anatolia and Thrace to the north and south; while another of two corps, stationed in the capital and at Adrianople, would have given ample security against a Russian or Bulgarian attack.

Two minor details that should have received attention were the appointment of a supreme commander for both the land and sea defences of the Dardanelles and the allocation of all heavy guns available to the Gallipoli Peninsula. Both these measures would have greatly facilitated the task of the defence.

Finally, a word must be said in praise of the medical services of the Fifth Army, which did most excellent work under very onerous conditions and despite extreme poverty of means.

A NEW LIGHT UPON THE INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA BY THE RUSSIANS IN AUGUST, 1914

(With Map)

BY ALEXANDER SMIRNOFF

Two very important books have recently appeared in Russian which deal with the beginning of the World War. Both of them were published outside Russia and were written by generals of the Imperial Army, now living abroad as refugees. These books are a valuable contribution to the literature of the World War, because nothing so far has come from an authoritative author concerning the events of the campaign in East Prussia from the Russian side. It is now possible to construct for the first time a tolerably clear picture of the state of affairs which reigned at Russian G.H.Q., and under what conditions the Armies of Russia fought from the beginning of hostilities.

General Daniloff, late Quartermaster-General under the Grand Duke Nicholas, gives the history of war for the first twelve months, until the Grand Duke was superseded by the Emperor in August, 1915. Placed in such a responsible position immediately below General Yanushkevich, the Chief of Staff, he had an exceptional opportunity of seeing the inner working of the Higher Command at first hand.

General N. Golovin, late Professor at the Military Academy of Petrograd, and some time Military Attaché to the Imperial Embassy in Paris, describes the invasion by the Russian Armies of East Prussia in August, 1914.

It is to be regretted that those two works have not as yet been translated into English. General Ironside's book, "Tannenburg," though interesting, cannot take the place of General Golovin's invaluable work, for the latter had access to more documents and private letters, besides being in close touch with many of the surviving generals who took part in the invasion of East Prussia.

Let us now see in what atmosphere the Russian leaders had to carry out their plans.

There can be no doubt that Russia began the war unprepared. That she more than any other country wished to avoid a conflict by every possible means right up to the last moment when Germany presented her ultimatum, is proved by every diplomatic and military document. The German General Staff being aware of Russia's weak points clearly strove to bring about hostilities. The Germans having made a diligent study of the Russian Army, its organization, its methods of combat, its strategy as taught at the Military Academy, which they knew was more theoretical than practical, and being acquainted with the characters of those generals who had gone through the Japanese War, many of whom were still on the Active List, had no doubt that Russia as a military Power was considerably weaker in every way than was generally supposed. Their one and only idea was to strike hard in order to crush France and Russia, the two allied Powers, once and for all. The moment seemed to them most propitious.

When war broke out Russia first of all was faced with a shortage of 3,000 officers.* But what made matters worse was the military convention with France by which Russia was obliged to place 800,000 men in the field on the fifteenth day of mobilization.† General Jilinsky, who was Chief of Staff up to 1913, had imposed upon Russia an obligation impossible of fulfilment—to begin military operations when only a third of her forces were ready.

General Golovin states further that from twenty-four to twenty-nine days actually elapsed before the Russian Army was fully ready. ‡ Another difficulty was the nomination of a Commander-in-Chief, to which post General Sukomlinoff, the War Minister, was aspiring. Utterly unfitted for the position, having no knowledge of modern war methods, his apathetic character and even laziness made him undesirable for such a responsible post. The Emperor chose the Grand Duke Nicholas, who up to then had been in command of the Guard Corps and Petrograd Military District. This choice also was not a happy one. Having a striking appearance and seemingly energetic, the Grand Duke had neither the necessary military knowledge nor the grasp of facts for making rapid decisions. The recollection of Kuropatkin's mistakes in the Japanese War caused the new commander to rely upon decentralization, and whereas in 1904-1905 the Commander-in-Chief continually supervised every detail, in 1914 we see the very reverse, the Grand Duke leaving the

* See "History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front," by General Golovin, p. 3.

† *Ibid.*, p. 59.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

Army commanders too much liberty—in a word, letting the reins out of his own hands. “The experience of the late war proved many shortcomings of this system, which needlessly decreased the influence of the Commander-in-Chief on the course of action and on the most important operations.”* General Daniloﬀ states that on assuming command of the Russian forces the Grand Duke requested all officers who had served up to then on the staff to remain at their posts. Thus General Janushkevitch, who was Chief of Staff, became automatically the Grand Duke’s right hand, and General Daniloﬀ, who was Quartermaster-General, also served in this capacity from the opening of hostilities.

General Golovin lays especial stress upon the fact that the plan of campaign was not worked out by the Grand Duke, and points out that in consequence the Commander-in-Chief was forced to adopt the ideas of others. That this was a mistake is obvious, because “unless he who prepares a strategical plan has before his mind’s eye a clear picture of all military operations, of marching, quartering, supply, entraining and detraining, embarkation and debarkation and a personal knowledge of the difficulties which attend on war, his work will be of little value.”†

It would appear that up to 1908 it was thought expedient for Russia to concentrate the bulk of her forces against Austria;‡ General Palitzin, who was at that time Chief of the Staff, rightly assumed that a decisive blow could not be delivered simultaneously against Austria and Germany. But when Jilinsky succeeded him Russia embarked on a policy which was bound in the long run to spell disaster. In 1913, by the agreement made between France and Russia, the plan of campaign was based on two contingencies: (i) that Russia was waging operations against the bulk of the Austrian Army and a portion of the German Army; or (ii) that she was attacked by the major portion of the Austro-German forces. In the first case, two Russian Armies were to be concentrated against Germany and three against Austria, two being kept in reserve. In the second case, three Russian Armies were to be concentrated against Germany and two against Austria, with the same number in reserve. This plan had been worked out as far back as 1910.

That the Grand Duke is to blame for tacitly acquiescing in such a plan, which deprived Russia of the power of concentrating a superior force against either belligerent, is evident. Nor does the

* See “The World War,” by General G. Daniloﬀ, p. 139.

† Cp. “The Science of War,” by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson.

‡ See “The History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front,” p. 71.

plan show any great strategic ability on the part of the French General Staff, which should have warned its ally of the great danger that it would entail. In a word : " If it were generally understood that in regular warfare success depends on something more than the capacity for handling troops in battle, many far-reaching mistakes might be avoided." * To gain a clearer idea of the lack of a firm guiding hand, it is only necessary to examine the operations against East Prussia. " News confirming the violation of Belgium's neutrality was a clear proof to us that the principal German forces would be launched against the Western Front." † And bearing this in mind it was assumed that three local corps (I, XVII, XX) with perhaps the V Corps would be at the disposal of the Germans, with, of course, the usual reserves (Landwehr). ‡ " We could be sure to have a numerical superiority." § And with this assumption which was based on no definite facts G.H.Q. drew up fresh plans, which could not have brought about anything but disaster against an enemy who was better organized and who had at his disposal more numerous railways and better roads. Space and time seem also not to have been taken seriously into consideration when this plan was made.

The Russian commanders seem never to have considered the fact that war " is a contest in which mind and character win, not brute force, and that war is an intellectual art " ; || besides, in war " we have to deal not so much with numbers, arms and manœuvres as with human nature." ¶

The Russian generals, educated in a school which was nothing if not academic, basing their military ideas on the strategy of Generals Leer and Miknevitich, which though sometimes brilliant was too theoretic in character, were a whole generation behind the times, so far as higher military knowledge was concerned, and were unable to grasp the conditions necessary for successfully moving large bodies of troops in the field. And yet " one of the first tests of a general's capacity and skill is his method of concentration for offence. To select the right point, to conceal by demonstrations the contemplated purpose, to execute it rapidly and without confusion, to organize the important question of supply," ** are all considerations

* Cp. " Stonewall Jackson," by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, Preface.

† See " The World War," p. 131.

‡ Ibid., p. 132 ; also " History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front,"

p. 99.

§ See " The World War," p. 132.

|| Cp. " Great Captains," by Captain Theodore Dodge, U.S.A., p. 132.

¶ " The Science of War," by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson.

** Cp. " Great Campaigns," by Major Charles Adams, p. 202.

which must be fully taken into account by a commander and his staff.

The orders, issued from G.H.Q., the North-Western Front, and by the First and Second Army commanders, were invariably far too lengthy and confused. They were filled with innumerable details and with matters with which any well-educated officer should be familiar.

Very early in August, 1914, the French Ambassador in Russia and the Russian Ambassador in Paris began to press the Government of the Tzar to make some sort of a diversion, by which a portion of the German forces in the West might be drawn to the Eastern Front, thereby easing the situation for the French. And when the Grand Duke left for the front on the 14th of August, M. Basili, the Foreign Office official who was attached to his staff, daily pressed him to do something to help the Allies who were contending against the advancing German host.

The first instructions issued by the General Staff relating to the invasion of East Prussia, were to General Jilinsky, commanding the north-western region, who was in command of the First and Second Armies. The two Armies were to advance; the First from the direction of Kovno; the Second from Mława, east of the Masurian lakes, with the intention of turning both the enemy's flanks and cutting off his retreat from the Vistula. A detachment was to be left to watch the Masurian lake district and to keep the two Armies in touch.* It was soon to be proved that "no matter how careful may be the pre-arrangements for precision in the execution of a combined operation when the distances are wide, as often as not there interposes some complication which detracts from the fulfilment of the combination."† Thus the primary mistake of the Russian plan lay in sending two Armies so widely apart to invade East Prussia, for "success depended upon movements of the enemy which could not have been foreseen. It is useless to threaten an enemy if the latter can counter the blow before the threat becomes effective."‡ The Russian Higher Command seems to have forgotten that "Generalship aims at being stronger than the enemy at the decisive point at meeting him when he is at disadvantage."§

General Jilinsky on receiving his orders began the advance at once. The cavalry of the First Army moved forward on the 15th

* See "History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front," p. 99.

† Cp. "Lord Clyde," by Archibald Forbes.

‡ Cp. "The Russo-Turkish Campaign," by Sir F. Maurice, p. 33.

§ *Ibid.*

of August and the bulk of the forces on the 18th and 19th; and the Second Army began to cross the frontier on the 19th. "And here we see the same haste and muddling of such a complicated operation as the strategical deployment of a mobilized Army by G.H.Q." * General Daniloff draws our attention to the faulty organization of the Higher Command of the Army. He makes no secret of General Yanushkevich's habit of never openly expressing his opinion on strategical questions—a habit which had a deleterious effect upon the prestige of the G.H.Q. † He also makes it clear that there was no close understanding or liaison between the Grand Duke and the Government, with the result that the demands made by G.H.Q. were not treated with full attention. In a word, "the war seemed to be a thing belonging exclusively to the Army which did not enter into the nation's life. Success under these conditions was hardly likely." ‡

On the 19th of August General Samsonoff, commanding the Second Army, received a message from General Jilinsky urging him to expedite his advance, as the First Army had been fighting for "two days at Staluppenen and found itself in a difficult position. Samsonoff's reply was that for the moment he could not comply with this request as his troops had to march sixteen miles daily over a sandy region." § To make matters worse, the troops of the Second Army on crossing the frontier were already exhausted and the transport was not up to full strength. || Meanwhile, General Rennenkampf had forced the Germans to retreat on the 21st of August, after the combat of Gumbinnen. "He had been caught napping, having ordered a halt on the 20th without reference to the situation of the enemy, whose positions he had failed to reconnoitre. The Cavalry Corps had only covered forty-eight miles in three days, 17, 18, 19, and their transport was not as incomplete as that of the infantry." ¶ The First Army remained stationary for two days, until the 23rd of August, when it "resumed its advance, which was made extremely leisurely and irresolutely, notwithstanding the enemy's lack of resistance." ** In addition to this dilatory advance "no touch of any kind was maintained with the retreating enemy when five and a half cavalry divisions and one and a half infantry

* See "History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front," p. 105.

† See "The World War," p. 140.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

§ See "History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front," p. 190.

|| See "The World War," p. 146.

¶ Cp. "Tannenburg," by Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside, p. 109.

** See "The World War," p. 145.

divisions had not been engaged at Gumbinnen and were close to the scene of action." * There can be no excuse for Rennenkampf's inaction, for, even if the troops were tired and needed a short rest, he was not justified in letting the Germans slip away without ascertaining the direction of their retreat.

Although it was contrary to the views of G.H.Q., Generals Jilinsky and Rennenkampf exaggerated the importance of Königsberg. They had no information on which they could base their assumption that a great portion of the hostile forces had retreated towards that fortress, and yet they detached two corps in that direction, keeping the remaining two corps at Gerdauen and Bishofsburg.† General Rennenkampf, on resuming his advance on the 23rd of August, rigidly adhered to his faulty policy of keeping the bulk of his cavalry on the right flank, nor did he utilize it as a protective screen well in advance of his Army. Indeed, the manner in which he handled his cavalry throughout this short campaign proved him incapable of leading an independent army.

Meanwhile, the Second Army was advancing from Mława. Its rear was even in a worse plight than that of the First Army. General Samsonoff was fatally tied to the network of Russian railways.‡ On the 22nd of August he informed General Jilinsky regarding the absolute disorganization which prevailed in his rear and of the devastation of the country. The men were without provisions and the horses unprovided with fodder.§ On the 22nd he occupied Ortelsburg, Niedenburg and Soldau—a front of fifty-six miles.|| The same day he received a telegram from General Jilinsky: "German troops after a series of strenuous combats, which have culminated victoriously for General Rennenkampf, are retreating hastily, blowing up bridges. The enemy has left before you inconsiderable forces. You are to advance towards the enemy who is retreating before General Rennenkampf's Army with the object of cutting off the German retreat to the Vistula."¶ General Samsonoff, hearing vague rumours that German troops were being transferred from the Vistula fortresses to Lautenburg and that Allenstein was occupied, but being without definite knowledge of his whereabouts, then asked General Jilinsky's sanction to move his Army more to the west. "The latter at first would not allow it, but

* Cp. "Tannenburg," p. 198.

† See "The World War," pp. 147, 148.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

§ See "History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front," p. 196.

|| See "The World War," p. 146.

¶ See "History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front," p. 203.

afterwards agreed, making for himself a mental picture of the general position and gives the Second Army a new direction : Sensburg—Allenstein." * This change of direction still further increased the distance between the First and Second Armies, and, to make matters worse, "Samsonoff uncovered his right flank more than ever." † This movement took place on the 24th of August, and General Samsonoff was especially instructed "that his cavalry should be pushed well ahead towards Sensburg and that aerial reconnaissance should also be in that direction." ‡ The following day General Samsonoff's Chief of the Staff drew General Jilinsky's attention to the fact that the Second Army had been marching without cessation for eight days and asked permission to rest the troops for a day. This request was definitely refused, as "the advance was slower than he (Jilinsky) expected. The enemy had left Insterburg on the 23rd of August and was no less than two marches from Samsonoff's Army. A day's rest, therefore, could not be sanctioned until the line Allenstein—Osterode was reached, whence it would be possible to menace the enemy's line of retreat to the Vistula." §

The same day General Filimonoff, Quartermaster-General of the Second Army, was sent by General Samsonoff with instructions to point out to General Jilinsky the dangers that existed on the left flank and rear of the Second Army. The latter, however, was not impressed and closed the interview with the remark : "I order him (Samsonoff) to advance." || By the next day, the 26th of August, the position of the Second Army became extremely critical, "and the work of the Higher Command which had brought it up to the battlefield terminated. It is impossible to hold any other opinion than that it had done everything to ensure defeat in the combat with the Eighth German Army." ¶

It was only at this juncture that the Grand Duke Nicholas left his headquarters at Baranovichy to consult General Jilinsky, "to tell him of his anxiety and to hasten *Rennenkampf's* march." ** "Great captains have won successes by personal activity and by relying on themselves in critical matters. No general may shelter himself behind the lapse of a subordinate. He must stand or fall

* See "The World War," p. 147.

† *Ibid.*, p. 149.

‡ See "History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front," p. 206.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

|| *Ibid.*

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

** See "The World War," p. 149.

by what he himself does or fails to do." * It was the Grand Duke's duty to have personally visited Samsonoff a week previously and to have seen with his own eyes the state and situation of the Second Army. But it was too late to do anything on the 26th when severe fighting was going on. Strange although it may appear, it was only on the 27th that General Jilinsky and his staff seem to have realized how great was the danger which threatened General Samsonoff's army, and yet the Second Army was isolated and could not expect any immediate help from the First Army.† Not only were the two Armies widely separated, but there was also a "very faulty service of liaison. Neither G.H.Q. nor N.W.H.Q. was informed for a day or two at a time of what was occurring in the Armies. Even army corps were in ignorance of their neighbours' movements." ‡

On the 28th of August General Samsonoff telegraphed to General Jilinsky that he was leaving his headquarters for the battlefield and that communication with him would be severed for a time. "The catastrophe for the Army began from that moment." §

This "is another example added to many in military history of the futility of framing for days ahead plans which are dependent for their execution on what the enemy may do and of the difficulty of ensuring united action between two forces which are not in direct communication. Napoleon's dictum that a double line of operations is unsound is still true. Telegraphy has, however, made it possible to keep forces which are separated still under the control of one man; and they are then working on a single line of operations in the sense in which Napoleon understood the phrase. But except where there is some means of exchanging information and receiving and issuing orders between forces which are working apart, failure to cooperate will still be the rule and not the exception." ||

The details concerning the battle of Tannenburg are too well known to need repetition. Everybody remembers the débacle of the Second Army and General Samsonoff's suicide.

An impartial reader cannot but notice that the Higher Command proved incompetent from the very outset. From the Grand Duke downwards nobody evinced any initiative or grasp of facts. Every plan and every movement was vague, faltering and hesitating. Courage coupled with cool calculation, the qualities so much needed


* Cp. "Great Captains."

† See "The World War," p. 150.

‡ Ibid., p. 152.

§ See "The History of the 1914 Campaign on the Russian Front," p. 264.

|| Cp. "The Russo-Turkish War," by Sir F. Maurice.



[To face page 104.]

in a leader, were never shown by any one of the principal generals. "The mistakes were on the whole the outcome of insufficient preparation of all our Army." * "Even at the outbreak of hostilities no one had any conception of the coming difficulties," † and when faced by hard facts the leaders were incapable of appreciating the situation correctly and of framing a practical plan of action. Throughout the campaign the strategy of the Russians was faulty. "Yet the plain truth is that strategy is not only the determining factor in civilized warfare, but that in order to apply principles the soundest common sense must be most carefully trained." ‡ And in this the Russian Higher Command failed—and failed dismally.

To the campaign of Hindenburg and Ludendorff against the Grand Duke and Generals Jilinsky, Rennenkampf and Samsonoff may be applied the words written by the veteran Jomini in October, 1866, with reference to the remarkable campaign then just ended: "These astonishing successes were brought about by a combination of those general causes which influence the fate of Empires, in the first rank of which we may in particular place the neglect of the principles of strategy by one side and their application by the other." §

* See "The World War," p. 154.

† *Ibid.*, p. 113.

‡ *Cp.* "Stonewall Jackson," Preface.

§ *Cp.* "Précis de l'art de la Guerre," by General Jomini, Third Appendix.

THE ANATOLIAN REVOLT

TRANSLATED FROM THE TURKISH

(*With Map*)

BY C. A. HOOPER *

PART I

INTRODUCTION

It is convenient to divide the Anatolian Revolt into three periods, in order to be able to study and to investigate it with ease: (1) Nationalist uprising and rebellion; (2) Regular formations; (3) Nationalist salvation and independence.

The most important and dangerous of these is, of course, the first, since this is the period of lack of government and revolt, which made it possible to found a Nationalist Government, to form Regular armies, and to secure the regular working of the administrative machine.

The first period, which extends from the 15th of May, 1919, on which date Smyrna was occupied by the Greeks, up to the 16th of January, 1921, the date of the victory of the first In Oni, which marks the end of the internal revolts, is worthy of careful attention, as including the most important phases of our National struggles.

* The author of the following brief account of the rise and development of the Turkish Nationalist movement is Mehmed Arif Bey, who, as commander of the 11th Division, and in other capacities, took a considerable share in most of the important military actions directed against the *Entente* Powers and Greece in Anatolia. He writes, consequently, with the authority of an eye-witness, who also takes a personal part in most of the events he describes. The publication of an official "History of the Nationalist Revolt" by the Turkish General Staff—and this appears to be contemplated—would throw light upon a considerable number of points concerning the foundation of Nationalist Turkey, with regard to which the world knows nothing, or next to nothing, at the present time. Pending the publication of such a work, however, the serious student of Turkish affairs is obliged to obtain his information where and how he may, testing it, and assigning it to its proper place in the whole mosaic of facts. This account by Mehmed Arif, written in Angora and dated the 25th of January, 1924, contains many facts not generally known, which may perhaps prove of value and interest to students of both political and military affairs. The translation has no literary merit, except that it adheres faithfully to the original—an indispensable condition. Owing to exigencies of space, certain passages have been omitted altogether, but this in no wise alters the general aspect.

The Nationalist Uprising and the Constantinople Government.—

The complete abuse, by the Allied Powers, of the clauses of the Armistice of Mudros, caused apprehensions to arise among the Turkish people. It was felt that treachery was contemplated, and it began to be regarded as certain that the nation would be exposed to a new disaster in the near future.

Had the Ferid Government, which maintained silence with regard to the rumours concerning the occupation of Smyrna current in the European, and in particular the Greek Press, approved of the occupation of Smyrna or the British mandate? The high-spirited youth of Smyrna, when informed that their town would be occupied by the Greeks, assembled together on the day preceding the occupation, and after holding long discussions with regard to the method of defending Smyrna, elected a Central Committee from among their number. Unfortunately, this committee was unable to make any preparations for the next day; the occupation of Smyrna becoming an accomplished fact.

On the 13th of May, 1919, the British Admiral Calthrop informed the Vali Izzet, in a note, that in accordance with Article 7 of the Mudros Armistice, the forts and defences of Smyrna would be occupied by the Allied Powers on the 14th of May, 1919. Thereupon, the Ali Nadir Pasha, commanding the Smyrna Army Corps, circulated the following notice to the units in Smyrna and neighbourhood :—

“Smyrna, 14th of May, 1919.

“(1) In accordance with the terms of Article 7 of the Armistice Convention, the forts of Smyrna and the neighbouring districts will be occupied by Allied detachments.

“(2) The occupation will take place to-day in the afternoon, and with this object in view, the Allied Powers will each send a detachment to the fortifications in question.

“(3) On the arrival of these detachments, the forts, together with the breeches of the guns in the forts and their sights and all other materials for defence, will be handed over to the commanders of the aforesaid detachments.

“(4) During the occupation of the fortifications, absolutely no opposition shall be manifested, and all necessary facilities shall be given.”

Ali Nadir Pasha, who handed over the fortifications to the allied Powers, stated, in an order of the day, issued that evening, that the town of Smyrna was to be occupied by Greek troops on the morning of the 15th of May, 1919, and that, in order not to give rise to any incident, officers and men should assemble in the

barracks. Certain patriotic and self-sacrificing officers proposed to evacuate the town, taking with them the whole of the infantry and artillery units in and outside Smyrna, in which enterprise, however, they were not successful. In fact, on the following day, 15th of May, the Greeks occupied Smyrna and committed various atrocities. The tragedy of Smyrna, which occurred before the eyes of the Europeans, is of a nature to bring shame to the face of humanity for all time. The local Greeks participated in this tragedy.

The number of these Greeks who, entering one of the doors of the churches as civilians, rushed forth from another in the uniform of Greek soldiers and overwhelmed the Muslims, was certainly not smaller than that of the Greek troops.

Several of our co-religionists, who were unable to tolerate the inhuman attacks and excesses of the Greek troops and the local Greeks, and the indignities which injured our national and religious feelings, fell victims to the Greek bayonets and rifle-butts. The chief of the Smyrna municipality, Colonel Suleiman Fethi Bey, was killed in this way.

The tragedy of the occupation of Smyrna created a profound impression on public opinion. Those who fled or emigrated from Smyrna gave harrowing accounts of Greek savagery and depravity, and the soul of every Turk and Muslim rebelled. It was then decided to arise, and to defend the country, to maintain its honour and to proclaim a fresh *jihad*. Meetings were held on all hands, and Nationalist committees were formed and armed forces assembled. In this way, as will be seen later, a commencement was made in severe fighting against the Greeks, and in the formation of Nationalist fronts around Smyrna.

Nationalist Fronts: Aivalik and Soma Front.—The Greeks, not content with the occupation of Smyrna, began to extend the area of their occupation in the direction of Maghnisa and Aidin, and endeavoured to disembark troops at Aivalik. After the occupation of Smyrna, the headquarters of our XVII Army Corps, and the remnants of the 56th Division, having been imprisoned, ceased to exist.

Lieut.-Colonel Ali Bey (Deputy for Afiun-Kara-Hissar), commanding the Aivalik sector, who was well acquainted with the situation of the Constantinople Government, and was satisfied that this occupation was nothing else than the creation of a *fait accompli*, decided, entirely upon his own initiative, to prevent the Greek disembarkation, causing his decision to be communicated to the English Captain H——, residing in Aivalik. The officers and men of the 172nd Regiment under Ali Bey's command completely shared

his views, and the necessary steps were taken to prevent the disembarkation.

Ali Bey took active and successful steps rapidly to bring Nationalist organizations into existence in the *nahihs* and villages in the sector. The patriotic help of Hilmi Bey, the Mutessarif of Karasu (to-day Vali of Brussa), is worthy of mention. It was given in spite of the opposition and intrigues of the administrators of the Kazas, who at all costs avoided the Nationalist organizations.

The Greeks, who for some considerable time had displayed neither courage nor bravery, began to disembark troops at Aivalik on the 28th of May, 1919, under the protection of two of their torpedo boats. The forces of Ali Bey, moving to a point two kilometres to the east of Aivalik, got into touch with the Greeks and in this way established a front.

In a cypher telegram written from Salihli, Colonel Bekir Sami Bey, deputy commander of the XVII Army Corps, who a few days before had moved from Ak-Hissar in the direction of Salihli, expressed his approval of the action taken by Ali Bey, but, in view of greater activities to be undertaken later, requested that as many losses as possible should be avoided. On the other hand, however, the Minister for the Interior, Ali Kemal, and, later, the Minister of War, gave instructions, in accordance with a decision of the Cabinet, dated the 29th of May, 1919, that the units should fall back to Soma and Balikessir. The officer in command of the XIV Army Corps, Yusuf Izzet Pasha, who had established his headquarters at Balikessir on the 6th of June, 1919, also expressed his approval of the action at Aivalik. It is strange that the Bab-i-Ali, which a few days before gave instructions for the units to fall back, now shared these ideas. Is it possible that the Greeks undertook this action without the approval of the Allied Powers?

The Greeks extended the occupation of Smyrna as far as Nazilli, Tireh, Odemish and Ak Hissar, and on the 9th of June dispatched a powerful detachment to occupy Berghama. Upon the occupation of that place by the Greeks, the flank and rear of the Aivalik front being endangered, a Nationalist and military detachment organized by Ali Bey, with a view to improving the situation, carried out a raid on Berghama on the 16th of June, destroying a Greek force composed of approximately one battalion and one battery, and in this way a front was established in Berghama and district. At this point, Colonel K  prili Bey, who had been appointed to the command of the 61st Division, with its headquarters at Panderna, proceeded to Soma, and took over the command of that front.

The Aidin and Nazilli Fronts.—As soon as the regrettable news of the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks reached Aidin, the people, in a state of exasperation, collected together in the place of public prayer and held a meeting. Sabri Bey, one of the Sultani professors, delivered an impassioned speech to the people, and after Khojah Essad Effendi (deputy for Aidin and President of the Red Crescent) had read an eloquent prayer, a telegram in the following terms was dispatched in all directions :

“To all Committees for National Defence : You are aware of the occupation of Smyrna. Your communication with this town is cut off. Preserve tranquillity and moderation. Be active in forming without loss of time, armed organizations, with the object of preserving our national rights. God is with us. For we are oppressed and downtrodden. Do not despair.—The Aidin Nationalist Committee.”

A few days later, the Italian commandant occupying Kosh Ada and district, in a telegram dispatched to Aidin, stated that Aidin would not be occupied by the Greeks, and Izzet, the Vali of Smyrna, in a circular note written to the surrounding districts, stated that the Greek occupation was of a temporary nature, and that it had been undertaken in accordance with the decision of the Allied Powers. This information tranquillized public opinion and partially lessened the exasperation of the people. Nevertheless, Aidin was occupied by the Greeks on the 28th of May, 1919.

Upon the occupation of Aidin by the Greeks, a number of patriotic persons, leaving Aidin, went to Chineh, and there commenced to assemble Nationalist forces. The occupation of Aidin and the advance of the Greeks towards Nazilli aroused the anger of the population of Denizli. The Denizli Nationalist Committee, born of the zeal and encouragement of the Mufti, Ahmed Khulusi Effendi, and the deputy for Denizli, Yusuf Bey, and his friends, with the help of the Mutessarif of Denizli, Faik Bey (deputy for Tekfur Dag), published the following declaration on the 10th of June, which was translated into action : “The Greek forces which have occupied our beautiful town of Smyrna are advancing into the interior of the provinces. Wherever they have set foot, they have been guilty of innumerable atrocities and terrifying excesses. They have hoisted the Greek flag on our mosques. . . . We have decided to stand up against this treacherous enemy. We have decided, in the first place, not to allow him to advance in this direction from the Meander, and subsequently to expel him from the province. Our honourable and manly comrades, strong in the greatness of Allah,

are coming armed, one by one, to our aid. Rather than groan and die under the heel of oppression of the Greeks in the future, we have decided either to die now like men, or to live in dignity and honour. Those of our brothers who recognize that to be active is an obligation of religion and honour, must not remain passive spectators ; bearing in mind that time is money and that there is no time to lose, we must act. God is our helper.—Denizli Nationalist Committee.”

As a result of the patriotic efforts and zeal of the Denizli Commissioner of Police, Hamdi Bey, and of cavalry Captain Ekrem Bey,* the Nationalist forces, which amounted to a considerable total, moved towards Nazilli, arriving there on the 21st of June.

The Nationalist forces of Yuruk Ali Efendi, which had concentrated at Nazilli, and a fair number of gunners under the command of Major Ismail Hakki Bey, commanding the artillery of the 57th Division, united with the Denizli Nationalist forces, and, under the command of Major Haji Shukri Bey (formerly deputy for Diarbekir), decided to retake Aidin. First of all, the Malkatch bridge between Nazilli and Aidin was blown up. The Greek outpost situated at a distance of three hours' journey from Aidin, was raided and driven back, and on the 28th of June the Greeks were attacked. The battle continued on the 29th, and on the 30th, after street fighting, Aidin was retaken by the Nationalist forces. The Greeks, however, who had received reinforcements, re-occupied Aidin. Thereupon, the Nationalist detachments moved to Köshk, between Aidin and Nazilli, and formed a new front.

Demirji Mehmed Efendi, who had given up brigandage, arrived at Köshk with his following, and took over the command of the Nazilli front ; Yuruk Ali Efendi took over the command of the Meander district ; Nuri Bey, known by the name of “ the Arab Captain,” took over the command of the Meander Nationalist Regiment ; Captain Fikri—and later Lieutenant Zekia Bey—took over the command of the Aidin regiment, Major Ismail Hakki Bey taking over the command of the artillery on the aforesaid front. A general central committee was formed at Nazilli, to which Aidin, Mughla, Denizli, Burdur, Isparta and Adalia were attached.

At this juncture, Kemal Pasha, general commander of the *gendarmérie* sent by the Constantinople Government ostensibly to

* He had been a member of Shahzadeh Effendi's staff, which, prior to the occupation of Smyrna, had arrived in the Smyrna and Aidin districts with the title of Advisory Committee, and on the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, had joined the Nationalists.

give advice to the Nationalist forces, was arrested, and upon giving a sworn undertaking, was allowed to return to Constantinople.

Khojah Essad Effendi (deputy for Aidin), who had been given the title of Mufti of the Nationalist Army, and Reshad Bey, President of the Municipality, were sent to Constantinople by way of Rhodes with the political duty of explaining the cruelties and atrocities of the Greeks to the Constantinople Government and also to the representatives of the Allied Powers, and of requesting the termination of the occupation. They finally succeeded in obtaining the dispatch of an international Commission of Inquiry. The reports presented by that Commission, although in our favour, did not prevent the continuance of Greek oppression.

The Salihli Front.—After the occupation of Smyrna, the Greeks extended their area of occupation towards Kassaba and Odemish, and also occupied the station of Ahmedli.

A youth named Essad Bey, twenty years of age, one of the notables of Alashehr, entered Ahmedli with a Nationalist force of forty to fifty persons which he had collected, and forced back the Greek outpost to Orghanli. The Greek troops, profiting by the information and treachery of the local Greeks, carried out a raid at night and wiped out part of this inexperienced youth's detachment, taking the other part prisoner.

The next day, Khalil Efeh, with a Nationalist detachment which he had collected together from Salihli, entered Ahmedli, drove out the Greeks, and established a front. A few days later the Circassian, Edhem, who had come from the direction of Panderma to Salihli with a number of mounted men, took over the command of this front.

Later, upon Parti Pehlevan Agha, Sari Efeh (Edib Bey) and similar Nationalists joining, the Salihli front was formed into an extremely strong Nationalist front. . . .

The activities of the Nationalist forces, and the rapid spread in every direction of the news of the successes occasionally gained against the Greeks, stirred up the warlike feelings of the people and kindled their patriotic determination.

Material and moral participation in this Nationalist endeavour, which was a natural product of the exasperation born of the soul of the nation, was considered an obligation of honour for every person possessing a conscience and patriotism. Among the Nationalist forces were young children and also white-bearded grandfathers. There were large numbers of women who carried the ammunition and food for the Nationalist combatants, and

not a few Turkish ladies also took part in the fighting, mauser in hand.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha.—On the 16th of May, 1919, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, with the members of his staff, left Constantinople by steamer, making for Samsun. It was an extraordinary trick of fate that the Pasha, who, but a short time previously, had decided to go to Anatolia, even as a civilian, found himself instructed to go there in the capacity of Aide-de-Camp to the Sultan, and Inspector of the Ninth Army, armed with extraordinary powers.

The Pasha and his staff reached Samsun in safety, but not regarding it as a suitable place for residence, he transferred his headquarters to Havsa. During the twenty days, approximately, which Mustafa Kemal Pasha spent with his headquarters at Havsa, he got into touch with certain military and civil personalities, and obtained the requisite information regarding the situation, and the state of public opinion.

The Ferid Government, which regarded the Nationalist rising in Anatolia as a revolutionary movement, organized by members of the Committee of Union and Progress, rather than as the natural result of national exasperation, soon regretted having appointed Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Anatolia. On the 8th of June, accordingly, the Minister of War, Shefket Torghut, requested the Pasha to return at once to Constantinople.*

Upon receipt of this short and significant communication, couched in the following terms : " You are requested to proceed here immediately by one of the steamboats at your disposal," the Pasha—who had gone to Anatolia with no intention of returning to Constantinople—sent messages of excuse to the Government and moved from Havsa to Amassia. He then invited Ali Fuad Pasha, who was in command of the XX Army Corps in Angora, to come at once to Amassia in order to confer with him.

Ali Fuad Pasha, together with Hüssein Réouf Bey, arrived at Amassia on the 19th of June, 1919.†

As the result of discussions at a conference held on the night of the 19th–20th at Amassia between Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Ali Fuad Pasha, Réouf and Rafet Beys, certain important and far-reaching decisions were reached of which the following is a summary : The Central Government is completely under foreign pressure and influence. It is decided, therefore, to coordinate the activity and

* The Constantinople Government attributed this necessity to British pressure.

† He was accompanied by Hüssein Réouf Bey, who had recently reached Angora, travelling there by way of Panderma.

efforts of the Committees of Defence which have been formed throughout the country, the people having definitely decided not to enter into foreign bondage and to safeguard their national unity.

In order that the nation may be able to defend its rights, it is decided that a "National Assembly" with full powers shall be convoked at Sivas. Until such time as that Assembly shall be convoked, its place of meeting shall be kept secret, and before the date of its first meeting all arrangements for defence shall be made.

Meanwhile, unless the views and behaviour of the officers sent from Constantinople are satisfactory, their orders and instructions shall not be transmitted.

Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, who was in Erzerum, and Mersinli Jemal Pasha, who was in Konia, agreed to these decisions. Two days later, Ali Fuad Pasha returned to Angora. Réouf Bey continued to work with Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Anatolia until he joined the Constantinople Chamber of Deputies about seven months later.

After remaining a few days in Amassia, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, together with his staff, moved to Sivas.

It had already been decided by the inhabitants of the eastern vilayets, whose territory had been promised to Armenia, to hold a National Congress at Erzerum, but with a view to the holding of a more generally representative Congress after the Erzerum Congress, the Pasha issued secret instructions for the dispatch of the delegates to Sivas.

Meanwhile the Constantinople Government continued to send out orders against the formation of armed organizations, and the British, by an attempt to disembark troops at Samsun, sought to threaten central Anatolia. The Pasha decided to oppose by force of arms the British enterprise, which was attempted just as he was starting for Erzerum, and the necessary military measures were taken by the commander of the III Army Corps.

At the beginning of July, while on his way to Erzerum, the Pasha received further telegrams from the Palace and Damad Ferid, requesting his return to Constantinople.

The last of these messages arrived on the 6th of July, at which date Mustafa Jemal was in Erzerum. It was couched in the following terms: "The termination of your post having become necessary, your immediate return to Constantinople is required by the Sultan."

The Pasha replied to this message by sending in his resignation from the Army, and, on the 23rd of July, he and Réouf Bey Effendi took part as delegates at the Congress which met at Erzerum.

The Constantinople Government, which looked upon those who took part in the Congress as criminals and rebels, then gave orders that civil and military officials who attended it should be arrested.

Meanwhile, in order to prevent the disembarkation at Samsun by the British, who were undoubtedly cooperating with Damad Ferid, the necessary orders and instructions had been given to Lieut.-Colonel Ismail Hakki Bey, commanding the 15th Division, at Samsun, while Nationalist forces, including an artillery battalion, had been concentrated in the neighbourhood of Kavak,* a place which forms a kind of door to Central Anatolia.†

The British, who were convinced that they would encounter armed resistance, gave up their enterprise of disembarking at Samsun, and subsequently withdrew their forces from Merzifun. On account of his hostile attitude towards the British, Colonel Rafet Bey was then removed from his post by the Constantinople Government, Colonel Selah Eddin Bey (formerly deputy for Mersina) being appointed in his place.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, although the Constantinople Government publicly announced that he had been removed from his post and outlawed, was received in a striking manner by the people both at Erzerum and Sivas. He presided at the Congress in the latter town on the 4th of September.

At this Congress the "National Pact" was drawn up and the terms of the well-known "Defence of Rights" were laid down, while, with a view to the effective administration of the whole of Anatolia as far as Ismid, a "Representative Assembly" was elected. The Congress then terminated its labours.

The "National Pact," which embodied the principles laid down at the Erzerum Congress, was couched in the following terms :—

"Art. 1. The fate of those portions of the Ottoman Empire, the majority of the population of which are Arab, and which, at the conclusion of the Armistice of the 30th of October, 1918, were occupied by the enemy, shall be settled in accordance with the opinion, freely to be expressed, of the population. All those portions of the Empire which are situated within and without the aforesaid Armistice line, and which are inhabited by an Ottoman-Islamic majority, united by religion, by blood and by origin, and the people of which are inspired by feelings of mutual respect and sacrifice towards one another, and completely respect

* Between Samsun and Amassia.

† The commander of the III Army Corps, with headquarters at Sivas, was Colonel Rafet Bey (now General Rafet Pasha). The 5th and 15th Divisions were under the orders of this Army Corps. I was entrusted with the command of the 5th Division, with headquarters at Amassia, and later to the command of the Kavak sector.

their general social and ethnic rights, and the conditions incidental thereto, form a whole. They will not consent for any reason whatsoever, either in fact or resulting from a legal decision, to any separation.

" Art. 2. We agree that the three sanjaks, which, as soon as they were free, voted for union with the mother country, shall, if necessary, again proceed to a vote.

" Art. 3. The determination of the legal position of Western Thrace, which is dependent upon the Turkish peace, must be in accordance with a free vote to be given by the inhabitants.

" Art. 4. The security of the town of Constantinople, which is the seat of the Islamic Caliphate and the capital of the Imperial Sultanate and the centre of the Ottoman Government, together with the Sea of Marmora, must be protected from any danger whatsoever. Provided that this principle be safeguarded, a decision concerning the opening to the commerce and transport of the world, of the Straits connecting the Mediterranean and Black Seas, which may be taken jointly by us and all other States concerned, is admissible.

" Art. 5. The rights of minorities, as comprised in the Treaty principles fixed (observed) by the *Entente* Powers and their enemies, and certain of their associates, shall be confirmed and assured by us, in the firm belief that the Muhammadan inhabitants in the adjoining countries will also benefit by the same rights.

" Art. 6. In order that our national and economic development may be facilitated to the utmost (*daireh yi imkianeh girmek*), and in order that it may be possible to carry on our administration in a more modern way, we, like every people, consider that independence, and complete freedom in the matter of assuring our development, as fundamental principles of our life and continued existence. For this reason, we are opposed to restrictions prohibiting our political, judicial and financial development.

" The method of settlement of our debts, when ascertained and verified, shall not be contrary to these principles."

The Representative Assembly, which had now undertaken the active administration of Anatolia, had already severed for some twenty days all connection with Constantinople. While these events were in progress the Ferid Cabinet fell, and the Ali Riza Pasha Cabinet, which it was expected would arrive at an understanding with Anatolia, took office. Communications were again resumed with Constantinople, and a kind of an understanding between the two was arrived at. The Minister of Marine, Salih Pasha, visited Amassia, with a view to getting into direct touch with the Representative Assembly.*

As a result of discussions between Mustafa Kemal, Réouf Bey and Bekic Sami Bey and Salih Pasha which lasted for three days, it was decided, with the full concurrence of Salih Pasha, that the

* I accompanied Salih Pasha on his journey from Kavak to Amassia, and presented several Nationalist detachments to him on the way.

Chamber of Deputies should be opened at Brussa, in Anatolia, and a protocol was drawn up to this effect. One copy was signed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Réouf Bey and Bekir Sami Bey, and the other copy by Salih Pasha, and exchanged.

But in spite of the fact that Salih Pasha left Anatolia agreeing to the re-opening of the Assembly there, and to helping the Nationalist movement, he and his friends in the Constantinople Cabinet persisted in acting contrary to this promise.

The question of the meeting of the Constantinople Chamber * gave rise to a great deal of discussion and correspondence, and as a result Constantinople was decided upon.

In consequence of the general understanding arrived at with the Ali Riza Pasha Cabinet, a certain amount of tranquillity was restored to the country, and with the approval of the Minister of War, Jemal Pasha, it was decided still further to strengthen the Nationalist fronts. In this connection, the organization of the whole of the Smyrna front was entrusted to Colonel Rafet Bey. The latter established his headquarters at Nazilli.

Events in Constantinople and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.—In January, 1920, when the deputies were assembling in Constantinople with a view to the re-opening of the Chamber of Deputies, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in order to be closely in touch with Western Anatolia, which was daily increasing in importance, moved the Representative Assembly from Sivas to Angora on the 28th of January. He received a wonderful reception from the people of Angora on this occasion.

Ali Fuad Pasha was at Angora, being occupied with the organizations in Western Anatolia, and in particular, with the northern front against the British ; and in the south, with the Cilician front against the French.

But the members of the "Liberal Entente" continued to intrigue against the Nationalist movement, and to cooperate with the British. Finally, they had recourse to every measure, in collaboration with Vahid Eddin, calculated to bring about internal disorder and rebellion, and to bring Damad Ferid once more to power.

The British also continually embarrassed and threatened the Ali Riza Cabinet. They insisted, in particular, that our forces should be withdrawn, on the Smyrna front, to the "Milen" line.

* By the Constantinople Chamber is meant neither the National Assembly nor the Representative Assembly, but the old Constantinople Chamber of Representatives which the Nationalists wished to see convoked at Brussa or in some other town. As has been seen earlier in this article, they failed in this.

The Ali Riza, finding himself unable to carry on his government in these circumstances, was obliged to resign. The Salih Pasha Government, which then came into power, was soon accused of complicity with the Nationalist movement.

The Allied Powers, apparently with a view to obtaining their own safety, but in reality, however, to be able to dominate and control the country, and to hinder the development of the Nationalist movement, officially occupied Constantinople, the seat of our Government on the 16th of March, 1920. Several of our statesmen were treated with ignominy, arrested and exiled to Malta. The Chamber of Deputies then dispersed, its members seeing no possibility of continuing their labours, and Damad Ferid, who then again assumed office, once more began his accursed activities, with all his strength and energy.

The Nationalist movement was condemned. It was proclaimed as being a rebellion against the Padishah, and its leaders were described as being Unionist and irreligious. Propaganda was carried on by *fetvas* and proclamations, which inflamed the minds of the people. Moreover, a policy of intimidation was followed by Anzavur, who obtained control of Anatolia in the Bigha area.*

Upon the occupation of Constantinople by the Allied Powers, and the occurrence of several regrettable events, the railways and bridges in the neighbourhood of Kiva and Ulukishla, which form the connecting link between Constantinople and Adana, were destroyed by the Nationalists in order to separate Anatolia from Constantinople.

The British forces between Eskishehr and Afium were also subjected to pressure on all sides. They retreated from Eskishehr, where they left animals and much equipment, and fell back in the direction of Kiva.


Upon the dispersal of the Chamber of Deputies in Constantinople—the country being exposed to fresh dangers (crises)—the necessity for the convocation in Angora of a National Assembly possessing extraordinary powers was proclaimed by the Representative Assembly, and the deputies were hastily invited to that town (19th of March, 1920).

Anzavur, who was engaged in organizing formations against the Nationalist forces in the Bigha district, occupied Pandermana, with the help of the British, and killing one of our brave commanders, Lieut.-Colonel Rahmi Bey, defeated the military detach-

* His correct name is Ahmed Anzavour Pasha. He was a Circassian who probably had the confidence of the Sultan Vahid Eddin.

Mekmed Arifs

ACK SE



ment under that officer's orders, and obtained a dominant position in the territory in question.

Anzavur, who obtained the special protection of Damad Ferid, and the assistance of the " police regiments," composed of infantry and artillery, organized and formed by Suleiman Shefik, Minister for War at that time, gave the name of the " Army of the Caliph " to these forces, and, clothing himself, outwardly, with the garment of religion, easily deceived the people, and in a short time occupied the *livas* of Izmit, Panderma and Karasu, and extended his power and influence as far as Duzja and Boli. In the face of this situation, Brussa, Eskishehr and Angora were threatened.

In our southern sectors, skirmishes and battles continued with the French. The Greeks were getting ready to attack at the first opportunity. The activity of the Pontus people was increasing. In the interior of the country, certain signs were perceived of rebellious counter activities against the Nationalist forces. The Grand National Assembly, which had assembled on the 23rd of April, with a view to taking in hand the destinies of the country, had not yet been able to organize its work. Anatolia, aiming at destroying the joint activities of enemies at home and abroad, was passing through a period of great stress and anxiety. (May, 1920.)

An important revolt which occurred at Konia at the beginning of April was quelled, and misunderstanding dissipated, as a result of steps taken by Colonel Rafet Bey Effendi, who arrived in the Konia district from the Smyrna front with a fair number of *zaibek* cavalry.

Ali Fuad Pasha, moving with the effectives of a part of the 24th Division and the detachments of the Nationalist forces of the Eskishehr *liva*, opposed the " police forces " at Kiva and the Straits.

The cavalry, to which the name of " Mobile Forces " was given, under the orders of Cherkess Edhem, commanding the Salihli front, with the added assistance of the Balikessir and Brussa Nationalist forces, drove out the Anzavur forces from the Brussa and Panderma districts.

In view of the gravity of the situation in the Duzja and Boli districts, the remaining portions of the 24th Division (under the command of the late divisional commander Mahmud Bey) moved from Khandak Uzreh to Duzja, and a part of the forces under the command of the late Arif Bey, moved from Angora to Bekpazar.

(To be concluded in the next number)

STRATEGY AND CLASS WARFARE

BY LIEUTENANT D. A. G. BANNERMAN, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders

At the present time the views of the Bolsheviks on war are naturally of interest. The following account is taken largely from articles on Bolshevik policy, which appeared in August in the Russian paper *Poslyednya Novosti*, printed in Paris.

The first object of strategy is to form a plan of campaign. This includes preliminary considerations as to the character of the war in view, the determination of the numbers and means necessary to wage it, and the fixing of the starting point from which the forces must begin their activities (the strategic deployment of the army).

The object of a war largely predetermines its character, and the object of a war is not necessarily the destruction of the enemy's field forces. The Bolsheviks consider all wars undertaken by them as wars for the "liberation of the proletariat from the oppression of the bourgeois or capitalist classes," *i.e.* as class warfare. This necessitates the invasion of the enemy's territory, where the oppressed class is in need of liberation, since freedom cannot be gained merely by adopting a negative or defensive rôle. The character of class warfare will therefore always be in the nature of a violent offensive by the Red Armies.

In reckoning the strength and means necessary to attain its objective, the Red staff must consider not only its own resources, but also the resources which may be put at its disposal by the "oppressed class" in the country for whose liberation war is being undertaken. Further, its own resources must be available in sufficient quantity to give an immediate superiority at the first clash with the enemy's army.

The heavier the first blow, the greater will be the impression produced, and the more grounds will there be for expecting that it will call into activity the hitherto inactive revolutionary forces which sympathize with the Red army and cause them to explode.

In class warfare account must be taken not only of man-power

and material resources, but of political propaganda. Political propaganda will be a weapon in class warfare, just like gas, tanks, artillery, etc.

Political ideas can and will be used as weapons of a psychological nature, on an immeasurably greater scale than has ever been attempted so far, and therefore political propaganda and agitation must be carried out in three main directions.

First, the idea of war must be made popular among the population and army of the Red nation. Secondly, there must be propaganda and agitation in the ranks of the enemy's army. This must be carried on by emphasizing and playing upon class distinctions within the army and so disintegrating it—this will be the most responsible and important task of the political arm, and one which, more than anything else, will aid strategy in the attainment of its objects. Thirdly, there must be incessant work and propaganda among the civil population in the enemy's country.

In addition to this direct action against the enemy's moral, propaganda must be used to influence the sympathetic elements of the proletariat in the countries bordering on the theatre of war with the object of isolating the enemy.

The objective of political propaganda is man, and the Red leaders fully realize the vital importance of the human factor in war. Despite, therefore, the strong tendency nowadays to overestimate the possibilities of so-called "mechanical warfare," and to rely on money and machinery for victory, the Bolsheviks believe that, owing to the increased stress and strain of modern warfare, the importance of the human factor has increased and not diminished. They hold that those who contemplate making war must reckon more carefully than ever before with human psychology, nerves, exhaustion and will to fight.

It will be just as necessary, consequently, for the politicians and diplomats to work out a political plan of campaign, as for the General Staff to work out its military plans. Thus the cooperation between the political and military branches must not be broken off after the outbreak of war, but, on the contrary, it must become even more closely knit. The question of the strategic deployment of the Red armies will depend, therefore, on a greater number of factors than existed in Imperialistic wars.

The degree of maturity and growth of the revolutionary process within the enemy's territory, and the inner political condition of the armed forces of the enemy, will be decisive factors in considering the choice of areas for the deployment of the Red forces.

If these conditions are favourable, then the initial deployment may sometimes be carried out on the actual frontier—indeed, such a deployment would conform better with the essentially offensive character of class warfare. In a specially favourable case it might be possible to carry forward the offensive without waiting for the complete concentration and deployment of the Red army.

Such a favourable case would be when the process of disintegration amongst the enemy's troops, and the organization of new forces in his territory sympathetic to the Red invasion have gone on so quickly and successfully that only slight pressure from outside is necessary to complete the overthrow of the enemy. Unsuccessful instances of Bolshevik attempts to exploit the preparation of a rebellion are seen in the recent attempts in Esthonia and Bulgaria. These political preparations went hand-in-hand with preparations for an offensive with those parts of the Red army and navy which were then closest to the frontier. The Red forces were concentrated as quickly as possible and brought to a war footing.

The correctness of decisions taken in such cases will entirely depend on the accuracy with which the political branch has appreciated the general situation.

The circumstances of class warfare offer a wide field for the choice of the immediate objective. As mentioned above, this will not always be the main forces of the enemy. The acquisition of territory, for instance, may be of primary importance. Such a case would arise when the enemy's army had already been completely undermined by propaganda, while his civil population had become so much saturated with revolutionary ferment, that the first appearance of the Red army would cause a violent rising of the "down-trodden proletariat," and the transference of power to its hands. The Bolsheviks consider that Georgia furnished an example of such a situation. The seizure of territory when a people is ready to welcome the invader can attain directly the object of the war, and the enemy's army can then be held by a comparatively weak detachment. Naturally, the solution of the action to be taken in any case must depend upon the military and political intuition of the commander.

Thus class warfare presents an endless diversity of problems, and consequently of solutions.

In selecting and appraising the line of operations in class warfare the Red staff must consider not only their length and importance in connection with the objectives, but must also understand the meaning and influence of "live" and "dead" centres. A

"live" centre is a centre politically sympathetic with the Red armies. They are usually to be found in big industrial areas. A "dead" centre is one politically apathetic or actively hostile to the Red armies, and is usually found in agricultural or sparsely inhabited areas. Thus it may happen that the most advantageous line of operation will be one that appears totally unsuitable from a purely military point of view, and the early days of a war may give a whole series of surprises to the staffs of "bourgeois" armies.

Tukhatchevski considered that one of the reasons for the failure of the spring campaign of 1919 against Denikin lay in the fact that the main line of operations of the Soviet armies on the southern front led, not through the "live" mining areas of the Don basin, but through the "dead" region of the Don steppes.

Further, in the war with Poland, the main line of operations of the Red armies of the western front led through the "dead" regions of the Lomja and Seidlce provinces, which were hostile to them, but led directly to the important objective and great political centre of Warsaw. The line Kovel—Lodz—Lublin—Dombrov basin, though longer, would have secured for the Red troops a "live" area in which to operate, and would have helped in raising a rebellion against the Polish Government and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus in class warfare great attention must be paid to the political aspect, in choosing a line of operations.

Of course the ideal line of operations will be that which gives the possibility of satisfying in equal degree both political and tactical requirements. This tendency to make use of "live" areas was seen also in the strategy of the White leaders. Generals Alexeiev and Kornilov chose as their base for mobilization and as the starting point of their offensives to the north the region of the Cossacks, who had long resisted the influence of revolutionary ideas, under the *ataman* Dutov, leader of the Ural Cossacks.

Under the conditions of class warfare new considerations must also be taken into account as regards the question of strategic reserves and bases. Up to the present time the conception of strategic reserves and bases has always been closely associated with an army's own territory. In class warfare the proletariat, or "oppressed class," among the enemy may be organized and may become reserves for the Red armies. The distribution and grouping of these reserves will correspond to the distribution and grouping of the "live" proletariat centres.

Thus under conditions of class warfare one may meet a situation

where a large proportion of the strategic reserves will be found, not behind the front line, but in front of it. Exactly the same may be said of the bases, which may be formed, according to the course of the war, in the "live" centres entered and "liberated" by the Red forces.

This new conception of bases and the employment of reserves opens up a wide horizon, and presents a vast scope for the most varied and original combinations in forming the plan of campaign.

For instance, should the Bolshevik forces invade China, their base would presumably be South-Eastern China, which has already been prepared for them by intensive propaganda, and where large numbers of the population are actively sympathetic. South-East China is the *point d'appui* of the Gomindan party, which is preparing strategic reserves and the necessary means for the Red armies in rear of Marshal Chang-Tso-Ling, and in front of the Bolshevik front line.

It is evident that an accurate appreciation of the forces struggling in China, and of the "live" areas of China, would play a very important rôle in the working out of the plan of campaign for class warfare on this particular front. The Bolsheviks have only to break through the barrier of the conservative army of Chang-Tso-Ling, when they will receive an enormous "flood" of assistance from the Bolshevized population of South-Eastern China, giving them the most favourable conditions for a further rapid advance.

Finally, the Red plan of campaign must include the consideration of the means of organizing and securing the L. of C., and of bringing and keeping the army up to strength.

Under conditions of class warfare the Bolsheviks consider that these problems will be enormously simplified for them. By advancing through a "live" region they expect to be able to bring about the local dictatorship of the proletariat, and to use it for the administration and protection of their L. of C., and so to avoid using large numbers of troops for this purpose. So far all armies have been obliged to waste a very considerable proportion of their man-power on the entirely "passive" problems of the protection of their rearward communications. This has necessarily made armies dependent on, and sensitive to, their L. of C. The Red leaders hope and expect to find themselves far freer in this respect.

The strategic exhaustion of an army (one of the reasons for the failure of Napoleon's Moscow campaign) presents far less danger for the Red armies. The Bolsheviks hope to be able to get control

of large areas without much resistance, and without the fear that the "ocean of land" will swallow up their armies, or that they will lose their man-power, not as a consequence of losses in battle, but from excessive wastage on the "passive" problem of the protection of their rear and communications. It is essential, therefore, for them that the lines of communication should pass through "live" areas.

This simplification of the difficult question of the relation of numbers to space strengthens the hopes of conquest in the heads of the Red leaders. By overcoming in the manner outlined above the difficulties which have so severely handicapped invading armies in the past, they hope to achieve far greater results. They also count upon enlisting recruits from the proletariat in the areas occupied by their troops and of gaining the support of prisoners belonging to the working classes captured by them. In other words, they expect that the problem of making good wastage in war will become incomparably easier for them than for their enemies. They believe that the world may yet see the strange paradox of an army, which, in spite of losses in battle and from sickness, will yet steadily increase in numbers, and to a noticeably greater extent than could be produced by the dispatch of reinforcements from its own land.

In the event of successful action by its agitators and propagandists against British authority in Asia, the Soviet Government reckons on consolidating its position on the coasts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans in the comparatively near future, and on bringing the vast spaces and millions of Asia under its control.

In conclusion, a few words must be said as to the conduct of the war itself. Its significance and objective will demand the utmost energy, determination and speed of attack. It must be carried on with an offensive spirit. The more energetic and determined the manner in which it is waged, the more grounds will there be for reckoning on the speedy and effective explosion of allied and sympathetic forces, not only in the theatre of war, but also in neighbouring lands. The more incessantly the enemy is kept under the effects of his first impressions, the more effectively and speedily will the process of the dissolution of his people be completed, and the sooner will secret allies find a suitable occasion to show themselves.

In class warfare periods of quiet and rest in the operations are not at all desirable.

The favourable relation of numbers to space, the comparative independence of the rear and the lessened anxiety as to its protection,

and the possibility of making good wastage by suitable use of "live" centres as intermediate bases are factors which, under sound leadership, will help the Red armies to dispense with forced breaks in operations, and by which the end will be brought nearer.

"The proletariat army, which exists only for the freeing of the world from the power of capitalism, must be imbued from highest to lowest with the impulse to the violent offensive." This is the very foundation of the new Field Manual, the second part of which was approved by Frunze not long before his death, and which was to have been issued this summer to the troops. "The Red army must fulfil its war problems on the basis of a mighty offensive effort, combined with the strictest regard to the proper conduct of operations."

On the extension and working out of the theoretical principles of class warfare, the Red communist staff, professors of the Military Academy and various "People's Military Associations" are engaged. The test of the truth of their conclusions has not yet been made.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE TERRITORIAL COUNTY ASSOCIATIONS

BY CAPTAIN G. E. GRIMSDALE, R.E.

A RECENT letter to the *Times*, suggesting that the abolition of the Territorial County Associations would be a useful step towards both economy and efficiency, came as something of a shock to the present writer. It was the more difficult to understand coming as it did from "Territorial." A Regular officer who, unlike the writer, had not had the privilege of serving with the Territorial Army, might conceivably argue that the dual control of War Office and County Association was unbusinesslike ; but it is strange to find a Territorial disparaging the very bodies which are his best friends, and which really make it possible for the administration of the Territorial Army to be carried on smoothly. In view of the increased importance of the Territorial Army as the recognized medium of expansion in case of national necessity, a short account of the County Associations, outlining their constitution, duties and relations with the War Office, and the unit may be of interest, therefore, to readers of the *Army Quarterly*.

The County Territorial Associations have formed an integral part of the Territorial organization since the inception of the Force in 1907. Their legal status is clearly set out in the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907. As regards the members constituting an Association, it should be noted that in addition to "representatives of the employers and workman," not less than half shall be representatives of units of all arms raised within the county. In practice, commanding officers of units generally represent their own units on the Association.

Several interesting points may be noted in this constitution. The Territorial Army depends largely on the good will of local employers of labour, both as regards recruiting, and in the provision of holidays at times which are suitable for men to go to their annual camp. Naturally, an employer who is serving on the County Association will take greater interest in his local unit than one who is not.

It follows that the more employers who can be persuaded to serve on an Association, the better chance local units will have of getting adequate support and encouragement from them. This support is very necessary, if a unit is to maintain its strength and a high percentage attendance in camp. If, however, the County Associations are eliminated, there is little doubt that so also will disappear the support of almost all the local magnates. This would have disastrous consequences for the Territorial Army, and might well be a blow from which there would be no recovery.

Again, commanding officers who constitute the greater portion of the Association which administers their units, have a large amount of control over all questions of administration. Herein lies one of the main advantages of the system. Local conditions of units differ, on account of varying conditions of local employment, density of population and similar factors. Consequently, such questions as the most suitable time of year or type of country for the annual camp, vary greatly in different localities. No hard and fast rules will meet all cases; but the Associations, by virtue of their constitution, are particularly suited to solve such problems, to the greatest benefit of units. It is scarcely possible to imagine a centralized department at the War Office, dealing so easily or satisfactorily with such questions of purely local convenience. Nor must it be forgotten that all the members of these Associations are voluntary workers, giving up a great deal of their own time to the cause of the Territorial Army. Each Association has a permanent (paid) secretary and a staff of clerks, as there is naturally a continuous flow of work, both routine and otherwise, which has to be dealt with in the intervals between the meetings of the Association. In practice these secretaries, who are hard-worked men, are invaluable to the units and individuals of the Territorial Army.

So far, an Association has only been discussed from the point of view of its organization, which has been designed with the dual purpose of assisting the Territorial Army and of constituting the link between it and the War Office. A County Association as regards the War Office really acts as a trustee for the efficient expenditure of the public money entrusted to it, and it is also responsible for the efficient state of the units raised by the county in every respect save military training.

Now, in consequence of the great variations in local conditions, to which reference has already been made, individual Associations have equally great variations in their annual expenditure. For instance, with two Associations one may find that local circumstances

make it cheaper to maintain a permanent establishment of horses, whereas the other may find it cheaper to hire them when required. Further, it will frequently occur that money allotted for a particular purpose may be insufficient ; but the Association concerned, by effecting savings elsewhere, may be in a position to find enough money to carry through its original purpose. To quote an example :—an Association may be short of money required to enable some unit to travel to a better but more distant annual camp. By securing, however, a contract for supplying forage more economically than in the previous year, it may be in a position to transfer the money so saved from the “ Horse ” account to the “ Travelling Expenses ” account. Fortunately, the necessity for allowing such transfers within Associations is recognized, and this elastic system of accounting is a great help towards producing efficiency in Territorial units. It will be realized, however, that if the centralized financial control of the War Office were to be substituted for that of the Associations, the necessarily rigid system of accounting which would have to be imposed, would be ill-adapted to the varied needs of individual Territorial units.

In its relations with units, the following are the main duties as laid down in the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act : (1) the organization and administration of the Territorial units in the county ; (2) recruiting for the Territorial Army ; (3) the provision and maintenance of ranges, drill halls, armouries, offices, etc., for units ; (4) the provision of sites for camps, and horses for use in peace ; and (5) arranging with local employers for holidays for their men to attend the annual camp.

The above is a formidable but by no means an exhaustive list of an Association's duties. With the exception of recruiting, the greater part of which is now usually undertaken by units, each of these items entails a considerable and continuous amount of work. In addition, it must be remembered that since 1924, the whole of the organization and administrative work in connection with the new Supplementary Reserve, has been delegated to the County Associations.

Let us consider for a moment how items (3) and (4) above affect an individual unit. The Association provides, free of charge to the unit, furnished offices, messes and canteen or recreation room ; drill hall, horses and riding school ; armoury, clothing and equipment stores ; medical inspection of recruits ; and clothing and tailoring. It makes a substantial grant towards the expenses of a band, and arranges for the heating, lighting, cleaning and periodical painting

and repair of all buildings. In fact, it generally looks after the material needs of the unit. Without the Association each unit would be dealing with a large number of different services, *e.g.* R.E., R.A.S.C., R.A.M.C., R.A.O.C., Remounts, etc., in addition to many civil contractors for supplying its various requirements. Each of these services would entail extra correspondence, but the Association now arranges all these matters for the unit, more or less as a matter of routine, with the minimum of correspondence. The great advantage of the system, is that a commanding officer and adjutant are relieved of almost all administrative troubles, and can devote themselves to the training of their unit. This advantage is, in fact, the chief *raison d'être* of the County Associations.

From the foregoing remarks it will be appreciated that the commanding officer of a Territorial unit has more influence with the higher military authorities than that of a Regular unit, as, by virtue of his membership of his County Association, he is able to see that matters affecting his unit are submitted direct to the War Office. It is obvious that the civilian nature of the Association enables it to take a far stronger line of action in order to achieve its ends than is permissible for even the most exalted member of the Regular Army.

From the above considerations it will be seen that without these Associations, every Territorial unit would have to be given a considerable increase in its permanent staff to deal with the mass of administrative details involved. Organized as at present, the County Associations administer very efficiently, at the cost of a secretary and a few clerks, the large sums allotted annually by the War Office. It is difficult, therefore, to see how any additional economy would be introduced by their abolition, and there can be little doubt that efficiency would suffer if units were burdened with innumerable extra worries of an administrative nature.

Finally, there is also a psychological factor that must be mentioned. The Territorial is a civilian although he sometimes wears khaki. He is accustomed to deal with civilians, and may not trust or even understand the higher military authority. There is, moreover, no doubt that in the mind of a Territorial officer there is a general feeling (however ill-deserved it may be) that the War Office does not altogether understand his point of view, or sympathize with his very real difficulties. Between him and the War Office, however, there exists the County Association, which is a purely civilian body, and therefore able to deal with the War Office on equal terms. In such a body he knows that he can put every con-

fidence : he knows that his point of view is thoroughly appreciated by his association and that it will always be as strongly represented to the War Office as may be necessary : and his mind is relieved, therefore, of all anxiety as to the possibility of misunderstandings. The importance to the Territorial Army of this psychological factor cannot be measured in monetary terms, but there is no doubt that it is very considerable.

To sum up, one may say that the essential for the efficient administration of the Territorial Army is elasticity of thought and action, which is provided under present arrangements by the latitude allowed to the County Associations. Under a centralized War Office control, all the administrative machinery would inevitably come under fixed schedules and regulations. Could such control meet the special requirements of a Citizen Army, the first consideration of whose members must of necessity be their civilian professions or trades ? Surely it is not too much to say that the abolition of the Associations would entail the collapse of the Territorial Army.

REGIMENTAL HISTORY: A METHOD OF TEACHING IT

BY CAPTAIN HANBURY PAWLE, The Royal Berkshire Regiment

OUR Colours! What is their significance? What do they mean to us?

Whenever we approach them we salute them. Whenever they are moved from one place to another they are guarded with fixed bayonets. The Colour Party which escorts them on a Ceremonial Parade is specially selected.

In days gone by, when they were taken into battle, the fiercest fights raged round the Colours, and, whatever the odds, they were not likely to be captured by the enemy while there was a man left alive to defend them.

And even in these unromantic days, any one who has witnessed the impressive ceremony of Trooping the Colour must realize that a regiment looks upon its Colours as being something almost sacred.

What are these Colours—these two flags that we treat with such reverence?

The King's Colour. The Union Jack inscribed with the names of battles fought in the Great War of 1914-1918. Mons, the Aisne, Ypres, the Somme—familiar names these! Less familiar perhaps are the names of battles won in Italy, Macedonia and the Middle East—still, you will find many men who will tell you all about those battles: And as to the causes of the war, the nations which fought with us against Germany and her allies, the names of all the successful leaders on either side, the kind of weapons employed—and so on; these are things which almost every school-boy knows, for were not our arms crowned with victory only seven short years ago? Even to-day we are still learning to our cost the results of that colossal conflict which raged throughout the whole of the world.

Now what of the other flag—The Regimental Colour? Perhaps it is dark blue. Why is it that colour? There is a fierce-looking

dragon at the foot of it ; what does that mean ? On a ribbon encircling the name of the regiment perhaps we find the words " Princess Charlotte of Wales " ; who was the Princess Charlotte of Wales ? and then come all those Battle Honours. Some of these bear names, too, which were familiar to us in our school days. Peninsula, Alma, Sevastopol, Copenhagen—but why Copenhagen ? Was not that a sea fight ? What is that name doing on the Colours of an infantry regiment ? And as for some of the other names—Nive, Orthes, Egmont op Zee. Who knows anything about these ? When were the battles fought ? Where ? and why ?

So many questions arise when one begins to study the Colours of a regiment, and to have them answered we should naturally turn to the soldiers of the regiment itself.

The officers of a regiment must of course know the answers to all these conundrums. The non-commissioned officers should be able to answer them, and an endeavour is now made at every infantry depôt to teach the recruit the elements of the history of his regiment during the first twenty weeks of his service.

But the history of the Peninsular War alone is a long and serious study, to say nothing of the work entailed in digging out from various books of reference the causes, incidents and results of such campaigns as the second American War, the Crimean War, the campaigns in Afghanistan, the Sudan and so on. How then are all these books of reference to be sifted to procure a good general knowledge of the history of a particular regiment ?

There will probably be the standard work " The Regimental History " to turn to, but although invaluable to the student who is naturally fond of the subject and is, therefore, well read in the history of the Empire—for the ordinary man who searches for general knowledge of the battles in which his regiment fought this work has its limitations.

In the first place, it will probably cost two guineas, which at once places it out of the reach of non-commissioned officers and men. In the second place, being a complete record of the doings of the battalions (including the Service battalions) since the regiment was first formed, it will almost certainly consist of two volumes of closely written matter recording its facts in such detail that only the very staunchest enthusiast will be likely to attempt to read the book through from beginning to end. Finally, there can be no room in a book of this kind for historical reference to events which led up to the declaration of war in the various campaigns in which the regiment fought ; and yet—how can the Peninsular War really

interest any one who has not traced, however roughly, the marvellous career of Napoleon Bonaparte? Does not the battle of Queenstown Heights lose half its thrill if the reader has no knowledge of the events which led up to the American declaration of war?

The standard regimental history is an essential record, and an invaluable book of reference, but the keenest student will be in danger of losing the clear outline of the history in a maze of detail, should he make up his mind to tackle the complete work from cover to cover; and the man who looks to such a book to assist him in teaching the elements of regimental history to his company or platoon will find a great difficulty in extracting from it the material he requires.

It is pleasant to think that in every regiment there are enthusiasts who have made a special study of history in general and their regiment's history in particular, but surely the ideal to be aimed at is a standard where every officer has a very fair knowledge of all the subject, where every non-commissioned officer can answer intelligently any reasonable question put to him concerning his regiment's Colours, and where the average private soldier, by the time he has completed his initial course at the depôt, has a good grounding in the subject—a grounding which may stimulate his interest to pick up more knowledge as he progresses.

No subaltern, on joining his regiment for the first time, can be expected to dive immediately into books of reference and to spend hours in acquiring the knowledge of the regiment's history, although he is probably quite anxious to learn it. Certainly no non-commissioned officer would do so—and as for the private soldier

It is clear, then, that a book must be especially written with the definite object of teaching the elements of regimental history to all ranks in a regiment: a book which is cheap—cheap enough for the private soldier to buy; short—for the average man will not sit down to a long work; and interesting—a man's interest must be stimulated.

As a result of a certain experience on this subject, the writer of this article would suggest that the book should be written as a series of lectures.

The method adopted for the teaching of regimental history is, as a rule, for the officers or non-commissioned officers to lecture their men on the subject. Better results will be obtained, therefore, if the whole history is split up into a course of lectures which can

be taken in order, and thus avoid the possibility of putting the various campaigns in their wrong order.

The first lecture should deal shortly with the Empire, its origin, organization and defence. It should set out our Dominions and Dependencies, and the most important of our smaller possessions, *e.g.* Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, etc. It should also give in rough outline the manner in which they were acquired and the system by which they are governed.

The part which the Services are called upon to play in assisting the Government to carry out its laws and a short account of the organization of the Army with a passing reference to the Navy and Air Force should be included in the lecture. In this way the class will learn something of the Empire and the Empire's Government, and will realize the importance of the force behind the Government which enables it to govern. The recruit will at once look upon his position in an entirely new light. He will see that he has his part to play in a regiment which, in its turn, has a very important rôle to fulfil in assisting the Government to maintain this most wonderful Empire intact and in increasing prosperity.

For this lecture, no notes should be given to the recruit, but it is to be hoped that his interest will be roused to learn something of the past deeds of the regiment to which he has the honour to belong.

Each of the ensuing lectures should be headed with the particular points which the lecturer proposes to drive home that day, *viz.* : Lecture II. Origin—American War of Independence—St. Lucia.

In dealing with the American War of Independence, the lecture should give a brief but clear account of the events which led up to the disagreement between England and her colonists in America. This should be made into a little story, and traced out so that when the time comes for the battles to be mentioned by name the class will know why we were fighting in America and what it was all about.

Each lecture should be written in such a manner as to make it possible for the officer or non-commissioned officers to talk about the subject for a space of thirty minutes, without reading it word for word from the book.

The writer of the book should aim, throughout his course of lectures (at the most, let us say, eight pre-war lectures and six concerning the Great War), at driving into the heads of his class, through the mouth of the lecturer, the following points : (a) the number of

Honours on the Colours, and which were the battalions which won them ; (b) the nation against which each battle was fought ; (c) the reason why we found ourselves at war ; (d) where the battles took place ; (e) the names of any really important leader on either side ; and (f) roughly when the battles took place (without learning a string of dates, which have sickened many would-be enthusiasts of history).

In addition to the above points the lectures should contain short descriptions of the battles in which the regiment was engaged ; a comparison of the old methods of fighting with our present-day science of warfare ; a brief account of the wonderful career of Napoleon Bonaparte ; the manner in which we came into possession of the Sudan ; and so on. These facts may stick in the minds of the more intelligent of the class, but, in any case, if the writer of the book has made the above six points clear in the mind of the officer or non-commissioned officer delivering the series of lectures, and if, in his turn, the lecturer has made these points clear to the majority of his class, the men can be said to have been given a good grounding in the knowledge of their regimental history.

But there is still one more point to make.

The average recruit cannot take notes at a lecture. He does not write quickly enough and his mind does not work quickly enough. But notes he must have—something with which to refresh his memory from time to time, and so the question must be tackled.

The best method is to have the shortest possible notes printed at the foot of the lecture ; "Recruits' Notes" being a summary of the essential parts of the lecture, put in the simplest possible language.

If these recruits' notes are put at the foot of every lecture, they can be placed on the blackboard in the space of five minutes, and the men can then copy them into their books.

Here then is the complete contents of a book of say fifty pages ; a book which the men can afford ; a book from which the officers can lecture ; a book written with the following objects in view : (i) to enable the average junior officer or non-commissioned officer to give, at any time, a good, clear, consecutive course of lectures on regimental history either to a squad of recruits or a platoon of partially trained soldiers ; (ii) to ensure continuity in instruction ; for, in the event of a platoon commander leaving his platoon when in the middle of a course of lectures, the instruction can be carried on without difficulty, provided his successor has a copy of the same

book and is informed of the number of the lecture last given ; (iii) to ensure the taking of clear and concise notes by the class ; notes which, if read through from time to time, will keep all the main facts of the regimental history clear in the mind ; and (iv) by introducing history, and facts of general knowledge into the lectures, to make a consecutive story which will arouse the interest of the private soldier in the events which led up to the battles, the names of which he sees inscribed on the Colours of his regiment.

It is suggested that if a suitable officer were selected in each regiment to write a book of this type for use in the regular battalions, the subject of regimental history, instead of being taught badly, and being looked upon as one of the most deadly of the hours on the education programme, would be taught well, and looked forward to as a subject which has a real fascination.

THE LEWIS GUN IN THE INFANTRY PLATOON

BY CAPTAIN H. W. M. MAY, The Hampshire Regiment

THE ultimate military aim in war is the destruction of the enemy's main forces on the battlefield (F.S.R., Vol. II. Chap. I. Section 2 (i)). The two further principles, which go hand-in-hand with this axiom, are: (1) Mobility, being the power to manœuvre and act with rapidity; and (2) Offensive Action, as victory can only be won as a result of offensive action.

It is particularly under these two heads that I wish to criticize the effect of the present quota of Lewis guns, as carried by an infantry platoon, *i.e.* two.

I. MOBILITY

The Home establishment allows one L.G.S. wagon to carry the Lewis guns of the platoons of a company.

Now a L.G.S. wagon is only mobile so long as there are roads or tracks passable for wheeled traffic, or in extremely open and favourable country. The moment that these conditions do not exist, the guns must be transferred from the wagon to the man. The immediate effect of this is seriously to reduce the mobility of the platoon, so much so, that in Great Britain, where, owing to lack of transport, it is often impossible to provide L.G.S. wagons for Lewis guns, platoons carry light dummies. This would appear to be tantamount to an admission that the men are unable to carry the real Lewis gun without a too serious effect on their mobility and physical condition. The provision of the pack mule in the place of the limbered wagon slightly reduces speed of movement, but increases the range of country over which a gun need not be man-handled. But both the limbered wagon and the pack mule are large and vulnerable targets, nor are they easy to replace during an action. Putting on one side, therefore, the nature of the country, the action of the enemy can enforce the man-handling of guns, at an early

stage in the operations, causing a great loss in the mobility of a platoon and much physical strain on the men.

As has been already stated, the establishment is one L.G.S. wagon to carry all the Lewis guns of a company, with the result that when a platoon is detached from a company it must at once man-handle its guns, and yet, when such a situation arises in Great Britain, the guns are not carried and dummies are substituted. Why should men be expected to do in war what they are not called upon to do in time of peace?

In the opinion of the present writer, the employment of the pack mule affords the only solution to this problem. If it is provided with a mule, a platoon becomes more independent and its mobility is increased, because it cannot be denied that with the present establishment its two Lewis guns interfere with the mobility and therefore handicap the fighting value of a platoon.

The question then arises, does the extra fire-power as represented by the guns compensate for the difficulties arising with regard to their transport?

2. OFFENSIVE ACTION (THE PLATOON IN THE ATTACK)

For the purposes of argument and demonstration, let us take a platoon under active service conditions. It is fair to say that its average strength would not be more than twenty of all ranks, namely :

Platoon commander	1
Platoon sergeant	1
Runner	1
Two Lewis gun sections, each 5 men	10
Two rifle sections, one 3 and the other 4 men	7
Total	20

For the sake of illustration, offensive action can be divided into three stages : (a) the approach (dealt with above under mobility) ; (b) the fire fight ; and (c) the assault.

(b) *The Fire Fight*.—A platoon commander decides to use the fire-power of his Lewis gun sections to cover the advance of his rifle sections (I.T., Vol. II. Chap. III. Section 38 (8)). So far so good, but the aim of the infantry in attack should always be to get to close quarters as quickly as possible (I.T., Vol. II. Chap. III. Section 35). To this end a platoon commander decides to assault

with his rifle sections covered up to the last moment by fire from his Lewis gun sections. This method of cooperation between the arms of the platoon is much in favour and is perfectly sound, and as a manoeuvre in time of peace will be carried through without a hitch and score full marks. But what really happens in war? The Lewis gunners are not particularly efficient, probably four or five months ago they were civilians; it is raining and muddy or hot and dusty, the guns in moving from position to position are certain to suffer from the elements, with the result that a platoon commander is lucky if he gets 50 per cent. fire-power from his guns; indeed, he will often get less although half the men in his platoon are taken to produce that result. Of course the Lewis gunners should assist with their rifles when the gun stops, but what actually happens is that their attention is fixed on getting their gun going again. You cannot serve two masters. In brief, it appears to be a very moot point whether the extra fire-power of the Lewis guns justifies the admitted loss of mobility to a platoon.

(c) *The Assault*.—At this point 50 per cent. of a platoon are immobilized by the Lewis guns, so that the number of bayonets actually taking part in the assault is lamentably small, even if up to this point in the attack there have been no casualties. The Lewis gunners' first duty is to their gun; if, therefore, they take part in the assault, the Lewis gun sections cease to exist as such, whilst if some of the men stay with the gun to keep it in action, and the remainder take part in the assault, the Lewis gun section is disintegrated. If, on the other hand, the men stay with their guns covering the rifle sections up to the last moment as planned by the platoon commander, the weight of the final assault is so slight that it will probably fail. Yet this is the plan of action we see carried out continually, the Lewis guns bringing fire to bear from a flank and the rifle sections going in with the bayonet, however weak in numbers they may be. Thus in the final assault it may be said that the gun has a stultifying effect on the platoon closing with the bayonet, and yet this is essential to final success.

In the latter part of 1918 in France, when warfare became more mobile, platoons were generally very weak numerically and the problem of manning and carrying the Lewis guns was a difficult one. Their fire-power decreased greatly owing to the physical condition of the men, caused by fighting in the open in wet and mud and the lack of really efficient gunners, so that, generally speaking, the guns were far more of a nuisance than an assistance.

In North Russia in 1919 the conditions were such that wheeled

traffic could not be used, pack transport was not provided, and the guns accordingly had to be man-handled. After a short experience of these conditions when operating in the forest the Lewis guns were left behind in order to preserve mobility and to save the men the fatigue of carrying them.

There is another point also that must be borne in mind in criticizing the present number of Lewis guns carried by a platoon, namely, the great difficulty of maintaining efficient Lewis gunners under active service conditions.

After the few Regular soldiers have become casualties, reliance in war has to be placed on partially trained civilians, who have little enough time to master their rifles, let alone the Lewis gun, and the strain, consequently, of trying to keep up two efficient Lewis gun sections in a platoon becomes almost unbearable.

No purely destructive criticism being worth anything, the writer would therefore suggest the adoption of the practice prevailing in India—namely, that there should not be more than one Lewis gun section in a platoon. In this way it would generally be possible, even after a long spell of war, to have at least one efficient Lewis gun section in a platoon.

Loss of fire-power owing to the reduction of the number of guns would be largely compensated for by the greater efficiency of the Lewis gun *personnel*.

The mobility of a platoon is not so seriously affected and the striking-power is increased.

If, in addition to this change, pack transport were substituted for the present limbered wagon, the writer believes that the best policy would be being adopted until such time as a really light fool-proof automatic weapon is invented.

THE SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL

BY CAPTAIN H. BULLOCK, Indian Army

It is suggested that the desirability of introducing some form of summary court-martial into our code of Military Law merits consideration.

Such courts have been widely used in the Indian Army since the Mutiny, and in the Army of the United States of America since 1898. The military code of both these countries much resembles British Military Law, being based on the Common Law of England.

In passing, it is worthy of mention that in a dissenting minute to the report of the Darling Committee on Courts-Martial (1919) certain members (one of whom has since held office as Secretary of State for War) wrote: "... we would ... recommend that a commanding officer be given wider powers, without prejudice however to a man's right to ask for a court-martial. A commanding officer must be assumed to be a man of sense and discretion, and in our opinion should be given wider powers."

It will be remembered that, in consequence of the recommendations of this same Committee, the regimental court-martial (composed of three officers, with power to award 42 days' detention only) was abolished.

Among the more patent advantages of a military court having summary jurisdiction may be claimed (1) economy, both of money and of time; (2) accuracy, by the adoption of a routine procedure free from technicalities; and (3) a more efficient maintenance of discipline, by extending the power of a commanding officer so as to enable him to deal swiftly with all but the more serious military offences.

In support of these claims, the present writer would put forward the following arguments:—

(1) *Economy*.—If the present system of military cost-accounting were to provide for the reckoning-up of the cost of every court-

martial that takes place, it is probable that those who hold the purse strings would be disagreeably surprised. The expense of a general court-martial is of course normally far more than that of a district court-martial ; and it is the latter rather than the former which the summary court, if introduced, would replace to a great extent. But even a district court-martial usually needs the services of some five officers, including the prosecutor and often an officer to assist the accused.

The travelling and daily allowances of officers on a court-martial, especially in one that is held overseas, form the most formidable item in its cost account. If, moreover, the account were to take into consideration the loss of the time that would otherwise have been applied by these officers to their ordinary daily duties, and the consequent possible loss of efficiency in their units, it is submitted that the results as shown by the total cost for a normal year would give the General Staff " furiously to think."

It may be said that the average district court-martial only takes one day to try out ; but, even so, it must be remembered that by the introduction of summary courts (on which not more than one to three officers would be employed instead of five) the reduction in the number of district courts-martial held would be enormous ; it is probably safe to say that they would be reduced to one-third of the present number.

It is submitted that the saving to the State that would result would alone justify the innovation, provided that discipline did not suffer in consequence.

(2) *Maintenance of Discipline*.—Two essentials of discipline are accuracy—i.e. fairness—and promptness. Military justice has always been noted for its scrupulous fairness ; and opponents of the summary court-martial system might urge that, by the substitution of the will of a single individual holding a summary court-martial for the reasoned opinion of the three officers composing a district court-martial, the good reputation of military justice might be imperilled. But against any such danger may be set the following considerations : (a) The discipline of the Indian Army has probably been improved rather than harmed by the introduction of the summary court. In fact, the reason for its introduction in India is said to have been that, at the time of the Mutiny, it was noticed that the state of discipline in the Punjab Frontier Force units (in which a system of summary courts-martial existed) was superior to that obtaining in some other parts of the Army ; and that, in consequence, the system was made universal for the Native Army in

India. This of course is not intended to raise any comparison between the Indian sepoy of those days and the British soldier of to-day ; but, nevertheless, it seems to be a proof of the efficacy of summary courts. (b) The right to hold summary courts-martial could be restricted to commanding officers being field officers of not less than fifteen years' service ; or it could even be delegated by brigade or divisional commanders to senior officers selected from the above class, their names being published in formation orders. (c) The proceedings of summary courts-martial would be subject to review not less strict than that of any other court-martial ; and that the law might provide (with suitable safeguards against undue delay) that the sentence of a summary court-martial should not normally be put into execution until countersigned by the brigade commander or other superior authority ; such superior authority might also be given the power to remit or mitigate any sentence, or to set aside altogether any illegal conviction.

(3) *Accuracy*.—It is suggested that accuracy would best be secured by the adoption of a "stereotyped" form of proceedings ; and, in view of the large number of officers who would have to familiarize themselves with the procedure of a summary court-martial, that the procedure and "form of proceedings" should be as free from technicalities as possible.

Provision should be made, it is suggested, for the accused to be represented by an officer as Counsel if he so wishes, and for him to elect trial by District Court-Martial.

The form laid down for the proceedings of a summary court-martial under the Indian Army Act is a good example—whilst providing for all likely contingencies, it is yet both brief and clear. A prosecutor would only be appointed in complicated cases or when the accused was represented by an officer.

The table set out at the end of this article gives some idea of the courts at present used in the United States of America and India, and the right-hand column contains suggestions for similar courts in the British Army.

In conclusion, these notes are meant in no spirit of cavil against the existing Army Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder ; but are solely intended to afford food for thought regarding the desirability of such a reform as the introduction by suitable legislation of summary courts-martial on the grounds of economy of time and money ; the essential being that discipline must not thereby suffer to any degree, however slight.

TABLE

	U.S.A.	India.	Suggested for British Army.
Court composed of	Second-in-Command.	C.O.	C.O.
Maximum powers in respect of private soldier.	3 months' I.H.L. if soldier consents in writing before trial by S.C.-M.; otherwise 1 month.	1 year's rigorous imprisonment, and dismissal.	112 days' detention.
Maximum powers in respect of non-commissioned officer.	Nil, unless he waives his right to trial by garrison or regimental court-martial; then reduction to the ranks.	As above, and also reduction to the ranks.	Reduction to the ranks.
Proceedings.	Evidence on oath, but not recorded. Charge, findings, and punishments entered on special form.	Evidence on oath, and recorded. Proceedings on special form.	As for Indian S.C.-M.
Confirmation.	All punishments need confirmation by C.O., who may mitigate or remit them.	Countersignature by brigade commander necessary, who may mitigate or remit punishments.	As for Indian S.C.-M.

NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

ONE important book of the quarter, on the work of the German Parliamentary Committee inquiring into the causes of the loss of the war, is reviewed in the body of this number. Other books of especial interest are: the biography of General von Falkenhayn—with important extracts from his diary in August–September, 1914—and the German official account of the collapse of the German-Bulgarian forces in September, 1918.

WESTERN FRONT

In *Erich von Falkenhayn, General der Infanterie. Eine Biographische Studie* (Berlin: Mittler, 12 marks), General von Zwehl has written a very sympathetic account of the leader of the German Armies from September, 1914, to September, 1916. He does not attempt to present him as “a star of the first magnitude, commander and statesman in one,” but as a very capable soldier who knew his own limitations and had little faith in Germany’s winning a decisive victory, after her first pounce on Paris had failed. Thwarted by what his biographer calls “bad luck,” under which he includes the Yser inundation, and bad weather both in Russia in 1914–15 and at Verdun in 1916; bound to an obstinate and unbending collaborator in Conrad von Hötzendorf; and handicapped by an independent, reserved and almost taciturn nature, that roused neither love nor enthusiasm in his subordinates, he accomplished much by sticking to the German principle of attacking where the enemy is weakest. But his greatest claim to fame is that when he took over command immediately after the German defeat at the Marne, in a few days he restored order and re-established confidence in a demoralized army.

Born in September, 1861, he entered, through the cadet schools, an ordinary line regiment, and was from 1887 to 1890 at the *Kriegsakademie*—where he was placed third in his class, Lauenstein (Bülow’s Chief of the Staff in 1914) being first, and

Freytag-Loringhoven (the military historian) second. From 1896 to 1902 he was in China, first as an instructor to Chinese troops, and then on the staff at Kiaochow, and later on that of the German Expeditionary Force in the Boxer troubles. The author, by the way, admits the complete failure of Germany to carry out her plan of converting China into a useful military ally like Turkey.

After three years' command of a battalion and five years' General Staff service, Falkenhayn was suddenly promoted at the beginning of 1911 to the command of a Guard regiment, and two and a half years later was appointed Minister of War and lieutenant-general. Barely more than a year later he was Chief of the General Staff in the field. That he should have been selected for this last post may be accounted for by the fact that, being present at Great Headquarters as Minister of War, it was easy to transfer Moltke's duties to him without attracting the attention which the introduction of another general would have occasioned. Zwehl suggests that Bülow commanding the Second Army, Hindenburg only just sent to Russia, and Goltz, on the retired list, were the possible candidates.

Except during the period when he was C.G.S., the 13th of September, 1914, to the 31st of August, 1916, Falkenhayn kept a diary, and from this extracts of great interest are printed. We learn that the demand for three extra army corps made by the General Staff in 1912-1913 was not "turned down" because the *Reichstag* refused to find the money, as asserted by Ludendorff and others, but because the Minister of War could not find the cadres. The peace Army was already short of 1,400 officers and 4,000 non-commissioned officers; and to form the three new corps and to provide for the usual wastage would have required roughly 5,200 officers and 19,500 non-commissioned officers more. Without lowering the quality and standard of the Army, the numbers could only be found gradually in the course of a period of years.

As early as the 10th of August, 1914, the Chief of the Military Cabinet approached Falkenhayn and asked him if he was prepared to take over the duties of Chief of the General Staff. Thus early had Moltke been found out. On the 3rd of September there is an entry :

"Impressed again on Moltke and Stein [Deputy C.G.S.] the necessity of occupying the north coast and also of halting for rest on the Marne."

By the 31st of August Falkenhayn had become convinced of the

danger threatening the German right, and on the 5th of September he records :

“ The General Staff itself admits to-day that the retreat of the French is being carried out in complete order, but it cannot come to a new decision ” ; and later, “ Only one thing is certain : our General Staff has completely lost its head. Schlieffen’s notes do not help any further, and so Moltke’s wits come to an end.”

The astounding part is to follow. No information of importance came from the front during the 7th, 8th and 9th of September (battle of the Marne). On the 9th (the last day of the Marne) Falkenhayn notes :

“ When the General Staff told me this morning early that no information of any kind had come from the front, I went to Moltke, as it appeared to me to be incredible. But the incredible is true. Since early yesterday Moltke has only received one message from the five Armies on the right. And that was from Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch, sent to the Second and Third Armies. It is to the effect that the right of the Second Army is holding on with difficulty, and the left, thanks to the support of the Third Army, *appears* to be making progress.”

On the news of the retreat reaching the Supreme Command on the 10th, the first plan made was “ to withdraw the front in Alsace behind the Rhine ! ” On the 12th, Falkenhayn was present at the conference of the C.G.S. with the Kaiser, and he records :

“ the most interesting thing that I heard was that the General Staff don’t know what has happened to the First Army [Kluck], nor how it now stands. It now turns out that the reverse it met with happened on the evening of the 8th of September.”

General von Zwehl tries to make out that this entry is a mistake, and says, “ the only reverse was when Hentsch brought the order to retire.” But that was on the 9th, and Hentsch himself reported that the retirement was under way before he arrived. The truthfulness of his report is thus confirmed ; and Kluck’s *post bellum* claim that, when ordered back, he was about to beat Maunoury and then turn on the B.E.F. is finally exploded. The exhibition of the incompetence of the German General Staff in 1914, coupled with the exposure of the ways of that body in 1918, in the captured records of the German Fourth Army,* must tarnish if not demolish for all time

* Reviewed in the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1925, p. 157.

its carefully propagated reputation for efficiency ; it was only successful in set pieces and against the unready, and not always then.

In excuse for Falkenhayn's decision to use the new Reserve corps at Ypres in October, 1914, it is stated that "two former corps commanders reported they were fully fit to be employed, only their march capacity was not yet up to standard."

Other matters of interest that crop up are that Moltke, after his supersession, at once got to work to intrigue for Falkenhayn's removal, as being too young and not possessing the confidence of the Army ; that it was Falkenhayn who suggested the employment of Hindenburg ; on his own supersession on the 31st of August, 1916, he was offered the post of Ambassador at Constantinople, which he declined. Later, he was sent to Turkey for the purpose of reconquering Mesopotamia, but the burning of the dépôts with all the ammunition for the campaign at Haidar Pasha put an end to that scheme, and he was then sent to Palestine. He protested throughout that the Turks were not strong enough to take the offensive.

He was without doubt the most competent and most far-seeing of the German commanders and strategists.

The eleventh volume of General Palat's *La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental*, has the sub-title *Bataille de la Somme 1^{er} juillet 1916—1^{er} janvier 1917* (Paris : Berger-Levrault, 20 francs). Its 407 pages include not only the narrative of the Somme operations, but also the final stages of the fighting before Verdun—as subsidiary to the great battle—and the intrigues which brought about the removal of General Joffre from command. The book is pleasant reading, not only from its easy style, but from the fact that General Palat repeatedly emphasizes the complete accord that existed between the French generalissimo and Sir Douglas Haig, which made any written agreement as regards unity of command quite unnecessary. Of the British Commander-in-Chief he says : "*Il montre une affabilité d'accueil qui contraste avec la froideur de beaucoup d'Anglais,*" and he speaks of the

"cordial intimacy in the relations between the General Staffs of the two nations. In the course of the battle the movements were studied and executed in collaboration."

The energy of Mr. Lloyd George is recognized, with the remark that "frankness was not his dominant characteristic."

It is made very clear, whatever the British may have hoped, that

General Joffre did not expect a break through by force of arms—as General Nivelle planned next year and failed to achieve. In spite of the initial French successes obtained by General Foch south of the Somme—which we are told General de Castelnau suggested should be exploited by wheeling to the right and clearing the Germans away from in front of the Tenth Army—Joffre on the 30th of July put his name to a pamphlet entitled *L'usure adverse*, in which it was said: "We are endeavouring to disorganize the enemy forces, weaken them and wear them out (*les user*)."

The general failure to do as much as the politicians and public expected is attributed in various passages to the ineffectiveness of the preliminary British bombardment; to the inexperience of the British troops—to most of whom the battle was "an apprenticeship in war"; to repeated attacks at the same spot where there had already been failures; to the small number of French heavy guns, some of which were lent to the British; to the bad weather and mud. Credit is given to the British for continuing the battle, whilst the French gradually relaxed their efforts, the Parliamentarians having determined to get rid of Joffre and Foch. General Palat, pointing out that Sir D. Haig was promoted to Field-Marshal for his services, describes the removal of these generals "*à la fois une injustice et une sottise*," and gives it as his opinion that had they remained in command, there would not have been the lamentable failure of April, 1917. The German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line and the discontinuance of the publication of the German casualty lists giving the regiment and arm of the men killed, besides the numerous German regimental accounts now available, are sufficient evidence of the effect of the Somme fighting on our enemy: the history of the 27th (Württemberg) Division declares that not the Marne, but the Somme was the turning point of the war.

Joffre disposed of, whilst the German command acted with decision,

"the French Chamber met each day . . . in secret session, to deliberate . . . the contrast between the two methods of governing in a crisis is most striking. Love of Parliamentarism and democracy very nearly smashed these institutions and with them the people who professed them."

The appointment of General Nivelle, it is stated, was never regularized by an announcement in the *Journal Officiel*; instead of it there appeared the names of a "Comité de Guerre" of three politicians, General Lyautey, and Admiral Lacoze; and General

Lyautey, being "too military," soon had to go. It was not until the return of General Foch in April, 1918, that the soldiers regained control of the operations.

The Kaiser's peace move of the 15th of October, 1916, the author regards as a trap to catch the Allies, induced by the desperate condition of the German Army after the Somme. One thing, at any rate, is certain, that had General Joffre remained in power, the Allied offensive would have been resumed in February, not in April, and would have caught the Germans in the act of retiring.

There is only one 1 : 80,000 map of the Somme, showing the lines gained in the various advances in colour, and two detail maps of the Verdun front ; but at the very low price of the book no more could be expected.

Das I Reserve-Korps in der letzten Schlacht (The I Reserve Corps in the last battle), by its commander, General-leutnant Wellmann (Hannover : *Edler and Krische*, 1 mark), is practically a war diary of the formation from the 24th of August, 1918, to the Armistice. As a whole, it is not of great interest to us, for the corps fought opposite the French and Americans in the Upper Alsace area ; but a few points are worth recording. Thirty-four divisions, three or four at a time, passed through it in the period mentioned, among them the 1st Guard Division under Prince Eitel Friedrich, who informed General Wellmann that in the spring offensive, when it was put in near St. Quentin,

"it had very heavy losses, 371 officers and 12,140 other ranks . . . and he complained that the reinforcements sent to fill the division up were not worth much."

For a nine-battalion division (1st, 2nd and 4th Foot Guard Regiments), these casualties are enormous, and the British XVIII Corps, which was principally concerned in fighting it, may be congratulated.

The I Reserve Corps is represented as ever-victorious in beating off attacks, except on one occasion, when on the 13th-14th of October the 1st Guard Division lost many prisoners—"this was the only defeat that any part of the corps suffered in the seven weeks' fighting." But it progressed steadily backwards. This retrograde process is euphemistically described as "uninterrupted victorious defence."

The losses are not given, there is only an allusion to a Storm-battalion reduced to 16 men. Amongst the American divisions

against the corps are mentioned the 78th and 159th, and an account is given of the American "lost" battalion which broke the corps front, but then was surrounded for several days; refusing to surrender, it was eventually released by the German retirement.

There is yet another instance given of the Germans being prepared against surprise by the capture of a French officer with a map showing the direction of a projected attack.

General Wellmann closed his remarks with :

"*Einst wird kommen der Tag*" (*Der Tag* will come one day), which reflects the peaceful and repentant attitude so noticeable in Germany.*

The German military authorities have taken the very wise step of publishing, in parts at a low price, a short summary of the lengthy volumes of the official account of the war. The title given to the series is *Der Weltkrieg in seinen grossen Linien. Gemeinständliche und kritische Darstellung nach dem Werke des Reicharchivs (Freiburg : Bielefeld, Heft I., 1.50 marks ; and Heft. II., 1.30)*. This may be translated as "The World War in Outline. A Popular and Critical Account based on the Official History." The reasons given for issuing this short account are : (1) to advertise the Official History, and at the same time, by emphasizing the important features of the war, to make more comprehensible the very lengthy text of that work ; (2) to make an authorized history available for the innumerable Germans who have neither money to buy nor time to read what, forgetting the Treaty of Versailles, are called in the preface and in the text, the volumes of the *General Staff Work*.

Part I, 96 pages for eighteenpence, deals with "the outbreak of war and its causes. Conditions at the beginning of the war. Plans of campaign."

Part II, 52 pages for fifteenpence, narrates "The Battles of the Frontier. The Pursuit."

The general purpose of this popular account is to show that Germany ought to have won the last war and will win the next. The lack of success is ascribed to the failure of the Army and cavalry commanders, always excepting the two Crown Princes.

The German higher leading and the results of the operations are dealt with in even more favourable terms than in the "General Staff Work," as may be judged from the following specimen :—

"In the course of the 26th of August [1914] a clear appreciation of the

* The *Militär Wochenblatt* has invited subscriptions to a new national daily paper, "under cooperation of the leading military writers," entitled *Der Tag*.

situation was pieced together at Coblenz [Supreme Command]. The Chief of the General Staff began to doubt the magnitude of the victory which had been supposed from the first reports from the Armies. It became ever plainer that the view that the decision of the campaign in the West had already been obtained was erroneous, and doubts arose whether the decision to transport strong forces to the East was not premature. Moreover, the commander of the Eighth Army [Hindenburg] reported confidently on the beginning of the battle of Tannenburg. The idea of transferring six corps was abandoned, but the sending of the Guard Reserve Corps and XI Corps was adhered to."

The German public are informed, among other things, that "the result of the battle of Le Cateau was an incontestable success [not victory] for the First Army," but no fruits were gathered owing to the clumsiness of Kluck and the inaction of Marwitz. The terrible blunder of Crown Prince Rupprecht in attacking in Lorraine is covered up by saying :

"by the battle in Lorraine the German Southern Wing had solved its task of covering our left flank and made possible the great wheel of the main part of the German Army."

The writers of the summary have a more difficult task before them than the authors of that wonderful piece of fiction and "General Staff work," the Official account of 1870-1871; but their production will hardly, even in Germany, obtain the credence enjoyed by the latter for so many years, until exposed by Meckel, Fritz Hönig, Kunz, Kretschmann and Prince Krafft von Hohenlohe.

There are no maps.

Die Front in den Krisen des letzten Kriegsjahres—the front during the crises of the last year of the war—by Generalmajor Freiherr von Schoenaich (*Leipzig : Oldenburg, 1 mark*), is an extraordinary good summary of the last months of war, of the political as well as of the military events. Though a soldier, the author is inclined to attribute the complete collapse of the German Empire to the military leaders. He poses two questions: "Should the great attack of the 21st of March, 1918, have been made?" and "When on the 28th of March it was obvious it would fail to obtain a decisive victory, what should have been done?" He puts the situation in 1917 more clearly than it has yet been set out: In the spring, when President Wilson made his suggestion of a peace without victors or conquered, Germany, certain that unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring England to her knees, and with her the

Entente, fell back to the Hindenburg line to await events. The hope proved deceptive: Great Britain was embarrassed, but never hungry like Germany, and at the front there was not the slightest sign of lack of ammunition.

"Then in the summer as the time for the promised victory approached, a pitiless sun scorched down on our exhausted fields that for months had been gasping for rain. All over Austria raged distress such as was unknown even in our large towns in the preceding cabbage-stalk winter."

The peace resolution of the Reichstag, therefore, was imposed by necessity and no empty form of words. Then the Russian collapse and the hopes of exploiting the great Empire for supplies, changed Germany's heart again; she put herself wrong with the world by the terms of the Brest-Litovsk peace, and Ludendorff determined to seek an overpowering victory in the West, for which, among other things, the transport available was wholly insufficient. Each attack came to a standstill as the Allies, better provided with transport facilities, managed to get up reserves in time.

Lord Haig's attack of the 8th of August, 1918, was the turning point—the black day for Germany—so far as the fighting troops went, and General Schoenaich is of opinion that if the British had gone on, "there would for the first time in the war have been a real break-through."

Herr Dr. Heinrich Pohl, Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Tübingen, must have read his Aristophanes well before sitting down to compile *Der deutsche Einmarsch im Belgien* (Berlin: Dümmler, 1.50 marks), as his arguments to make the worse appear the better reason and to prove that Germany committed no breach of international law or treaty by marching into Belgium in August, 1914, are naturally of the politico-comic order. Like so many other German professors, he quotes extracts from important documents, but never gives these in their entirety. He considers that already in 1864 Belgium had violated the neutrality, given her by the treaty of 1839 and guaranteed by Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria, by permitting the Emperor Maximilian of Mexico to recruit a Belgian volunteer corps for service in Mexico. Britain and France had already violated the neutrality of Belgium by exercising, so he says, pressure on her to take part with them in the Crimean War! The next great point is that Britain in 1870 obviously did not consider the treaties of 1831 and 1839 sufficient guarantees of neutrality, for she demanded from France and Prussia

a further expression of their intentions with regard to Belgium. The Emperor William I's very definite declaration and the text of the renewed treaties then made are of course not given. They embodied a full renewal of the 1839 guarantee. A draft of a treaty alleged to have been handed to Bismarck "in July or August, 1866," by Count Benedetti, the French Ambassador, in which one article gave the French the right to enter, and, if necessary, to conquer Belgium without interference from Prussia, is put forward as evidence of the complete end of Belgian neutrality, in spite of the formal treaties of the 9th and 11th of August, 1870, between Britain and Prussia and Britain and France, again guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. The statement of a Belgian officer, that the French at Sedan adopted "in principle" the idea of breaking through Belgium to escape envelopment, although they never attempted to do so, is regarded as further proof. The Professor concludes that the neutralization of Belgium was not "genuine." But not sure of his ground, he quotes from newspaper articles and magazines, and views of various anonymous persons, as tending to show that treaties are not binding for ever, and lays down on page 23, it is well to remember: "No treaty, even a neutrality treaty, is entered into for all cases that may arise." Finally, he pleads the law of necessity; he admits that no State may advance this if it has brought itself into difficulties by its own free action. Germany may with justice plead it; for the Allied Powers by their "encirclement" of her placed her in dire necessity and gave her every right to self-defence by any means.

AUSTRIA

Das Haus am Ballplatz—literally translated, "The House in the Ball Square"—by Freiherr von Musulin (*Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 10 marks*), sounds like the title of a novel, but the Austrians use the expression Ballplatz as we use "Downing Street," to mean the Foreign Office, and Baron Musulin confesses himself to be the official who drafted the ultimatum to Serbia of the 23rd of July, 1914. The book is his autobiography, and in it he takes the attitude, now common among Austro-Hungarians who were in power in 1914, that the poor old Empire was driven by fate, and none of them was in any degree responsible for her downfall. Of himself he says that he was a mere amanuensis, and it was the tragedy of his career that he rose high enough in the Diplomatic Service to see how things happened, but not sufficiently high to have a voice in decisions.

After serving eleven years abroad, Petersburg, Bukarest and

Belgrade, places of especial interest to the policy of the Dual Monarchy, he was seven years in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, and then Chief of the Department for Church Affairs, 1910-1916. But during 1913 he revisited his native province, Croatia, and on his return he wrote a paper on Yugo-Slav pretensions and Serbian propaganda, then burning questions enough. From his peaceful meditations on Church Affairs, he was suddenly summoned to draft the Note to Serbia.

"in which, on the basis of Serbia's moral responsibility for the events of the 28th of June [the Sarajevo murders], certain demands for the suppression of Great-Serbia propaganda were to be addressed to her."

Baron Musulin supposes that he was chosen on account of his reputation for literary abilities and style, but other reasons will suggest themselves to the reader : especial knowledge and concealment of the ultimatum from the normal channels. He assures us that every paragraph was carefully weighed by the statesmen responsible to ensure that nothing unreasonable was demanded and that Serbia must accept. He asserts further that every one expected that Serbia would accept, and that it was a great surprise when the ultimatum met with sharp criticism from foreign countries. After all, the title of the book is not perhaps inappropriate. If the war was brought about in this way by a party of men who did not understand the meaning of words put on paper for them, the sooner diplomacy is taken out of the hands of diplomats and handed over to lawyers, the better.

BALKANS

The latest monograph of the German *Reichsarchiv* deals with the Macedonian theatre, the Allied attack of the 15th of September, 1918, the collapse of Bulgaria and the exit of the Germans from the Balkans. It is entitled *Weltkriegsende an den mazedonischen Front* (Oldenburg : Stalling, 5 marks). The book is beautifully bound in green and gold, instead of the paper cover of the earlier numbers, and contains 8 maps and 21 photographs. One can only envy the Germans their cheap military literature.

The real cause of the Bulgarian collapse was the defeat of the German Armies in France. Of the 22 German battalions and 72 German batteries on the Macedonian front at the end of 1917, only 3 battalions and 32 batteries remained at the end of August, 1918. The rest and numerous small units had left for the decisive theatre ; but there were still with the Bulgarians, according to the list of

German units that took part, given in the appendix, 17 machine-gun companies, 7 engineer companies, 9 aeroplane squadrons, besides detachments for flash ranging, sound ranging, signals, telephone, wireless, listening, pigeon service, anti-aircraft guns, searchlights and L. of C. formations. Nine additional battalions were brought in from Rumania during the final offensive. German commanders and staff officers filled many of the most important posts.

The German-Bulgarian forces on the Macedonian front were organized as the Fourth, Second, First and Eleventh Armies. The two former were east of Doiran, the British sector, watched the Ægean coast and Struma valley, and therefore took little share in the final battle. The First and Eleventh Armies were grouped under the command of General von Scholtz and a German staff. The First Army was commanded by a Bulgarian, the Eleventh Army and the two corps in it by Germans, one division having a German general.

The outline of the campaign is simple. Attacked in the centre about Dobropolye, where the difficulties of ground were not so great as elsewhere, 2 French divisions forming the spear-point, the German-Bulgarian line fell back on the 15th and 16th of September, and broke on the 17th, the front opening like double doors to admit the Allies. The German commanders made desperate efforts to fill the gap, but failed. On the 30th of September, driven off their line of communications by the direction of the Allied attack and bombed on narrow mountain roads by the pursuing aeroplanes, and with relentless Serbians on their heels, the Bulgarians threw in their hand and begged for an armistice. Most of the Germans and the Austrian contingent on the Adriatic coast managed to escape into Hungary.

The sudden collapse of Bulgaria has, it is stated, been a mystery to most Germans. It has often been attributed to treason. The German official reasons now given, put it down to lack of enthusiasm for the war, to disappointment that it was not a short war ending when the territory coveted by Bulgaria had been conquered, and to the Bulgarian Army, from lack of good officers and modern equipment, being only fit to fight other Balkan armies, not those of first-class Powers. The friction between the Bulgarians and their German masters is admitted ; but in excuse it is urged that

“ even the world-experienced and world-adept English officers did not understand consideration for the feelings of their Australian countrymen in war ” !

The friction, which was ever-increasing, was due largely to the "younger brothers" seeing their Teutonic brothers better clothed and better fed, and, we learn from Bulgarian sources, sending off every scrap of food and raw material they could lay hands on to Germany. The Germans were blamed for failing to obtain a decisive victory; the talk of peace without annexations—Bulgaria went to war to get territory—aroused suspicion in 1917. In 1918 there were mutinies in the Bulgarian Army, and its commanders refused to make any more attacks.

The official statement that the German officers showed lack of *savoir faire* in the management of their allies has produced a storm of protest in German periodicals. It has elicited the further fact that the Bulgars treated conquered Serbian territory with consideration, regarding it as their future property; the Germans drained it of everything, treating it as a temporary possession to be exhausted of supplies. Bulgarian *gendarmes* and police actually arrested Germans for house-breaking and theft. That German generals had the Bulgarian National Anthem played and dealt out German decorations by the basketful did not compensate for their presence.

Little is said about the operations opposite the British, where a series of rocky terraces made a successful assault out of the question. The loss of the impregnable position of Doiran is attributed to the Bulgarians deserting.

The curious inadaptability of the German officer is unconsciously brought out by the book. In a country rather more rugged than Wales, with only mountain tracks instead of roads, few bridges and one railway, the Germans issued orders and made appreciations for movements which could apply only in a non-mountainous country with a perfect road-net like Northern France, and could be carried out only by willing troops and well-trained staffs.

Une Division française à la Bataille du Dobropolié (Paris : Charles-Lavauzelle, 5 francs), by Capitaine Riniéri, also deals with the final battle of the Salonika forces, particularly with the share of the French 122nd Division in it, and supplements the German official account summarized above. The general situation in September, 1918, the development of the plan of attack, and the execution of the attack of the division are given at some length. Even by a Bulgarian account, the victory was so decisive that the Bulgarian Army was unable to recover, and "the military power of what has been called the Prussia of the Orient was annihilated." The defeat, the author

thinks, was mainly due to the "discouragement and lack of confidence" of the Bulgars before the operations began, in consequence of the disasters suffered by the Germans in France.

The means of the Allies permitted an offensive on only nine miles of front; the sector of attack selected, guarded by natural obstacles and difficulties of ground, seemed to forbid anything of the nature of a decisive victory; but once the front was broken a way was opened on to the Bulgarian communications, and particularly to a knot of roads and the sole line of railway, about which were accumulated the greater part of the enemy's dépôts of material and repair shops. An immediate pursuit was essential, and for this the Serbian troops, acquainted with the country and burning for revenge, were just the sort required. There are sketch-maps and reproductions of photographs of the country.

ITALY

The Italian General Staff has issued two more monographs on the war (*Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 10 lire each*). The first is *La Conquista di Gorizia*, with 12 maps and 48 photographs, including those of a number of generals, and panoramas. It is a very complete narrative of the preliminaries and fighting on the 6th, 7th and 8th of August, 1916, but the operation orders are summarized, not given in full.

The second volume, *Brigate di Fanteria, Volume Secondo*, continues the histories of the infantry brigades, and deals with 13 of them, giving lists of officers killed, casualties, honours gained and number of days in the line.

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

In 1920 Rittmeister R. Hennig, who was on the staff of the commandant of the troops in German South-West Africa, wrote an excellent military account of the operations there, founded on the official records. It was entitled *Deutsch-Südwest im Weltkrieg*. He has now published a more popular volume *Sturm und Sonnenschein in Deutsch-Südwest* (*Leipzig: Brockhaus, 5 marks*), in which, with a brief sketch of the campaign, he gives his own adventures, and an account of the colony, with hints to intending settlers on its farming prospects, natives, animals and insects. There are a number of photographs, and pencil and colour sketches.

GENERAL

Comment dura la Guerre (Paris : Charles-Lavauxelle, 11 francs), by Lieut.-Colonel Breveté Fischer, is not a polemic work on strategy, but a plain record of recollections of, and reflections on, the railway communications of the French Armies, including those in Italy and Salonika. There are 27 sketches showing the railway organization of the L. of C. up to the railheads at various times. There is a final chapter on the railway problems in the next war, when the zone exposed to bombardment will be deeper, and the difficulties of railway extension into the enemy country greater.

Comment naquit l'artillerie de tranchée française (Paris : Berger-Levrault, 1.50 francs), by Colonel Duchêne, is an interesting footnote to the development of the trench-mortar which, unfortunately, has no counterpart in English. The first French effort to compete with the *Minenwerfer* was in truth a "stick-gun"; for it was no more than a hard pole turned to dimensions on a lathe, from which the metal cases of the fixed ammunition of the 75 field gun, properly packed with "usefulness," were fired reversed. It, however, fulfilled the specification of "creating rapidly a light gun to fire a heavy projectile," although, as an artillery officer complained, it did not take into account the principles of ballistics. The next step was to employ steel tubes of 58 mm. internal diameter, of which there were plenty available, as mortars, and the service projectile, first of the 120 mm. and then of the 155 mm. gun, with a rod screwed into the base, as projectiles. There are illustrations.

Freischaren und Freikorps (Partisan Bands and Free Corps), by Lieut.-General K. Adaridi (Berlin : Eischenschmidt, 5 marks), is a manual for the next war. The author defines *Freischaren* as

"detachments that operate independently at more or less great distance from the main army against the rear or on the flanks of the enemy, and whose object is to occasion the enemy the greatest possible harm. They accomplish this by demolition of railways and roads, preventing the use of waterways, destruction of telegraph and telephone lines, attack of convoys, destruction of ammunition, supplies and stores, constant disturbance of the troops," etc.

Freischaren, he tells us, may be formed of troops or volunteers from the inhabitants, but in the former case, they are usually called *Freikorps*.

With many examples drawn from Spain, 1808-1813 ; Finland, 1905 ; Russia, 1812 ; Germany, 1813-1814 ; and France, 1870-1871 ; General Adaridi deals with the general conditions affecting and the tactics of partisan bands, their leading, armament, clothing and equipment, transport, supply, discipline and care of wounded and sick, reconnaissances, ambushes, attacks and removal of prisoners and booty. A special chapter is devoted to coastal raids. He can only find three examples of raids by detached parties in the enemy's rear during 1914-1918, one in the Alps by a Prussian Jäger battalion against the Italians, and two in Russia ; he obviously has never heard of Cornulier-Lucinières' raid during the battle of the Marne, when French horsemen nearly captured Kluck and his headquarters, and compelled the old man to defend himself with the rifle and pistol he carried at the period. A final chapter deals with the Free Corps raised in Germany after the Revolution to maintain order, and to extend Germany's borders. These in many cases were formed divisionally of reliable soldiers. Thus General Maerker's Free Corps came from the 214th Division. In other cases they were raised locally.

A treatise on strategy, not as a theoretical art, or based on the open warfare of the short campaigns before 1914, but a practical handbook for statesmen and soldiers founded on the lessons of the great war, when all the resources of the nations engaged were involved, is badly needed. The want is to a great extent filled by Colonel Culmann's *Stratégie* (Paris : Charles-Lavauzelle, 24 francs) ; its 590 pages certainly take into account most of the new factors of war and their application. The first chapter recalls the general principles, brought up to date by the consideration of the relations of a Government to its commanders ; and the utilization of diplomacy, science and economic organization. The second chapter deals with the forms of strategic manœuvre ; the third with railways as the means and objectives of strategic manœuvre, and the fifth with the employment of motor vehicles for strategic purposes. The sixth chapter is concerned with especial lessons of the war : attack, manœuvre in retreat, destruction of communications and industrial establishments. In chapters vi and viii the campaigns of 1806 and 1905 are studied to show the influence of ground, and the relation between manœuvre and battle. In chapter viii, 1812 is used as an example to show the consequences of want of proportion between the political objective and military possibilities. Chapter ix considers Count Schlieffen's plan and his use of Napoleonic methods.

Chapter x deals with the defence of a State, the lessons of 1914-1918, and the fortifications of the future. Chapter xii considers the form of future wars, their dependence on industrial mobilization, and the consequences of the partial disarmament of Germany; chapters xiii and xiv with "couverture" and preliminary operations. The final chapter is concerned with the elaboration of a plan of operations and all the factors which affect it.

It will be seen, therefore, that Colonel Culmann's book is a practical but by no means elementary treatise, taking into account the many fixed, changing and variable factors that affect modern war.

Die alte Armee und die junge Generation (The Old Army and the Young Generation), by Major von Rabenau of the German *Reichswehr* (Berlin: Mittler, 5 marks), is designed to warn the younger generation, particularly the authors amongst them—like Jünger, Hesse, Ritter—that all was not necessarily wrong with the old German Army because it lost the war. He quotes in conclusion, and they sum up his theme, the final words of the "Meistersinger," *Verachtet mir die Meister nicht* (Never despise the Masters who have preceded you), which is specially telling, as no one could have been more of an iconoclast, revolutionary and innovator than Wagner. After every war there has been a sharp criticism of the older generation, but the younger one in its time has done nothing very epoch making, and in its turn has earned criticism from its junior. It is the old story of the Chief of the Staff who heard that his G.S.O.1 was going about depreciating him. He sent for his subordinate, and said,

"I hear from various sources that you think me old and doddering. Well, you may be right, but I feel that you ought to know that a little G.S.O.3 in the next room thinks the same of you."

The author considers that many of the younger generation, being in subordinate posts, saw war from the wrong angle, and naturally have drawn wrong conclusions. He is particularly indignant that the old officers are accused of not understanding the psychology of their men, of lacking personality, and having experience of war but no understanding of it, so that, as one young writer has said: "in a single year all the doctrine that had held good for forty years was demolished." There is too great a tendency now to dream of 1950 and 2000, and of aircraft and gas, instead of working out combats, with the actual experience gained in the war, in the use of infantry and artillery, which will continue for many

years to be the decisive arms. Some of our own young authors, who have recently been described as manœuvring armies of pens and ink over battlefields of writing paper, will find much to their enlightenment in Major von Rabenau's book.

Nearly all the Germans who have written their personal experiences of the war, *e.g.* Hesse, Jünger, Unruh, have been of the hyper-sensitive class, who describe their thoughts and sensations under fire, and the effect of war on their psychology, persons indeed of a nature quite foreign and unknown to the ordinary Englishman. In a collection of letters written home during the war entitled, *Aus dem Kriege*, by Rudolf Binding (*Frankfurt : Rutten & Loening, 7 marks*), we have as an exception the straightforward record of a thoroughly sane and healthy mind. Commencing the war in the divisional cavalry of one of the Reserve divisions which fought at Ypres in 1914, and eventually becoming one of the divisional staff, he served for the whole war, except for August–November, 1916, in Galicia, on the Western Front, mainly in Flanders. It is a most interesting record. He has nearly got our measure. In March, 1917, he records that "the British carry on the war without enthusiasm, as in a fight against a plague of mice or other vermin," and wonders what we should be like if we suddenly became enthusiastic. An American has said the same thing: "Your men don't seem to hate Fritz like ours, but regard him as a rattlesnake that requires attention." Herr Binding knows English, and was a close student of our publications—the British despatches he finds dull and wearisome and Colonel Repington's forecasts always wrong.

Of the monotony of trench-warfare, during which many German officers seem to have spent their time in writing voluminous notes on the workings of their inner consciousness, he says: "the longer it lasts the more incapable one is of describing it;" for it almost has the appearance of peace conditions;

"one does one's best to improve relations with the inhabitants, one examines the soil with a view to exploiting it, one trains one's men, visits the officers of neighbouring units, talks and argues."

He openly admits that he does not fight for ideals or "in the smallest degree for *Kultur*. I hold it idiotic to fight for it with weapons." But he understands fighting to gain possession of a definite object, or even fighting for fighting's sake.

He throws an interesting light on the German view of the situation as the Sixth Army approached Ypres in October, 1914. Going

forward on the 19th of October as divisional cavalry officer, his patrols came in contact with advancing troops and were fired on. His men, however, established that they had British in front of them and that there was a staff in Langemarck. He rode back at once, but the General Staff officer to whom he reported merely said contemptuously (*geringschätzig*), "Stragglers from Antwerp."

In view of the controversy in 1917, and recently, as to the precise meaning of *Kadaver* (the body of a dead animal), which is not cleared up by any dictionary, one entry is interesting as illustrative of the difference between it and *Leichnam* (body of a human being). On the 27th of April, 1915, describing the state of the ground after a gas attack, he says :

"I rode over a plank bridge, in the centre of which was the *Kadaver* of a long-dead horse, without which the bridge would be in the water. . . . The legs of an English soldier, still with putties on, stick out of the side of a trench, into which the *Leichnam* had been built."

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

The Foundations of the Science of War. By Colonel J. F. C. FULLER.
With numerous diagrams. Hutchinson. 25s.

It is unfortunate that the reviewer, being a few years older than Colonel Fuller, must, in the latter's opinion, necessarily be "opposed to scientific progress," "a worshipper of tradition," "incapable of seeing world forces in their true relation," and "militarily short-sighted." Having read the new book and formed his opinion of it, feeling such disqualifications might be justified, the reviewer handed it to a recently joined officer who had passed high out of Sandhurst. "Poor fellow," was the verdict. "No more than that?" And the answer came: "Do the Staff College teachers black their faces as well as ink their fingers, and does Colonel Fuller 'rattle a couple of bones' when he lectures?"* To which there was only one reply:

"That is a length to which I trow
Staff College teachers cannot go."

Read in the spirit of "The Hunting of the Snark" and the "Bab Ballads," much amusement will be derived from "The Foundations of the Science of War." It was an immense relief to hear the ex-cadet's appreciation; for the danger of such a book is that the young should take it seriously. The ballad of "Sir Macklin," Gilbert's illustrations included, if slightly militarized, seems to make an excellent review of Colonel Fuller's book.†

To ascertain the views of a slightly maturer generation, the

- * The allusion apparently is to "The Hunting of the Snark":

"Chanted in mimsiest tones
Words whose utter inanity proved his insanity,
While he rattled a couple of bones."

- † "Sir Macklin:

"Argued high and argued low;
He argued also round about him.

* * * * *

"The hundred and eleventh head
The priest [Col.] completed of his structure.
'Oh, bosh!' the worthy bishop [general] said,
And walked him off as in the picture."

book was handed to a captain of parts, who had served in France. His verdict was, " War is simple, Colonel Fuller has tried to make it complicated." Thus fortified by the young, we have no hesitation in giving our own opinion of the book.

" He who can, does ; he who cannot, teaches." Colonel Fuller has been a teacher at the Staff College, and he has cast the matter of some fifty lectures he gave into a book. It is of the greatest interest to be given a glimpse of the manner in which the " Brain of the Army " is trained, and to taste the condensed food on which it is nourished. He seems, however, to have made a great mistake in confusing lecturing with book-making ; the mental acrobatics, striking paradoxes and funny epigrams necessary if a teacher of little personality is to keep the attention of his hearers, are out of place in an argumentative work. No doubt great traditions are handed down at Camberley. One of them must be the historic remark of the C.I.G.S., Sir William Nicholson, at a General Staff Conference in its halls. A Staff College teacher of that era had held forth in lugubrious tones on great " principles " for over half an hour. Said the C.I.G.S. in a whisper audible to the whole room, " Must the unfortunate students listen to that officer for two years ? " Colonel Fuller, no doubt, has heard of this incident, and it excuses his attempt to make his subject humorous. True, its humour is of a laboured character ; we were going to write " Futurist," but it would be improper to apply such an adjective to him ; for, as in most of his published work, he is irremediably bound to the past, can at best only think in terms of the last war ; and that he seems to have misunderstood, regarding it as a case of normal warfare, whereas, from first to last, it was a siege.

Colonel Fuller, as a good lecturer, illustrates his remarks with diagrams. These must have provoked roars of applause, especially the four snakes, boomerangs, or what nots, chasing each other round head to tail in a " vicious " circle. As a Gnostic (in the latest sense of the word, Gnosis—the reviewer also reads obscure works that he does not understand), the diagram which sums up the " Science of War " might be described as follows :

" And the body of the first beast was ' Cosmic,' its head three-cornered, with a ball impaled on each horn called ' Direction,' ' Object ' and ' Objective ' ; and its winged tail was ' Economy of Force.' The body of the second beast was ' Physical,' and its head, the front horn of which was the tip of the tail of the first beast, ' Economy of Force,' and the other horns ' Security ' and ' Offensive,' and its waggly tail was ' Mobility.' The body of the third beast

was 'Moral,' its head the tail of the previous beast as aforesaid, with horns 'Surprise' and 'Endurance,' and its own tail stiff 'Determination.' The body of the fourth beast was 'Mental,' its head three-cornered as aforesaid, 'Determination,' 'Distribution' and 'Concentration,' and its tail 'Direction' in the mouth of the first beast." (No, the reviewer is all right; he is a moderate abstainer.)

Other diagrams are of the abacadabrac order: triangles (the heads of the beasts) inscribe, circumscribe and intersect each other. One, of three triangles dipping into each other, seems to be of the field-work filter order.

Colonel Fuller is indeed obsessed of triangles, or rather, in consequence of his military training, by "threes." Many other things besides the threes of his "beasts" are marshalled in this formation to march past, apparently because man has "body, brain and soul," and has a "three-fold organization, possessing structure, and powers of control and maintenance"; besides, we might add, wearing "coat, trousers and boots" and using "knife, fork and spoon." Other threes paraded are "experience, reason, genius"; "butterfly, chrysalis, caterpillar"; "three moods"; "simple movement towards an enemy, offensive movement and protective movement"; "character, instinct, impulse"; "time, space and force"; "fear, moral and courage," etc., etc. These "threes" give an idea of the matters which Colonel Fuller discusses. However, out of all these threes emerge the triumphant "nine" principles:

- | | | |
|--------|------------------------------|-------------------|
| (i) | The principle of direction : | |
| (ii) | " " | concentration, |
| (iii) | " " | distribution, |
| (iv) | " " | determination, |
| (v) | " " | surprise, |
| (vi) | " " | endurance, |
| (vii) | " " | mobility, |
| (viii) | " " | offensive action, |
| (ix) | " " | security. |

An odd order to place them in, to say the least of it !

Colonel Fuller has read much (he says) in the last fifteen years, and thought more. The pity is that he seems to have read some of the wrong sort of books, obscure and forgotten authors rather than masters—he thinks poorly of Clausewitz, Dragomirov, Foch and Co. The result, as so often is the case with self-centred thinkers, is that he has produced, and clothed in cabalistic language, old ideas,

believing them, from their fantastic form, to be original. He thinks that he has discovered new principles, which, if he will read, say the works of Colonel (now General) Mordacq—not to mention Goltz and other Germans—have been already formulated, and clearly formulated. We would particularly direct his attention to the post-war writings of Colonel Culmann (French) and Major von Rabenau, which put in simple language what he has befogged, and also to the writings of the author mentioned in the concluding sentence of this review.

However, Colonel Fuller does not suffer from false modesty. We thought the words on the wrapper were those of his publishers ; but they are his own. He thinks : " I am trying to do for war what Copernicus did for astronomy, Newton for physics, and Darwin for natural history." Oh lor' !

It would take a pamphlet of a length of about one line only for each page of his book to prick the bubbles and to show that he had mainly written what he labels in others " common nonsense." His ideas will not help a soldier to feed himself and slay an enemy. The stuff is a compound of the philosophy of the use of force sprinkled with axioms of minor tactics—or, as he calls things, " Tactics," " Grand Tactics," " Strategy " and " Grand Strategy." He gives no concrete examples to support his ideas. He cultivates " imagination "—with curious results. He writes, for instance,

" A little imagination will lead us to realize the difference between our mentality and that of a Frenchman or a German, and once we have realized this difference we can instantly assume the mental attitude of a Frenchman or German and see things as they [his grammar] would see them."

As both French and German General Staffs singularly failed to understand their own people in the war, how can a foreign soldier, even with a little imagination, hope to do so " instantly " ? *

We suggest that Colonel Fuller should " perpend " before again rushing into print, and condemning others. He has a quite observable " beam." " Shopenhauer " (sic) and " *Contes drolatique* " (sic) staring at each other across a pair of pages, and bad grammar, do not suggest the higher culture. His pedagogic attitude of " what I know not is not knowledge " is not always quite justified. We beseech him to examine himself, as Cromwell advised the Scottish

* The French doctrine of the offensive was partly founded on the premise that the French soldier was not at his best on the defensive. France was surprised herself at the wonderful " return " of her men at the Marne and the historic stand at Verdun. Similarly, Ludendorff could not conceive German forces being anything but " ever victorious."

Elders, and to consider whether sometimes he may not be wrong. He is right sometimes. For no exception can be taken to the final conclusions of Colonel Fuller. He prints at the end of his exordium the three words, in block characters, a line to each :

GUARD
MOVE
HIT

It is extraordinary that two great and independent thinkers, just a generation apart, one before the war, one after, should come to much the same conclusions in much the same form. For Colonel Foch, in *Des Principes de la Guerre* (2e edition, 1906, p. 241), prints in column form :

*En garde
Engager l'épée
Allonger le bras*

*se couvrir ;
prendre le contact ;
menacer l'adversaire dans la ligne
directe pour le fixer ;
La manoeuvre seulement alors. . . .*

Doubler ou dégager ou. . . .

We thus see exactly how much the " Science of War " has advanced in twenty years, and on whom the mantle of the prophet falls.

The Scots Guards in the Great War, 1914-1918. By F. LORAINÉ PETRE, O.B.E., WILFRID EWART, and Major-General Sir CECIL LOWTHER, K.C.M.G. John Murray. 21s.

Two battalions of the Scots Guards fought in the Great War. The 1st Battalion went overseas with the British Expeditionary Force in the 1st (Guards) Brigade : the 2nd in the 7th Division, which landed at Zeebrugge before the fall of Antwerp. Thus the Regiment bore its full share of the heavy fighting of 1914—above all in the epic struggle at Ypres : and in the following year the 2nd Battalion was at Neuve Chapelle and Festubert. Both units joined the Guards Division on its formation in August 1914, and their record from Loos of that year to Maubeuge in November 1918, embraces nearly all the big battles on the British front in France and Belgium.

To follow the fortunes of two such distinguished battalions, whose stories can, for the most part, be related concurrently, is a comparatively straightforward task for a regimental historian. It is, therefore, all the more a matter for regret that misfortune has dogged the preparation of this volume. The death of Captain Wilfrid Ewart by a stray bullet in Mexico City on New Year's Eve,

1922-1923, robbed the Regiment of a writer of whom much had been expected. One can hardly doubt that the author of *The Way of Revelation* would have produced a chronicle in every way worthy of the high endeavour, devotion, and achievement of the Scots Guards in the Great War. Captain Ewart had barely commenced his task, and, as General Lowther truly observes, "Men able to do the sort of work required cannot be found at every corner." A successor was eventually discovered in Mr. F. Loraine Petre, who, before his death in May, 1925, did a great deal of useful research among the war diaries; but the book was still far from complete, and its publication is due to the diligence of General Lowther, whose task, in the circumstances, must have been one of peculiar difficulty.

On the whole, the Regiment has reason to be gratified by the result. The battalion diaries have been followed with meticulous care, so much so that the casual reader may regard some passages in the text and sundry footnotes as expressing distrust of other authorities. This can hardly have been intended; it is more likely that the essential difference in scope and outlook between a regimental and a divisional history has not always been appreciated.

In common with all regimental narratives, some of the most interesting portions of the story are to be found in extracts from private letters and diaries. Yet such sources of information should be used with rather more discretion than has sometimes been displayed in these pages. One contribution from the late Sir E. Hulse, a very gallant officer, describes from hearsay some German atrocities committed on the Aisne in 1914. Nothing authentic of this nature was reported at the time.

One may also question whether undue prominence is not given to the part played by the 2nd Battalion of the Scots Guards in fraternizing with the enemy. Sir E. Hulse's narrative of his own experience on Christmas Day, 1914, is of great interest, but a similar ebullition of friendship on a much smaller scale is noted as having taken place a year later in circumstances which indicate a surprising amount of forbearance on the part of some of the 2nd Battalion.

A short chapter is devoted to the Reserve Battalion of the Regiment, and the appendices show casualties, strengths and drafts; orders, decorations and medals; and the battle honours. In the absence of battle plans showing the positions and objectives of the battalions, use is made, by permission, of maps from *The Guards Division in the Great War, 1915-1918*, and from *The War Diary of the Master of Belhaven*. There is a good index.

The Study of War. An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 23rd of February, 1926, by Major-General Sir ERNEST SWINTON, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., Chichele Professor of Military History in the University of Oxford. The Clarendon Press.

General Swinton's inaugural lecture will be read with great interest by many beyond University circles. His graceful apologies for a point of view which "has as its foundation the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and the School of Military Engineering, Chatham, and the Army," are scarcely needed. It is no bad thing that a prominent soldier of the most scientific branch of the Service is now to influence and guide the study of military history at Oxford. There is no reason to doubt that he will prove sufficiently susceptible to the atmosphere of his new environment for the University to derive the maximum benefit from his outlook.

General Swinton comments at some length upon the prevailing lack of enthusiasm for matters military due, as he justly observes, "to overmuch knowledge of a kind." This indifference may well be more difficult to combat than the ignorance of former days. He gives full credit to those who are striving for universal peace and goodwill by way of arbitration and disarmament, but by his survey of present world conditions amply justifies his doubt that war can be permanently prevented and military history thus rendered a study of purely academic interest.

Perhaps chief interest will centre upon the lecturer's forecast of the nature and course of active operations of the future. He says emphatically that, in spite of all inventions and scientific developments, "It is the man that counts most." And he believes that training, equipment and leading are of increasing importance as contrasted with "big battalions." He does no more than indicate the future possibilities of air and submarine power, and points out that the increased facility for destruction afforded by technical progress may, in part, be counterbalanced by a conservation of human life due to the same source.

Finally, General Swinton refers to the connection between the study of war and the University. "The greatest service which its study can render is to prevent our stumbling into hostilities because we do not recognize the signs nor appreciate the implications of their approach." If men go forth from Oxford "after ordered reflection on the nature of war and with a true conception of how the State may best prepare for it, avoid it, or meet it when and if it

comes, they will be equipped to help their country at a time when help is most required."

Kekewich in Kimberley. Being an Account of the Defence of the Diamond Fields, October 14th, 1899–February 15th, 1900. By Bt. Lieut.-Colonel W. A. J. O'MEARA, C.M.G., late R.E. Medici Society. 7s. 6d.

Though the conduct of Cecil Rhodes during the siege of Kimberley has by no means escaped the notice of responsible writers on the South African War, it has been left to Colonel O'Meara to tell the whole story, and thus to reveal the great qualities of the commander of the defence. Kekewich not only proved himself a fine soldier, but also exhibited a wonderful tact and patience in circumstances which would have broken a weaker man. So this tribute is long overdue. But it could hardly have taken a better form than the concise and moderate account of the events of the siege related by Kekewich's chief staff officer.

Rhodes, of course, possessed a wonderful influence in the "Diamond City." With great restraint Colonel O'Meara says that however influential Rhodes might have been, he was neither a trained soldier nor a military genius. As a matter of fact, the great man's conception of war was childish in the extreme, as was proved by his efforts to influence the plans of Buller and Roberts, and by his futile suggestions to Kekewich regarding the conduct of the siege. And the relief of Kimberley was not of paramount importance, though such was the opinion of Rhodes. His secret correspondence with the High Commissioner and Roberts, his deliberate divulgence of secret military information, and certain other of his acts were crimes against martial law. But Rhodes had too many partisans in the city for Kekewich to do other than suffer him: and the great majority of the irregular troops were employees of De Beers.

In saying to Kekewich:

"You damned soldiers are so loyal to one another that I verily believe if God Almighty even was in a fix you would refuse to get Him out of it should the doing so interfere with your damned military situation,"

Rhodes shows himself the baffled egoist, but into these words, so recklessly spoken, one may read an unconscious compliment both to Kekewich and the British Army.

But the troubles and anxieties within the gates are kept to their due perspective, and the narrative clearly shows that Kekewich's defence of Kimberley ranks as a considerable military achievement.

His organization of the resources of the city was excellent. If the Boers who invested the place seemed over-cautious and unenterprising, the reason is to be found in the energetic and aggressive measures which successfully kept them at bay.

In 1909 Major-General R. G. Kekewich was appointed Colonel of the Buffs, in which most of his regimental service had been spent. Needless to say, the Buffs are proud of him and his memory is held in high honour. By the generosity of the author and of the dead General's sister, the whole of the proceeds from the sale of this book go to the charitable funds of the regiment.

Winged Defence. The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military. By WILLIAM MITCHELL.
G. P. Putnam's Sons. 10s. 6d.

General Mitchell is a distinguished officer of the United States Army whose brilliant career in the air branch entitles him to speak with authority upon the aeronautical defence of his country. His book is a strong plea for a separate American Air Force to which could be assigned the sole responsibility for such defence.

All good airmen will be inclined to agree with him in principle. He affirms boldly that the traditions of the United States Army and Navy render these two Services psychologically unfit to develop the new arm; and makes the comforting admission that Great Britain, "with her Air-Ministry co-equal with her Army and Navy" and her well-devised system of aerial defence, leads the world in her conception of air-power.

The General is convinced that the United States has the resources needful to make her the foremost Air Power of the world, and outlines a policy under which a separate American Air Force could attain that end. He urges that in time of peace every military aeroplane is capable of employment in some useful undertaking not necessarily connected with war, instancing such duties as mapping the country, patrolling forests to prevent fires, carrying mails, eliminating insect pests from crops, and in making aeronautical commercial transportation surveys. Thus, indeed, is the aeronautical position of a country built up, not by hasty improvisation when the crisis is at hand. During peace General Mitchell would have a small percentage of the aerial strength on permanent military duty, whilst the remainder were used for civil work and assembled periodically for manœuvres and military training.

In forecasting the war of the future the surface sea unit is given

no place. Many pages are devoted to a description of the experimental sinking by air bombs of all types of warships—impressive enough, even if all the air resources of America were concentrated for this exercise and the doomed craft lay stationary and defenceless at known anchorages. It is contended that aircraft will dominate the sea, assisted, beyond their radius of action, by submarines. A great point is made of the fact that an average of 4,000 aeroplanes can be built for the cost of one battleship, and it is urged that the use of aircraft would render unnecessary most of the present costly coast fortifications.

As General Mitchell has no need to envisage a serious invasion of his country by land, it is but natural that he should have little to say regarding the future rôle of the American Army.

"Armies," he writes, "will be used on land for insuring domestic tranquillity, holding operating bases for aircraft and seacraft and, in a last analysis, together with air-power against hostile armies."

The book should provide food for thought on both sides of the Atlantic. It is a challenging contribution to a subject on which there is much divergence of opinion in Great Britain; and, although each nation has her own peculiar problems, the principles are everywhere the same.

A History of The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in The Great War, 1914-1918. Edited by Major-General A. G. WAUCHOPE, C.B. Vol. I., Regular Army. The Medici Society. 7s. 6d.

The published war history of a regiment depends for its success as much upon its plan, arrangement, and presentation as it does upon the actual narrative. Those responsible for this history have done well to arrange the work in three volumes, of which the volume under review is devoted to the Regular battalions, the others, which are to follow, will deal with the Territorial Force and the New Army battalions. Considering the high standard of production, the price—seven shillings and sixpence per volume—is quite as low as can be expected, and should ensure a wide circulation among past and present Black Watch men and the relatives of the fallen.

As explained in the Preface, the work of each battalion is described mainly by officers who were serving in it at the time; but the initiated will understand that the position of editor can have been no sinecure. And one may be certain that the story of the 2nd

Battalion owes much to General Wauchope's narrative of his own experiences.

The 1st Battalion went to France in August, 1914, in the 1st (Guards) Brigade of the 1st Division. It was thus in the retreat from Mons, and the battles of the Marne, the Aisne and Ypres, 1914; at Aubers Ridge and Loos, 1915; the battles on the Somme in the following year; at Messines and Ypres again in 1917; and bore its share in the final "advance to victory." After the Armistice it marched into Germany. The 2nd Battalion—which at the beginning of the war was finishing a tour of foreign service begun in 1899—came to France in the Bareilly Brigade of the Meerut Indian Division, and fought at Neuve Chapelle, Aubers and Loos. At the end of 1915 it went to Mesopotamia, served in the unsuccessful operations for the relief of Kut, and was in the victorious advance to Baghdad and beyond. Transferred to Palestine, the Battalion then assisted in Allenby's final defeat of the Turk.

It will be seen that the telling of separate battalion stories involves no repetition, and the narrative in each case is as full and adequate as space permits. There is no dull transcription of war diaries here, and the closely packed, yet easily read pages may fairly be said to give a vivid impression of the Regular battalions of the Black Watch in and out of action. Room has been found for a description of dress and equipment at different periods of the war, a matter of genuine historical interest which is too seldom found in records of this nature.

The appendices are exhaustive and well planned. They include a complete roll of the fallen and a list of honours and awards. It is of interest to note that the total casualties of the 1st Battalion amounted to 5,421 and those of the 2nd Battalion to 3,498.

There is also a short account of the 3rd (Special Reserve) Battalion which did trying duty in Ireland from November, 1916, until March, 1919.

Among a profusion of interesting illustrations are several reproductions of original drawings. The frontispiece depicts a soldier of the Black Watch after a drawing by Sir William Orpen. Much care has obviously been expended upon the preparation of the maps, though more battle plans showing clearly the situations and objectives of the battalions would add still more interest to the text. The index is good, and at the end of the book some blank pages are provided for personal notes.

The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle,
Vol. XXXII. 1924.

The 43rd and 52nd Light Infantry are practically unrivalled in their method of placing on record year by year the tale of their regimental activities. This volume is up to the usual standard, as regards interest and news. The Calendar is an epitome of the history of the Regiment, and must be an invaluable inspiration for lectures. The doings of each battalion and of the dépôt are summarized in diary form, and the progress of the numerous regimental institutions and associations is reviewed.

The strictly professional note is maintained by the concluding instalment of Colonel J. F. C. Fuller's "Sir John Moore's System of Training," which has appeared in the Chronicle in serial form. But sport and athletics very properly occupy a great deal of attention in a year of peace-time soldiering. The 43rd at Shorncliffe and the dépôt each has a hunting season to survey, and in India, the polo team of the 52nd "had a fairly successful season and any amount of amusement."

Organization for War Within an Infantry Battalion. By Colonel
T. N. S. M. HOWARD, D.S.O. Gale and Polden. 1s.

As Colonel Howard points out in his Preface, there is, at present, no official text-book which gives in detail the organization of a battalion for tactical purposes. In this pamphlet he suggests a war organization of the various battle headquarters and groups; a formation for an approach march by a battalion; a battalion, "formation of readiness"; and gives the internal organization of a platoon on the basis accepted at Hythe. Colonel Howard's recommendations are the result of many years' experience as battalion and brigade commander, and are eminently sound and adaptable. Due regard is paid to War Establishments, Part XXIII. A. It would be well if some such organization were laid down officially in order to secure uniformity of training.

Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919.

The Medical Services. By Sir ANDREW MACPHAIL, Kt., O.B.E.,
B.A., M.D., C.M., LL.D., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., F.R.S.C.,
Professor of the History of Medicine, McGill University.
Published by authority of the Minister of National Defence,
under direction of the General Staff.

Sir Andrew Macphail has not only written an admirable history of the Canadian Medical services, but he has also produced a

challenging and very interesting book on war, which owes much of its coherence and range to the way in which he has grouped his facts round the central theme of certain errors that were made, and has shown the work of simple error in infecting the whole of a complex body. And because the errors are important, even fundamental, his book has something of an epic character, where the same faults of vision from which we suffered in this country may be seen at work in somewhat simpler conditions, so that the story is easier to follow and more dramatic. Briefly, they are : the error of believing that armies can be improvised ; the error of civilian control of a military machine ; and the failure to realize that armies, to be an efficient instrument, must be absorbed into a single body, one and indivisible.

A special difficulty confronts the historian of Medical services : the professional aspect of their work is distinct from the military aspect, and infinitely more controversial. In the case of the Canadian Army Medical Corps fate added a third aspect, the political, which so affected the Corps and the Army through it that, were it not presented, the military history of the Corps could not be correctly understood. Sir Andrew Macphail has presented this aspect in some of the most slashing chapters of a fighting book, and few dispassionate readers will disagree with his verdict upon the late Minister of Militia :

“ With his exuberant energy and confident patriotism he took upon himself as a personal task what could only be achieved by the most skilled and delicate military organization. The glorious experiment was impossible. His career is a warning to democracy of the inevitable man that will arise when defence in time of peace is a matter of no serious concern.”

At times, indeed, Sir Andrew over-proves his case, as when he argues against the discursive activities in Canada of the Military Hospitals Commission, a civilian body, that under the Geneva Convention “ it was an indefeasible principle that the military sick and wounded should be cared for by military authority.” After all the stout blows which he has given this dog of civilian interference, the use of such a stick as this is petulant.

In arrangement, Sir Andrew starts with the purely military history, explains it with the political history, links administrative history on to the two, and then turns to the more technical sides, the ancillary services, and an extremely interesting view of professional results—where his judgments are as robust and personal

as in the other parts of the book. Then, after a chapter on the Red Cross and one on pay, promotion, honours and the Roll of Honour, he picks up the military story again with the campaign of 1918, and so to demobilization. There are many useful tables. With it all the book is a single book, and makes a single and enthralling story, which in itself is a remarkable achievement.

The Preface tells us that "maps sufficient for the general reader will be bound with the text." There is no map, except one of the medical arrangements on a typical divisional front in trench warfare. We had noted for criticism a number of small points: our space is better occupied in recommending a book whose vigour, whose mordant humour, fine humanity, and brilliant common sense should commend its sound judgments to a far wider public than its title would suggest. To read it is not only to understand the C.A.M.C., but to increase one's understanding of war and of Canada. It is also a bracing and enjoyable experience. Lastly, in form and in printing the book is a pleasure to hold and to read.

The London Scottish in the Great War. Edited by Lieut.-Colonel J. H. LINDSAY, D.S.O. Published at Regimental Headquarters.

In his Foreword to this mostly admirable book Lord Haig, Honorary Colonel of the London Scottish, says:

"Apart from the military lessons they may contain, all Regimental Histories serve a double purpose. They are a last honour paid to the memory of brave men and old comrades who have gone before us. They perform also a most useful work in helping to keep alive among all ranks a proper pride in the achievements and good name of the Regiment to which they belong."

It is very difficult to write a short, graphic and stimulating story of a battalion without sacrificing the detailed and authenticated accuracy which alone can make it a true history—that is, the fruitful subject-matter resulting from research and sound judgments for the future. As a memorial of the brave men who played so fine a part in the making of the story, or as an example and a charge to future London Scots, this book is admirable. It is easy to follow the movements of the battalions, and the twenty sketch-maps are clear and helpful—though it is a pity that four of them are set in too far forward, so that the reader has to keep turning back to follow the text on them. There is less success in recording the relevant details of minor tactics. Such phrases as "heavy casualties were

incurred," "little was now left of the company," are common, without mention of strength. An account of a minor operation on the 19th of April, 1918, is a model of apparent succinctness, but it reveals on close study every kind of omission and ambiguity. It is ungracious, however, to draw attention to the failings of a regimental history which has many merits, although the fault to which attention has been drawn is a tiresome one for any reader who wishes to find out what really happened. It also disturbs confidence in other statements to the source of which no reference is given.

The London Scottish were the first Territorial unit to enter France in 1914, crossing on the 15th of September. They were put into the line on Messines Ridge on the 31st of October, where their conduct earned high praise. On the 5th of November they joined the 1st Guards Brigade, and were with the 1st Division until February, 1916, when they were transferred to the 56th Division on its reconstitution. They thus took part in nearly every great battle on the Western Front after the Aisne. One of their battalions was chosen for the Rhine Occupation.

The 2nd Battalion went to France with the 60th Division in June, 1916, to Salonika in November, and reached Palestine towards the end of July, 1917. The Battalion was one of the units withdrawn from the Division in 1918 for the Western Front, and returned to France in June, joining the 30th Division, with which it took part in the battle of Courtrai.

Well arranged, well produced and well illustrated, this is a book which is a fine tribute to the dead, and a vehicle in which past and present London Scots can live again their well-fought battles. The weakness to which reference has been made has little bearing on these aspects of the book; and, after all, the fostering of a robust *esprit de corps* is of greater importance than the writing of minor tactical history.

An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Ten Maps for Examination Purposes. By Major-General Sir W. D. BIRD, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Gale and Polden. 3s. 6d. net; post free 3s. 9d.

In a short study of the very interesting battle of Liao-Yang General Bird gives a concise account of the action, first from the Russian point of view and then from the Japanese. Throughout he quotes Field Service Regulations to illuminate the many errors made on each side, and in an appendix sets fifteen very searching

examination questions on the application of the principles that are stated in those regulations to the problems that arose. The effect on the reader is to regret that General Kuropatkin, Marshal Oyama and General Kuroki did not have the advantage of possessing the present edition of the book ; apart from this, however, General Bird easily succeeds in creating an instructive picture of the uncertainty under which a commander labours, without disturbing the usual verdict upon Kuropatkin of over-caution and lack of vigour. Very clearly written, with ample and easily followed sketch-maps, it should prove an attraction to the study of the Russo-Japanese campaign.

Strategical Atlas of the Oceans. By VAUGHAN CORNISH, D.Sc., F.R.G.S. Sifton, Praed. 5s.

These five large maps are accompanied by a paper on Singapore and Naval Geography read at the Royal Colonial Institute last year.

A man's ideas upon policy must largely depend on the conception he forms of the surface of the globe. The atlas is responsible, in its unhappy flatness, for many false ideas. Dr. Vaughan Cornish's theme here is the re-arrangement of the atlas in order to sharpen our mental picture of the world and to make it a less misleading background for our consideration of modern world politics.

No fleet, going about its lawful occasions, need cross the meridian 70° W. Dr. Vaughan Cornish cuts the map of the world along this line : the centre of his map is therefore 110° E.—the " Washington Line." A study of his map brings home to the mind in a striking way the great influence, upon our outlook, of the convention by which we are accustomed to visualize the map of the world as centred upon the Greenwich meridian. He further divides the map into quadrants conformable to this division, which combine into very convenient hemispheres.

The strategic importance of Singapore, though enhanced by the Washington Treaty, is unfortunately a matter of geographical fact beyond the touch of our domestic politics ; but the value of this atlas lies much less in the polemic of Dr. Vaughan Cornish's essay, sound though that is, than indirectly in the re-arrangement of ideas that should follow from a prolonged study of the map of the world presented in this convenient and modern manner. The reviewer has stuck the map upon his own wall—and no reviewer can say more than that in recommendation.

Historical Illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II. By Major H. G. EADY, M.C., *p.s.c.*, Royal Engineers. Sifton, Praed. 10s. 6d.; post free 11s.

Much time and trouble must have been spent on this book. Major Eady has taken *Field Service Regulations, Vol. II.*, section by section, and has provided nearly every section with appropriate illustration, from a score of campaigns ranging from Marathon to the Great War. There are many maps and sketches.

The heading of his useful bibliography, "List of reference books . . . easy to read and easy to obtain," will perhaps indicate the limitations of the book. The value of meditation on history lies not at all in the number of examples reviewed, but in the constant practice of reflecting deeply upon human action; the substantial reconstruction in the mind of the situations of war is a hard acquirement; if it were not so, a wide and superficial scholarship would be the royal road to greatness. Few of Major Eady's examples are really so easy and pat as they look. The book, in fact, savours a little of the classroom, in spite of the preface's disclaimer of "potted history." As a handy index to historical example, however, it should be an extremely useful time-saver, and Major Eady is to be congratulated on that measure of achievement in a gallant attempt.

"*Owl Pie*," Christmas, 1925. The Staff College, Camberley. 2s. 6d. post free.

"*Owl Pie*" began life seven years ago as a Christmas Annual designed to provide the outgoing student with a souvenir of his time spent at Camberley. It now appears in an enlarged form, and the editors hope that it will appeal to a wider circle and become a link between all officers who have passed through the College. If future numbers are as good as the one under review there is every reason to suppose that this hope will be justified.

Besides the usual accounts of College sport and games and the annual Reunion, there are a score of contributions. The fooling, in verse or prose, is readable and amusing even to an outsider; while among the articles of more general interest there is a good account of coursing in a Turkish prisoners of war camp and a biographical sketch of General le Marchant, telling the story of his work in the making of the Royal Military College. There are also short accounts of an Arab wedding, of moose hunting in New

Brunswick, of a forced landing in Persia in 1918, and of visits paid to four East Prussian families at the close of 1924, not uninformative upon British as well as of Prussian prejudices.

The magazine is well printed, and is illustrated from old engravings as well as by topical photographs. Subscriptions may be paid to the Editor, "Owl Pie," The Staff College, Camberley, Surrey, or by banker's order.

Elements of Field Artillery. By LESLIE EDWARDS BABCOCK, Princeton University Press, U.S.A. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 31s. 6d. net.

The author gives an account of the organization of the American Field Artillery and a full description of the equipment in use. One chapter heading—"The British 75 mm. Field Gun"—may cause the reader some surprise, but the book explains that certain American batteries are armed with British 18 prs. re-bored to take 75 mm. ammunition in conformity with the remaining batteries which are equipped with French 75 mm. guns.

The author deals with most branches of Field Artillery work—communications, reconnaissance, liaison, movements by rail and by water, equitation and animal management all receive attention. It is interesting to compare American methods with our own, and to find that the outlook is, on the whole, very similar, although there are certain minor divergences, for example, the use of the mil. system of angular measurement.

The American Field Artillery has a portable W.T. set for communication between forward infantry battalions and their supporting artillery brigades and between these units and their respective headquarters. This set is reliable up to five miles under favourable conditions. On a wave-length band between 74 and 76 metres, nine stations in a communication net can operate without mutual interference. The book is a technical one, intended for young officers and O.T.C. cadets of the American Service, and well fulfils its purpose of summarizing official manuals. Its value as a textbook for beginners in this country is not so great, but, nevertheless, it makes very interesting reading.

Territorial Cadets in Belgium. Narrative of Tour of Battlefields, 1925. July 29th to August 5th.

In 1925, for the third year in succession, a Territorial Cadet Brigade visited the Continent for a tour of the battlefields. The

itinerary was confined to Belgium, and included Zeebrugge, Ypres, Dixmude, Waterloo and Brussels, where the Brigade was reviewed by the King of the Belgians. The narrative of the visit here published is supplemented by a very elaborate pictorial record, and a detailed account of the arrangements which were made for it. These expeditions are of great value not only to the Cadet movement, but also to the Empire at large, and much credit is due to the officers concerned and to the Essex Territorial Army Association, which body is responsible for the appearance of this attractive little book.

The Dragon, No. 315. February, 1925. 6d.

This number of the regimental paper of the Buffs appears in a new cover which has been designed by Mr. Graily Hewitt. No little ingenuity and taste have been displayed in showing the Battle Honours complete and in their proper order: the result should meet with general approval, particularly as the dragon of the Regiment is now depicted according to the most authentic lights. The contents of this number of the magazine reach the usual high level of interest.

How to Instruct in Aiming and Firing (Revised 1926). By Major J. BOSTOCK, O.B.E. Gale and Polden. 1s. 6d.

This little book, wherein Major Bostock stands at the elbow of the young instructor in the elements of musketry, must by now be well known throughout the Army. The fourteenth edition is sure of a welcome wherever weapon training is being carried on.

Guide to First Class and Special Certificate—Imperial Geography. Gale and Polden. 6s. 6d.

This book should be of great use to both teachers and students in Army education circles. It is calculated to give the reader an interesting view of the subject, and follows the syllabus closely. The constant use of a good atlas and the practice of making sketch-maps from memory are strongly urged, which is as it should be.

British Archives and the Sources for the History of the World War. By HUBERT HALL, Hon. Litt.D. Camb., F.S.A. Humphrey Milford (The Oxford University Press). 16s.

The scope of the Economic and Social History of the World War published on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment is further

exemplified by this volume which is one of the largest of the series. It contains no history, but is a survey of, and guide to, the raw materials upon which the historian of the future will work ; yet this is not all, for much space is devoted to an historical and contemporary survey of British records in peace and war ; the decay and reform of the archives ; and the use of records. It is interesting to remark how large and varied are the archives in the hands of local authorities up and down the country ; and, also, what a large proportion of the War Office records bears upon social and economic rather than on military history.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

The National Review, February 1926. "A British Soldier in East Africa," by Brig.-General R. G. Burton.

A short account of the late Lieut.-General Sir Michael Tighe.

The Nineteenth Century and After, February 1926. "Two Chiefs of the General Staff," by Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside, K.C.B.

A sketch of the younger Moltke and of Conrad von Hötzenndorf during their period of association as Chiefs respectively of the German and Austrian General Staffs. General Ironside considers that the whole tenor of their correspondence was "frankly brutal in its political immorality. . . . War was desirable if waged at the proper moment. They were always thinking and writing about the 'menacing' nations around them. In the end they assumed inevitably the position of the baited bull, seeing red at every corner and rushing out at the slightest movement of a bystander."

The Nineteenth Century and After, March 1926. "The Japanese Fighting Forces and Disarmament," by Captain M. D. Kennedy.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

- "The Siege of Vienna by the Turks in 1683." By Jeremias Cacavelas. Published by the Cambridge University Press. 10s. net.
- "O.T.C. Year Book and Diary, 1926." Published by Forster, Groom & Co., Ltd. 1s. 6d.
- "Historical Illustrations to Field Service Regulations." Vol. II. By Major H. G. Eady, M.C., *p.s.c.* Published by Sifton, Praed & Co., Ltd. 10s. 6d.
- "Territorial Cadets in Belgium. Tour of Battlefields, 1925." Published by Essex Territorial Army Association.
- "The Sportsman's Cookery Book." By Major Hugh Pollard. Published by Country Life, Ltd. 7s. 6d.
- "Winged Defence." By William Mitchell. Published by G. P. Putnam's Sons. 10s. 6d. net.
- "How to Instruct in Aiming and Firing." (Revised 1926.) By Major J. Bostock, O.B.E. Published by Gale & Polden, Ltd. 1s. 6d. net.
- "Kekewich in Kimberley, being an account of the defence of the Diamond Fields, 14th October, 1899—15th February, 1900." By Bt. Lt.-Col. W. A. J. O'Meara, C.M.G. Published by the Medici Society. 7s. 6d. net.
- "Guide to First Class and Special Certificates—Imperial Geography." Published by Gale & Polden, Ltd. 6s. 6d. net.
- "The Broken Trident." By E. F. Spanner. Published by Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.
- "Elementary Tactics, or the Art of War, British School." By Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh, M.C., *p.s.c.* Published by Sifton, Praed & Co., Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.
- "The Foundations of the Science of War." By Col. J. F. C. Fuller. Published by Hutchinson & Co., Ltd. 21s. net.
- "The Scots Guards in the Great War, 1914-1918." By F. Loraine Petre, O.B.E., Wilfrid Ewart, and Major-Gen. Sir Cecil Lowther, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O. Published by John Murray. 21s. net.
- "The Study of War. An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 23rd February, 1926." By Major-Gen. Sir Ernest Swinton, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. Published by the Clarendon Press. 2s. net.
- "Conformation and Appointments of the Horse." By Major R. S. Timmis, D.S.O. Published by Forster, Groom & Co., Ltd. 2s.
- "Conway Morgan, 1885-1915. A Memoir." Published by Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd. 7s. 6d.
- "A Short History of the British Army to 1914." By Eric William Sheppard, Captain, Royal Tank Corps. Published by Constable & Co. 14s. net.
- "1914." By the Earl of Halsbury. Published by Thornton Butterworth, Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.
- "Official History of the War. Mesopotamia Campaign, 1914-1918." Vol. 3. By Brig-Gen. F. J. Moberly, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office. 15s. net.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

HOUSE OF LORDS

ARMY ACCOUNTS.—On the 25th of November, 1925, *Lord Olivier* called the attention of the House to the decision of the Government to revert to the form of Army accounts superseded in 1920, pointing out that the recommendations of several committees on the subject, of which the most recent was the Lawrence Committee, supported the system known as “cost accounting,” under which commanding officers would have a more direct control and interest in the economical administration of their units. *Lord Haldane* expressed the hope that the system to which the Government were reverting would not be the same as the old system in force before the war. *Earl Stanhope*, replying for the Government, defended their action on the grounds that the advantages of the scheme advocated in the Lawrence report would not in practice justify the extensive changes they would involve, which would entail great expense ; but he stated that although cost accounting was to disappear as regards combatant units, it was proposed to maintain it for many other important services, and that the accounts, though brought in in accordance with the principles in force before the war, would give more material information than had then been the case.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

TERRITORIAL ARMY (RECRUITING).—On the 24th of November, in reply to a question by *Colonel Perkins*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that the number of recruits who had enlisted in the Territorial Army during the past 12 months was as follows :—

	1924					
November	1,653
December	1,596
	1925					
January	1,898
February	3,036
March	4,253
April	4,447
May	6,241
June	5,147
July	4,128
August	1,266
September	1,378
October	1,704

KADAVER FACTORIES.—On the 24th of November, in reply to a question by *Commander Kenworthy*, the *Secretary of State for War* informed the House that the source of the original rumours as to the so-called corpse conversion factories behind the German lines could not be traced with any certainty. Statements to the effect that the Germans had set up a factory for the conversion of dead bodies first appeared in the *Lokalanzeiger* in 1917 and in Belgian newspapers, and a German Army Order dealing with the same subject was subsequently captured. There was evidence that the word "*kadaver*" was used to mean human bodies as well as carcasses of animals, and, on the information before it at the time, the War Office saw no reason to disbelieve the truth of the story. On the 2nd of December, in reply to a question by *Mr. Arthur Henderson*, the *Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs* stated that the Chancellor of the German *Reich* had authorized him to say on the authority of the German Government that there was never any foundation for the story. He added that on behalf of the Government he accepted this denial and trusted that this false report would not again be revived.

ROYAL AIR FORCE (FATAL ACCIDENTS).—On the 25th of November, in reply to a question by *Sir F. Hall*, the *Secretary of State for Air* stated that during the 12 months ended 30th of September, 1925, there had been 42 fatal accidents involving 57 deaths. In no case were the machines equipped with parachutes, but provision was now being made as speedily as possible for the equipment of the whole Air Force with parachutes on the basis of one parachute for every seat in an aircraft.

ROYAL AIR FORCE (HOME DEFENCE STRENGTH).—On the 25th of November, in reply to a question by *Commander Kenworthy*, the *Secretary of State for Air* announced that since the 1st of August last the establishment of the Royal Air Force allotted to Home Defence had been increased by four squadrons, which when completed would represent an addition of 48 Service aeroplanes and 88 pilots.

COST ACCOUNTING.—On the 30th of November, in reply to a question by *Brigadier-General Clifton Brown*, the *Financial Secretary to the War Office* stated that the scheme of Army cost accounting hitherto in force would in a normal year, allowing for pension charges, involve an expenditure of £300,000. The scheme contemplated was estimated to cost £100,000.

MILITIA.—On the 1st of December, in reply to questions by *Colonel Applin*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that there was at present no intention of reconstituting the Militia infantry battalions,

and that of the £1,000,000 voted in the 1922 Estimates for the Militia, £9,603 was spent mainly in gratuities payable under regulation to officers of the old Militia, the balance unspent being surrendered to the Exchequer.

ARMY OF OCCUPATION, CAIRO.—On the 7th of December, in reply to a question by *Sir F. Wise*, the *Financial Secretary to the War Office* stated that the cost of the headquarters of the Army of Occupation in Cairo was in 1914 £11,700 at 1914 rates of pay, and in 1925–1926 £56,500 at post-war rates.

HOSPITAL BEDS.—On the 7th of December, in reply to a question by *Brigadier-General Charteris*, the *Secretary of State for War* gave information to the effect that the number of equipped beds in military hospitals under the control of the War Office was, on the 31st of October, 6,751; the average daily number occupied was 3,567.

RHINE ARMY.—On the 8th of December, in reply to a question by *Mr. Erskine*, the *Financial Secretary to the War Office* stated that the total recorded number of marriages between non-commissioned officers and men of the British Army on the Rhine and Germans, from the commencement of the occupation to the end of June, 1925, was 619.

WAR OFFICE.—On the 8th of December, replying to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Heneage*, the *Financial Secretary to the War Office* stated that since November, 1918, the civil staff in the War Office had been reduced by 88 per cent. and the military staff by 89 per cent.

LAND FORCES (GREAT POWERS).—On the 11th of December, in reply to a question by *Major Glyn*, the *Secretary of State for War* issued the following table representing the strengths of the regular and subsidiary land forces of the under-mentioned Powers, the figures for the regular forces being authorized strengths, those for the subsidiary forces being approximate :—

Country.	Regular Land Forces.	Subsidiary Land Forces.
United States of America	116,000 (a)	280,000
France (including the Colonial Army)	654,000 (a)	5,100,000
Italy (including the Colonial Army)	250,000	3,065,000
Japan	164,000 (a)	1,580,000
Russia	634,000 (a)	8,426,000
Poland	250,000 (a)	2,518,000
British Empire—		
Imperial Forces	222,000	648,000
Indian and Colonial (Local) Forces	183,000	—

NOTE (a)—Includes the Air Force which is part of the Army

CADET GRANTS.—On the 9th of February, 1926, in reply to a question by *Mr. Clarry*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that the grants of financial assistance to the Territorial Cadet Force, sanctioned in 1925 and withheld owing to the uncertainty as to whether, in view of the demands for reductions in expenditure, Army funds would be able to continue to afford the grants, would be paid in the current year.

GERMAN PRISONERS.—On the 9th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. Trevelyan*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that at the time of the evacuation of Cologne, 23 Germans were undergoing sentences imposed by British Summary and Military Courts. Of these, 9 had been transferred to custody at Wiesbaden and the remaining 14 transferred to the German authorities.

WAZIRISTAN CAMPAIGN.—On the 9th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. Viant*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that His Majesty's Forces which took part in the operations in Waziristan between the 21st of December, 1921, and the 31st of March, 1924, had been granted the India General Service Medal with clasp; 181 decorations and 979 mentions in despatches had been awarded.

FIGHTING SERVICES.—On the 10th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. Gillett*, the *Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs* stated that the percentage of total national expenditure expended by France and Italy on their Army, Navy and Air Force was as follows :—

France	1923, 13'3	1924, 12'3	1925, 16'9
Italy	1923, 14'3	1924, 14'6	1925, 16'5

ARMIES OF OCCUPATION.—On the 15th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. Trevelyan*, the *Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs* stated that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine were of the following strengths on dates before and after the evacuation of the Cologne zone respectively, the figures for the latter date being for the moment approximate :—

				1st October, 1925.	1st February, 1926.
British	9,000	7,800
French	73,100	59,000
Belgium	17,100	7,500

STAFF COLLEGE.—On the 16th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. Basil Peto*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that there were 440 entrants for the approaching examination for admission to the Staff College at Camberley, and 34 vacancies open

for competition, of which 22 were for British Army officers, and 16 vacancies were to be filled by nomination, of which 10 were for British Army officers.

OFFICERS RETIREMENTS.—On the 18th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. Erskine*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that the number of officers under the rank of captain who voluntarily retired or resigned their Commissions during the year 1925 was 150 ; the number compulsorily retired or called upon to resign was 84.

CAVALRY.—On the 23rd of February, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that the cavalry on the British establishment had been reduced from 14,716 in 1913–1914 to 9,105 in the present year.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE.—On the 25th of February, in reply to a question by *Mr. Ramsay Macdonald*, the *Prime Minister* stated that the Government had no intention of re-opening the question of a separate Air arm and Air Ministry, its intention being to pursue the organization of Imperial Defence on the existing basis of three co-equal services. He further said that it was in the interests of the fighting Services that controversy on this question should cease.

CHANNEL ISLANDS.—On the 2nd of March, in reply to a question by *Mr. Penny*, the *Financial Secretary to the War Office* stated that the full effective cost to Army funds of military establishments in the Channel Islands was estimated to be £290,000 for 1925–1926 and £280,000 for 1926–1927.

IRAQ.—On the 2nd of March, in reply to a question by *Mr. Short*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that the total cost of maintenance of Army forces in Iraq was for 1919–1920 £45,312,975 (including expenditure on Persia and on Indian native troops), and that for 1925–1926 it was estimated at £274,500 (excluding expenditure on Indian native troops).

APPENDIX

[*Supplied from official sources with the permission of the Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.*]

I. THE ARMY

1. ARMY COUNCIL

The Rt. Hon. Sir W. Laming Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P.,
Secretary of State for War (President of the Army Council).

Colonel the Earl of Onslow, O.B.E., Res. of Off., *Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War (Vice-President of the Army Council).*

General Sir George F. Milne, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.S.O., Col. Comdt. R.A., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C., *Chief of the Imperial General Staff (First Military Member).*

Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*,
Adjutant-General to the Forces (Second Military Member).

Lieutenant-General Sir W. Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*,
Quarter-Master General to the Forces (Third Military Member).

Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. Noel Birch, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt. R.A., *Master-General of the Ordnance (Fourth Military Member).*

Captain H. D. King, C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D., M.P., R.N.V.R., *Financial Secretary of the War Office (Finance Member).*

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., *Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War (Secretary of the Army Council).*

2. DEPARTMENTS OF THE WAR OFFICE

Secretary of State for War

The Rt. Hon. Sir W. Laming Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P.

Military Secretary to the War. Lieutenant-General Sir David G. M. Campbell, K.C.B.
Secretary of State for War.

Judge Advocate-General. Sir F. Cassel, Bt., K.C.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

General Sir George F. Milne, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Col. Comdt. R.A., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C.

Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. Major-General Sir J. T. Burnett-Stuart,
K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Staff Duties. Major-General A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G.,
p.s.c.

Director of Military Training Major-General Hon. J. F. Gathorne-Hardy,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Adjutant General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
<i>Director of Recruiting and Organisation.</i>	Colonel Sir R. S. May, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director of Personal Services.</i>	Major-General G. J. Farmar, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director-General, Army Medical Service.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir W. B. Leishman, Knt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Quarter-Master General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
<i>Director of Movements and Quarters.</i>	Major-General A. A. McHardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Director of Remounts.</i>	Major-General G. H. A. White, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>Director of Supplies and Transport.</i>	Major-General G. F. Davies, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E.
<i>Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores.</i>	Major-General R. K. Scott, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>Director-General, Army Veterinary Services.</i>	Major-General H. T. Sawyer, C.B., D.S.O.

Master General of the Ordnance

Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. Noel Birch, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt. R.A.	
<i>Directors of Artillery.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) S. C. Peck, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) S. W. H. Rawlins, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>Director of Fortifications and Works.</i>	Major-General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>Director General of Factories.</i>	

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War

<i>Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.</i>	Colonel the Earl of Onslow, O.B.E., Res of Off.
<i>Director-General of the Territorial Army.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir H. S. Jeudwine, K.C.B., K.B.E., Col. Comdt. R.A.
<i>Comptroller of Lands.</i>	H. G. Goligher, Esq., C.B.E.

Financial Secretary of the War Office

Financial Secretary Captain H. D. King, C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D.,
M.P., R.N.V.R.
Director of Army Contracts. N. F. B. Osborn, Esq., C.B.

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War and Accounting Officer. Sir H. J. Creedy, K.G.B., K.C.V.O.
Deputy Under-Secretary of State. J. B. Crosland, Esq., C.B.
Assistant Under-Secretary of State. Sir B. B. Cubitt, K.C.B.
Chaplain-General. Rev. A. C. E. Jarvis, C.M.G., M.C., D.D.

3. COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AT HOME**A.—ALDERSHOT COMMAND**

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Lieut.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bart.,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. P.
Heywood, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Major-General in charge of Administration. Major-General Sir P. O. Hambro, K.B.E.,
C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
1st Cavalry Brigade. Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) F. W. L. S. H.
Cavendish, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
1st Air Defence Brigade. Colonel C. W. Collingwood, C.M.G., D.S.O.
1st Division. Major-General Sir A. A. Montgomery,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
1st Infantry Brigade. Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) Hon. A. G.
Hore-Ruthven, V.C., C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
2nd Infantry Brigade. Colonel Commandant J. G. Dill, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
3rd Infantry Brigade. Colonel Commandant H. H. S. Knox, C.B.,
D.S.O.
C.R.A. 1st Division. Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) A. G. Arbuthnot,
C.M.G., D.S.O.
2nd Division. Major-General Sir E. P. Strickland, K.C.B.,
K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.
5th Infantry Brigade. Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) W. W. Pitt-
Taylor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
6th Infantry Brigade. Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) W. H. Bar-
tholomew, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 2nd Division. Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) H. R. Peck,
C.M.G., D.S.O.

B.—EASTERN COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.</i>	Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Braithwaite, K.C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. Bonham-Carter, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Major-General in charge of Administration.</i>	Major-General J. W. O'Dowda, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>4th Division.</i>	Major-General Sir R. B. Stephens, K.C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>10th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) T. W. Stansfield, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>11th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) F. J. Marshall, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>12th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) E. B. Hankey, D.S.O.
<i>C.R.A. 4th Division.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) A. B. Forman, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>54th (East Anglian) Division.</i>	Major-General J. Duncan, C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>161st Essex Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel T. N. S. M. Howard, D.S.O.
<i>162nd East Midland Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. Brown, C.B.E., D.S.O., T.D.
<i>163rd Norfolk and Suffolk Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel W. K. Legge, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 54th Division.</i>	Colonel A. R. Wainwright, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>44th (Home Counties) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir H. W. Hodgson, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.V.O.
<i>131st (Surrey) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel B. C. Dent, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>132nd (Middlesex and Sussex) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. E. Solly-Flood, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>133rd (Kent and Sussex) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. N. Dick, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 44th Division.</i>	Colonel R. E. Myddleton, T.D.

C.—LONDON DISTRICT

<i>General Officer Commanding.</i>	Major-General the Lord Ruthven, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade.</i>	Major E. W. S. Balfour, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>26th (London) Air Defence Brigade.</i>	Colonel D. H. Gill, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>56th (1st London) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir G. P. T. Feilding, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>167th (1st London) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel G. C. B. Paynter, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>168th (2nd London) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel A. E. Glasgow, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>169th (3rd London) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel J. V. Campbell, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.

C.—LONDON DISTRICT—*continued*

C.R.A. 56th (The London Division).	Colonel A. S. Cotton, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.M.
27th (London) Air Defence Brigade	Colonel H. C. Simpson, C.M.G., D.S.O.
47th (2nd London) Division.	Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, K.C.M.G., C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i>
140th (4th London) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel W. H. V. Darell, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
141st (5th London) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel C. H. Pank, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
142nd (6th London) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel T. R. C. Price, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
C.R.A. 47th (2nd London) Division.	Colonel E. H. Eley, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., T.D.

D.—NORTHERN COMMAND

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieut.-General Sir C. H. Harington, G.B.E. K.C.B., D.S.O., Col. The King's R., <i>p.s.c.</i>
General Staff Officer 1st Grade.	Colonel W. W. Seymour, <i>p.s.c.</i>
Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.
5th Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel P. J. V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.
6th Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel H. S. Sewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
50th (The Northumbrian) Division.	Major-General F. A. Dudgeon, C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i>
149th (Northumberland) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. H. S. Morant, D.S.O.
150th (York and Durham) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. L. Alexander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
151st (Durham) Light Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. H. Stobart, C.B.E., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 50th (Northumbrian) Division.	Colonel C. E. Palmer, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
49th (The West Riding) Division.	Major-General A. A. Kennedy, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
146th (1st West Riding) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Lord H. C. Seymour, D.S.O.
147th (2nd West Riding) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. E. Sugden, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
148th (3rd West Riding) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel D. S. Branson, D.S.O., M.C.
C.R.A. 49th (The West Riding) Division.	Colonel J. G. B. Allardyce, C.M.G., D.S.O.
46th (The North Midland) Division.	Major-General C. C. Van Straubenzee, C.B., C.M.G.
137th (Staffordshire) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel C. J. C. Grant, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>

D.—NORTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

- 138th (*Lincolnshire and Leicestershire*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel L. H. P. Hart, D.S.O., T.D.
- 139th (*Sherwood Foresters*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel B. A. Smith, D.S.O., M.C., T.D.
- C.R.A. 46th (*The North Midland*) Division. Colonel W. W. Jelf, C.M.G. D.S.O.

E.—NORTHERN IRELAND DISTRICT

- General Officer Commanding. Major-General F. F. Ready, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
- General Staff Officer 2nd Grade. Major O. T. Hibbert, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*

F.—SCOTTISH COMMAND

- General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. Lieutenant-General Sir W. E. Peyton, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., Col. The 15/19 H., *p.s.c.*
- General Staff Officer 1st Grade. Colonel E. G. L. Thurlow, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
- Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration. } Colonel (temp. Col. on Staff) C. R. Newman, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
- 51st (*The Highland*) Division. } Major-General A. B. Ritchie, C.B., C.M.G.
- 152nd (*Seaforth and Cameron*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel L. Holland, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
- 153rd (*Black Watch and Gordon*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel A. J. Reddie, C.M.G., D.S.O.
- 154th (*Argyll and Sutherland*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel Sir N. A. Orr-Ewing, Bart., D.S.O.
- C.R.A. 51st (*The Highland*) Division. Colonel E. F. Shewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
- 52nd (*The Lowland*) Division. Major-General H. L. Reed, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
- 155th (*East Scottish*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel S. H. Eden, C.M.G. D.S.O.
- 156th (*West Scottish*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel R. S. Murray-White, D.S.O.
- 157th (*Highland Light Infantry*) Infantry Brigade. Colonel A. J. McCulloch, D.S.O., D.C.M., *p.s.c.*
- C.R.A. 52nd (*The Lowland*) Division. Colonel F. Rainsford-Hannay, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

G.—SOUTHERN COMMAND

- General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. General Sir A. J. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, Col. R. U. Rif., A.D.C.

G.—SOUTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

<i>Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) H. Karslake, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Major-General in charge of Administration.</i>	Major-General G. H. B. Freeth, C.B. C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>2nd Cavalry Brigade.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) B. D. Fisher, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>3rd Division.</i>	Major-General Sir W. C. G. Heneker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>7th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) G. H. N. Jackson, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>8th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) W. D. Wright, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>9th Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Commandant Sir H. J. Elles, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>C.R.A. 3rd Division.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) H. C. Stanley-Clarke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>48th (The South Midland) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>143rd (Warwickshire) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel Hon. M. A. Wingfield, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>144th (Gloucestershire and Worcs.) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel R. G. Jelf, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>145th (South Midland) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel L. A. E. Price-Davies, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , A.D.C.
<i>C.R.A. 48th (The South Midland) Division.</i>	Colonel W. E. Clark, C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>43rd (The Wessex) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir E. Northey, G.C.M.G., C.B.
<i>128th (Hampshire) Infantry Bgde.</i>	Colonel H. C. R. Green, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
<i>129th (South Wessex) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel M. H. E. Welch, C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>130th (Devon and Cornwall) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel E. Treffery, C.M.G., O.B.E., T.D.
<i>C.R.A., 43rd (The Wessex) Division.</i>	Colonel A. C. R. Nutt, D.S.O.

H.—WESTERN COMMAND

<i>General Officer Commanding-in Chief.</i>	Lieutenant-General Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.</i>	Colonel Sir H. Wake, Bart., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
<i>Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.</i>	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) E. Evans, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.
<i>53rd (The Welsh) Division.</i>	Major-General Sir T. O. Marden, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Col. Welch R.
<i>158th (Royal Welch) Infantry Brigade.</i>	Colonel A. C. Girdwood, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>

H.—WESTERN COMMAND—*continued*

159th (Welsh Border) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Hon. A. F. Stanley, D.S.O.
160th (South Wales) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel D. H. Leslie, T.A.
C.R.A. 53rd (The Welsh) Division.	Colonel A. H. D. West, D.S.O.
55th (The West Lancashire) Division.	Major-General H. D. De Prée, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
164th (North Lancashire) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel L. J. Wyatt, D.S.O.
165th (Liverpool) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel H. A. Walker, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
166th (South Lancashire and Cheshire) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel C. N. Perreau, C.M.G.
C.R.A. 55th (The West Lancashire) Division.	Colonel H. E. Carey, C.M.G., D.S.O.
42nd (The East Lancashire) Division.	Major-General A. Solly-Flood, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Col. P.W. Vols., <i>p.s.c.</i>
125th (Lancashire Fusiliers) Brigade.	Colonel J. A. Strick, C.B., D.S.O.
126th (East Lancashire and Border) Infantry Bgde.	Colonel R. E. S. Prentice, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
127th (Manchester) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. L. Challenor, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 42nd (The East Lancashire) Division.	Colonel H. de C. Martelli, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>

J.—CHANNEL ISLANDS

*Guernsey and Alderney Dis-
trict :*

*Lt.-Governor and Com-
manding the Troops.* Major-General Hon. Sir C. J. Sackville-
West, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*

Jersey District :

*Lt.-Governor and Com-
manding the Troops.* Major-General Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

4. DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE ARMY

A.—Cavalry Regiments

Regiment.	Station.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
The Life Guards (1st and 2nd)	Regent's Park	Lt.-Col. Hon. G. V. A. Monckton-Arundel, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
Royal Horse Guards (The Blues)	Windsor	Lt.-Col. Lord A. R. Innes-Ker, D.S.O.	
1st King's Dragoon Guards	Rhine	Lt.-Col. W. F. Chappell, D.S.O.	
The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Gds.)	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. R. H. Osborne, D.S.O., M.C.	
3rd-6th Dragoon Guards	Colchester	Lt.-Col. G. A. Sanford, D.S.O.	
4th-7th Dragoon Guards	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. A. S. Pilcher	
1st The Royal Dragoons	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. W. T. Hodgson, D.S.O., M.C.	
The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)	Meerut	Lt.-Col. J. J. Readman, D.S.O.	
3rd The King's Own Hussars	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. R. Burnside, D.S.O.	
4th Queen's Own Hussars	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. T. W. Pagnell, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
5th-6th Dragoons	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. J. A. Brooke	
7th Queen's Own Hussars	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. Hon. D. P. Tollemache, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars	York	Lt.-Col. A. Curell.	
9th Queen's Royal Lancers	Egypt (tempy.)	Lt.-Col. J. Greene, D.S.O.	
10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales's Own)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. M. Graham, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. F. H. Sutton, M.C.	
12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's)	Tidworth (for Egypt)	Lt.-Col. J. Blakiston-Houston, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
13th-18th Hussars	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. W. Holdsworth.	
14th-20th Hussars	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. F. B. Hurdall, M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
15th-19th Hussars	Egypt (for Palestine)	Lt.-Col. Hon. J. D. Y. Bingham, D.S.O.	
16th-5th Lancers	Egypt (for Tidworth)	Lt.-Col. G. F. H. Brooke, D.S.O., M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
17th-21st Lancers	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. T. P. Melville, D.S.O.	

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

B.—Royal Regiment of Artillery

Stations of Units.

Brigades, Royal Horse Artillery.

Brig.	H.Q. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H.Q. and Batteries.	—
1	H.-Q. A, B M	} Aldershot	3	H.-Q. D, J, F	} Abbasia, Egypt
2	H.-Q. K C L		5	H.-Q. G, N E I O	
		Meerut Sialkot Risalpur	Unbrig.		Newport (Mon.) Trowbridge Secunderabad St. John's Wood

Field Brigades, Royal Artillery.

1 (Army)	H.-Q. 11, 52, 80 (H), 98	} Deepcut	17	H.-Q. 10 13, 26, 92 (H)	} Bordon
2	H.-Q. 35 (H) 53, 87 42		18 (Army)	H.-Q. 93, 94, 95 (H) 59	
3	H.-Q. 18, 62, 65 (H), 75	} Meerut (for Shorncliffe) Agra (for Shorncliffe) Deepcut	19	H.-Q. 29 (H) 39, 96, 97	} Edinburgh Dunbar
4	H.-Q. 4 (H), 7 14, 66		20	H.-Q. 41, 45 (H) 67, 99	
5	H.-Q. 63, 64, 73, 81 (H)	} Longmoor	21	H.-Q. P. Z. (H)	} Brighton
6	H.-Q. 69, 74, 77, 79 (H)			Q (H)	
7	H.-Q. 9 16 17 43 (H)	} Bulford	22	Y H.-Q. 32, 33, 36 (H) 55 (H)	} Lahore (for Jullundur) Lahore (for Ferozepore) Ferozepore (for Lahore) Jullundur (for Lahore)
8	H.-Q. H (H) V, W, X		23	H.-Q. 60, 89, 90 (H) 100 (H)	
9	H.-Q. 19, 20, 28, 76 (H)	} Larkhill	24	H.-Q. 22, 50, 56 (H) 70	} Rawalpindi
10 (Army)	H.-Q. 51, 54 30 (H), 46		25	H.-Q. 12, 25, 31 (H) 58	
11	H.-Q. 78 (H), 83, 84, 85	} Lucknow Fyzabad (for Lucknow) Lucknow (for Cawnpore) Bareilly (for Lucknow) Lucknow (for Fyzerbad)	26	H.-Q. 40 (H) 48 15	} Jhansi Nasirabad
12	H.-Q. 6, 23, 49, 91 (H)		27	H.-Q. 21, 24, 37 (H)	
13	H.-Q. 2, 8, 44, 82 (H)	} Rhine	28	H.-Q. 1, 3, 57 (H) 5	} En route India
14	H.-Q. 68, 88 (H) 38, 61 (H)				
15	H.-Q. R. T, U, S (H)	} Hyderabad (Sind) Exeter Bristol			} Jubbulpore (for Allahabad) Allahabad (for Jubbulpore)
16	H.-Q. 27 (H), 34, 86 (H) 72				
		} Kirkee			
		Secunderabad			

Allotment of Batteries to Field Brigades.

Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.
H	8th	1	28th	18	3rd	35	2nd	52	1st	69	6th	86	16th
P	21st	2	13th	19	9th	36	22nd	58	2nd	70	24th	87	2nd
Q		3	28th	20	"	37	27th	54	10th	71	26th	88	14th
R		4	4th	21	27th	38	14th	55	22nd	72	16th	89	23rd
S	15th	5	28th	22	24th	39	19th	56	24th	73	5th	90	"
T		6	12th	23	12th	40	26th	57	28th	74	6th	91	12th
U		7	4th	24	27th	41	20th	58	25th	75	3rd	92	17th
V	8th	8	13th	25	25th	42	2nd	59	18th	76	9th	93	18th
W		9	7th	26	17th	43	7th	60	23rd	77	6th	94	"
X		10	17th	27	16th	44	13th	61	14th	78	11th	95	"
Y	21st	11	1st	28	9th	45	20th	62	3rd	79	6th	96	19th
Z		12	25th	29	19th	46	10th	63	5th	80	1st	97	"
		13	17th	30	10th	47	27th	64	"	81	5th	98	1st
		14	4th	31	25th	48	26th	65	3rd	82	13th	99	20th
		15	26th	32	22nd	49	12th	66	4th	83	11th	100	23rd
		16	7th	33	"	50	24th	67	20th	84	"		
		17	"	34	16th	51	10th	68	14th	85	"		

C.—Pack Brigades, Royal Artillery

Brig.	H.-Q. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H. Q. and Batteries.	—
I.	H.-Q. 2, 3, 4	Ewshot	21st	H.-Q., 12 (H)	Jutogh
II.	H.-Q., 5, 7, 9	Bulford	(Indian)		
III.	H. Q., 16, 18, 19	Aldershot	22nd	H.-Q. ..	Kohat
			(Indian)		
IV.	H.-Q., 15, 20, 21	Norwich	23rd	8 (H) ..	Rawalpindi
			(Indian)	H.-Q. 17 (H)	Quetta (for Waziristan)
V. }	H.-Q. ..	Helmieh	24th	H.-Q. ..	Peshawar
	I		(Indian)		
	13, 14 ..				
20th (Indian)	H.Q., 10 (H)	Razmak	25th	11 (H) ..	Nowshera
			(Indian)	H.-Q. ..	Abbottabad
				6 (H) ..	Rawalpindi

Medium Brigades, Royal Artillery.

Brig.	H.-Q. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H.-Q. and Batteries.	—
1	H.-Q. 1, 3 (H) (T.D.)	Shoeburyness	4 (etd.)	9 (T.D.)	Muttra
	22 (H) (T.D.)			13 (H)	Agra
	5 (H) (T.D.)			14 (H) (T.D.)	Roorkee
2	H.-Q.	Ipswich		16 (H) (T.D.)	Delhi
	7 (H) (T.D.) 12	Ambala			
	4 (H) (T.D.)	Peshawar	5	H.Q. 18 (H) 19	Larkhill
	8 (T.D.)	Ferozepore		(H) (T.D.), 20	
3	H.-Q. 2 (T.D.)	Malta		(H) (T.D.) 21	
	10 (H) (T.D.)			15 (T.D.)	Roorkee (for Calcutta)
	6 (H) (T.D.)		(unbrigaded)		Christchurch
	11 (H) (T.D.)	Gibraltar		17	Fort Fareham
4	H.-Q.	Muttra		23 (H) (T.D.)	

Heavy Batteries, Royal Artillery.

Battery.	—	Battery.	—	Battery.	—
1	Sierra Leone (for Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth)	13	Karachi	28	Bere Island
2	Jamaica	14	Fort William, Calcutta	29	Mauritius
3	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth (for Sierra Leone)	15	Plymouth	30	Spike Island
4	Gibraltar	16	Fort Brockhurst	31	Gibraltar
5	Plymouth	17	Plymouth	32	Fort Brockhurst
6	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth	18	Lough Swilly	33	Plymouth
7	Aden	19	Ceylon	34	Leith Fort
8	Gibraltar	20	Bere Island	35	Aden
9	Bombay	21	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth	36	Templebreedy
10	Malta	22	Fort Brockhurst	37	Leith Fort
11	en route for Singapore	23	Malta.	38	Hong Kong
12	Hong Kong	24	Shoeburyness	39	Spike Island
		25	Hong Kong	40	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth
		26	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth	41	Fort Carlisle
		27	Singapore	42	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth

Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Royal Artillery.

1st	1, 2, 3,	Blackdown.	
Survey Co., Royal Artillery	Larkhill.

D.—Royal Engineers

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Military Engineering, R.E.	24th (Fortress) Co., Malta
Dépôt, Chatham.	26th (Field) Co., Bordon
Electric Light School, Gosport	27th (Fortress) Co., Bermuda
Training Battalion, R.E., Chatham	30th (Fortress) Co., Plymouth
Dépôt Battalion, R.E., Chatham	31st (Fortress) Co., Ceylon
R.E. Mounted Dépôt, Aldershot	33rd (Fortress) Co., Queenstown Harbour
Railway Training Centre, Longmoor	34th (Fortress) Co., Guernsey
1st Field Squadron, Aldershot	35th (Fortress) Co., Pembroke
1st (Fortress) Co., Gibraltar	36th (Fortress) Co., Sierra Leone
2nd (Field) Co., Egypt	38th (Field) Co., Aldershot
3rd (Fortress) Co., Dover	39th (Fortress) Co., Sheerness
4th (Fortress) Co., Gosport	40th (Fortress) Co., Hong Kong
5th (Field) Co., Aldershot	41st (Fortress) Co., Singapore
6th (Field) Park Co., Aldershot	42nd (Field) Co., Egypt
7th (Field) Co., Rhine	43rd (Fortress) Co., Mauritius
8th (Railway) Co., Longmoor	44th (Fortress) Co., Jamaica
9th (Field) Co., Shorncliffe	45th (Fortress) Co., Portsmouth
10th (Railway) Co., Longmoor	49th (Fortress) Co., North Queensferry
11th (Field) Co., Aldershot	54th (Field) Co., Bulford
12th (Field) Co., Aldershot	55th (Field) Co., Catterick
13th (Survey) Co., York	56th (Field) Co., Bulford
14th (Survey) Co., Edinburgh	58th (Porton) Co., Porton
15th (Field Park) Co., Aldershot	59th (Field) Co., Catterick
16th (Fortress) Co., Paull-on-Humber	Experimental Bridging Estab., Christchurch
17th (Field) Co., Bulford	1st A.A. Searchlight Bn. R.E., Blackdown and Belfast
18th (Field Park) Co., Bulford	
19th (Survey) Co., Southampton	
22nd (Fortress) Co., Gosport	
23rd (Field) Co., Aldershot	

E.—Royal Corps of Signals**Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.**

School of Signals, Catterick
 Dépôt Bn. R. Signals, Catterick
 Training Bn. R. Signals, Catterick
 Signals Experimental Estabtn., Woolwich
 "A" Corps Signals, Ewshott
 Cavalry Divisional Signals
 "D" Troop, Cavalry Divisional Signals, Aldershot
 "E" Troop, Cavalry Divisional Signals, Tidworth
 1st Divisional Signals, Aldershot
 2nd Divisional Signals, Aldershot
 3rd Divisional Signals, Bulford
 4th Divisional Signals, Colchester
 No. 1 Anti-Aircraft Signal Co., Blackdown
 No. 1 (Med. Art.) Signal Section, Colchester
 No. 2 (Med. Art.) Signal Section, Larkhill
 No. 1 (Field Art.) Signal Section, New-castle-on-Tyne
 No. 2 (Field Art.) Signal Section, Edinburgh
 Aldershot Command Signal Co., Aldershot
 Eastern Command Signal Co., London

Northern Command Signal Co., York
 Scottish Command Signal Co., Edinburgh
 Southern Command Signal Co., Bulford Camp
 Western Command Signal Co., Chester
 North Ireland Signal Co., Belfast
 South Ireland Signal Section, Spike Island
 Rhine Command Signal Co., Cologne
 Rhine Field Signal Co., Cologne
 No. 1 Co., Egypt Signals, Egypt
 No. 3 Co. Egypt Signals, Egypt
 No. 2 Wireless Co., Sarafand
 Signal Section, Iraq
 Signal Section, Gibraltar
 Signal Section, Malta
 Signal Section, Malaya
 Signal Section, Hong Kong
 Signal Section, North China
 Signal Section, Mauritius
 Signal Section, Bermuda
 Signal Section, Jamaica
 Signal Section, Sierra Leone
 Signal Section, Ceylon
 "L" Co., Simla

F.—Infantry Regiments

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Grenadier Guards	Windsor	Lt.-Col. E. G. H. Powell	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. L. M. Gregson, O.B.E.	
3rd ditto	Hyde Park Barracks	Lt.-Col. M. E. Makgill-Crichton - Maitland, D.S.O.	
1st Coldstream Guards	Wellington Barracks	Lt.-Col. E. D. H. Tolle-mache, D.S.O., M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. G. J. Edwards, D.S.O., M.C.	
3rd ditto	Tower of London	Lt.-Col. J. C. Brand, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Scots Guards	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. G. H. Loder, M.C.	
2nd ditto	Warley	Lt.-Col. Sir V. A. F. Mackenzie, Bart., D.S.O., M.V.O.	
1st Irish Guards	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. R. V. Pollok, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
1st Welsh Guards	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. R. E. K. Leatham, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Scots	Aden (for Glasgow) Egypt	Lt.-Col. J. H. Mackenzie, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto		Lt.-Col. F. C. Tanner, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)	Dover	Lt.-Col. R. G. Clarke, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Allahabad	Lt.-Col. J. Rainsford-Hannay, D.S.O.	
1st The Buffs (East Kent Regt.)	Gibraltar	Lt.-Col. R. E. Power, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Portland	Bt.-Col. J. Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster)	Shorncliffe	Bt.-Col. O. H. L. Nicholson, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Rawal Pindi	Lt.-Col. J. A. Nixon, D.S.O.	
1st Northumberland Fusiliers	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. W. N. Herbert, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Fyzabad	Lt.-Col. S. H. Kershaw, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. C. R. Macdonald, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Delhi	Bt.-Col. C. F. Watson, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment)	Ambala	Lt.-Col. M. O. Clarke, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. G. A. Stevens, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The King's Regiment (Liverpool)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. G. L. Oliver	
2nd ditto	Iraq	Bt.-Col. W. A. Blake, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Norfolk Regiment	Egypt and Cyprus	Lt.-Col. J. P. L. Mostyn	
2nd ditto	Colchester	Lt.-Col. S. J. P. Scobell, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Lincolnshire Regiment	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. F. G. Spring, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. A. B. Johnson, D.S.O.	
1st Devonshire Regiment	Blackdown	Lt.-Col. G. N. T. Smyth-Osbourne, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Delhi (for Aden)	Lt.-Col. J. D. Ingles, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Suffolk Regiment	Colchester	Lt.-Col. R. G. Coles	
2nd ditto	Gibraltar	Lt.-Col. F. S. Cooper, D.S.O.	
1st The Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert's)	Devonport	Lt.-Col. J. S. N. Harrison, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Khartoum	Lt.-Col. H. I. R. Allfrey, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own)	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. P. L. Ingpen, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Mhow	Lt.-Col. A. A. W. Spencer	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st East Yorkshire Regiment	Tientsin	Lt.-Col. J. McD. Haskard, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Lichfield	Lt.-Col. W. G. Geddes, D.S.O.	
1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regt.	Malta	Lt.-Col. J. P. Tredennick, D.S.O., O.B.E., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Iraq (for Dover)	Lt.-Col. W. R. H. Dann, D.S.O.	
1st Leicestershire Regiment	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. H. Edwards, D.S.O., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Colchester	Lt.-Col. W. T. Bromfield	
1st The Green Howards (Alexandra Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment)	Strensall	Lt.-Col. M. D. Carey	
2nd ditto	Jamaica and Bermuda	Lt.-Col. C. H. de St. P. Bunbury	
1st Lancashire Fusiliers	Tidworth (for Dover)	Lt.-Col. A. H. Spooner, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Madras and St. Thomas Mount	Lt.-Col. W. J. Woodcock, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Scots Fusiliers	Glasgow (for Portsmouth)	Lt.-Col. C. H. I. Jackson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Landi Kotal)	Bt.-Col. H. E. R. R. Braine, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Cheshire Regiment	Dinapore	Lt.-Col. H. S. Adair, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. E. G. Hamilton, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Royal Welch Fusiliers	Nasirabad	Lt.-Col. H. V. V. Kyrke, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Pembroke Dock	Bt.-Col. C. I. Stockwell, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st South Wales Borderers	Devonport	Lt.-Col. L. H. Tudor, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Agra	Lt.-Col. T. C. Greenway, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own Scottish Borderers	Edinburgh	Bt.-Col. P. A. V. Stewart, C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Egypt	Lt.-Col. J. C. W. Connell, D.S.O.	
1st The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. E. B. Ferrers, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. H. H. Lee, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. R. C. Smythe, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Gloucestershire Regiment	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. Fane, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jhansi	Lt.-Col. R. Wilkinson, D.S.O.	
1st Worcestershire Regiment	Meerut	Lt.-Col. L. M. Stevens, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. F. P. Dunlop, C.B.E., D.S.O.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st East Lancashire Regiment	Quetta	Lt.-Col. P. Hudson, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Bordon	Lt.-Col. J. H. L. Poé, D.S.O.	
1st East Surrey Regiment	Hong-Kong	Lt.-Col. F. S. Montague - Bates, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jersey	Lt.-Col. J. S. Fitzgerald, <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. H. D. Goldsmith, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Guernsey	Lt.-Col. A. P. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
1st The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding)	Gosport	Lt.-Col. N. G. Burnand, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	En route for Singapore	Lt.-Col. C. J. Pickering, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Border Regiment	York	Lt.-Col. G. H. Harrison, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Khartoum	Lt.-Col. A. J. Ellis, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Royal Sussex Regiment	Bordon	Lt.-Col. C. E. Bond, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Singapore (for Rawal Pindi)	Lt.-Col. S. de V. A. Julius, <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Hampshire Regiment	Jubbulpore	Lt.-Col. R. S. Allen, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Plymouth	Lt.-Col. L. C. Morley, C.B.E.	
1st South Staffordshire Regiment	Bombay and Deolali	Bt.-Col. J. R. M. Mins-hull-Ford, D.S.O., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Plymouth	Lt.-Col. P. R. C. Com-mings, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Dorsetshire Regt.	Malta	Lt.-Col. G. M. Herbert, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. F. Badham, D.S.O.	
1st The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire)	Tidworth	Lt. - Col. B. H. W. Taylor, C.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Lebong and Bar-rackpore	Lt.-Col. B. Evans	
1st Welch Regiment	Bareilly	Lt.-Col. C. R. Berkeley, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. T. G. Mathias, D.S.O.	
1st The Black Watch (Royal High-landers)	Multan	Lt.-Col. Hon. C. M. Hore - Ruthven, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Fort George	Lt.-Col. S. A. Innes, D.S.O.	
1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Rhine	Bt.-Col. A. G. Bayley, C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Razmak (for Chakrata)	Lt.-Col. W. H. M. Freestun, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Essex Regiment	Colchester	Lt.-Col. A. B. Incedon-Webber, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Cawnpore	Lt.-Col. C. R. Roberts-West	
1st The Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment)	Londonderry	Lt.-Col. K. C. Weldon, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rawal Pindi (for Waziristan)	Lt.-Col. R. S. Hart, D.S.O.	
1st The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire)	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. F. W. Greenhill, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Gravesend	Lt.-Col. W. P. H. Hill, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Northamptonshire Regiment	Blackdown	Lt.-Col. R. M. Raynsford, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Karachi	Lt.-Col. G. L. Crossman, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The Royal Berkshire Regiment (Princess Charlotte of Wales's)	Lahore	Lt.-Col. A. E. F. Harris, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. F. H. Moore, C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Queen's Own Royal West Kent	Poona	Lt.-Col. A. K. Grant, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto [Regiment]	Woking	Lt.-Col. J. T. Twisleton-Wykeham-Fiennes	
1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry	Dover	Lt.-Col. H. W. B. Thorp, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Ferozepore and Amritsar	Lt.-Col. H. Mallinson, D.S.O.	
1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry	Poona and Kirkee	Lt.-Col. B. E. Murray, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. J. C. Hooper, D.S.O.	
1st Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. W. A. Stewart, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Ahmednagar	H. P. F. Bicknell, D.S.O.	
1st King's Royal Rifles Corps	Rawal Pindi	Lt.-Col. F. G. Willan, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. C. A. Howard, D.S.O.	
1st Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's)	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. F. H. Dansey, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Kamptee and Nagpur	Lt.-Col. A. W. Timmis, M.C.	
1st Manchester Regiment	Rhine	Lt.-Col. C. C. Stapledon	
2nd ditto	Rangoon	Lt.-Col. J. R. Heelis, M.C.	

Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's)	Calcutta	Lt.-Col. H. V. R. Hodson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Lichfield	Bt.-Col. F. C. T. Ewald, D.S.O.	
1st York & Lancaster Regiment	Bordon	Lt.-Col. T. W. Parkinson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jullundur	Lt.-Col. B. J. Curling, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Durham Light Infantry	Belfast	Lt.-Col. A. E. Irvine, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Sialkot)	Lt.-Col. J. W. Jeffreys, D.S.O.	
1st Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regt.)	Holywood	Lt.-Col. T. A. Pollock-Morris, O.B.E., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Bangalore	Lt.-Col. W. H. E. Seagrave, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
1st Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire), Buffs (The Duke of Albany's)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. K. G. Buchanan, C.M.G., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Nowshera	Lt.-Col. J. O. Hopkinson, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Gordon Highldrs.	Secunderabad and Belgaum	Lt.-Col. I. Pictyn-Warlow	
2nd ditto	Bordon	Bt.-Col. J. L. G. Burnett, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders	Maymo	Lt.-Col. A. D. Macpherson, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. G. I. Fraser, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles	Rhine	Lt.-Col. E. G. Dunn, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Wellington, Calicut and Malappuram	Lt.-Col. H. R. Goodman, D.S.O.	
Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. W. E. Johnson, D.S.O.	
1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. G. W. Muir	
2nd ditto	Parkhurst	Lt.-Col. C. P. James, D.S.O.	
1st Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own)	Peshawar	Lt.-Col. E. B. Powell, D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. L. Buxton, C.M.G., D.S.O.	

5. ROYAL TANK CORPS

Headquarters Royal Tank Corps Centre	..	Wool.
Col. Comdt. T. C. Mudie, D.S.O. <i>p.s.c.</i>		
1st (Depot) Battalion	Wool, Dorset.
Lieut.-Col. H. D. Carlton, D.S.O.		
2nd Battalion	Farnborough.
Lt.-Col. C. D. V. Cary-Barnard, C.M.G.,	D.S.O.	
3rd Battalion	Lydd.
Lieut.-Col. W. J. Shannon, C.M.G., D.S.O.		
4th Battalion	Catterick.
Lieut.-Col. H. G. R. Burges-Short, D.S.O.		
5th Battalion	Perham Down, Salis-
Lieut.-Col. N. H. Stone.		bury Plain.
1 Section, 12th Armoured Car Company	..	Rhine.
Central Schools	Wool.
Col. C. N. F. Broad, D.S.O.		
1st and 2nd Armoured Car Companies..	..	India.
3rd	" "	Cairo.
5th	" "	Scarborough.
6th	" "	Razani (for Peshawar).
7th	" "	Peshawar (for Lahore).
8th	" "	Kirkee.
9th	" "	Bareilly.
10th	" "	Delhi.
11th	" "	Lahore (for Waziristan).
12th	" (Less 1 Section)	Belfast.

II. THE ARMY IN INDIA

[Corrected up to the 1st of February, 1926.]

Army Headquarters

Commander-in-Chief

Commander-in-Chief. Field-Marshal Sir William R. Birdwood, Bart.,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.
Military Secretary. Major-General H. O. Parr, C.B., C.M.G., I.A.

General Staff Branch

C.G.S. Lieut.-General Sir A. Skeen, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., C.M.G.,
I.A., *p.s.c.*
D.G.G.S. Major-General Sir G. N. Cory, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., B.S.,
p.s.c.
D.M.O. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. L. O. Twiss, C.B.E.,
M.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*
D.D. (Intell.) Colonel M. Saunders, D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*
D.M.T. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) R. J. Collins, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*
D.D.S.D. Lieut.-Colonel K. D. B. Murray, D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

ATTACHED TO GENERAL STAFF

Major-General, Cavalry. Major-General C. A. C. Godwin, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*
Major-General, Artillery. Major-General W. H. Kay, C.B., B.S.
Colonel on the Staff, Colonel C. W. Singer, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Royal Engineers. B.S.

Adjutant-General's Branch

A.G. Lieut.-General Sir J. S. M. Shea, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*
D.A.G. and D.P.S. Major-General Sir W. S. Leslie, K.B.E., C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*
D. of O. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) M. R. Walsh,
C.M.G., M.C., B.S., *p.s.c.*

Quartermaster-General's Branch

Q.M.G. Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Richard Stuart-Wortley,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*
D.Q.M.G. and Major-General C. N. Macmullen, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.M.Q. C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Master General of Supply Branch

Master General. Major-General Sir E. H. de V. Atkinson, K.B.E., C.B.,
C.M.G., C.I.E., B.S.

Engineer-in-Chief's Branch

Engineer-in-Chief. Major-General R. N. Harvey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Northern Command

(RAWALPINDI)

G.O.C.-in-Chief. General Sir C. W. Jacob, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., I.A.

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) R. J. T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

D.A. and Q.M.G. Major-General K. Wigram, C.B., C.S.I., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Peshawar District

(PESHAWAR)

Commander. Major-General R. A. Cassels, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

1ST INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Risalpur)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. G. K. Green, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

1ST INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Landikotal)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. G. Loch, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., B.S.

3RD INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Peshawar)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. C. Potter, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Nowshera)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) S. F. Muspratt, C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Kohat District

(KOHAT)

Commander. Major-General H. Isacke, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., B.S., *p.s.c.*

5TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Kohat)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) H. S. Moberly, C.B., I.A., *p.s.c.*

6TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Kohat)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) P. L. Beddy, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

Rawalpindi District

(RAWALPINDI)

Commander. Major-General Sir L. R. Vaughan, K.B.E., C.B.,
D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

11TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Abbottabad)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) J. Whitehead,
C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

13TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Jhelum)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. Herdon,
C.B., C.I.E., I.A., *p.s.c.*

12TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Rawalpindi)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. L. Knight,
C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

Lahore District

(LAHORE CANTT.)

Commander. Major-General A. E. Wardrop, C.B., C.M.G., B.S.

2ND INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Sialkot)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. R. Harbord,
C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

Ferozepore Brigade Area

(Ferozepore)

Brigade Commander. Col. (Temp. Col. Commandant) R. J. F. Hayter,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

JULLUNDUR BRIGADE AREA

(Jullundur)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) D. I. Shuttleworth,
C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Lahore Brigade Area

(Lahore)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) R. S. St. John,
C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

AMBALA BRIGADE AREA

(Ambala)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) D. Deane,
D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Waziristan District

(DERA ISMAIL KHAN)

Commander. Major-General A. Le G. Jacob, C.B., C.M.G.,
C.I.E., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A.

7TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Razmak)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) O. C. Borrett,
C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., B.S.

8TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Bannu)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) J. L. Furney,
C.B., I.A.

9TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Razam)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. C.
Kensington, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

10TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Manzai)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) F. P. C.
Keily, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A.

Western Command

(QUETTA)

G.O.C.-in Chief. Lieut.-General Sir George M. Kirkpatrick, K.C.B.,
K.C.S.I., B.S., *p.s.c.*

*Colonel on the Staff,
General Staff.* Colonel (Temp. Colonel on the Staff) B. R.
Moberly, D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

D.A. and Q.M.G. Colonel (Temp. Colonel on the Staff) A. J. G.
Moir, D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

ZHOB INDEPENDENT BRIGADE AREA

(Loralai)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. L. Porter,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Baluchistan District

(QUETTA)

Commander. Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson, K.C.B., B.S.,
p.s.c.

14TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Quetta)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. C.
Alexander, C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

Baluchistan District—continued

15TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Quetta)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) P. F. Pocock,
C.B., D.S.O., I.A.

Sind-Rajputana District

(KARACHI)

Commander. Major-General H. F. Cooke, C.B., C.S.I.,
C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A.

NASIRABAD BRIGADE AREA

(Mount Abu)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. S. G.
Craufurd, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O.,
A.D.C., B.S.

Eastern Command

(Naini Tal)

G.O.C.-in-Chief. General Sir G. de S. Barrow, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
A.D.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Colonel on the Staff, Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) L. F.
General Staff. Renny, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

D.A. and Q.M.G. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. M. Ford-
ham, C.B.E., I.A., *p.s.c.*

United Provinces District

(Meerut)

Commander. Major-General G. McK. Franks, C.B., B.S., *p.s.c.*

3RD INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Meerut)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. A. Tom-
kinson, C.B., D.S.O., B.S.

17TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Dehra Dun)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. R. Brad-
shaw, C.B., C.B.E., I.A., *p.s.c.*

18TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Bareilly)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) P. H. Dundas,
C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

United Provinces District—continued

19TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Lucknow)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. E. McNamara, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

DELHI INDEPENDENT BRIGADE AREA

(Delhi)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. Barstow, C.B.E., I.A.

*Presidency and Assam District**(Calcutta)*

Commander. Major-General H. D. O. Ward, C.B., C.M.G., B.S.

ALLAHABAD BRIGADE AREA (INDEPENDENT)

(Allahabad)

Commander. Major-General M. R. W. Nightingale, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

*Southern Command**(Poona)*

G.O.C.-in-Chief. Lieut.-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) C. J. B. Hay, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

D.A. and Q.M.G. Major-General P. Holland-Pryor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., I.A.

*Central Provinces District**(Mhow)*

Commander. Major-General Sir H. C. Holman, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

20TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Jhansi)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) F. W. Ramsay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

21ST INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Jubbulpore)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. H. Beach, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

*Poona District**(Poona)*

Commander. Lieut.-General Sir C. W. G. Richardson, K.C.B., C.S.I., I.A., *p.s.c.*

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

Poona District—continued

4TH INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(Secunderabad)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. D. Giles,
C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

16TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Ahmednagar)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. W. H. M.
Moens, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

22ND INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Secunderabad)

Brigade Commander. Major-General A. L. Tarver, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.,
I.A., *p.s.c.*

*Bombay District**(Bombay)*

Commander. Major-General H. A. V. Cummins, C.B., C.M.G.,
I.A., *p.s.c.*

*Madras District**(Wellington)*

Commander. Major-General J. Ponsonby, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., B.S.

BANGALORE BRIGADE AREA

(Bangalore)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. W. Jackson,
C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., I.A.

*Burma Independent District**(Maymyo)*

Commander. Major-General H. C. Tytler, C.B., C.M.G.
C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

RANGOON BRIGADE AREA

(Rangoon)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) P. B. Sangster,
C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

Aden Independent Brigade

Commander. Major-General J. H. K. Stewart, C.B., D.S.O.,
I.A., *p.s.c.*

III. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

1.—Air Council

<i>President of the Air Council.</i>	Lieut.-Colonel the Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel John Gurney Hoare, Bart., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
<i>Vice-President of the Air Council.</i>	Major Sir Philip A. G. D. Sassoon, Bt., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P., Under Secretary of State for Air.
<i>Members.</i>	Air Chief-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Chief of the Air Staff; Air Vice-Marshal Sir P. W. Game, K.C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Air Member for Personnel; Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Air Member for Supply and Research; Air Commodore C. L. N. Newall, C.M.G., C.B.E., A.M., Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (Additional Member); Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B., Secretary of the Air Ministry.

2.—Air Ministry

<u>Secretary of State for Air.</u>	Lieut.-Colonel the Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel J. G. Hoare, Bart., C.M.G., M.P.
<u>Under Secretary of State for Air.</u>	Major Sir Philip A. G. D. Sassoon, Bt., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P.
<u>Secretary of the Air Ministry.</u>	Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B.
<u>Department of the Under Secretary of State for Air :—</u>	
<i>Director of Civil Aviation.</i>	Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. S. Brancker, K.C.B., A.F.C.
<u>Department of the Secretary of the Air Ministry :—</u>	
<i>Secretary.</i>	Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B.
<i>Principal Assistant Secretaries.</i>	H. W. W. McAnally, Esq., C.B.; B. E. Holloway, Esq., C.B.; J. A. Webster, Esq., C.B., D.S.O.
<i>Director of Accounts.</i>	J. S. Ross, Esq., C.B.E.
<i>Director of Contracts.</i>	C. R. Brigstocke, Esq., C.B.
<i>Director of Meteorological Office.</i>	G. C. Simpson, Esq., C.B.E., LL.D., D.Sc., F.R.S.
<u>Directorate of Lands (Joint Service for War Office and Air Ministry):—</u>	
<i>Controller of Lands.</i>	E. H. Coles, Esq., C.B.

Air Ministry—continuedDepartment of the Chief of
the Air Staff :—Chief of the Air Staff.Air Chief-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt.,
G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.Civil Assistant.

Captain T. B. Marson, M.B.E.

Director of Operations
and Intelligence.Air Commodore C. L. N. Newall, C.M.G.,
C.B.E., A.M. (Deputy Chief of the Air Staff).Director of Organisa-
tion and Staff Duties.Air Vice-Marshal Sir I. L. B. Vesey, K.B.E.,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*Signals.

Air Commodore L. F. Blandy, C.B., D.S.O.

Director of Works and
Buildings.Major-General Sir W. A. Liddell, K.C.M.G.,
C.B.Dept. of the Air Member
for Personnel :—Air Member for Per-
sonnel.Air Vice-Marshal Sir P. W. Game, K.C.B.,
D.S.O., *p.s.c.*Director of Personal
Services.Air Vice-Marshal C. A. H. Longcroft, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.Director of Training.

Air Commodore T. C. R. Higgins, C.M.G.

Dept. of the Air Member for
Supply and Research :—Air Member for Supply
and Research.Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. G. H. Salmond,
K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*Director of Technical
Development.Air Commodore F. C. Halahan, C.M.G.,
C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O.Director of Scientific
Research.H. E. Wimperis, Esq., O.B.E., M.A.,
F.R.Ae.S., M.I.E.E.Director of Airship
Development.

Group Captain P. F. M. Fellowes, D.S.O.

Director of Equipment.Air Commodore A. M. Longmore, C.B.,
D.S.O., *q.s.***3.—Air Commands****AIR DEFENCES OF GREAT BRITAIN***Headquarters (tempy.):* Air Ministry*Air Officer Commanding-in-
Chief.*Air Marshal Sir John M. Salmond, K.C.B.,
C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O.**A.—HOME****(a) Inland Area***Headquarters :* Hillingdon House, Uxbridge.*Air Vice-Marshal*.. T. I. Webb-Bowen, C.B., C.M.G., Air
Officer Commanding.*Air Commodore*B. C. H. Drew, C.M.G., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*, Chief
Staff Officer.

(a) *Inland Area—continued*

Units as follow :—

<i>Headquarters, No. 1 Group</i>	Kidbrooke.
No 1 Stores Depôt	"
" 3 " "	Milton, Berks.
" 4 " "	Ickenham.
The Packing Depôt	Ascot.
Medical Stores Depôt	Kidbrooke.
Record Office	Ruislip.
Armament and Gunnery School	Eastchurch.
No. 207 (Bombing) Squadron	"
School of Technical Training (Men)	Manston.
No. 2 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	"
No. 9 (Bombing) Squadron (H.Q. and 2 Flights)	"
Reception Depôt	W. Drayton.
<i>Headquarters, No. 3 Group</i>	Spittlegate, Grantham.
No. 39 (Bombing) Squadron	Spittlegate.
" 100 (Bombing) Squadron	"
" 2 Flying Training School	Digby.
" 7 (Bombing) Squadron	Bircham Newton.
" 99 (Bombing) Squadron	" "
" 5 Flying Training School	Sealand.
" 2 Stores (Ammunition) Depôt	Altrincham.
Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment, including—	Martlesham.
No. 15 (Bombing) Squadron	"
" 22 (Bombing) Squadron	"
<i>Headquarters, No. 6 Group</i>	Kenley.
No. 24 (Communication) Squadron	"
" 32 (Fighter) Squadron	"
" 56 (Fighter) Squadron	Biggin Hill.
Night Flying Flight	"
No. 41 (Fighter) Squadron	Northolt.
Inland Area Communication Flight	"
Superintendent of R.A.F. Reserve	"
No. 25 (Fighter) Squadron	Hawkinge.
" 17 (Fighter) Squadron	"
Station Headquarters	Duxford.
No. 19 (Fighter) Squadron	"
" 29 (Fighter) Squadron	"
" III (Fighter) Squadron	"
Meteorological Flight	"
<i>Headquarters, No. 7 Group</i>	Andover.
No 4 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	South Farnborough.
School of Photography	" "
Experimental Section (R.A.E.)	" "
School of Army Cooperation, including
No. 16 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Old Sarum.
Central Flying School	Upavon.
No. 3 (Fighter) Squadron	"

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

(a) *Inland Area—continued**No. 7 Group—continued*

No. 1 Flying Training School	..	Netheravon.
„ 11 (Bombing) Squadron	..	„
Electrical and Wireless School	..	Flower Down.
No. 58 (Bombing) Squadron	..	Worthy Down.
School of Balloon Training	..	Larkhill.
No. 12 (Bombing) Squadron	..	Andover
„ 13 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	..	„
<i>Units Directly under Area Headquarters :—</i>		
R.A.F. Dépôt	..	Uxbridge.
(a) School of Physical Training	..	„
R.A.F. Central Band	..	Uxbridge.
M.T. Repair Dépôt	..	Shrewsbury.
Inland Area Aircraft Dépôt	..	Henlow, Beds.
No. 23 (Fighter) Squadron	..	„
„ 43	..	„
Air Ministry Wireless Section	..	Kingsway, W.C.2.

(b) *Coastal Area*

Headquarters : 33-34 Tavistock Place, W.C.1.

Air Vice-Marshal. F. R. Scarlett, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

Group Captain. P. H. L. Playfair, M.C., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follow :—

<i>Headquarters, No. 10 Group</i>	..	Lee-on-Solent.
R.A.F. Base	..	Gosport.
(a) Headquarters	..	„
(b) No. 420 (Fleet Spotter) Flight	..	„
(c) „ 421 (Fleet Spotter) Flight	..	„
(d) „ 423 (Fleet Spotter) Flight	..	„
(e) „ 461 (Fleet Torpedo) Flight	..	„
(f) „ 462 (Fleet Torpedo) Flight	..	„
(g) Development Flight	..	„
Care and Maintenance Party	..	Cattewater.
R.A.F. Base	..	Calshot.
(b) No. 480 (Flying Boat) Flight	..	„
School of Naval Cooperation	..	Lee-on-Solent.
Storage Unit	..	Tangmere.

Units Administered Direct by Area Headquarters.

R.A.F. Base	..	Leuchars.
(a) Headquarters	..	„
(b) No. 401 (Fleet Fighter) Flight	..	Leuchars.
(c) „ 404 (Fleet Fighter) Flight	..	„
(d) „ 405 (Fleet Fighter) Flight	..	„
(e) „ 406 (Fleet Fighter) Flight	..	„
(f) „ 442 (Fleet Reconnaissance)	..	„
(g) „ 443	..	„
(h) „ 444	..	„
Flight	..	„

(b) Coastal Area—continued

*Units Administered Direct by Area Headquarters—continued*R.A.F. complement in H.M.S. *Argus*.

Marine Aircraft Experimental Establishment

Felixstowe.

Care and Maintenance Party

Grain.

Inspector of Recruiting, R.A.F.

Henrietta Street, W.C.2.

(a) R.A.F. Recruiting Depot

Birmingham.

(b) " "

Newcastle.

(c) " "

Finchley (for Uxbridge).

R.A.F. Central Hospital

Holly Hill, N.W.3.

Research Laboratory

Central Medical Board

(c) Cranwell

Headquarters : Cranwell, Sleaford, Lincs.*Air Commodore*.A. E. Borton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.*Wing-Commander*.S. W. Smith, O.B.E., *q.s.*, Administrative
Duties.

Units as follow :—

R.A.F. (Cadet) College.

Band.

Boys' Wing.

R.A.F. Hospital.

(d) Halton

Headquarters : Halton House, Halton, Wendover, Bucks.*Air Vice-Marshal*.C. L. Lambe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Air
Officer Commanding.*Wing Commander*.W. R. Read, M.C., D.F.C., A.F.C., Staff
Duties.

Units as follow :—

No. 1 School of Technical Training

(Boys) Halton.

School of Cookery

"

R.A.F. Hospital

"

(a) Pathological Laboratory

"

(e) R.A.F. Staff College

Headquarters : Andover, Hants.*Air Vice-Marshal*.Edgar R. Ludlow-Hewitt, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
M.C., Commandant.*Group Captain*.Christopher L. Courtney, C.B.E., D.S.O.,
p.s.a.

(f) Special Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force

Headquarters : 145 Sloane Street, London, S.W.1.*Air Commodore*.John G. Hearson, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Air
Officer Commanding.*Squadron Leader*.

Henry Dawes, M.B.E.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

(I) Special Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force—*continued**Units Administered Direct by Command Headquarters—*

S.R. Unit :—

No. 502 (Bombing) Squadron .. Aldergrove.

A.A.F. Units :—

No. 600 City of London (Bombing)

Squadron .. Northolt.

,, 601 County of London (Bomb-
ing) Squadron ",, 602 City of Glasgow (Bombing)
Squadron Renfrew.,, 603 City of Edinburgh (Bombing)
Squadron Turnhouse.**B.—OVERSEAS**

(a) R.A.F., Middle East

Headquarters : Villa Victoria, Cairo.*Air Vice-Marshal.* Sir Oliver Swann, K.C.B., C.B.E., Air
Officer Commanding.*Air Commodore.* R. H. Clark-Hall, C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief
Staff Officer., *p.s.a.*

Units as follow :—

Administered direct by Command Headquarters.

Egypt Stores Depôt Aboukir.

,, Engine Repair Depôt Abbassia, Cairo.

,, Aircraft Depôt Aboukir.

Aden Flight Aden and Somaliland.

No. 216 (Bombing Squadron Heliopolis.

,, 47 (Bombing) Squadron .. Helwan.

,, 208 Army Cooperation) Squadron Moascar, Ismailia.

,, 4 Flying Training School .. Abu Sueir.

Heliopolis Details Heliopolis.

(b) Iraq Command

Headquarters : Baghdad City.*Air Vice-Marshal.* Sir J. F. A. Higgins, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.,
A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.*Air Commodore.* H. C. T. Dowding, C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, Chief
Staff Officer.

R.A.F. Units as follow :—

Administered Direct by Command Headquarters.

Station Commandant Hinaidi.

H.Q. Accountant Office Baghdad.

Brigade Accountant Office "

Aircraft Depôt Hinaidi.

Indian Hospital Karradah.

British Hospital Hinaidi.

Central Supply Depôt "

Petrol Dump "

Supply Depôt Mosul.

(b) *Iraq Command—continued.**Administered Direct by Command Headquarters—continued*

Inland Water Transport (Detachment)	Baghdad.
No. 1 (Fighter) Squadron	Hinaidi.
„ 6 (Army Co-operation) Squadron	Mosul.
„ 8 (Bombing) Squadron	Hinaidi.
No. 30 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 45 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 55 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 70 (Bombing) Squadron	„
No. 3 Armoured Car Company	Basrah.
„ 4 „ „ „	Hinaidi.
„ 5 „ „ „	Mosul.
„ 6 „ „ „	Hinaidi.
<i>Station Headquarters</i>	Basrah.
Stores Depôt	„
Base Supply Depôt	„
Combined Hospital	„
Inland Water Transport	„
No. 84 (Bombing) Squadron	Shaibah.

Military Forces in Iraq.

2nd Battalion Beds and Herts.	63rd Co. Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners.
1/15th Punjab Regt.	Iraq Signal Section.
4/2nd Bombay Pioneers.	No. 2 Wireless Coy., R.C.S. (No. 2 Section).
2/16th Punjab Regt.	

(c) *R.A.F. India**Headquarters : Delhi.*

<i>Air Vice-Marshal.</i>	Sir E. L. Ellington, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., <i>p.s.c.</i> , Air Officer Commanding.
<i>Group Captain.</i>	J. A. Chamier, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E. Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follow :—

<i>Headquarters, No. 1 Indian Wing</i>	..	Peshawar.
No. 5 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Kohat.
No. 20 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Peshawar.
<i>Headquarters, No. 2 Indian Wing</i>	..	Risalpur, Nowshera.
No. 27 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 60 (Bombing) Squadron	„
<i>Headquarters, No. 3 Indian Wing</i>	..	Quetta.
No. 28 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	„

Units administered direct by Command Headquarters :—

Aircraft Depôt	Karachi.
„ Park	Lahore.
No. 31 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	..	Ambala.
Central Accounts Office	Poona.

THE ARMY QUARTERLY

(d) R.A.F. Mediterranean

Headquarters : Valletta, Malta.

This Command comprises all units cooperating with the Navy in the Mediterranean Sea area.

Group Captain. A. W. Bigsworth, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.,
Officer Commanding.

Squadron Leader. H. E. M. Watkins, A.F.C., Air Staff Duties.

Units as follow :—

R.A.F. Base Calafra, Malta.

(a) No. 481 (Float Plane) Flight

R.A.F. Units in—

H.M.S. *Eagle*.

(a) Headquarters.

(b) No. 402 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.

(c) „ 422 (Fleet Spotter) Flight.

(d) „ 440 (Fleet Reconnaissance) Flight.

(e) „ 460 (Fleet Torpedo) Flight.

H.M.S. *Hermes*.

(a) Headquarters.

(b) No. 403 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.

(c) „ 441 (Fleet Reconnaissance) Flight.

(e) Palestine Command

Headquarters : Bir Salem, Palestine.

Air Commodore. E. L. Gerrard, C.M.G., D.S.O., Air Officer
Commanding.

Wing-Commander. W. H. Primrose, D.F.C., Staff Duties.

R.A.F. Units as follow :—

Command Accounts Office Bir Salem.

No. 14 (Army Cooperation) Squadron
(less 1 Flight) Ramleh, Palestine.

R.A.F. Units as follow :—

No. 2 Armoured Car Company Sarafand and Jerusalem.

Supply Depot Sarafand.

Palestine General Hospital Ludd.

Repair Section Sarafand.

Headquarters, R.A.F., Trans-Jordania Amman.

1 Flight No. 14 (A-C) Squadron

1 Section of No. 2 Armoured Car Coy.

Military Units in the Palestine Command :—

9th Q.R. Lancers Sarafand.

No. 2 Wireless Coy., R.C.S. (H.Q. and

No. 1 Section)

(f) Independent Units, &c.

Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee *via* A.P.O., S 40, British
(British Section) Army of the Rhine.

MESSRS. LONGMANS & CO.'S LIST

THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF AIR FIGHTING

By Major OLIVER STEWART, M.C., A.F.C. With an Introduction by Wing Commander W. O. Barker, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C. With Diagrams. Crown 8vo. 6s. net.

"Will certainly prove a standard work on strategy and tactics. It is the first technical work of its kind to be published in England."—*Morning Post*.

STONEWALL JACKSON AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

By Colonel G. F. R. HENDERSON, C.B. With an Introduction by Field-Marshal the Right Hon. Viscount Wolseley, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.C., etc. 2 Portraits, and 33 Maps and Plans.
2 vols. Crown 8vo. 25s. net.

THE SCIENCE OF WAR:

A Collection of Essays and Lectures, 1891-1903

By Colonel G. F. R. HENDERSON, C.B. Edited by Colonel Neill Malcolm, D.S.O. With a Memoir of the Author by Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, V.C. Portrait of the Author and 4 Maps. 8vo. 21s. net.

RECORDS OF CLAN CAMPBELL IN THE MILITARY SERVICE OF THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1858

Compiled by Major Sir DUNCAN CAMPBELL OF BARCALDINE, Bt., C.V.O., F.S.A. Scot., F.R.G.S. With a Foreword and Index by Sir Richard C. Temple, Bt., C.B., C.I.E., F.S.A., V.P.R.A.S.
8 vo. 12s. 6d. net.

HISTORY OF BURMA. From the Earliest Times to 10th March, 1824, The beginning of the English Conquest.

By G. E. HARVEY, B.A. (Lond.), B.Litt. (Oxon.), Indian Civil Service. With a Preface by Sir Richard Carnac Temple, Bt. With Illustrations and Maps. 8vo. 21s. net.

SOUTH AFRICA: People, Places and Problems

By WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.
With 35 full-page Illustrations. 8vo. 16s. net.

A study of the South African Union, its people and special problems, designed to bring home to the reader the essential realities of South African life.

HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL GEOGRAPHY

By G. G. CHISHOLM, M.A., B.Sc., F.R.S.E.
With Maps and Diagrams. 8vo. 25s. net.

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., LTD., 39 Paternoster Row, London, E.C.4



THE Barr & Stroud Rangefinder illustrated is the type F.T.32 on dwarf tripod mounting. This type of Rangefinder is made in base lengths of 66 cms., 80 cms. and 1 metre, for Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery. A tall tripod mounting is supplied if desired. Accurate ranges can be taken rapidly and frequently. All these equipments are light and portable.

Barr & Stroud Limited

ANNIESLAND

GLASGOW

&

15 Victoria Street, London, S.W.1

Telegrams:

"Telemeter, . . . Glasgow."
"Rete-mailet, S.West, London."

TRADE



MARK

Telephones:

Glasgow,
London.

Western 3775,
Victoria 7337.

The Army Quarterly

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. Editorial	225
II. Military Prize Essay, 1926	238
III. The Old Brown Battlefields. By Major-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.	261
IV. The Need for Economic Intelligence. By Major G. M. Routh, C.B.E., D.S.O., R.A., Indian Army Ordnance Corps	273
V. The Employment of Troops under the Emergency Regulations. By Lieut.-Colonel H. de Watteville, late R.A.	283
VI. Transportation Problems of the Next Great War on Land. By Brevet Major B. C. Denling, M.C., R.E.	293
VII. Major-General Henry Lloyd, Adventurer and Military Philosopher. By Colonel J. C. F. Fuller, D.S.O.	300
VIII. The Anglo-French Occupation of Togoland, 1914 (with Map). By A. J. Reynolds	315
IX. The Anatolian Revolt. Translated from the Turkish (with Map). Part II. By C. A. Hooper.	323
X. Marshal Saxe's Mule; or, Practice v. Theory. By Lieut.-Colonel Baird Smith, D.S.O.	338
XI. The Fuel Problem. By Lieut. H. J. Cooper, R.A.S.C.	347
XII. The Value and Originality of "The Foundations of the Science of War"	354
XIII. The "Officers' Strike" in Bengal, 1786	362
XIV. Horses, L.D. By Ex-Yeoman	371
XV. Reminiscences of Russia, 1917. By Major E. E. Charles	378
XVI. Territorial Field Artillery and Mechanical Draught: An Experiment with Fordsons. By Captain O. T. Frith, R.A.	390
XVII. War Games on Sand Models (with Sketch). By Major R. H. Dewing, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.	397
XVIII. Ensign, Cornet and Brigadier. By Colonel H. Rowan-Robinson, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.	399
XIX. Notes on Foreign War Books	401
XX. Reviews and Notices of Recent Books and Articles on Military Subjects	422
XXI. Parliamentary Notes	446
XXII. Bertrand Stewart Prize Essay, 1927. Subject Selected and Rules of the Competition	449

LONDON:

WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, LTD.

94, Jermyn Street, St. James's, S.W.

Price Seven Shillings and Sixpence net.

INDIA or CEYLON—100 Guineas Return by

P&O

At Reduced Winter Fares (December—February)

A visit to India or Ceylon in mid-winter, entailing an absence from England of two months or less, will appeal to many people—to those who wish to visit resident friends or relatives; to those who would see the enchantments of architecture with which India's fascinating history has been enriched; to those who, loving India, hold the well-founded belief that India to-day—political eddies apart—differs but little from the India of earlier days. Ceylon, as a sunny winter resort, has a charm peculiar to itself. To travel both ways between London and Marseilles by the P. & O. Sleeping Car Express will shorten the double journey (fare £120) by 13 or 14 days.

For Illustrated Handbooks, "A Winter in India" and "Ceylon, an Equatorial Playground," with special steamer dates and cabin plans, apply:

P. & O. HOUSE
(F. H. Grosvenor, Manager),
14-16, Cockspur Street,
LONDON, S.W. 1.



THE ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. XII. No. 2.

JULY, 1926

EDITORIAL

SINCE the appearance of the last number of the *Army Quarterly* the country has passed successfully through a grave crisis. There is fortunately no need in this Review to discuss the causes which led to the General Strike or to speculate on the consequences that might result from this novel method of bringing pressure to bear upon Parliament and the Government of the day. Political questions are of no concern to the soldier. But from the point of view of the Army it was eminently satisfactory that no necessity arose for the calling in of the troops actively to assist the civil authorities in the maintenance of the public peace. It was a great tribute to the innate good sense and to the law-abiding instinct of the people as a whole that order was so well maintained during the General Strike. It is satisfactory, nevertheless, to learn on the authority of the Secretary of State for War that not one of the rumours which was in circulation reflecting upon the discipline of the Army had the slightest foundation in fact. The loyalty of the troops is happily beyond question.

* * * * *

The subject of the Bertrand Stewart Prize Essay for 1926 deals with a problem which ought to claim the attention of all sections of the community in this country and especially that of members of the "Services." It is somewhat disappointing, therefore, to find that only twenty-six essays were submitted, although it is satisfactory that of the twenty-six essayists the great majority are evidently giving careful thought to the matters connected with Imperial defence.

The principal criticism which can be made against the essays—at least against those which have not been recommended by the Referees

—is that, while the ideas expressed by the writers are sound enough, there is a want of method in their marshalling of the arguments and much irrelevancy. The subject for the Prize Essay was, briefly, the changes in the problems of Imperial defence caused by recent developments in the Balance of Power and by recent methods of warfare. But some competitors, instead of developing their arguments in a logical manner, wandered into lengthy disquisitions on the principles of Imperial defence and quite forgot to show how the latter had been affected by recent events. Others, on the contrary, seemed to be hypnotized by the words “new weapons and methods of warfare,” and could not resist the temptation of discoursing at length on gas and tanks, although they failed to point out how either was influencing at the present moment Imperial defence. On the other hand, it is only just to praise all the essayists for the moderation and good balance of their opinions, and it was encouraging, perhaps also surprising, that extreme views as to the effects of air and submarine warfare were lacking. Extreme views are generally popular, but, in considering how the problems of Imperial defence have been influenced by recent developments, it is essential to keep our minds clear both of alarmist and also of unduly optimistic views. For instance, it would be folly to deny that the advent of the aeroplane has materially affected the military position of Great Britain, since she is now open to attack from the air, but it would be equally foolish and absolutely unnecessary to depict the South of England as uninhabitable in the event of war. It may be legitimate for the journalist to excite attention by the vigour of his descriptions, but military writers especially must remember that exaggeration is fatal to that “clear thinking” which Lord Haldane used so persistently to recommend. And in no subject is clear thinking more necessary than in Imperial defence. For there are so many minor if interesting issues to confuse us that we can only hope to understand the problem by keeping a firm hold on the vital factors. The great merit of the essays of Captain Gattie and of Major Chenevix Trench is that they do bring out clearly all the points which matter.

Both essayists have shown skill in discussing the changes in the Balance of Power caused by the war of 1914-1918. It is always difficult for a military writer to touch on the intentions of foreign States, because, if he does so, he will at once be accused of attempting to cause ill-feeling. But, of course, it is impossible to write about Imperial defence without considering every contingency. For instance, it is essential for all of us to understand the importance of Singapore as a naval base, and we cannot do so until

it is shown how the United States of America and Japan at the present moment dominate the Pacific Ocean.

Both essayists, again, bring out clearly the dangers to the defence of our sea communications arising from aircraft and submarines. Imperial defence means in the long run the defence of our sea communications, and unfortunately the danger to them is greater now than formerly, although it is even more urgent that they should not be interrupted. For many years past Great Britain has been dependent for her food supplies on other parts of the Empire, but she is now dependent on foreign countries for what is practically a vital article, namely, oil. It is curious how little attention has been paid to this matter, and yet no subject is more worthy of the anxious consideration of our public men and scientists.

Finally, there is another problem which is discussed in these essays and in some ways it is the most difficult problem of all. How can the defence of the Empire be best coordinated? How can the military forces of the various independent peoples forming the British Empire be centrally controlled? It is a problem which has not yet been solved; in fact, we seem a long way from arriving at any satisfactory solution. We have not even solved the problem of how best to coordinate the armed forces of Great Britain, much less those of the Dominions. We must first of all devise a practical system for the control of the Navy, Army and Air Force, both in peace and war, before we can approach the more difficult problem of how to combine the military resources of the Empire.

* * * * *

The amendment to the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act moved in the House of Commons by Mr. Thurtle, the object of which was to abolish the death penalty "for all that class of cases which involve cowardice and desertion when on active service," is of interest to the public generally, and to soldiers in particular, because it is said to represent the official policy of the Labour Party. Mr. Thurtle argued in support of his amendment that "cases of cowardice and of desertion when on active service cannot strictly be classed within the category of crime." "They are due," he said, "more to human weakness than to any vicious intent," and he contended that "it is an outrage on elementary justice that such offences should be punishable by the irrevocable penalty of death." Whether or not he proved his contention is, of course, a matter of opinion, but the House of Commons by a large majority refused to accept his amendment and this decision was undoubtedly in the best interests of the Army.

The justification for the death sentence for grave military offences

is the fact that such offences endanger the safety of the State, the lives of the offender's comrades and the success of the army with which he is serving. In civil law high treason is punishable with death because the offence gravely imperils the safety of the State. *Salus reipublicæ suprema lex.*

The only military offence for which death can now be awarded when troops are not on active service is mutiny. Grave cases of mutiny, whether on active service or not, come very near to rebellion. It is essential that an authority for the purpose of quelling a mutiny shall possess the power of inflicting an immediate and exemplary punishment. This applies with especial force to the British Army, where a small number of white officers are often in command of native troops in distant lands.

It is, however, in the main round the offences of desertion and cowardice before the enemy that the controversy as to the death penalty has been carried out. The grounds which necessitate and justify the retention of the death penalty for these offences may be summarized as follows :—

(a) The death penalty is the only punishment which can be awarded under the Army Acts that is really an effective defence on active service. The only other severe punishments possible are long terms of penal servitude or imprisonment. These involve removing the offender out of the firing line to a place of comparative safety, and the offender from past experience knows that when hostilities are over the remainder of the sentence will, in all likelihood, soon be remitted. Moreover, guards have to be detained to take the offender back to prison, and it may not easily be possible to spare them from the firing line. To some extent the difficulty was met by the Suspension of Sentences Act passed in the late war, the principle of which has now been embodied in the Army Acts. But although the Suspension of Sentences Act proved most useful, the power of carrying out a death sentence must be in reserve or the Act loses its value. There were many cases of men who had their sentences suspended more than once. There must ultimately be a power of carrying out the punishments.

(b) A soldier who deserts or who shows cowardice assists the enemy, thereby endangering the lives of his comrades, the success of the army, and ultimately the safety and freedom of his country. It is important that every soldier should realize that he cannot secure his own safety at the expense of his comrades and of his country.

(c) If the death penalty is not authorized by law for such offences, experience has shown that it will nevertheless be carried out without

lawful authority, which is bad for discipline and more likely to lead to injustice.

(d) The very fact that the penalty of death can be awarded for these offences impresses their gravity deeply in the soldiers' minds.

It is urged by those who oppose the death penalty for these offences that, unlike grave civil offences, they are not necessarily due to any criminal or vicious intent. They may be due to physical weakness or to a nervous breakdown. Undoubtedly, the greatest care and discretion are necessary in administering the punishment, but, on the other hand, there can be little doubt that the knowledge that they may be incurring danger to life by running away does fortify and strengthen men's will-power and minds in enduring the hardships and dangers of war. Even with the greatest care there must be some hard cases, but it should be remembered that in war, in any case, thousands of wholly innocent lives are sacrificed for the supreme purpose of securing the national safety and well-being.

That in the British Army every conceivable precaution was taken in connection with the carrying out of death sentences in the late war is indicated by the following facts: Between the 4th of August, 1914, and the 30th of September, 1920, the total number of death sentences passed by courts-martial in respect of officers and men of the British Army was 2,692, of which only 291, or less than 11 per cent., were carried out.

Of these 15 were for murder for which they could have been sentenced to death by a civil court. Of the remainder the bulk were for the offences of desertion on active service, cowardice in the face of the enemy or mutiny. There were only two cases in which a soldier was executed for the offence of sleeping at his post when acting as sentinel. In 91 cases the men were already under previous sentences which had been suspended. In every case before the sentence of death was carried out the advice of the Judge Advocate General or of his deputy accompanying the force was obtained as to the legality of the proceedings, and the sanction of the commander-in-chief of the force with which the offender was serving was necessary. Before giving this sanction the commander-in-chief was careful to obtain reports from the commanding officer of the accused and of all officers commanding superior positions, with a view to ascertaining the condemned man's character and history, the requirements of discipline, and all the relevant factors having a bearing on the question whether it was necessary to carry the extreme penalty into effect.

• • • • • • •

The Session of the Committee appointed by the League of Nations to prepare the way for a Disarmament Conference was brought to a conclusion on the 26th of May. Its proceedings have no doubt been followed with interest by soldiers although the reports of them in the Press have been somewhat meagre.

The object for which the Committee was appointed was not to propound any definite scheme of international disarmament, but to bring about an exchange of views on the subject in order to find out the main obstacles that lie in the way of a satisfactory solution of the many problems involved in a general reduction of armaments. The proceedings of the Committee show clearly that the policy of not attempting to rush things was an eminently wise one, for, although it is true that a measure of agreement was arrived at upon certain questions, there can be little doubt that the principal difficulties, which will have to be faced before any large scheme of disarmament can be accepted by the European nations, remain unchanged. So long as the Russians refuse to take part in these discussions, there must be a certain unreality in them, because, although the Soviet Government has asserted—and continues to assert—that it has no aggressive intentions and that it is reducing its Army, its settled policy of political propaganda, backed by its enormous potential military strength, is a perpetual menace not only to the States bordering Russia, but also to the rest of Europe. So long, too, as the spirit of suspicion is so active among the nations there is little real hope of any general acceptance of disarmament. The Committee was wise enough to recognize the unfortunate bearing that this attitude of mind must have upon the objects which it has in view, but it remains to be seen whether or not it will be able to promote a feeling of security strong enough to allay suspicion by the formulation of schemes of “regional agreement” or by the creation of machinery enabling the League of Nations to go to the assistance of any State that may be attacked. Although sceptics may well doubt whether methods of this kind can ever be successful in promoting a scheme of disarmament that will be universally acceptable, there can be no doubt that it is only along such lines that the League of Nations can work and there will be a general feeling of satisfaction that the Committee has decided to follow them. Its decision to make the “peace armament” of a nation the criterion for disarmament is a little difficult to understand. It is not clear whether this term armament includes both material and *personnel*, but in either case it is the power of rapid expansion in the event of war which is the vital factor. A nation might well reduce its peace

establishment, but its policy would always be based on its capacity to increase its military resources in the early stages of a war.

* * * * *

The information regarding the discipline and the state of efficiency of the Russian Army contained in a "Statement" issued by three Conservative members of the House of Commons who recently visited Russia, would carry more weight had these gentlemen allowed themselves more time to study their subject and had they been better qualified to form an opinion. It would be difficult even for experts to judge the military value of an army of over 500,000 men by watching one review and paying a single visit—even if it was a "surprise inspection"—to one barracks. However, any first-hand impressions respecting the Red Army are of interest. We are told that it is "a very formidable weapon, but only . . . as regards insurrections or external aggression." The three M.P.'s do not believe that the Army is in a position or willing "to take part in any aggressive campaign which involves crossing its own borders," not because it is lacking in "military spirit, discipline or enthusiasm," but because it is weary of war. The policy of those who control it is said to be pacific because they feel that "the future of this generation will be fully occupied in preserving internal peace and building up reserves against possible contingencies in the next"; a statement which means—if it means anything at all—that preparations for war are not wholly ruled out of account in Soviet Russia.

The Army, Regular and Militia, numbers about 560,000 all ranks, and is said to be "self-contained"—an expression which is explained as meaning "that it is adequately provided with machine guns (a section to each company), light and heavy artillery, cavalry, engineers, transport, medical services, not to speak of a most efficient air service." The M.P.'s do not state exactly how they obtained this information or to what exactly it amounts.

In the administration of the Army, "democracy is the keynote." This apparently means that officers are chosen from the ranks "both for ability and education, though if the former is sufficiently high, the lack of the latter is made good by the authorities by an intensive system which appears so far to have met with success." Discipline is said to be excellent in barracks, on parade and in the streets, but a veil is drawn over what passes in the clubs, "where officers, non-commissioned officers and men meet on equal terms and footing" and where "the democratic note is maintained." The M.P.'s confess that they were puzzled "whether this note is entirely genuine, or inclined to be forced." At the barracks of

which, as already stated, they made "a surprise inspection," they were struck with the cleanliness of the surroundings, the abundance of the food, the excellent spirit and healthiness of the men, and the intelligence and energy of the officers. But "the dominating feature of the Army, as in the life of the industrial worker, the peasant and the sailor, is education, especially political." The object of the Soviet Government is said to be to develop in the soldier "mental capacity, and moral fibre, so that when his time in the Army is completed (*i.e.* two years for the Infantry and four years for the Special Corps) he may return to civil life a better and more efficient citizen of the State; a more reliable and self-reliant individual; and what is even more aimed at by the authorities, a more fervid and fanatical propagandist of Communism."

If this summing up of the policy of the present rulers of Russia is correct, and there is no reason to suppose it is not, the future of the world may well depend upon their success or failure in fashioning their democratic Army into an instrument of war.

* * * * *

There appears in this number of the *Army Quarterly* an article the writer of which makes a vigorous counter-attack upon a review that was published in our last number upon Colonel Fuller's book, "The Foundations of the Science of War." It seems to us after a careful study first of Colonel Fuller's book, then of the review in question, and, finally, of the article in this number, that all the parties concerned should be satisfied. Colonel Fuller has written a book in which he asserts that he "has attempted to do for war what Copernicus did for astronomy, Newton for physics and Darwin for natural history." Our reviewer came to the conclusion that "it would take a pamphlet of a length of about one line only for each page of his [Colonel Fuller's] book to prick the bubbles and to show that he [Colonel Fuller] had mainly written what he labels in others 'common nonsense.' His ideas will not help a soldier to feed himself and slay an enemy." The writer of the article in this number considers that three original features, namely:—"the method of science in approaching the subject, the organization of thought and the balance of the three spheres—make the book not only a foundation for further research, as was the author's declared object, but a landmark in military history, still more in military philosophy." *Tot homines, quot sententiæ.* Readers of the *Army Quarterly* must form their own opinion of the merits of Colonel Fuller's work in elucidating the problems of war. They must decide for themselves whether the application of the "methods

of science " to the study of war really simplifies the difficulties against which soldiers have to contend in the field. If this result can be attained, then, there can be no doubt that Colonel Fuller will have achieved the purpose for which his book was written. But his readers must bear in mind the advice given to them by the writer of the article, " . . . the full benefit of this book will only come to the man who soaks himself in it, for one of its cardinal values is that it is not a military ' crib,' but an education ; not a tabloid remedy for a particular ill, but a course of treatment—of military Pelmanism if you will—by which mental system as a whole is expanded and invigorated." We fear that this soaking process may be difficult for many people for the simple reason that, as our reviewer pointed out, Colonel Fuller has the knack of making simple things appear difficult, and the ordinary man has neither the time nor the patience to puzzle his brain in extracting the obvious from the complicated. Colonel Fuller, in addition to being one of our most thoughtful and progressive soldiers, is an officer, as the writer of the article in this number points out, who has proved his capacity as a staff officer in the field, but there is no doubt that if his written work on military subjects is to be of real value to practical soldiers, he should endeavour to cultivate a simpler and less diffuse style of writing. He should remember that the majority of the readers, for whom presumably he writes, are men of action, who cannot be expected to wade through 335 pages of what may be the most scientific explanation of Napoleon's well-known maxim, " The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack." That they would do well to read Colonel Fuller's latest work, is possible ; that they will read it, is improbable.

* * * * *

The death of Lieut.-General Sir Herbert Miles, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.B.E., C.V.O., during the General Strike, at the age of seventy-five, has removed a great personality and deprived a large circle of soldiers of a very dear friend. His career was more like that of the German officers who rose to high positions before the war of 1914-1918 : he saw little of troops. Entering the Royal Munster Fusiliers, at the age of twenty-six he went to the Staff College ; then performed a short spell of regiment duty. He subsequently held a continuous series of staff appointments, including that of Commandant of the Staff College, never commanding a unit, brigade or division, and, except for a few months in command at the Cape in 1904, rarely leaving London and

Aldershot. He had one year's war service in South Africa, being Buller's Chief of Staff at the relief of Ladysmith, closed his active career as Quartermaster-General, and during the Great War was Governor of Gibraltar. Such a career is not exceptional in the British Army, but Sir Herbert Miles was an exceptional man. A great organizer, a very clear thinker, an eloquent and witty speaker, exceptionally well read, he would have made a mark in any profession. It has been said of Falkenhayn that in any profession except that of soldier his gifts would have secured him a European reputation ; we are almost tempted to say the same of Sir Herbert Miles, but with more luck in the way of war-experience as a younger man, he might have had a military reputation outside the Army as well as in it.

* * * * *

Lieut.-General Sir William Leishman, Kt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.H.P., M.B., F.R.S., F.R.C.P., LL.D., Director-General, Army Medical Service, whose death occurred, at the age of sixty, on the 2nd of June, occupied a position of great eminence in the scientific world, and was known throughout the Army for the remarkable success of his work in elaborating and perfecting the means of preventing enteric fever by anti-typhoid vaccines. With the exception of the earlier years of his service in the Army, which commenced in 1887 as a surgeon in what was then the Army Medical Staff, most of his work from 1899 onwards, when he reached the rank of major in the Royal Army Medical Corps, was in connection with pathological and bacteriological research, as Assistant Professor and subsequently Professor of Pathology at the Army Medical School, Netley, and Royal Army Medical College, Millbank. When his term of office in the latter appointment expired in 1913 he became the expert on tropical medicine on the Army Medical Advisory Board and held that appointment during the war. Most of his time, however, was spent in France as Adviser in Pathology. He joined the Expeditionary Force in that capacity on the 3rd of October, 1914, in consequence of the unexpected prevalence of tetanus, gas gangrene and severer forms of sepsis amongst the wounded ; and he remained in France, organizing and supervizing the work of mobile laboratories and in constant association with the French and American scientific workers until April, 1918. After the war, on the reorganization of the Army Medical Department at the War Office, he was appointed Director of Pathology in it, and held that post until selected to succeed Sir John Goodwin as Director-General of the Army Medical Service at the end of July, 1923.

Sir William Leishman, when a young medical officer serving in

India, took part in the Waziristan Expedition, 1894-1895, and received the medal and clasp. During the Great War he was thrice mentioned in despatches, was created C.B. in 1915 and the same year the President of the French Republic made him a Commander of the Legion of Honour. In 1918 he was created K.C.M.G., promoted to the rank of Major-General, and was granted the Distinguished Service Medal of the U.S.A. On his appointment as Director-General he was promoted to Lieut.-General's rank, and was recently advanced to the grade of Grand Officer in the Legion of Honour. He was also a Knight of Grace of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem.

Many honours came to him on account of his eminence in science. He received the honour of Knighthood in 1909, was elected F.R.S. in 1912, F.R.C.P. in 1914, and to the Athenæum at the end of last year. Glasgow and McGill (Montreal) Universities conferred on him the honorary degree of LL.D. He was a member or chairman of many scientific committees and examiner at Oxford and Cambridge on his special subjects. His name will go down in history as the saviour of the British troops during the Great War from the scourge of enteric fever, which had decimated armies in the past and which, but for his beneficent work, would have been the cause of enormous losses and suffering then and in the years to come. As Director-General of the Army Medical Service he showed that a great scientist could become an able administrator.

* * * *

General Alexei Alexeievich Brusilov, who died last March after the *Army Quarterly* had gone to press, was, from his great and successful offensive against the Austrians and their German supporters in June, 1916, one of the best known, as he was one of the most eminent, of the Russian generals of the Great War. He held high command throughout, first of the Eighth Army; then, succeeding Ivanov, of the South-West Group of Armies, the larger half of the Russian forces; and finally, under the Soviet, he succeeded Alexeiev in the Supreme Command.

Born in 1856 of noble family, he was educated in the *Corps des Pages*, and, passing out low, was given a Commission in the cavalry of the line. He took part in the Russo-Turkish War, but, thenceforward, until 1914, had no war experience, and was for sixteen consecutive years in various appointments at the Officers' Cavalry School. During the Russo-Japanese War he was still at the School as Director, and, later on, he commanded the 2nd Guard Cavalry Division. He subsequently received command of the XII Corps

stationed in Podolia, on the Austrian frontier. On the outbreak of war in 1914 he was appointed commander of the Eighth Army, concentrated in his old corps area on the left of the great Russian front of attack. Though the Armies northward of him met with varying fortunes, Brusilov, even in retreat, was able to show continual success. In 1916, when Falkenhayn and Conrad von Hötzen-dorf disagreed as to the course to be pursued, and one went to Verdun and the other to Asiago, Brusilov's great opportunity came. With 4 Armies of over 40 divisions, he advanced on a front of 125 miles into the area round Luck, and drove the Austrians back between 30 and 40 miles. It was the severest crisis on the Eastern Front. Reinforcements hastily sent by the Germans, aided by the difficulties of communications, then brought the advance to a stop. But Brusilov had shown what Russians well commanded could still do against the Austrians, and the Germans then gave up hope of success in the East, and, withdrawing to the Hindenburg Line in the West, waited the effect of U-Boat warfare and the Russian revolution they helped to engineer. In June, 1917, under the Kerenski Government, Kornilov and Brusilov impelled the Russian Armies to their last, half-hearted offensive. In the end Brusilov accepted the Soviet régime and was permitted to remain at liberty and to reside in Russia, where he died.

Thoroughly understanding the Russian soldier, naturally gifted as a commander, consistently successful, believing in his luck, and retaining his energy as his years advanced, under happier conditions Brusilov might well have earned the reputation of a Skobelev or a Gourko, but, with the Grand Duke Nicholas and General Danilov, he will always be remembered as a great soldier.

* * * * *

We have received the following letters from two correspondents :—

“ In a ‘ Tale of the Afghan War,’ published in the *Army Quarterly* of January, 1926, it is stated that this deed of heroism has not been ‘ the subject of an author’s pen.’ It may be opportune to mention that this story is told in vivid detail in Chapter VIII of ‘ The Story of the Guides,’ by General Younghusband.

“ It may be of interest to add a few notes from a comparison of the two accounts.

“ In the latter account the Escort is given as consisting of 25 of all ranks of the Guides’ Cavalry, and 52 of the Guides’ Infantry ; and the Political Assistant’s name is spelt Jenkyns instead of Jenkins.

"The actual outbreak was started by the Herati Regiments, which had relieved the Kabuli Regiments at Kabul towards the end of August. The final spark was set to the fire on the 3rd of September by their receiving only a month of their back pay and the raising of the cry, 'Go to the British Embassy, and demand pay; there is lots of money there.'

"The name of the bearer of the letter mentioned in Ghulam Mahomed's account (though two prior letters had been dispatched) was Shahzada Taimus, a Prince of the Sadozai dynasty, but a trooper in the Guides. He was successful in delivering his letter, and later, after many adventures, reached India once more.

"From General Younghusband's account it appears that there were at least two other friendly witnesses of what occurred at different times of the day. The one being the brave letter-carrier, and the other an old soldier pensioner who was kept a prisoner, and who was a witness of the final sortie of the remnant of the garrison.

"A monument was erected by the Government at Mardan, the headquarters of the Guides, to this heroic band, on which is inscribed: 'The annals of no army and no regiment can show a brighter record of devoted bravery than has been achieved by this small band of the Guides.'

"A statue to Lieutenant W. Hamilton, V.C., was erected in Dublin Museum."

"In the course of his interesting article, published in the *Army Quarterly* for January last, entitled 'A Tale of the Afghan Wars,' 'H.M.' makes the statement that so far as he was aware, the deeds of the Guides Corps at Cabul in 1879, when Sir Louis Cavagnari was killed with the whole of his escort, had never been the subject of an author's pen, beyond a passing reference in books of reminiscences.

"I would refer him to the poems of Henry Newbolt. You will find among them one called "The Guides at Cabul," which I have read many times, and which seems to me to express even better than any prose description the incident in which the Guides figured."

12th of June, 1926.

MILITARY PRIZE ESSAY, 1926

CAPTAIN BERTRAND STEWART'S BEQUEST

The Referees appointed under the terms of the Bequest—namely : Vice-Admiral Sir George Hope, Major-General Sir Cecil Romer and Lieut.-Colonel Cuthbert Headlam—have decided to divide the prize, as follows : £60 to Captain K. F. D. Gattie, South Wales Borderers, and £40 to Major R. Chenevix Trench, Royal Signals.

The Referees are of opinion that the Essays sent in by Major C. F. Stoehr, R.E., Brevet Major B. C. Dening, R.E., Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, General Staff, and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Haining, R.A., deserve especial commendation.

Twenty-six essays were submitted to the Referees, the majority of which were carefully written, showing that their authors had given close study and attention to their subject.

“PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE TO-DAY. DISCUSS HOW THESE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN MODIFIED BY CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF POWER SINCE THE WAR (1914-18) AND BY MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN WEAPONS AND METHODS OF WARFARE.”

BY CAPTAIN K. F. D. GATTIE, D.S.O., M.C., SOUTH WALES
BORDERERS

“WHEN a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils.”—Luke xi. 22.

I. INTRODUCTION

Object of Imperial Defence

It is safe to start by postulating that the underlying object of Imperial defence is the same to-day as it was in 1914—namely, to

keep what we already have. Never, perhaps, in the world's history was there a palace quite so spacious as the British Empire nor one quite so full of treasure, and it is not unnatural if others should covet much of what we possess. Yet, however much it behoves us on this account to be the strong man armed and to permit none stronger than ourselves to rise up as a menace to our happy state of peaceful possession, it is clear that we cannot proceed to arm ourselves against the rest of the world or be in a constant state of readiness to meet any and every conceivable emergency. Political and economic considerations make any such notion ridiculous, and it is only when we take these considerations into careful account that we can even begin to arrive at the real meaning and the real complexity of the problem of Imperial defence to-day.

Effect of Political and Economic Considerations

Politically we stand for peace. We have much to lose and nothing to gain by war, and an indefinite period of peace in which to enjoy our goodly heritage—a perpetuation that is to say of the *status quo*—is as much to our advantage as it is contrary to the laws of nature. It follows that the last thing we wish to do is to antagonize other nations and to provoke war by warlike preparations which are in excess of our real requirements or incompatible with a purely defensive as opposed to an aggressive policy.

Economically, too, we do not wish to spend on our armed forces one penny more than we must, since financial burdens thus incurred cannot fail to strike at the very root of public prosperity.

The inevitable effect of the late war has been to lay increased emphasis on these political and economic considerations. We have become members of the League of Nations and entered into the most solemn covenants to preserve peace in a manner reminiscent of the Holy Alliance concluded at the close of the Napoleonic wars. We have gone further and formally recognized that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments, a subject which is at this moment engaging the earnest attention of the League. Meanwhile, on the score of economy, we have already ruthlessly applied the axe to the fighting Services much as was done a century ago, and it is furthermore most plausibly argued that money spent on preparation for war is wasted, if, as a result, the nation is economically crippled and unable to sustain the financial burden which a modern war would impose if it were to take place.

Disarmament and its Limits

Nevertheless, there are limits beyond which we cannot well go. In the first place, it is now generally accepted that disarmament must depend on security, and here it is perhaps not unreasonable if we attempt to draw a comparison between the security of the individual and that of the State. It was not so long ago that individuals in this country slept with pistols beneath their pillows. To-day such a precaution is unnecessary, but we are not yet prepared to dispense with bolts on our windows and doors nor with the policeman outside in the street, and in many parts of the world the pistol beneath the pillow still survives. So it is with the security of the State. We may be able to modify our defensive arrangements, but there are limits beyond which none but the foolhardy dares venture.

In the second place, let it not be forgotten, when we consider the economic aspect of the case, that navies, armies and air forces are not the creations of a moment and that the professional study of war is not one which can be dropped and as suddenly picked up again with impunity. We were taught this lesson once by the Crimean War in which the incompetence of our military and naval commanders was as nothing compared with the reckless parsimony which had for years previous been practised by the politicians at the expense of our Army and Navy. We were very nearly taught the lesson again in the last war. For there can be little doubt that, had we listened to the counsels of some of our political advisers, Germany would have won an overwhelming victory in the first year of the war, and we should have been left to face her—alone. As it was, we cut things perilously fine, and have largely Providence to thank for our escape. Lord Carnarvon, speaking in 1878 as Secretary of State for the Colonies, said “We lavish on what is obsolete, save on what is essential, and always think that our past good luck is a guarantee of future success.” We should look to it that the same be not true of us to-day, for a country which says that it cannot afford to go on paying for the upkeep of its armed forces is comparable to a man who says he cannot afford to go on paying his insurance premiums.

We repeat then that, whether we regard the matter from the political or from the economic standpoint, there are limits beyond which we can only go at our peril, and it is in deciding what these limits are in the case of the British Empire to-day that the problem of Imperial defence lies. Let us endeavour to tackle this problem

by considering, first, the vulnerability of the Empire, second, our potential enemies, and third, the weapons and methods of warfare which might be employed against us.

II. THE VULNERABILITY OF THE EMPIRE

Composition of the Empire

The British Empire is a body composed of the following parts :—

1, Great Britain and Ireland ; 2, the self-governing Dominions ; 3, India ; 4, the Crown Colonies and other overseas possessions ; and 5, the Mandated territories.

As in the case of the human body, each of these parts affects the whole, and the loss or damage of any one of them is liable to result sooner or later in the demise of the whole. Nevertheless, certain parts are more directly vital than others, and it is essential that we should be perfectly clear on this point if we are to base our Imperial defence on a sound foundation.

(1) *Relative Importance of Great Britain.*—Great Britain, then, we must regard as the brain and heart of the Empire. Here we find centred the control of the policy which governs the whole, its chief sources of white man-power, its chief industries, its financial wealth, the mainsprings of its commercial prosperity, and, finally, its chief arsenals, its chief munition factories, and the main base of its armed forces. It may be that one day the Empire's strength will become less centralized or that it will become centred in some part of the Empire other than Great Britain. It may be that one day the capture and sack of London will mean no more than the capture and sack of Rome did to the Roman Empire once the capital had been removed to Constantinople. For the present, however, there can be little doubt that the safety of Great Britain is vital to the existence of the Empire.

(2) *Of the Dominions and India.*—What then of the members of the body—the Dominions, on which the Empire (particularly Great Britain) so largely depends for its food, and India, whose wealth, trade and man-power tempted even Napoleon to regard it as a favourable objective ?

The safety of the members is of course extremely important, but let us be under no illusions. The loss of a single limb, though very serious and weakening to the whole, is not of itself vital. Our American colonies were lost as a result of the unfortunate war of 1775–1783, and yet the Empire suffered no incurable wound thereby.

(3) *Of the Crown Colonies and other Overseas Possessions.*—But, before attempting to elaborate this point any further, it is necessary that we should first proceed to consider the degree of importance which attaches to the Crown Colonies and our other overseas possessions. Most of these have been maintained chiefly for the purpose of securing the sea communications of the Empire, and may thus be likened to part of the arterial system of the body.

How vital these sea communications have been to the Empire, and how much the security of Great Britain itself and of the outlying parts of the Empire has depended on them, history has abundantly shown. On the one hand, they have ensured freedom for our Imperial trade, connected us with foreign markets, and thereby permitted that interchange of food, raw materials and manufactured goods which is so essential to our prosperity and, indeed, to our very existence; on the other hand, they have enabled us to concentrate and to maintain our land forces in all parts of the world where their presence has been required for the protection of our interests.

(4) *Of the Mandated Territories.*—Finally, we come to the Mandated territories. These are not really part of the Empire. They are more in the nature of foreign growths, the amputation of which would in some cases perhaps cause us more relief than injury, but which, so long as they remain attached to us, we are bound to look after. Should they ever become permanent adhesions we should have to regard them differently, but for the present our interest in them is limited by the temporary nature of their connection with us.

Summary

Let us now endeavour to sum up the situation. Are we prepared to say that home defence and the defence of our communications are the vital factors in Imperial defence, and that the safety of the rest of the Empire is only a secondary consideration? Not exactly—let us rather say that the safety of the rest of the Empire is primarily dependent on home defence and the defence of our communications.

The wars in which the existence of the British Empire has been at stake have been those that have been waged against Powers which have endeavoured to strike at its vital parts, and in all our numerous colonial wars there has never been any serious question of the Empire being in jeopardy. Even in the case of the War of American

Independence, to which reference has already been made, it was due to the interruption of our sea communications by France and Spain that we suffered the defeat at Yorktown which determined the result of the war ; nor must it be forgotten that what really saved the Empire during that dark period were two victories which had nothing to do with the fighting in America, namely the crushing defeat inflicted by Rodney on the French Fleet at the battle of the Saints and the successful resistance by General Elliott at Gibraltar to a siege by the combined forces of France and Spain which lasted over three years. Had these successes been failures our sea communications would have been lost, and the disintegration of the Empire must have inevitably followed. But, because so much stress has been laid on the importance of home defence and the defence of our communications, it must not be supposed that the local defence of the other portions of the Empire should be neglected. Undoubtedly local defence must be forthcoming everywhere, but it is only by appreciating the importance of the different portions in relation to the whole that we can hope to use the resources of the Empire to the best advantage or to decide upon the best distribution of such scanty permanent forces as political and economic considerations allow us.

III. OUR POTENTIAL ENEMIES

Policy Regarding Major and Minor Wars

Any war in which our vital parts are seriously endangered must clearly be a war of the first magnitude waged against one or more of the first class Powers—a struggle, in fact, for our continued existence as an Empire.

It is true that in the more immediate future we may be faced by other and smaller wars, but even though our pre-occupation at any given moment may be a minor crisis, no Imperial defence organization can be regarded as satisfactory which does not look ahead and cater for the major eventuality. It will only be necessary to introduce certain modifications into such an organization in order to adapt it to the needs of a small war, while in peace time it will only be necessary to put so much of the complete organization into actual operation as the general situation requires. Granted, then, that our organization must be based on the demands of a war of the first magnitude it is next necessary that we should endeavour to size up the probabilities as to our potential enemies in any future struggle of the scale we are envisaging.

The Balance of Power

In the past this country has assiduously striven to maintain the balance of power in Europe, that is to say, to adjust the strength of the States in the common interest of preventing any one of them from obtaining undue predominance. Thus we find ourselves in the latter half of the sixteenth century allied with the Dutch against Spain, in the latter half of the seventeenth century allied with France against the Dutch, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries allied in turn with the Dutch, with the Central Powers, and with Russia against France, in the latter half of the nineteenth century allied with the Central Powers and France against Russia, and, finally, in 1914 allied with France and Russia against the Central Powers. It is, indeed, this principle of the balance of power which has for centuries been the motive for a steady crop of alliances and *ententes* of which the ostensible object has been the preservation of peace and the inevitable outcome—war.

The League of Nations

To-day, by means of a League of Nations, which, as its name implies, is in contradistinction to the balance of power, an attempt is being made to maintain peace by general international regulation. There is nothing original in this idea. The "Concert of Europe," which followed the Napoleonic wars, and the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 (at which twenty-six and forty-four Powers were respectively represented) may be quoted as previous efforts in the same direction. It is significant to note that 1917 was the year fixed for the Third Hague Conference, and, instead, found the whole world in the middle of a gigantic war, the responsibility for which will certainly never be a matter of international agreement, however much its occurrence may be a matter for universal regret. In spite, therefore, of the substitution of the idea of a League of Nations for that of a balance of power, we cannot from an Imperial defence point of view afford to disregard the possible grouping of the nations should the League one day prove to be divided against itself, nor must we forget that there are certain nations which are not at present members of the League—notably Russia, Germany and the United States of America.

Future Possibilities

Let us, then, consider some of the possibilities of the future.

France and Italy.—France and Italy by reason of their geographical position and their existing armaments are clearly well

placed for striking a direct blow at our vitals. Let us imagine that France, distracted by financial embarrassments, or Italy fired by national aspirations, should fall into the hands of a modern Napoleon—despot, military genius, ambitious, unscrupulous. Let us suppose even that a coalition of these two countries under a super-Napoleon becomes bent upon the destruction of the British Empire. This, no doubt, would be a serious situation, but what of the rest of Europe? Could France and Italy afford to ignore their late enemies, Germany, Austria and Hungary? And if not, could they afford with their comparatively limited resources in man-power and material to risk pitting themselves against so mighty a combination?

Germany.—On the other hand, let us take Germany, rapidly increasing in population, dissatisfied with her frontiers, and anxious for the recovery of her Colonies, and let us suppose that she falls once more into militarist hands. She showed in the last war the kind of vital blow that she was capable of aiming at us, but at the moment she stands disarmed and it is difficult to see how she could take up the cudgels against us again except with the aid either of Russia or of France. In the former case, with France presumably as our ally, we should have to be prepared for operations on two main fronts—in the West and in the Middle East—for not until they were successful on one or other of these fronts, could our enemies hope to penetrate to our vital parts.

In the latter case, with Russia at the best only neutral, we have a terribly dangerous combination to face, and, though we have successfully faced equally strong European combinations in the past, there are certain modern developments of warfare, with which we shall deal later, which make a Franco-German alliance directed against the British Empire a very unpleasant event to contemplate, and one which, without outside assistance, the Empire might well find irresistible.

Russia.—But let us imagine Central and Western Europe to find a peaceful solution of their problems. What of Russia by herself as a potential enemy?

“Whither tend,” writes a contemporary, “the sources brought into play over a sixth of the Globe’s surface in a population of 175,000,000 which doubles in seventy years? The answer has a momentous bearing on civilization and is of especial importance to ourselves whose sphere of influence marches with Russia’s throughout the Asiatic continent.”* The blind impulse of a rapidly growing population to burst from icebound coasts in order to gain access

* See Skrine’s “Expansion of Russia,” p. 1.

to warmer waters will presumably be the governing factor and, though the Baltic in the west or the Pacific in the far east may give her what she wants, yet both history and geography seem to indicate that the more natural lines for Russia's advance lie southward and south-eastward of Moscow to the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. It will be observed that Russia is not in a position to strike a direct blow at Great Britain, but could we wait until she was at our throat ? or should we have to oppose a southern advance by the Russians, much as we opposed a western advance by the Germans, before they threatened our sea communications ?

We must not confine our attention, however, to European Powers. Even before the last war two nations outside Europe had already emerged and claimed our notice as Powers of the first class—the United States of America and Japan—and both as a result of the war may be said to have advanced still further their position and prestige.

Japan.—Let us suppose that Japan, rapidly becoming an industrial country, rapidly increasing in population, and finding an ever-growing necessity for markets for her goods, is persuaded that her high destiny can only be fulfilled if British influence and British trade are ousted from far eastern waters, and both China and Australia made the happy and exclusive hunting-grounds of Japan. By the seizure of Hong Kong and Singapore, the bases of our sea communications in this part of the world, Japan would be in a position to strike a vital blow at the Empire. But what of the United States ? Could the Americans afford to watch such a struggle unmoved ?

The United States of America.—Let us then consider the position of the United States. Here we find a country which has as little reason for initiating a war as the British Empire. Self-contained as regards almost every kind of raw material and with vast expanses of territory and a wealth of undeveloped resources at her disposal, peace is all she asks, in which to develop and to enjoy her wonderful patrimony. It is sometimes suggested that the people of the United States will one day endeavour to wrest Canada from the British Empire as they attempted to do in 1812. But their failure on that occasion, in spite of the fact that Great Britain was at the same time engaged in a death struggle with Napoleon, shows that a mere invasion of Canada is of itself useless, unless a simultaneous blow is struck at the Empire's sea communications. So great a disaster for the future of the Anglo-Saxon race as a British-American war it is impossible to conceive, whatever might be the occasion for

it. Moreover, there is every indication that the United States abhors the very thought of war, and, rejoicing in her geographical isolation, grows less and less inclined to risk any complications with the outside world. But herein lies the germ of a danger which may perhaps prove only one degree less disastrous for the Anglo-Saxon race than a British-American war. The isolation of the American continent is after all but transitory, for the world is assuredly shrinking and time and space are gradually being eaten up by speed. Who can say how long the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans will be reliable obstacles behind which to shelter? Can, then, the United States afford to neglect the study of the balance of power—not the balance of power in Europe, but the balance of power in the world? Can the American people afford to watch the downfall of the British Empire at the hands of Japan, France, Germany or Russia, or any combination of these Powers, and can they, if they are far-sighted, afford to disregard the fact that the British Empire is the main buffer which lies between them and what is known as “the Yellow Peril”?

This general review of future possibilities might be amplified to an almost unlimited extent by considering the parts which the numerous smaller nations might be expected to play in various contingencies, but it is not proposed to embark on any such undertaking here. We have perhaps already speculated too much and wandered too far into the realms of foreign policy.

Let us now get down to hard facts, and, keeping in the back of our minds the possibilities of the future, proceed to consider the actual happenings of the present.

Effect of Actual Events Since 1914

Since 1914 the following political events have occurred which have materially affected Imperial defence. Germany has been disarmed; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has terminated; the Washington Agreement has been concluded; there has been a revolution in Russia; and lastly there has been the signature of the Treaty of Locarno.

(1) *Disarmament of Germany*; (2) *Termination of Anglo-Japanese Alliance*; (3) *The Washington Conference*.—The disarmament of Germany and the disappearance of the German Fleet has, for the present, freed our Navy from the necessity of concentrating in home waters, while the termination of the Japanese Treaty has tended to shift the strategic centre to the Far East. Even with the

German menace at present removed, we are not prepared to move our Fleet too far away from home, nor can we afford to divide it, because, having accepted by the Washington Treaty a one-Power standard, we are not in a position simultaneously to maintain one Fleet in the Far East and another at home. A central position, therefore, is indicated for our Fleet in order that in an emergency it may be dispatched in whatever direction may be necessary, and it follows that the quickest route from west to east *via* the Mediterranean and Suez Canal (as opposed to the Cape route) assumes a greatly increased importance. The safety of this route and of the necessary Fleet bases and fuelling stations along it, is therefore essential. In the Far East, Hong Kong, by virtue of the Washington Agreement, cannot be strengthened as regards its seaward defences, and is in fact but an outwork to Singapore, which must be regarded as the main citadel. Singapore stands at the gateway to the East and conversely covers the main entrance to the Indian Ocean. Its retention is vital and its fortification and preparation as a sea base has become an Imperial necessity. With Singapore held, India, Ceylon and Aden in our hands, and the Persian Gulf under our control, we have little to fear in the Indian Ocean, while in the Mediterranean, so long as we retain Gibraltar and Malta, and sufficient forces in Egypt to ensure the safety of the Suez Canal from attack or sabotage, only France and Italy are in a position to cause us any serious uneasiness.

(4) *Revolution in Russia*.—Meanwhile, there has been a revolution in Russia, and those now in power at Moscow have openly declared their hostility to the British Empire. In the Far East they have exploited an awakening Chinese nationalism to foment anti-British riots and a boycott of British trade, which in Canton, where Soviet influence predominates, has reached the most serious proportions. In Malaya, India and Egypt, and in other parts of Africa, their agents have been busily endeavouring to spread sedition—at one moment playing on pan-Islamic tendencies and at another preaching a crusade against Imperialistic oppression of downtrodden peoples. In Great Britain itself, changing their cry to one of anti-capitalism, they are seeking to use our present industrial difficulties as a means for undermining the national stability, nor can we believe that they will spare any effort to effect a breach between Turkey and ourselves over the Mosul question. Russia, then, under her present rulers, must be regarded as a definite danger to the British Empire, and we must be prepared for her at every point where she can either directly or indirectly attack our vital spots. This makes

local defence all over the Empire, and particularly the safeguarding of our position in the Middle East, matters of the greatest Imperial concern.

(5) *Treaty of Locarno*.—Finally, there is the Treaty of Locarno to be considered. This Treaty, heralded, and rightly so, as a diplomatic triumph, has considerably eased the political situation in Western Europe. The German desire for revenge and the French fear of it, which were proving so mutually provocative, have, it is to be hoped, been quenched—at least for the time being—by the guarantee of the *status quo* on the Franco-German frontier in which Italy and ourselves have joined; nor can we doubt that if Germany enters the League of Nations the possibility of military understanding between Russia and Germany will become less probable.

Nevertheless, if the arrangements arrived at at Locarno are to be effective, we must not fail to recognize the obligation which it imposes upon us, and we must be prepared, therefore, to intervene at short notice either on the German or on the French side in order to assist in enforcing its provisions. This necessitates the maintenance of forces in the West, for, failing this, we may yet have to rank the Treaty of Locarno as merely a scrap of paper and a very dangerous scrap too.

IV. WEAPONS AND METHODS OF WARFARE

If one man means to murder another, he proceeds to arm himself with some lethal weapon and, generally speaking, either shoots his victim through the heart or head, cuts his throat, strangles him or possibly gives him poison. Similarly, the British Empire can be shot through the heart or head by an attack on Great Britain; it can have its throat cut by the severance of its communications; it can be strangled by economic pressure; or it can be poisoned by what, for want of a better term, we will call "Bolshevism." Let us consider each of these dangers in turn.

Methods of Attack on Great Britain

The first form of attack to which Great Britain is exposed is invasion by a hostile army. The Martello towers still to be seen on the south coast bear witness to the seriousness with which this contingency was viewed in Napoleonic times, and the recollection of the feverish digging of trenches which took place on the east coast at the commencement of the last war is still fresh in our

minds. The country has, however, since the days of William the Conqueror, proved immune from this form of attack, thanks to her island position and naval supremacy. The battle of Trafalgar in 1805 made the invasion of England as impossible as did that of Quiberon Bay in 1759 and of La Hogue in 1692, while in the last war it is doubtful whether the Germans even contemplated such a project.

To-day, however, our insular security is gradually growing obsolete, much as the moated castle has become. Two new forms of attack have already arisen to which the country is exposed as a result of modern developments, the first is attack by air and the second is submarine warfare. Both contain in them elements necessary to the vital factor of surprise—the former rapidity of movement and the latter secrecy of movement—but it is doubtful whether either is at present sufficiently developed to be able to strike us a decisive blow. It has been suggested that massed air attacks on London would so disorganize the country and so destroy the national moral that we should be quickly brought to our knees, and it has also been suggested that an unrestricted use of submarines by confronting the country with the spectre of starvation would achieve the same result. Whatever opinions we may hold as to the decisive effects of such methods of warfare, it is quite clear that they are both dangers which have to be guarded against and that to an ever-increasing extent.

Now in considering this problem, the first thing to realize is that the use of aeroplanes and submarines is limited by the fact that both require a base from which to operate and that these bases must be situated within a suitable range of the objective. This range must of course be expected to increase with the progress of scientific research. Whatever the range may be, however, and whatever it may become, it seems clear that, apart from the purely passive defence of anti-aircraft and anti-submarine devices, our policy must be to keep our enemy from establishing bases within such a range of this country, or, if he has already done so, to drive them back, and at the same time to establish our own bases within striking range of his country. This can only be done through the agency of an army. It will be questioned perhaps how a slow moving and cumbrous machine such as an army can hope to cope with the situation as the radius of action of aeroplanes and submarines increases, and we have the answer in the shape of the tank or, to be more explicit, in the future development of roadless traction. The mechanized and highly mobile army, which few can doubt

is the army of the future, can alone place it within our power, whether combined with France against Germany or with Germany against France, to keep our country immune from the air and submarine menace. As was pointed out earlier in this article it is in the event of our having to face a Franco-German combine that we should be placed in an awkward quandary. We should probably find ourselves besieged in our "moated castle" and unless our defensive arrangements were adequate to withstand such a siege until relief arrived from outside sources we should inevitably succumb.

Methods of Severing our Communications

The security of our sea communications has depended in the past on our naval supremacy all the world over, and that, in turn, on the security of our various naval bases. History's teaching is that provided the hostile fleet is sought out and either blockaded in its ports or else defeated at sea, command of the sea is ensured. As against this it is interesting to quote Vice-Admiral Trothe, the German Admiral, who, giving evidence in Berlin last January before the Parliamentary Committee for the investigation of the German collapse in 1918, and speaking of a naval plan to attack the mouth of the Thames and upset our whole transport system, is reported to have said: "Had the plan succeeded the British Fleet, the backbone of the British power in the world, would in our opinion have been so tremendously damaged that the whole conformation of the Powers of the world would have been changed and that is my firm conviction to-day."* It seems questionable, however, whether any such plan, unless it had led to a general engagement between the rival fleets, would have had any greater effect than was achieved by the Dutch in 1667 when they sailed up the Thames, burned the English dockyard and ships at Chatham, and held the Port of London blockaded for over a fortnight. Such operations are, in effect, nothing more than raids, and if we are to believe Captain Mahan, "such injuries are not usually to be confounded with cutting or even threatening the communications. They are the slight wounds of a campaign, not mortal blows: vexatious, not serious."† On the other hand, the defence of our communications, like Home defence, has to some extent been complicated by the aeroplane and the submarine, for to-day it would be quite possible to imagine serious and continuous interference with the sea com-

* See Press reports, 27th of January, 1926.

† See Mahan's "Naval Strategy," p. 130.

munications of a Power whose main fleet was still both undefeated and supreme.

In the broad Atlantic and Pacific Oceans the danger is almost negligible for the present and probably for some time to come, and in the Indian Ocean, thanks to the territory we control, it does not even arise. In the China Sea, however, the Mediterranean, and the English Channel, it is apparent that we are particularly vulnerable to this form of attack. In the event of war with Japan, Italy, and France, we can visualize these seas becoming closed to British shipping, except to the Fleet itself and to convoys proceeding under naval protection. In the case of the English Channel and the Mediterranean, this situation could no doubt be met by the diversion of the bulk of such shipping *via* the north of Scotland and the Cape route, always a comparatively safe alternative whilst Ireland and the bulk of Africa form part of the British Empire. In the case of the China Sea, however, there is no other route by which our communications with Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland could be maintained. But, more serious still, is the possibility that the various bases and fuelling stations, which we have already agreed to be essential to the mobility of our Navy, might themselves be rendered untenable by combined air and submarine attack.

It follows, then, that, first and foremost, it should be our policy to prevent all territory that can provide air and submarine bases within effective striking distance of our sea communications, and particularly our naval bases and fuelling stations, from falling into the hands of potential enemies. Such a policy may often be impracticable, and the perfection of all anti-submarine and anti-aircraft devices and their installation at threatened points is, therefore, the second preventive step which must be undertaken. Finally, we must be prepared to conduct land operations against any State within which hostile bases are located while we must be careful to frustrate any attempts by other nations to secure territory in which such bases might be organized.

So far we have alluded entirely to sea communications, for at the present time the bulk of the world's trade is sea-borne, and it is by the sea—and by the sea alone—that the various component parts of the Empire are linked together. Nevertheless, land communications are undoubtedly a valuable adjunct in our defensive organization and their development upon sound strategic lines is a matter of considerable Imperial importance. Road and railway construction, however, is a slow and costly business and we may well find that cross-country mechanical traction will ultimately be more

effective and economic especially in countries where land communications have yet to be developed. Similarly, aircraft at some time in the future may provide a practicable and economic means of transport for general commercial and military purposes, and the air routes of the Empire may one day prove as important as sea routes are to-day. In all such developments our policy must be to watch closely and to encourage scientific progress, but on no account should we allow ourselves to be carried away by enthusiasts or we may easily fall between two stools.

Economic Pressure

Economic pressure may be exerted in various ways. First of all, there is pacific blockade, which may be regarded as a blockade exercised by a great Power for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on a weaker State without actual war, such as the blockade which the League of Nations might institute under Article 16 of the Covenant in order to coerce one of its members. There can be no doubt, however, that it is an act of violence and therefore in the nature of war and any attempt to exercise it against a Power strong enough to resist would inevitably mean the commencement of hostilities. Once war has been declared a blockade is recognized as a legitimate right on the part of a belligerent and under international law neutrals are obliged to submit to it if it is "effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coastline." *

From the above considerations it is apparent that, so long as the British Empire maintains its supremacy at sea, and its communications are secure, it cannot be blockaded. Faced with this situation Napoleon by his famous "Continental System" endeavoured to introduce an organized system of boycott in order to reduce this country to bankruptcy, but the Continent could not do without the commerce, which we, thanks to our sea-power, controlled, and Napoleon's plan broke down. A similar boycott, though very local in effect, is that recently declared by Canton against Hong Kong with the encouragement of Soviet Russia, but it remains to be seen whether the adoption of such a policy against a maritime Power will not in the long run result in the biter being bit.

There is, however, another way in which economic pressure might be brought to bear, namely, by cutting off some particular and vital commodity at its source. For instance the world's supply

* See Article 2 of the rules of blockade, 1909.

of rubber and tin is closely centred round Singapore, and our retention of this key position, which we have already seen to be of vital importance for other reasons, acquires an even added importance. Speaking generally, however, the sources on which the British Empire is able to draw for its essential supplies are so numerous and so diverse that the dangers of this form of blockade are greatly diminished.

Let us take oil, for example, a commodity of ever-increasing importance for which the Empire is almost entirely dependent on foreign sources of supply. The main sources of the world's supply of oil are the United States of America, Mexico, Russia, Rumania, Persia and the Dutch East Indies. It is impossible to imagine a war in which all these sources would be closed to us, and, in the case of oil, it is not so much the question of getting it as of transporting it to where it is required which presents the difficulty. The number of oil tankers available is limited, and it is for this reason that the accumulation of reserves of oil requires careful consideration.

It is impossible within the scope of this article to deal fully with this important subject of economic pressure, but we can at least comfort ourselves with the thought that, granted our supremacy at sea, it is a danger to which our enemies will be far more exposed than we, and it is perhaps from this angle that the subject is most deserving of study.

Bolshevism

The essence of Bolshevism is organized revolution, and, since this can rarely be peacefully accomplished, it normally involves organized civil war. Those at present in power at Moscow are seeking through world-wide revolution a short cut to world-wide dominion. Their first aim is the destruction of the British Empire, their second, the substitution of the control of Moscow for that of Britain.

With troubles in Ireland still fresh in the memory, troubles in India (such as the Moplah rebellion) only a few years old, troubles in South Africa only narrowly averted in 1921, and in Egypt last year, nobody needs reminding of the liability of the Empire to civil disturbances on a scale demanding military intervention nor of the difficulties inherent in the guerilla form of warfare which such intervention entails. What then if these sporadic outbreaks became general and synchronous?

In 1831, Macaulay, speaking in the House of Commons, said,

"I know only of two ways in which society can be governed—by public opinion and by the sword. A government having at its command the armies, the fleets, and the revenues of Great Britain might possibly hold Ireland by the sword, but to govern Great Britain by the sword, so wild a thought has never occurred to any public man of any party." * The same remarks are equally true when applied to the government of the British Empire to-day.

If the weight of public opinion in the Empire is opposed to the Empire's continued existence and prefers the prospect of Moscow dictatorship, then such counsels will prevail and all schemes of Imperial defence will be in vain and indeed superfluous. The need for Imperial defence is conditional on a general desire for the Empire to continue, and, assuming this, its function in regard to internal disorders must be to safeguard the majority from coercion by a rebellious minority and to ensure the observance of constitutional procedure in accordance with those principles of freedom for which the Empire stands. In the face of Bolshevism local defence throughout the Empire has assumed a greatly increased importance, and all the more so when we remember that modern conditions of life have rendered society far more vulnerable to attack, while modern weapons have conferred on the organized revolutionary far greater powers of destruction.

Effect of Weapons as Opposed to Methods of Warfare

So far we have spoken of methods of warfare rather than of weapons—of strategy rather than of tactics. For even the submarine, the aeroplane and the tank should not be regarded as weapons so much as means for the conveyance of weapons, and it is this that gives them their strategic significance.

The most brilliant strategy, however, is of no avail unless it is crowned by tactical success. Tactics are indeed the strategy of the battlefield and, if we lose our battles, it is not easy to win our wars. Weapons, then, which govern tactics, demand our unceasing study. Our aim must be to be better armed than our adversary, and at all costs to avoid his being better armed than we are; to be able, if possible, to spring a surprise on him, but never ourselves to be surprised. This is true whatever the method of warfare may be.

On the other hand, we must remember that the evolution of weapons is slow, and we must be careful not to be led astray by the

* See Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, vol. viii, p. 395.

enthusiast. Thus chemical warfare, which was considerably developed in the last war, is undoubtedly deserving of particular attention to-day, but we must not allow ourselves to become unbalanced by too vivid an imagination.

"It will have taken more than a thousand years for the invention of gunpowder to have transformed war"* points out Colin; chemical warfare may in its turn transform war, but it will take time.

V. CONCLUSION

We have now considered in its general aspects the problem of Imperial defence as it confronts us to-day, and it will be readily seen that the problem is one which subdivides itself into several problems, and each of them into as many more.

Viewed from the standpoint of the fighting Services, the problem may be said to resolve itself into three main parts—the strength and distribution of our permanent forces in peace, the mobilization of our reserves for war and the general organization of the fighting machine as a whole. Let us then, in conclusion, endeavour to propound the main problems which appear to arise under these three heads in the light of what has already been said.

Strength and Distribution of Forces in Peace

(i) *Navy*.—As regards the strength and distribution of our permanent forces in peace, the Navy, as we have already seen, is committed for better or worse to a one-Power standard and a central concentration. For our supremacy at sea, on which so much depends, we must in future rely not on the numerical superiority of our Fleet, but on its superior efficiency and the freedom of action conferred upon it by the Imperial chain of defended ports on which it is based.

(ii) *Army*.—With the Army the situation is more complicated. Its strength in peace has never been based on a one-Power standard or indeed upon any standard which has borne any relation to the army of any likely adversary. Ever since the institution of the Cardwell system in 1873 the strength of our overseas garrisons has been the governing factor in the size of our Army, and, broadly speaking, the policy has been "one unit at Home for every unit abroad." The time has perhaps come for this system to be reconsidered and for the strength and distribution of our Army to be based,

* See Colin's "*Transformations de la guerre*," p. 14.

not indeed on that of any foreign army, but at least on a definite and up-to-date plan of Imperial strategy. Having regard, then, to the importance of our land frontier in the Middle East and its liability to attack, to the importance of Home defence and its inseparable connection with the situation in Europe, and, finally, to the importance of our overseas possessions and their influence on the maintenance of our naval supremacy, it may be found advisable, with the assistance of our Dominions and Colonies, and despite administrative and financial difficulties, to divide our Army into two main self-supporting blocks—the one in the East and the other in the West. The eastern block, centred on India, would have the rôle of maintaining internal order, garrisoning all defended ports east of Suez and resisting external aggression in case of any war in the East. The western block, centred on Great Britain, would have the rôle of maintaining internal order, garrisoning all defended ports west of Suez, and resisting external aggression in case of any war in the West. Assuming the strength of these two blocks to be based on their ability to act as a covering force behind which the Empire's reserves could be safely mobilized, their relative strengths would depend on several factors. Thus the size of the eastern block would depend on our relations with Russia and, to a less extent, with Japan, and on the fact that in the East we must be prepared to stand alone and without an ally. The size of the western block would depend on our relations with Germany and France and on the fact that in the West we can expect to find ourselves in alliance with one or other of these Powers.

(iii) *Air Force*.—The strength and distribution of the Air Force is perhaps an even more debatable matter than that of the Army. Some advocate a one-Power standard whilst others are of opinion that this is as unnecessary as a one-Power standard for the Army would be. Possibly the solution may be that the naval wing, or that part of the Air-Force which operates at sea, should be on a one-Power basis, while that part of the Air Force which operates on land should have its size and distribution determined by the same considerations which we have just suggested as applicable to our peace time Army.

Mobilization of Reserves for War

The question of reserves falls under two headings—reserves of man-power and reserves of material, and the one bears a definite and scientific relation to the other. As regards man-power it is obvious that a great war will call for the mobilization of the whole

resources of the Empire, but it is far from obvious how these resources should be applied. What proportion of our man-power should be allotted to the fighting Services, what proportion to the maintenance of those fighting Services in the theatre of operations, and what proportion to the other essential services of the community? What proportion of the numbers made available for the fighting Services should go to the Navy, what to the Army, and what to the Air Force? And how should these numbers be divided up between the various arms or branches of each Service?

The problem is hardly less difficult when we come to consider reserves of material. What is it we require? Where do we require it? How much must we manufacture or accumulate in time of peace? What sources can we rely upon in the event of war? We shall content ourselves with remarking that as our forces become more mechanized so we shall be forced to devote an ever-increasing proportion of our man-power to the manufacture of machines and the production of the materials required for their manufacture and a correspondingly decreasing proportion to man the machines we make. This leads us on to conclude that the "nation in arms" has ceased to be the outstanding feature of modern war, and that the industrial mobilization of the Empire will in future prove just as important as the mobilization of sailors, soldiers and airmen.

Organization

On what foundation, then, are we to construct the fighting machine as a whole? We would suggest that the two essential elements in any successful organization for war are "surprise" and "simplicity."

Whether we consider the legend of the wooden horse at Troy or the employment of tanks in the last war, whether we consider Miltiades' manoeuvre at the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. or the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, we find that surprise is indeed "the most effective and powerful weapon in war"* and, furthermore, that whether it be surprise of armament or movement, or a combination of the two, it can only be achieved by organization.

To-day any form of surprise, whether in armament or in the field, has been rendered increasingly difficult to obtain owing to the development of the Intelligence Service and of the means at its disposal, and of the Air Force. But this merely serves to emphasize

* See F.S.R., vol. ii, p. 3.

the increased necessity in future for more careful organization. If, therefore, the permanent forces of the Empire are merely in the nature of a covering force behind which the Imperial reserves can be mobilized, it is for consideration whether our main surprise will not have to be realized through the medium of our auxiliary forces and whether the composition and method of employment of these forces does not constitute one of the most important studies with which we are faced.

The need for simplicity in our organization it is hardly necessary to stress. Its achievement is a difficulty which it is hardly possible to exaggerate. In the first place the fighting forces of the Empire are under no central form of control. No single body has the power to order their disposition as a whole, or to prescribe their strength or composition, or to decide what contributions to Imperial defence the various parts of the Empire shall make either in peace or in war. The so-called Chief of the Imperial General Staff has, it is true, certain very limited powers of coordination as regards the land forces of the Empire, but these powers amount to little more than the right to make suggestions. The only agency through which we can hope to establish any real unity of purpose and effort is the Imperial Conference, the meetings of which are not even of annual occurrence. In the second place, the fighting forces of Great Britain are under no central form of control other than that of the Cabinet. There are three distinct fighting Services each controlled by a separate Department of State. The natural result of this independence is that we have to-day a separate naval, a separate military and a separate air strategy, instead of one strategy common to the three Services. The Navy, the Army and the Air Force—each is only too prone to consider its own point of view, whereas each is in fact impotent without the other two. One enthusiast advocates an independent Air Force, another the submarine or the tank, as the only sure means of winning a war, whereas a little reflection cannot surely fail to reveal the essential interdependence of all these products of modern military science. The only existing agency (other than the Cabinet) through which coordination of the frequently conflicting proposals of the three fighting Services can be sought is the Committee of Imperial Defence, a purely advisory body with no executive responsibility and no regular accredited representatives of the Dominions. Are we to expect that the Service representatives on this Committee will speak in unison or even in harmony unless we can evolve a common Service doctrine? And must it not often happen that, confronted with Service discord,

the politician will be obliged to constitute himself his own adviser on the problems of defence ?

Finally, let us consider the fighting Services themselves. Here again we find no real single control. The Navy is controlled by the Lords of the Admiralty, the Army by the Army Council, the Air Force by the Air Council, and each of these three bodies in compiling their annual estimates of expenditure can hardly fail to be influenced by the fact that the Treasury will be bound to regard each on its own merits and not in relation to the requirements of the armed forces as a whole, and to think in terms of the current year rather than in terms of what will be required over a period of years.

But, though it would indeed seem that our whole Imperial organization from top to bottom is the very negation of simplicity, let us not suppose that we can light-heartedly sweep away all this complicated machinery and substitute what happens to be our momentary idea of the ideal. It is only by slow and painful evolution that the ideal can be approached. At the same time we can at least try to ensure that our efforts are pushed in the right direction—in the direction, that is to say, of combination as opposed to separation and self-determination.

Combination must surely be our watchword for the future if the integrity of the Empire is to be preserved against those forces which are ever at work to compass its disruption.

THE OLD BROWN BATTLEFIELDS

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACMUNN, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.,
D.S.O.

"I sometimes think that never grow so red
The Rose as where some buried Cæsar bled."—OMAR.

To be Quartermaster-General of an Army in a time of re-organization after a great war, in conjunction with an economy wave, is no light matter, and it was my happy lot a couple of years ago to escape, after the searching inquiries of Lord Inchcape and his inquisitors, for a tour on the frontier. I am not quite sure whether quartermaster-generals or their equivalents were "before the hills in order stood," but I am quite certain that armies and their needs, organized armies and all that concern them, have been intimate affairs on our Afghan border for many a thousand years.

By every border post that the British Government maintain, stands a mound with a remnant of brick and pottery, the frontier post of the Græco-Bactrian troops, that guarded the same raiding paths and escapes, against the raids of the same hungry highlanders, for the hills ever live on the plains and the plains have the effrontery to resent it. I cannot suppose that Græco-Bactrian armies were the first to protect their farmers, and we know that the earlier armies of Alexander, organized to the last gaiter button, met the equally highly trained armies of King Porus, whose "Q" staff went through the very same agonies of supply then, as now. I know that the Tablets of Tel-el-Amarna show that Hammurabi and his officers sent the identical messages up and down the Euphrates, to expedite the supply boats and to inquire why consignments were deficient, as my "Q" staff were sending for me, on that same river, 4000 years later, for, in fact, "nothing ever changes in the building trade."

My tour first took me to Kohat, the oldest of our border stations, but alas, a horrified and mourning Kohat, for three days earlier an English lady, Mrs. Ellis, had been brutally murdered and her daughter abducted, from the very heart of the station, during the husband's absence on military duty. How the daughter was recovered by Mrs. Starr is now a frontier epic.

Now, it is over seventy years that we have held this border as heirs-at-law to the Sikh Government, and, till two or three years ago, outrages on English ladies were unknown. Murders, cruel and treacherous, of English officers, yes, but of wives and daughters, no. For some years the frontier has deteriorated in the matter of outlawry and outrage, for many reasons, while four years of world war had broken through all rule and tradition. To this came the young Amir's wild thirst for he knew not what, in 1919, with Pan-Islam and Pan-Bolshevism and Pan-Brutism everywhere, and no tribal border could be expected to remain undefiled.

Kohat is still Kohat, with its old Sikh fort and its well-planted station, but very different since I saw it in the days of the legions marching to Tirah in '97. It is now surrounded with barbed wire and electric lights. A small paradise within an inferno, for why should the British after seventy odd years be living as if among the Somali lions? And the answer is, "No man knows, but, yet it is so!" Murder and outrage remain because the vanity of the Pathan sees glory in a scalp, and more glory as the years roll on. Perhaps, too, the salt has lost its savour.

Some there be who say that bombing from aeroplanes is the cause of outrage against women, that we have abandoned our policy of non-molesting tribal women and children by our bombing of villages and *kirris*. It may be so, though our bombing is but a return for raid and murder to which the difficulty of bringing security to our citizens by other means has driven us.

It is true that aeroplanes are not a civilized way of convincing mountaineers that raids don't pay, but . . . *quoi faire?* Here is a story in point from the Euphrates. An Arab sheikh came to interview the political officer of the district. After the usual salutations he sat himself down, and smoked the proffered cigarette. Then a remark about the weather and crops, and then silence. Then suddenly—

"They've been bombing down my way."

"Oh," said the political officer.

"Rather rough, I call it," said the Sheikh, "considering all I've done for the Government."

"I hope they did not do much damage," said the political officer soothingly.

"No," said the Sheikh, "no," and he stroked his beard, "nothing to speak of, they only killed a cow, and a wife I hated."

And the whole ethics of the question are perhaps contained in that story. So much for women; men are a different story. A

couple of years ago I was in this same Kohat, and looked into the tiny little church built for the very few European officers that officered the old frontier force. A new chaplain was in the church, arrived that day from Madras, for duty with frontier troops, and together we walked round and studied the tablets. All were to the memory of officers killed on the border, some in action but quite half by murder and outrage, and the clerical hair stood on end at the tale of sudden death, where outside, the mall gleamed with the beautiful *Bohemia variegata* that General Birdwood had planted, in days gone by.

Kohat used to be the favourite station of that Punjab Irregular Force which afterwards became the Punjab Frontier Force. Then after years of guarding the frontier, of raid and counter-raid, and a fame that could only be matched by the now forgotten story of the Cape Mounted Rifles, it was merged by Lord Kitchener, for weal or for woe, with the great Indian Line. Despite this merging, it retains its character, and its ways of ready soldiering, and "Piffs" as much as ever, if you stroke it the wrong way. But though merged in the Line, it gravitates to the border, and two of the old regiments were in Kohat, and in the same unreformed mudlines of generations ago, with the same old grouse.

The question constantly arises, as to whether or no Lord Kitchener's policy, in bringing these units into the Line, was right or wrong. Certainly in old days they knew the Border and its ways inside out, and their small parties were never caught napping. New units from India are far less satisfactory for all the local work. You have to be a long time on the frontier to realize that the quieter things seem, the more mischief is brewing. Regular soldiers, at any rate in our Army, will not believe in an enemy's existence unless he is almost daily in evidence. No doubt this feeling is the same in all armies. Where no oxen are, the crib is clean, and the bottom of a light-house is very dark. On the other hand, Lord Kitchener felt that the Army, as a whole, was not getting the experience it wanted for war, while a valuable portion thereof was not in touch with the training and spirit of the Line. Then, further, the rising generation of officers in the frontier regiments—or perhaps their wives—were weary of perpetual frontier life, now that the rest of India lived on a railway line. They also bitterly complained that, when there was a big war on the frontier, the Line came through them, to glory, and they were left on the Marches. Which was, of course, their job, it being the recognized business of the Line to come through the light troops and do the heavy fighting.

Whichever view is right, it is hard to go back on a course once changed, and it is probable that the real error of vision took place when the Punjab Irregular Force was removed long years ago from the complete control of the Civil Government. But that again is so mixed up with the history of the past and changing policies, that there is no new meat in it. The old Frontier Force with its specialized frontier ways, and all its methods of life, tuned and graded to suit its conditions, has gone. Yet the units of the former Force retain their reputation within the Line for prompt efficiency, and all the soldierly virtues. The Civil Government has made many attempts to replace the Irregular Force with Militia, armed constabulary, and the like, but in these days when many of our own rifles and all the derelict weapons of Russia and Turkey, with ammunition for the asking, are in tribal hands, irregular troops may easily find themselves overwhelmed, and a police counter-raid converted into a campaign. So you may still argue the subject backwards and forwards, in any mess along the Border, and in the Border rest-houses, some old bound volumes of "Blackwood" will tell you how they did in the days of Nicholson, and Neville Chamberlain, and Keyes, and Edwardes. It is doubtful if we are much "farrer" since then, which can only mean that no one has yet solved the problem. Highlanders are always hungry, for the hills breed many, but feed few, and as Falstaff said at Gads-hill, "Young men must live, and gorbellied knaves with fat purses are fair game," from the Great Wall round all the way to Connemara.

If you sit late in a frontier mess, some gentleman with a large cigar will talk late into the night of tribal allowances, which he will call "Danegelt," and Danegelt it is in a manner of speaking, but Danegelt with some hammered steel behind it. Tribal allowances serve several different purposes. They are partly paid for services rendered to keep open a trade route, rather than exact a time-honoured custom of caravan squeeze—a tribute as old as the world in the annals of those who inhabit the vicinity of defiles and hold them in strength. They are partly paid to cover the expense of maintaining order. They are partly paid to make a chief strong enough to be effective. They are largely paid to make a credit against which authority can operate. When the boy is naughty he does not get his pocket-money. Where every offence has a recognized cash value, penalties are easily deducted from allowances. But, of course, occasionally pusillanimous policy may over-pay. So there is evidently subject for an eternal controversy on the allowance question, as Henry Lawrence told Lord Dalhousie, remembering the Black Watch story,

since, as Charles Kingsley said, "a poacher is but a keeper with his jacket turned inside out."

In the 'eighties another frontier force had sprung up, evolving on the tradition of General John Jacob, comprising the Baluch regiments, the Scinde Horse and the Bombay Mountain Batteries, of which one had come from the old Jacobabad Mountain Train. The occupation of Baluchistan just before the Second Afghan War, and the expansion into, and pacification of, Zhob, produced another tribal frontier under another local Government. Ideas developed differently, the terrain was different, the organization of the clans was more patriarchal as compared with the fierce democracy of Tirah and Waziristan. Discussion will still wax hot round the dinner table and keep you far into the night, on the merits of the Sandeman system, the close border, Mr. Bruce's *maliks*, and the things that happened ere Mr. Merk received the distinction of a coat of arms at the hands of frontier wags.

So much for the story of what strategically is the curtain, and the troops that used to maintain it. The great sally-ways by Khojak and Khyber have always been, and must always be, held and manned by the Line, whoever keeps order on the curtain.

Then out from mourning Kohat next day I drove on the old trail, not as of yore in a *tonga* with a wisp of lighted straw under ponies' bellies to make them start, but in a motor car on a reasonable road.

It was not by the great west road to Kurram past the high Samana wall and its line of forts, where Dargai looms atop the Chagru Kotal, as it hung when the Gordons and 3rd Sikhs stormed it and the 2nd Gurkhas mingled in the rush, but by the old frontier road to Bannu, which men have tried to call "Edwardesabad."

As the road breasts a pass, and the engine boils at a lonely spot, the driver remarks that it is a bad place to stop at, for here, bad men are apt to loot strangers and traders. Now, my *tonga* driver made the same remark thirty years ago, and no doubt some say the same on Bagshot Heath to this day.

Coming down the road, we meet a *naik's* party of the 53rd Sikhs, smart and clean as ever. It is a test to look clean, away from cantonments, on a frontier road with only a lance-jack to keep you in order. This party came along like a colour party in Birdcage Walk. Years ago the 3rd Sikhs were called the "Frontier Guards" for their smart ways, and they and the 2nd P.I. vied with each other in such. Some there were who prided themselves on the ways of a Californian ranch, but all the world over, turnout, especially when away from the eye of authority, stands as the outward and visible sign of inward

and spiritual discipline and a high-pitched training. It will be remembered how those who understood the psychology of the soldier pressed this during the war in rest billets behind the line. I remember seeing the Black Watch regimental guard mount under the adjutant, in the wet, heavy mud of the Tigris flats, and marvelled. Of such are old armies made.

Then we pass strings of the huge shaggy Bactrian camels and their Ghilzai owners returning to their summer grazing haunts, on the plains of Ghuzni, laden with their bales from Calcutta, chiefly Angora frock coats for the "quality" in Afghanistan. Saucy Ghilzai girls bestride them, in lacquered *khajawahs*, while old ladies run behind, for it is a hard world for women up on the Ghilzai plains when looks are gone. Nothing new here, the same *kafila* * of the same sept and clan has probably passed this way on this very date for many a generation. The ways of a migratory people are as persistent as those of the swallow.

Some day perhaps the goods will go to Kabul and Kandahar by rail, and the clans will carry them from a new railhead. Happily, for their means of livelihood, the motor lorry will not easily reach the hill folk for whom they cater.

Coming near Bannu, that oasis where only man is vile, relieves the eye after the bare hills of the passes—poplar and mulberry in the glory of their early green, the avenues of *Shisham* (*Dalbergia Sissu*), seas of wheat in the fields, irrigated by the waters of the Kurram river, through the myriad channels that all the hill tribes so well know how to dig. In spring and autumn it is a paradise in which the inhabitants, by the universal consent of all who have had dealings with them are, or were, the vilest of the vile. Whether that is a fair description of them for all time is to be doubted, and a reflection on the educative powers of our administration, which the officials concerned may be inclined to refute. But, as man cannot get away from his shadow, so he cannot get away from his past.

It would seem that wave after wave of invasion of all the northern races—for the Tochi and Bannu were one of the routes through which those floods of invaders entered, have poured into India and deposited their flotsam here. The worthlessness of the camp followers of the middle ages in Europe was proverbial, and we may be sure that those of the East were no better. This fertile valley, reached after miles of rough and starving roads, must have been one of the halting-places where accumulated every trader, courtesan and pander, and with them the malingerers of generations who

* Camel.

preyed on the armies. The original tribe, if ever an original tribe could have existed in such a locality, must have been mingled with every worthless stream that the hordes had exuded. It would take many *lustra* of high endeavour to improve such a *mélange*.

In the days of the Sikhs, Bannu was one of their outlying provinces farmed when possible to factors, paying as little of its fat revenue as it dare, and only paying in full to a Sikh force when it crossed the Indus at Kalabagh once every few years. It was here that Herbert Edwardes and Nicholson first brought notions of right and wrong, and peace and order, and a fair cess regularly paid.

How old the story is, it is impossible to gauge. At Akra, a desolate mound close to Bannu, was a flourishing Græco-Bactrian settlement, supplying, to this day, a steady yield of coin after every rain-storm—*Basileus Eucratides* and many another, with pieces of Ghandara carving, and all the usual potteries of such localities. "*Jam seges est ubi Troja fuit.*" As the Sikhs and the British, so the Græco-Bactrians kept a garrison lest the Hills should rob the Valley beyond endurance. Between Bannu and the Indus the Kurram cuts its way through a low range of hills, at the Tangdarra (lit. Narrow Door), and commanding one of the debouchments, stands the vast stone fortress, the Kaffir Kot of Rajah Til, whose name is but a legend, with nothing to it but a dancing girl *tag* as fortress betrayer, but who must have been one of the rulers of the then powerful Northern Hindu Kingdoms of the early Christian era, which fell before Mahmud of Ghuzni. And, no doubt Rajah Til and his forebears also dominated the valley of Bannu.

Through the long green avenues, passed beggars and pedlars and a leper—the broken cowrie of many markets—our car rattled into Bannu fort, to breakfast with the brigadier and his lady, ere swinging out over the old border.

A good breakfast done, we start again by the Tochi road, which since the Afghan War of 1919 has been made into a good motor road, away up to the old Militia headquarters at Dattakhel, which were abandoned by us under the Afghan pressure, a sad measure, but who could keep outposts when half India might be turning? Then past a new aerodrome and garage, over the administrative border, and up into the Wazir hills. Away on the right half, set back towards India, lie Gumati towers where Tonachy and "Blanco" White of the 3rd Sikhs lost their lives arguing the point with the Kabul Khel Wazirs, who were holding a tower as cornered rats will. Whereby two thousand pounds of education fell to a ten rupee Jezail

or probably a Martini-Henry, and the Indian Army and its Frontier Force lost two soldiers of the type that money cannot buy.

Along the valley are the Militia posts on every head and crag, so that the trader and the traveller may have a fair chance for their skins and avoid the pitfall of the stranger. Ten miles along we overtake a party of the new Militia, reconstituted on the cadre of the old. And here again we strike a controversy. The Northern and Southern Waziristan Militias were instituted as part of Lord Curzon's frontier policy, a policy that was even as the policy of the Black Watch in its first conception. Set a thief to catch a thief, employ hearty lads who would otherwise rob you for a living, and encourage a people who most of the year want peace and order to maintain it for themselves.

For some years this policy kept the border quiet and fairly cheap with some success. Then came the trial of trials. The great breakdown of world civilization had disturbed all Central Asia and reper-cussed on the border. The good Amir had held to his trust for all he was worth. Wise in his generation, mindful of his obligation and the "badge of peace and the bond of friendship" with which Lord Kitchener and Sir Henry MacMahon had invested him, he had kept peace on the border. But rumour and lashings of arms and ammunition that floated through the world at will were trying the tribes sore. The Amir Habibullah died, and Aman Ulla reigned in his stead. The "Beloved of God" gave place to the "Peace of God," to translate the beautiful names of Islam. Some devil's wind blew. The Amir beat the drum ecclesiastic, and launched his forces on India.

Such a thing had not been seen for a hundred and fifty years, and the call was too much for the tribes. All knew how generations earlier, any Afghan might hack his way to power and place in Hindustan. The Militias partly failed. When a people go, the troops they furnish go. At least so it would seem, for the Militias went, some more, some less, and are now taking up a modified rôle under a new name. It has pleased us to call them "Scouts." And it was our good fortune to pass a body of the Tochi Scouts fully clothed in the khaki of Britain, and accoutred with all modern panoply. And after the manner of the border, a *dole* and *turnai* were playing at their head, in other words a tabor and a pipe. And the air they were playing was that well-known frontier lilt, "Zakhmi Dil," or "The Wounded Heart," whose words are distinctly *Na Munassib*,* but which is a soldier's tune, as set by the

* No need to translate this.

British bandmasters, who, tradition says, brought it from Kabul eighty years ago.

The officer at the head was an Afridi, and delighted to pass the time of day, while we apologized for dusting the soldiery, which is good army manners, and may sweeten the dust.

The Tochi road runs past the military garrison of Saidgi and the larger station of Idak, here and there opening to wide cultivated spaces. Six miles above Idak we break away into the great new road that sappers and miners were hastily making to the Ruzmuk plateau, which is thirty-six miles as the road winds. All the way from Bannu, lorry convoys have been passing us, taking up military supplies and engineer stores, but now we meet steam-rollers with the White Horse of Hanover where their waist-belts should be, and pioneers and labourers at work, and the telegraph posts being repaired, and "Khassadar" towers being erected.

And here you may say, "What's a Khassadar," and the answer is, "He is an old border friend with a new name, otherwise a 'Catchie.'" But again the uninitiated ask, "What is a Catchie?"—and the answer is that "Catchie" is but short for "Catch 'em alive, oh!" and "Catch 'em alive, oh!" is the old frontier name for a tribal levies-man, who is found as a sort of special constable, by tribal chiefs, for a financial consideration. Their appellation refers more to the methods of their toilet than to the fashion of the capture of misdemeanants.

On this new road of pacification, while troops, as few as possible, hold the main points, the protection of the road to wayfarers is to be entrusted to Catchies, or, rather, Khassadars, and these gentlemen are perched on the high points above the road, and also patrol it. But as the road runs through tribal territory, every other warfarer is armed. Since peace is apparent in the land, men with arms are not molested as enemies, and yet, the Khassadars, who are dressed as their neighbours, are hard to distinguish from those who may at any moment commit an assault under arms. The Khassadar should wear a distinguished headband, but, as his friends and neighbours could not then resist the temptation of shooting at him, he keeps it in his pocket. The possibilities of the situation will be patent to those who have experienced it.

The road winds on, approaching completion, and finally reaches Razani, an upland enclosed flat, amid hills of stiff holly scrub, which means that the piquets round must be strong and well protected. Here we find the old frontier perimeter camp, that has ever been considered essential, since the tribes at Wana flung themselves on

and careered, sword in hand, through General Turner's camp in 1894. Turner's camp was a normal one, arranged for convenience, protection being given by the piquets. But when fanatics attack at dawn, determined to die, and only caring to see the rising sun first, it is more than piquets that can stop them. It needs steady volleys of cripple-stopping bullets.

Razani is one of the main military posts on the road, garrisoned largely by Gurkha units, and the usual tight-packed mule lines, the terraced hollow where the camels gurgle and bubble o' nights, and the stabbing camel smell annoys all within scent. There is a bazaar of duly accredited traders, who cater luxuries and etceteras for the Indian ranks.

From Razani there is a sharp rise up which the new road climbs by way of hairpin bends, while foot and pack travellers march by the mule path and the camel way in the gorge. The top of the Narai is well over seven thousand feet, and from thence a *maidan*, a rolling open plain, runs away to Ruzmuk itself, and protection is a simple matter. Camel convoys, details coming down for leave, sick being evacuated, thronged the road, with cavalry patrols on flanks, in a simpler way than usually possible.

A company of British troops tramped by, comfortable enough, in "shorts," and shirt sleeves, and open necks, innovations that have robbed hot-weather soldiering of half its terrors. It is interesting to see the Indian soldiery in shorts, and to remember that, in the days of Lake, the whole of the Indian Infantry wore white shorts, herring-boned at the edges with the colour of the regimental facings, and a scarlet cut-away jacket atop, which brings one back to the wise thesis that perhaps grandfather did know quite a lot about soldiering.

The company marches springily enough, thanks to Swedish drill, but the day is hot, and the pass is steep, and the soldiery perspire freely, reminiscent of the old memory of the Long Valley. "Dear me, Lord Palmerston, what a very strange odour! What is it?" "That, Your Majesty, is '*Esprit de corps*,'" said the War Minister. And the company passed away whistling.

Ruzmuk Camp itself was not long a-coming, for one could canter freely with a cavalry escort. A fine perimeter camp laid out on new clean ground, everything in order, as a new pin, with ample field of fire, and devil a chance at all for lads of spirit to rush it.

Facing in the direction of Makin are, marvel of marvels, two six-inch howitzers, brought up from the Derajat by heavy horses, to play the merry game of counter-snipe. When merry lads snipe a camp "for the Glory of God and His Prophet," there is some satis-

faction in answering to the farmstead tower of the responsible chief who should keep his lads in order. But—"answer a fool according to his folly"—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a lyddite shell for a wanton '303. Well may the Moslem inveigh against the law of usury.

Away above and on your right, the whole way is one of the great peaks of Waziristan, Shuidar, eleven thousand feet and more, with a sprinkle of pines on its slopes, and probably cedar and firs on its northern sides, for where the eastern sun strikes least and the moisture stays, there will the trees be gathered together, all the Himalaya along. The Suleiman mountains of the frontier are but off-shoots of the Himalaya. The cedar, the pine, the fir and the box are found always together in the Himalaya, grouped as the prophet Isaiah groups them, with that inherent accuracy of the Old Testament. The cedar, the pine, the fir, and the box, *Cedrus Deodaris* first-cousin to *Cedrus Lebani*, *Pinus Excelsa* and *Longifolia*, *Picea Morinda*, *Abies Woodrow* and *Webbiana*, and *Taxus Baccata*. It is noteworthy that Isaiah should group them so rightly, but the men of old were keen observers and there is hardly a recorded fact of nature in the volume of the Sacred Law that is not as truthful as the notes of the latest scientists. Round the Plateau of Ruzmuk the trees are chiefly the holly-oak, growing to the size and shape of a park holly, and little more.

Away beyond the camp at Ruzmuk, which dominates the highlands, the road will wander round to the frontier of the Derejat and the Gomal, by way of Tauda China, Kotkai, Jandola and Khirgi, to be eventually a highway, that shall help trade and civilization, and effectually "lift the *pardah*" of the recalcitrant.

But to come that way takes more time than is to spare, and so we turn our backs on Ruzmuk and Shuidar, and canter back to Narai, in time to catch the convoy escort, and return to Razani, and thence back again to Bannu, and down to the Indus at Kalabagh, by that abomination of a man in a hurry, a 2 ft. 6 in. railway. There, two large paddle boats from the Tigris, which maintained the Army in Baghdad, are finishing their days as a troop and train ferry, taking the 2 ft. 6 in. trucks over to the broad gauge at Mari Indus, on the Sind Sagar line.

Above the Kalabagh village, the Indus emerges from the great gorges it has re-entered at Attock, and slowly broadens to the great wide bed it then pursues for many hundred miles, till it strikes the rocky country again, far south by Sakkar Bakkar, that ancient Mohammedan stronghold.

With the return to the broad-gauge line, and the passage to the left bank of the Indus, my frontier jaunt ended, but one thing had struck me, and that is, that rulers come and go and *Jezails* change to Martini-Henry, and '303, the frontier still is the frontier, and the hand must keep the head more than ever. Further, that you want to know your way about more than ever, but that progress and education are bearing fruit, and are not entirely "jewels of gold in a swine's snout." The situation, in spite of all the trouble, has broadened, and border people are demanding more civilization, and more advantages, and the trans-border tribes are slowly imbibing the same instinct. "Belike they will make thee a *resaldar*, when I am hanged at Peshawar," is the spirit of some of the *maliks*. For the young officer, "the flying bullet down the pass" is as good a schoolmaster as ever.

THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

BY MAJOR G. M. ROUTH, C.B.E., D.S.O., R.A., INDIAN
ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS

"ROUSSEAU'S" article in the *Journal* of the R.U.S.I., November, 1925, is the first the present writer has seen in military literature dealing with this important subject. It must be regarded as a link in the chain of efficiency just as much as other preparation, and certain lessons of the war hitherto unrecorded may have their value.

"Rousseau" discusses the subject as a whole. There would, however, appear to be three distinct problems for the consideration of the Committee of Imperial Defence : (a) information on Empire resources, liaison with industry, and the organization of means of expansion in any emergency ; (b) details of economic conditions in foreign countries ; and (c) a working knowledge of the industries and resources of any portion of the world where the British Army may be called upon to fight, the collation of information to assist in increasing those resources and the ear-marking of men and plant for this purpose.

"Rousseau" deals mainly with (b). The writer's experience covers generally the Hinterland of the Indian Ocean mainly in respect of (c) including such places as Madagascar, Uganda, Kabul, Manila, Borneo, Saigon and China.

"Rousseau" makes certain points which might be emphasized. He comments on the conservative methods of military thought, and asks what inducement there is for a soldier "to study, analyze and tabulate such dull and seemingly unmilitary data as the organization of industry." (A possible answer to this is the plea for promotion by merit appearing in the same number.) He notes that delay in assimilating the improvements of science is paid for in blood and treasure in war, and that, as a matter of history, Britain traditionally relies on the bravery of her troops and her powers of improvisation. It is hard to avoid an unworthy suspicion that no inconsiderable section in our Army still regards science and industrialism as bad form, a regrettable lapse from clean fighting.

He brings out that poring over files and statistics has not the glamour of secret service work, although it is being recognized that wars tend to turn more and more on the economic conditions. There is, in fact, little doubt that history will record the surprising extent to which the economic blockade contributed to the Teutonic débacle in 1918.

The armies of old marched on their stomachs. Not till 1914 was it realized that the armies of to-day march on their factories, and depend as much on their communications behind the base as they do on those in front of it. Military writers on such subjects before the war, Henderson, May, Macdonnell, Vaughan Cornish, Fitzgerald Lee, Callwell and Repington, may be searched in vain for discussions on the industrial aspects of war—and yet the break-up of the South in 1864 was largely economic. But whole nations in those days were not mobilized, nor was supply so wholesale that it proved beyond the scope of some central national authority which had merely to place orders of a size not then likely to dislocate the industry concerned—and yet here again, one wonders why lessons were not drawn from the Crimean breakdown in 1855.

Another cause of neglect of the subject may be traced to human nature as influenced by our military organization. Economics would be "Q." Tactics is "G." For various reasons the best brains make for "G," which offers the best rewards and has its especial glamour. It might happen that undue acquaintance with commercial methods might spell indispensability in "Q," and consequently curtailed chances of preferment. This obstacle to the obtaining of the best men is very fundamental, nor will the change come about till the nation has paid once more the full price of experience.

(a) *Information on Empire resources, liaison with industry and the organization of means of expansion in any emergency.*—The writer believes that in Great Britain provisional measures of a comprehensive nature have been adopted for gathering information respecting and for the organization of national industry. The Dominions, aware of the movement at home, will presumably follow suit. Germany, France and Italy may be presumed by now, if the various signs are interpreted correctly, to have done the same. India, usually a stage behind, is here well in front. An influential Industrial Commission which sat from 1916–1918 has broken the ice with a striking Report,* the following extracts from which are instructive: "The deficiencies in India's industrial system are such as to render

* "Dpt. of Govt. Printing," Calcutta.

her liable to foreign penetration in peace and to serious dangers in war," and "Government must be provided with suitable industrial equipment. . . . The extraordinary extent to which the country, with its great industrial possibilities and requirements is dependent upon outside sources of supply for the raw materials and manufactured articles necessary in the daily life of a modern civilized community. . . . It is thus a most important duty of the Government of India to provide the machinery required to ensure the uniform development that alone will make the country self-contained, both economically and for purposes of defence."

As a result of this Commission's inquiry an Indian Stores Department was formed in 1922, and two years later the post of Master-General of Supply was created. A rational liaison between the Army and Trade has thus been brought into existence, and the nucleus of a Ministry of Munitions in time of war. The Indian Government has been the first to appreciate the need for a Lieut.-General to produce the industrial wants of the Army. The duties of this Master-General of Supply are laid down in the "Industrial Handbook,"* as follows: "(1) Local purchases for the Army and civilians of what is available. (2) Diversion of home orders to local manufacturers. (3) Assisting any one by money, experts, plant, or labour to start new industries or develop old ones. (4) Dissemination of information, advice and encouragement direct and indirect." These include "(i) Technical advice. (ii) Demonstration of processes and possibilities. (iii) Financial assistance." It is also made clear that the collection, careful analysis and judicious distribution of commercial and industrial intelligence is a necessary feature of Government policy both in peace and war. The Commission considered that this intelligence should be prepared by experts as a result of research on the spot and that it should be coordinated through a responsible head.

It is clear that India has covered much of the early spade work and that her experience will be useful for the Dominions, as also will a study of the remarkable way in which Von Lettow mobilized the resources of German East Africa, 1914-1917, when cut off from Germany.†

(b) *Details of economic conditions in foreign countries.*—The acquisition of information with regard to foreign countries constitutes rather a different problem. Such information should appear in the War Office confidential report on any country, and it

* "Dpt. of Govt. Printing," Calcutta, 1921.

† See "General Smuts' Campaign in East Africa," by General Crowe, p. 31.

does so appear, but not in any useful form. The mere fact that coal mines with a certain output exist in Lorraine or that dye factories in the Ruhr employ a certain number of men, is of little value in itself to an enemy. The compilers of these reports are not trained to commercial life and to them such information must appear redundant. "Rousseau" advocates a Department of Economic Intelligence to collect and to collate information, but it is a question whether a full-blown department is not asking more than the nation will see its way to finance, and there is already in existence the London School of Economics in Kingsway which prepares business men and conducts research in exactly the activities mentioned. There are Chairs of Descriptive Economics, Statistics, Commerce, Geography and Commerce. The last, covering foreign trade, raw materials and economic geography, might well advise and assist, or even become the nucleus of, any body formed to review such matters in view of war. This School has access to the Board of Trade archives, and it would seem that the addition of three selected officers with a budget to cover secret service money, inquiries and a suitable staff, could produce in time a mine of information which would save millions, release men for the firing line, and render forces more mobile and less tied to a distant base.

The subjects included in (b) may naturally be subdivided under two heads, viz. : (i) information which would be required in the event of the occupation of a country either belonging to an enemy or to an ally, and (ii) vulnerability. The preparations required in the first of these two cases is not particularly urgent in time of peace. If we were in a friendly country our allies would help us, if need be, to man their factories gradually. The occupation of an enemy's country would take time, and the spade work in restoring demolished industries would give time to produce the men and machines required for successful outturn. Nor does (ii) vulnerability require very deep research. A single slab of dynamite laid even by a comparative amateur might wreck one of the most vital portions of the Niagara power-station. A little timely inquiry and investigation must obviously give value out of all proportion to its cost—indeed, the Army cannot afford to neglect such a cheap insurance.

(c) *A working knowledge of the industries and resources of any portion of the world where the British Army may be called upon to fight, the collation of information to assist in increasing those resources, and the ear-marking of men and plant for this purpose.*—The writer's experience as an ordnance officer in matters under this heading has been gained in various theatres of war. In East Africa, 1914-1915.

and in North Persia, 1918, he learned from hard experience as the officer directly responsible, how greatly the lack of industrial intelligence collected in peace delayed operations in war, and how many millions were needlessly lost to the nation.

Before, however, dwelling on the lessons of the past, a hypothetical proposition of the future may more effectively illustrate the argument. Suppose, for instance, that Japan, having mobilized China in a world war of Yellow Races *v.* the Anglo-Saxons, should seek bases, oil and tropical raw materials in the Dutch Archipelago. Great Britain, being unable to permit an enemy to operate in those waters, so valuable both economically and strategically, might land a force of two divisions in Borneo, with a mobile flotilla in Sandakan Harbour to transport it to the threatened point, supported and supplied from Singapore. This force would have to guard the oil fields at Miri in Sarawak and Pakokko on the (Dutch) east coast. Under existing arrangements all requirements for the troops, except the provision of rice, would have to be imported, mainly from England, in British ships with British crews, carrying articles either imported into England or produced there by men who should be in the firing line.

In 1918, with England in undisputed command of the sea, tramp steamers even in convoys with strong escorts had at least hazardous passages. In 1928, opposed to an adventurous enemy with a neighbouring sea base and revolutionary improvements in air and submarine arms, the supply ship would have to face an extremely hazardous situation. The centre of gravity of the British Empire has shifted since 1918 east of Suez, but not so yet our means of offence and defence. In the eventuality, therefore, which the writer has suggested, it is clear that the transport even of absolute essentials which can only be imported from Great Britain or India would strain transport arrangements to the utmost, and it is obvious that every effort would be needed to provide what was possible on the spot. Among the essentials which would have to be imported for the two divisions would be guns, ammunition, electric plant, agricultural machinery, motor vehicles, machine tools, instruments, lamps, boots, equipment and so on.

A glance at the present exports and resources of Borneo may guide us in gauging the scale on which local production could be organized. They include timber, especially hard woods, shells, rattan, gutta-percha, dammar, camphor, vegetable oils and fats, tanning bark (cutch), edible birds' nests, sharks' fins, bees-wax, tin, gold, iron, some coal, rubber, rice, sisal, Manila hemp, Kapok,

sago, cattle, hides, cocoanuts, etc. It would appear from this list that the Force should at least be able to provide itself with foodstuffs locally and wheat could be brought from Burmah, with which object in view it would be desirable to connect up the Burmah rail system from Tavoi to the Bangkok-Singapore line. But, in addition to food, much of the remaining upkeep tonnage, probably 75 per cent. of the bulk, and half the odd 70,000 items used by a modern army, and, in the British Empire, mainly supplied by Ordnance, could be produced in Borneo.*

Reverting to the usable products of Borneo in detail, rope or yarn of any variety is obviously procurable from the hemp, sisal, coconut or rattan. A rope factory may be needed entailing one or two cheap machines, possibly a dynamo to operate by water-power, and one rope worker. But the type of machines, the man and possibly the site must be decided in time of peace, either by some one on the spot who has knowledge of the trade, or by some one sent out from England. As the hides and the cutch are locally procurable, a tanner and currier could produce leather at a nominal cost, whilst leather workers from India could prepare or repair leather equipment and harness, using the old ironwork. But here again, the organizing of a leather trade after a war has begun would present great difficulties—difficulties which might be reduced to a minimum if everything had been thought out beforehand. Cotton and wool articles are not producible in Borneo, but a supply of such goods might be procured either from India or Australia, the main point being to avoid having to obtain them from England. These textiles are among the most important and bulky commodities for which allowance has to be made.

Saw-mills for timber already exist in the island, but plans for their extension must be gone into, as well as arrangement for obtaining extra machinery for turning out huts, carts and furniture. Paint, varnish and tar can be extracted and prepared from pine woods without any very elaborate plant. Bricks and tiles, and possibly cement if suitable stone exists, are not a difficult problem. Soap can be prepared from the palm oil. The alkali, for making soap, caustic soda, may be obtained by mixing and straining lime water and soda. The soda in its turn may be got by placing the

* In India 87 per cent. of the bulk of ordnance stores is already obtained in the country, and in war, allowing for the fact that some of these are made from imported material, it is probable that by a system of adapting less efficient local substitutes, 90 per cent. of the entire bulk would become obtainable. There are certain articles used by the Indian Army which are more cheaply and satisfactorily imported in time of peace, where in war other factors would operate to justify manufacture in India.

ash of burnt seaweed in water and evaporating the solution. The cocoanuts have other uses besides soap. The leaves are used for hutting and roofing, for making brooms, baskets and umbrellas, and for burning as manure. The shells are the fuel of the coast. The nuts are eaten, the oil is used for lighting and cooking and the trunks are employed in building or used as water pipes. Rubber can be vulcanized and prepared as in Europe, or it can be used as Von Lettow used it in East Africa, by sprinkling the raw smoked juice on wheels to produce the effect of a pneumatic tyre.

These products could be multiplied almost indefinitely, but enough has been said to emphasize the importance of some pre-conceived plan by means of which a very minor immediate insurance may save millions in blood and treasure in the future, or even turn the scale between failure and success.

Harking back to the experience of the Great War, a British Force amounting in September, 1918, to nearly a division, was in occupation of North Persia. This force, under the command of General Dunsterville, was originally intended to mobilize the Georgians, and later to prevent the spread of German influence to the Indian Borderland. The force was connected with Baghdad by rail (70 miles) to Ruz and then by motor road, liable to be snowed up from October to March, 430 miles to Qazwin. Apart from the cost of the upkeep of the motor road for heavy lorries, M.T.H.Q. calculated that road transport alone cost £150 sterling per ton. Had there had to be pack transport by mule, donkey or camel as on the East Persian cordon to Meshed, or as actually happened later in North Persia, the cost would have been much greater. Further, the supply of motor transport for "Dunsterforce" crippled the initiative of General Marshall's Army, which was unable to undertake a projected expedition to Kirkuk. Transport was the key to the problem, and it would have been better solved by careful inquiry as to the best way of obtaining supplies than by multiplying axles. Much was done in regard to foodstuffs and firewood, but in so far as the 200 tons a month of Ordnance stores were concerned, definite proposals to secure 75 per cent. by purchase or adaptation of local stores were rejected at the time on minor technicalities.

Clearly old-world States like Persia must have evolved a system of clothing and daily necessities suited to the climate, and many of these should have been adaptable for British troops on the spot.

Take leather for instance—Hamadan (Alexander's Ecbatana) has supplied Asia with leather for some fifty centuries, and the ancient pits are still working. By employing at these an English

currier and tanner, the writer was able by minor modifications of the existing process to produce a tanned leather comparable with the products of the modern Cawnpore tanneries, and good enough for all ordinary equipment. The faults in the native process of tanning were speedily overcome. With a little forethought the existing tanning pits could have been adapted to produce leather, not only for "Dunsterforce," but for the 340,000 troops (ration strength) in Mesopotamia, at a time when shipping was very vital indeed.

The same applies to wool. "Dunsterforce" wanted round about 30,000 blankets, socks, puttees and jerseys. Also cardigans, sheepskins, comforters, rugs for animals, greatcoats, etc. There was a world shortage of wool, and Britain had purchased the entire Australian clip. Yet although all these items could be manufactured sufficiently near to our specifications in Persia at pre-war rates in London, all were actually imported. It cannot be urged that the collection of information regarding what could have been done locally presented serious difficulties, for sufficient details were actually acquired within three months, May to July, 1918, under the full pressure of campaigning. It was found that the above requirements could have been produced in two months, that women would knit soles or heels on to old socks at one penny each, as a famine relief measure. The existing stocking looms employed imported spun yarn, so that to use the local hand-spun yarn it would have been desirable to earmark a type of loom already manufactured by Harrison & Co., Manchester, and intended for this purpose. These facts will show that a pre-war study of Persian wool would have resulted in very considerable savings to the Empire in British labour and transport.

The same facts apply to cotton (local longstaple for tents, etc.), timber (giant oak of Mazenderan), linseed, castor and olive oil, sacks, stoves, boots (*givehs*), mule trunks, cooking pots, paper, glass, paint, earthenware, and any existing stocks of European stores.

Clearly a well thought out industrial intelligence and skeleton arrangements for the organization of Persian potentialities would have paid the State in 1918.

At the risk of seeming to flog a dead horse, reference must once again be made to East Africa. There Von Lettow waged successful war against us for three long years on his own resources, except for the assistance obtained from two store ships which escaped the blockade and from the *Konigsberg* which was piled up in a tropical river. In B.E.A., for the first year of war, stores were mainly imported. The Protectorate of British East Africa, fighting for its

very existence, had neither the leisure nor the means for an intensive development of its own resources, whereas the development would have followed in the ordinary course had the mechanism been contrived in peace. The King's African Rifles were equipped through the Crown Agents, a civil organization, and some months elapsed before they could be supplied on a military basis. The Uganda railway returned several thousand workmen to India who could well have produced munitions in the well-equipped Nairobi workshops. About September, 1915, public opinion began to ask why East Africa alone of all theatres was doing so little for its own needs. Plant and labour were registered by the writer under martial law and a base for General Smuts's advance prepared at Voi with such labour as could be spared from civil life. But there was always the terrible handicap of attempting to improvise in time of war what should have been already organized. The Molo saw-mills closed down because the Europeans had to carry rifles, and timber was imported from Norway and British Columbia. Hides, including zebra which has an extraordinary value for boot soles, were exported and so was the wattle for tanning them, while the finished leather was reimported for equipment. Factories were registered and orders given, but the distribution of these orders and their substitution for importation were far below the scale on which these establishments might have been organized on a considered scheme worked out in peace.

The French in Tonkin are very much alive to the problem of organizing their colony to be independent of France in war, and have subsidized certain industries. In fact, the G.O.C. at Saigon informed the writer that he was now in a position to conduct an extended campaign without help from Europe. Tapping as they do the Yangtse valley through their railway to Yunnan Fu, this statement is not without significance.

The Americans in the Philippines have an immediate problem before them. 7,000 miles from California, this Achilles heel would be cut off at once from the States in the event of trouble with Japan, as General Leonard Wood explained on the spot, and the American Government has left no stone unturned to ascertain what can be produced now and what production can be developed. Far more public money is sunk in the Philippines, and incidentally for this purpose, than the British would lay out, and even more than the French or Germans sink in a new colony.

Britain alone, falsely secure in a mighty Fleet that was once of two-Power standard, lags behind and hopes for the best. Time

and again war has caught us unprepared, but circumstances have given us time to organize. As war becomes more destructive, the danger of being overwhelmed before we have this time to prepare becomes more imminent. The luck may not be always with us.

An attempt has been made in this article to show that some organization is now needed to compile industrial intelligence. "Rousseau" suggests a department under the C.I.D. The writer prefers a liaison section of the London School of Economics administered by three Army officers with civilian subordinates working in the Kingsway building, with a co-opted staff of experts to travel and to report as to the potential resources of different possible theatres of war as indicated by the C.I.G.S. "Rousseau" suggests Imperial and Dominion representatives for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The writer considers that the Army is mainly concerned and that co-opted air and naval advisers and Dominion representatives would suffice. The agents employed are but the means to an end ; the result is aimed at, not the method.

But if this machinery to collate, to recommend and to earmark, is eventually inaugurated, the agents chosen must be the best of their kind, not staff officers unsuited to "G," who may succeed in "Q." The work will demand unusual powers of research, energy and initiative, and, if the right men are to be found, they must be attracted by either a liberal stipend and secure tenure, or by special opportunities for preferment. Their enthusiasm must be such that they will not rest content till the world is mapped out into possible war areas for each of which economic intelligence and industrial machinery easy to set in motion are card-indexed to date and ready to be put into use should the occasion arise.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS UNDER THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL H. DE WATTEVILLE, late R.A.

THE legal limitations which both constitutional practice and statute law have imposed on the armed forces of the Crown, when called upon to intervene or to take action in times of civil disturbance, have not suffered the slightest change under present conditions. These limitations remain identical with those outlined in King's Regulations and in the Manual of Military Law. * It is, therefore, a complete fallacy to assume that the passing of the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 has affected the legal status of the sailor or soldier when summoned to the aid of the civil authorities. Nothing could be better calculated to exacerbate a difficult situation than loose talk as to the remissness of H.M.'s Government in not resorting, after the Proclamation of an Emergency, to the armed forces at its command with a view to forcing a settlement of any industrial dispute. There is little to choose between this more than crude point of view and the clap-trap of advanced Communism ; both may prove equally harmful.

The Emergency Powers Act does not, in itself, endow H.M.'s Government with any powers whatsoever that are not in strict harmony with methods of civil administration familiar to every British citizen. Consequently, it cannot affect the legal basis on which rests the accepted right of the Executive to employ persons subject to Military Law in times of civil commotion. National tradition and prejudice in Great Britain have always demanded and obtained that the civil authorities should, in every possible case, be allowed to deal with the maintenance of public order and security unaided ; they must only summon the military power to their assistance when their own capacity has been recognized as inadequate, or as more than likely to prove inadequate, to cope with the forces of disorder. The principles underlying any use of armed force in an internal dispute will remain in the future, just as in the

* See chapter xiii.

past, founded on this sole necessity of assistance being required by the civil power. There can be no question of supplanting the normal administration of the country. In other words, the Emergency Powers Act does not contemplate the application of any steps such as might seem to savour even distantly of Martial Law.

There are, however, certain features in the manifestations of economic and social unrest of to-day that have materially altered the position of the armed forces of the Crown during an internal commotion. It is as well to consider the circumstances that led up to the passing of this Act.

Even before the Great War, it was growing obvious that any major industrial dispute might rapidly assume national proportions; further, that, by its very conduct, it might jeopardize, or at any rate greatly impede, the normal food supply of the country. The economic consequences of such a condition need no further emphasis. But scarcity of food can react in other directions. Consequently, there arose every prospect that serious disorder might follow any strike that might adversely affect the food supply or transport services of the community. The maintenance of public security thus assumed entirely new dimensions. As a result of repeated menaces of that nature which came, partially or wholly, to a head between 1911 and 1919, there was finally passed by Parliament in the year 1920 the Emergency Powers Act. That Act was designed solely to safeguard for the nation as a whole the supply of those necessities of life and the continuance of those public utility services which form an indispensable adjunct to modern urban existence. The aim of the Act is neither more nor less than to prevent all these supplies and all these services from being in any way obstructed by a discontented faction of the community. In order to achieve these ends, however, the Act does countenance the Executive enforcing precautionary measures for the maintenance of order and organizing State systems of food supply and of transport services. There can exist no thought of "strike-breaking" as such either in the theory or in the application of the Act.

In the meantime the problems resulting from the magnitude of the modern strike further affected the task of the Executive. This had become plain in 1911. This fact, combined with the effects, both direct and indirect, of the enforcement of Regulations subsequently made in pursuance of the Emergency Powers Act, has profoundly modified the situation of the armed forces. The organization of food supplies on a national scale, and the universal maintenance of public utility services, can only be regarded as

a highly sensitive administrative function which dare not be exposed to the risk of interruption or shock of any kind. Accordingly, the need for preventive and precautionary measures has grown in still greater proportion as the undertaking has increased in scale. From this circumstance there inevitably arose the necessity of calling upon the armed forces of the Crown to perform tasks of a preventive and precautionary nature according to a complete and far-reaching plan.

In years gone by, the troops, when called out on strike duty, used only to be moved in small numbers ; they were brought on the scene only when " requisitioned " by local civil authorities ; they were regarded as a last reserve to the civil power to be employed at critical moments when things either had actually ended, or at least threatened to end, in acts of violence. In those days industrial disputes were normally small, highly localized, affairs which more frequently than not terminated in rioting or arson. Since that time things have changed very greatly. The industrial dispute of the present day is tending to become political in character ; it is conducted on far wider and on different lines. So the task of troops called upon to maintain order must also change. Further, although actual violence has, relatively speaking, decreased enormously, the intensity of the struggle, the organization of the strikers or malcontents, the completeness of the spirit of passive resistance, have enhanced the difficulties of the administration of the country to an incalculable extent ; in like measure, the difficult and thankless task that may fall to the lot of the soldier, dragged into an internal dispute of this character, has augmented in complexity.

The actual situation which has arisen out of recent events may be summarized as follows :—

(i) The armed forces of the Crown may now be called upon to assist the civil power as much for the maintenance of the supply of necessities of life and for the upkeep of public utility services as for the preservation of law and order.

(ii) These tasks necessarily require preparatory or anticipatory naval and military activity ; the distribution of the forces so employed may assume a character which can encroach upon the domain of strategy, whilst subsequent measures become wholly precautionary or preventive in their nature.

(iii) The employment of troops tends to become national in scope and most delicate in its application.

(iv) Anticipatory and preventive measures rely upon a display

of force, as much—if not far more than—its physical application, for their success.

(v) As acts of violence become proportionately more and more scarce, so the employment of troops (or of naval units ashore or afloat) assumes more and more the semblance of pure police duties : the prospect of any resort to force in order to repress force thus recedes greatly.

(vi) On the other hand, should, in a desperate situation, any armed conflict result, the consequences might be most extensive and of the utmost gravity to the country as a whole.

Circumstances might, of course, be apprehended in which it is possible that the repression of public disorder may become an urgent and instant necessity. It may prove imperative to prevent the spread of a disturbance or to maintain a normal food supply into any specified area at any cost. It is, moreover, even possible that foreign or extraneous agencies might be fishing in troubled waters, or might be combining with indigenous organizations exploiting social or industrial unrest. The likelihood of such a weapon being employed by a hostile Government cannot be excluded from a careful survey of the international situation of to-day.

Three possible contingencies seem to present themselves which might involve the armed forces of the Crown in dealing with civil disturbances. These are :—

(a) Sporadic, localized, outbursts of disorder accompanied by symptoms of mob violence such as occurred in Glasgow in January, 1919. Even in graver, if more law respecting, movements of wider proportions there is no foretelling that in certain instances similar outbreaks may not recur in isolated localities.

(b) Industrial, social or economic unrest may manifest itself in great strikes such as occurred in 1911, 1921 and in May, 1926. In these cases the maintenance of public utility services (as in the two former cases) or of the supply of the necessities of life (as in May, 1926) will necessitate the Proclamation of an Emergency, to be followed by the issue of Emergency Regulations.

(c) There remains the yet more serious contingency of the entire population of any town or district resorting to mob violence, either spontaneously, or as the outcome of an organized movement, or as the result of machinations originating outside the country. This aspect of the case verges on open sedition, in which case some modified form of civil war might soon loom into view.

The first contingency is one which is foreseen in the hitherto familiar methods of the employment of troops in aid of the civil

power. The third contingency, strangely enough, is of older origin and is more or less dealt with in the Manual of Military Law.* The second is a product of quite recent times : it is in many respects that which is fraught with far and away the greatest difficulty and gravity. The nearer the forces of unrest remain " within the law " in their outward conduct, the more difficult is the part of the soldier.

The Emergency Powers Act, designed to meet this last-named situation, only marks a definite stage in the exercise of its latent authority by the Crown through the Government of the day. In itself and by itself the Act possesses little specific virtue beyond empowering the Government to make and to enforce Regulations which are subjected to the approval of the House of Commons.

In a situation of extreme and growing gravity there exists nothing, of course, to prevent H.M.'s Government from stiffening the Regulations and from claiming fresh powers of a more drastic nature. Such a contingency, however, lies beyond the present discussion.

Nevertheless in the Act there are enunciated two definite limiting principles :—

(1) Nothing in the Act shall be construed to authorize " the making of any Regulations imposing any form of compulsory military service or industrial conscription."

(2) It is expressly stated that no Regulation shall make it an offence to practise " peaceful picketing " or other form of persuasion to take part in a strike.

Again, it is essential to remember that the Emergency Regulations, which, so it is intended, should be made under the Act, were so worded, both in 1921 and in May, 1926, that they should be enforced by the civil power. The Act further provides for the trial of all offenders against the Regulations by courts of summary jurisdiction ; it is indeed expressly laid down that no Emergency Regulation should alter any existing procedure in criminal cases or confer any right to punish by fine or by imprisonment without trial.† It follows that under this Act the military authorities neither possess nor could possibly claim, any new powers of arrest or any powers of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, two important points arise out of the Regulations made in 1921 and repeated in May, 1926, *i.e.* :—

(i) Under Regulation No. 1 (both in 1921 and 1926) the Army Council is enabled to take possession of land, buildings or works (including undertakings of public utility) and any property used or

* See definitions of " riot " and " insurrection " in chapter xiii.

† See Emergency Powers Act, 1920, s. 2 (3).

intended to be used in connection therewith. Should this course be adopted, the land or premises so occupied would become, for the time being, Government property. They could, consequently, be protected as such.

(ii) In Regulation No. 3 (1921) and No. 4 (1926) it becomes possible for the military authorities to interrogate civilians, but only in connection with the necessity of supplying information with regard to transport, when such is required.

In other respects the legal status of the troops, both in 1921 and in 1926, remained unaltered. The military authorities, recognizing the civil nature of the Emergency Regulations, wisely and scrupulously regarded them as such. Nothing could have been more prejudicial to the Army than to lose sight of this fact. Military action thus remained limited to that of pure passive defence. Any intervention of armed force outside these limits could only have been assumed under the common law rights of the Crown. In such an event action could only follow the outbreak of disorder. The situation would thus normally follow the procedure laid down in the Riot Act (1 Geo. I, St. 2, c. 5) and explained in King's Regulations.

The position of troops called upon to escort food convoys or to undertake similar tasks, under Regulations similar to those issued in 1921 and 1926, can thus be regarded as being as difficult as ever. The troops conceivably could only support or supplement the action of the police by the employment of their weapons in order to repress flagrant acts of violence or to repel force by force. Any measures which, though partaking of a precautionary nature, could at the same time be held to override the law, or in any way to curtail the liberty of the outwardly law-abiding civilian, are strictly illegal.

Nevertheless, there are certain existing statutes whereby the sailor or soldier, in his capacity as such, might take action to prevent not only acts of violence but also trespass and destruction of property. These are :—

(i) Under the Aliens Order, 1920, article 9, the Army Council can request the Home Secretary to place additional restrictions on the movements and actions of aliens in any specified area within the United Kingdom.

(ii) Under the Official Secrets Acts, 1911 and 1920, it is possible to arrest and to punish any person approaching, inspecting, passing over or entering a "prohibited place" provided that the intention in so doing is for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State. This definition of "prohibited place" is very wide and

includes any place upon which any munitions of war are present or momentarily stored. But the Act was primarily designed to combat possible acts of espionage and sabotage instigated from abroad and only when the intention of the offender is in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State. The practical effect of these two Acts, therefore, is extremely limited.

In his capacity as a private person the soldier also possesses certain powers which could be exercised by him when on duty in an emergency; chief amongst these is the Malicious Damage Act, 1861. The remaining Acts which might be held as applying to such situations are named in the note at the close of this article. But for all practical purposes it must remain for the most satisfactory working principle to arrange for any necessary arrest to be effected by the civil police. All troops on strike duty should consequently be accompanied, whenever possible, by one or more constables who should take any action of this nature.

On the whole, the Emergency Regulations made in 1921 and 1926 may be said to have achieved their end. No case of bloodshed occurred which could be laid to the door of unwise or precipitate action of any soldier, while order was maintained and the food supply of the country was preserved. But it was clear that, in the event of more serious disturbances, it might have been desirable to strengthen the hands of the military authorities, when engaged in support of the civil police, by means of supplementary Regulations which would have aimed at—

(a) The prevention, by the civil and military authorities, of the access of any persons to all, or any, places being guarded by the police or by the armed forces of the Crown with appropriate powers of detention.

Such a measure would infallibly lead to the creation of "Special Emergency Areas" out of or into which traffic of all kinds could be controlled much as was done in the case of the special military areas under the Defence of the Realm Regulations during the late war.

(b) The prevention of any wrongful use of civil or military uniform and the illegitimate use of any authorized documents of identity, also accompanied by necessary powers of detention.

But the main lessons of the Emergencies of 1921 and of May, 1926, in so far as they affect the naval and military authorities, point clearly to the need of a total revision of the ideas hitherto entertained as to these civil questions. The gravity of the possible evil consequences arising out of inadequate measures or of ill-timed action has intensified beyond all calculation. The old-fashioned conception

whereby the disciplinary branch of the War Office, to take one instance, could cope with such matters is not only totally obsolete, but it constitutes a true source of national danger. A far broader attitude is required towards these problems. The issues are too critical to be left to chance ; they require handling in an understanding and utterly impartial manner. There can be no question of "strike-breaking" in the true sense of the term. It is far more a case of preventing a minority of ill-guided fellow-citizens from taking an insensate and disastrous course of action that must involve widespread suffering, if not an ultimate national cataclysm. The unnecessary employment of force may prove as disastrous as the omission to take adequate precautions to prevent even a minor act of violence. The moral factor counts for everything in cases where the very contingency excludes anything but passive defence. Completeness of preparation and rapidity of action are essential to avoid failure. The Emergencies of 1921 and of May, 1926, fortunately passed off without any real recourse being made to armed force. This fact, perhaps, constitutes the best proof of the adequacy of the Regulations then made, as well as of the sufficiency of the powers accorded to the armed forces of the Crown during these periods of extraordinary difficulty.

In the past the main responsibility lay on the officer commanding the troops on the spot : an invidious and hateful task at all times. Now the responsibility has shifted to the highest military authorities in the land. The task before them is no less difficult, no less hateful. But it demands the highest degree of perspicacity and skill : it is no longer to be performed by any but those best able to assume the greatest responsibility. Failure in such a delicate problem might involve the gravest consequences, such as might spell ruin to the Army Council itself.

APPENDIX

The following notes are intended to show what legal powers are possessed by military officers and other ranks under normal conditions in their dealings with civilians * :—

(i) Power to Use Force and to Effect Arrests without Warrant

It is lawful to use force and to eject a trespasser on Crown property, and this right may be exercised by any person in the service

* The author is indebted to W. H. Moresy, Esq., C.B.E., for his assistance in putting together the following notes.

of the Crown. But the degree of violence employed must not exceed the necessity. (Clarke and Lindsell, Cap. on Re-entry.)

Apart from trespass, a servant of the Crown, in common with any private person may, in case of felony either committed or apprehended, effect an arrest. This power may be summarized as follows :—

“ A PRIVATE PERSON may effect an arrest :

“ If a felony is committed or a dangerous wound is given in his presence ; if he finds a person committing an indictable offence by night ; if an affray takes place and is continued in his presence or if there is a reasonable ground to think it will be renewed ; if persons do not disperse after the Proclamation contained in the Riot Act has been read ; if a person is about to commit felony or treason or any act manifestly endangering life—but there must be no detention after the intention may be presumed to have ceased ; if a felony has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground for believing the person he is arresting has committed that felony.”

Any person, and therefore any soldier, may also effect an arrest without warrant in cases of offence against any one of the following statutes :—

Official Secrets Act, 1911, sect. 6.

Official Secrets Act, 1920, 1st Schedule.

Malicious Damage Act, 1861.

Larceny Acts, 1861 and 1916.

Vagrancy Act, 1824.

The Malicious Damage Act, 1861, deals with several offences coming under the definition of a “ felony ” and so the offender becomes liable to arrest by a private person. Accordingly, any military guard or sentry would possess the legal power of arresting any individual showing intention to commit certain forms of crime, such as arson, the unlawful use of explosives, damage to ships, interference with navigation marks, destruction of canal and harbour works, obstruction of railways, injury to telegraphs, and the wounding of cattle. (Manual of Military Law, p. 108.)

(ii) *Right of Interrogation*

Generally speaking, no soldier possesses any such power except to meet the special cases outlined in :

Official Secrets Act, 1911, sect. 7.

Official Secrets Act, 1920, sect. 6, and 1st Schedule.

Under these Acts the soldier (of any rank, it should be noted), when on duty, may not only interrogate, but may also order any person to attend at a time and place specified in the order to give information as to a suspected offence under that Act.

(iii) *Right of Search*

Generally speaking it is lawful to search when it is lawful to arrest. But this is usually done under a warrant issued by a justice of the peace; but under the Explosives Act and similar Acts it can be carried out under a warrant issued by a superintendent of police.

The power of soldiers to search, however, exists under the following Acts :—

Official Secrets Act, 1911, sect. 7.

Official Secrets Act, 1920, sect. 6, and 1st Schedule.

Firearms Act, 1920, sects. 2 and 11.

(iv) *Right of Seizure of Property*

The soldier possesses no power to seize any property unless this be any article likely to cause a felony, and in this case the power only exists when carried out with an arrest and search. Certain cases do exist under the Criminal Law when property may be seized, *e.g.* false coins, but for the present purpose this right is limited to seizure under the Firearms Act, 1920, sect. 11.

(v) *Right to Destroy Property*

Certain cases of this right occur under Criminal Law, but such rights should not be sought for by the soldier.

(vi) *Right to Stop Vehicles*

This power exists in the same degree as the power of arrest.

(vii) *Right to Stop Roads or Traffic*

No powers of this nature exist, but certain very limited rights can be exercised by military authority under the Military Manœuvres Acts, 1897 and 1911, of closing roads or footpaths under due notice and for specified periods during manœuvres.

(viii) *Right to Close Licensed Premises and Places of Entertainment*

No powers exist. The Licensing Acts contain no provisions of this nature.

TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT GREAT WAR ON LAND

BY BREVET MAJOR B. C. DENING, M.C., R.E.

THE next great war on land between modern Powers is likely to be fought under conditions very different to those governing the 1914-1918 campaign. In this article it is hoped to show how the changed conditions will affect transportation, the latter being a term used to cover all organizations such as docks, railways and canals, required for the supply and movement of troops in the field. If changes in transportation methods are forced upon us, the Army as a whole will be considerably affected.

So far as can be foreseen at present, the next war will differ from that of 1914-1918 in three essentials, namely, in the very largely increased use of aircraft, gas and mechanical transport, the latter term including all forms of tanks and tractor.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE AEROPLANE AND GAS

In view of the fact that gas is likely to be discharged in future far more from the air than from shells or cylinders on the ground, it is advisable to consider the influence of the aeroplane and gas together rather than separately. In fact, neither the aeroplane nor gas can affect transportation to a great extent without the other, for the two inventions are complementary.

The aeroplane to-day can travel at a very great speed and operate against any stationary object upon the land within a war radius of action of perhaps three hundred miles. It is possible for an industrial nation to possess aircraft in very large numbers (in the Great War Britain possessed over 7000, and to-day France, the leading Air Power, has some 5000). Aeroplanes have carried bombs already of over 4000 lbs. in weight. Though no gas bombs were dropped in the late war, experiments have since been carried out with a view to estimating the possibilities of spraying areas with gas. Using a persistent gas of the "mustard" type, it has been shown

that a gallon of gas will render untenable a large area and that a squadron of ten bombers can contaminate an area of ten miles by two miles in one attack. Persistent gas can, in ordinary circumstances, be calculated to cause casualties up to fourteen days from the date of discharge, and in some cases, far longer.

The methods of escape open to an army from such forms of attack are as follows : first, probably, protection will be sought by the provision of a strong Air Force to meet the enemy in the air, and to carry a similar type of warfare into an enemy's country. Secondly, troops may gain a degree of immunity by concealment and frequent movement, rarely offering a definite objective to the enemy's air force.

Thirdly, some security may be obtained from the occupation of gas-proof shelters, and by wearing gas-proof respirators and clothing. Even for ordinary mobile troops, however, it is clear that prospects of eliminating the danger of gas attack from the air are not good. The position of those portions of an army in the field which cannot move is obviously far worse. It is an accepted axiom by the Royal Air Force that even with a superior air force absolute immunity from air attack cannot be guaranteed to a certain spot, even if expensive numbers of every known anti-aircraft device are employed. The air is so vast that under cover of clouds or darkness, attackers can always slip through. When instead of one spot, a whole transportation system is offered to air attack, it is clear how difficult the question of defence has become. If, in France in the last war, the docks, the base supply depôts, the regulating stations, railheads had all been within bombing range of the enemy's aircraft, developed as they will be in the next war, what could have happened ? In practically all of these places work had to continue night and day, day by day, and to practically all the sites there was no alternative. The objective was fixed as firmly as it possibly could be. A few vital places could have been selected by the enemy for attack, and adequately escorted squadrons sent off for gas attack. It is difficult to come to any conclusion but that life and normal working as it was known in 1918 at any of these important places would have been quite out of the question. A repetition of the attack once every ten days would have rendered the points permanently untenable. The troops in front, dependent day by day on trains for food and ammunition, could certainly not have fought or advanced, and might have been in great danger of collapse by starvation.

That is the position to-day. In what way can the difficulty be

overcome? There would, in the opinion of the writer, seem to be three possible methods of evading the existing danger.

First, there is the method of evasion by dispersion. There are those who advocate that dispersion on the transportation system will give the required security, that by having many ports instead of a few, many small scattered depôts instead of one or two large ones, and many alternative railway routes, transportation may still be worked on the hitherto accepted scale. Unfortunately it is clear that in many theatres of war it would be quite impossible to adopt such a method of evasion. On many coasts the choice of a base is strictly limited and the possible number of railway routes in many countries is governed by the configuration of the ground. Further, in view of the difficulties of railway control experienced in the past, even with large centralized supply depôts, it is doubtful if the working of a scattered system of small depôts is feasible with armies of any size. It is unlikely that a policy of dispersion by itself will be the answer to the menace of gas attack from the air.

A second method of escape is that of not allowing any vital link in the transportation system to be within the three hundred miles, or whatever the accepted bombing limit, of the main hostile air forces. According to present ideas, under the term "vital links" should be included the docks and base depôts, the regulating stations and any junction where it is absolutely essential to have *personnel* operating continuously. Forward of these points, though air attacks might render certain railheads uninhabitable and cause interruptions to traffic, the difficulties might be overcome. But what does the acceptance of this method of evasion entail? It means an enormously long line of communications and armies, even where short lines of communications are available, are asked to push their stationary bases back out of range of air-gas attack. The formidable nature of the task which such a policy would set the railways can be recognized when it is remembered that the lines of communication of the British Army, when it had reached the Rhine in 1919, were only about two hundred and fifty miles. Such long lines of communication are only workable either where the forces concerned are comparatively small or where a network of high class up-to-date railways exist, such as joined the German Eastern and Western fronts in the late war.

The third method by which the transportation Service can hope to evade this form of attack is by what is, to all practical purposes, the abandonment of railways and the wholesale adoption of cross-country traction in lieu. There would appear to be some chance

of security for a supply system which, in addition to the use of roads, had the choice of perhaps hundreds of alternative routes from the base area to the front. This method of supply has the definite advantage that a short line of communications could be worked within close range of an enemy's air forces without fear of serious interruption. It has the disadvantage that in some theatres of war where rivers, swamps, hills and forests abound, of not being practicable at all. In such theatres, however, it is unlikely that a war between Great Powers will be fought. Even with forward transportation solved by this means, the difficulty remains of keeping the ports and docks working. For the solution of this part of the problem, there would appear at present to be no alternative to making our armies as small as possible so as to reduce the size of ports, docks and depôts offered as targets, to developing highly the anti-aircraft defence of decisive localities and to duplicating vital base organizations. None of these steps will be popular. Most commanders like to employ large armies, dislike tying up weapons in the stationary defence of communications, and object to the waste involved in the duplication of rearward services.

THE INFLUENCE OF MECHANICAL TRANSPORT UPON TRANSPORTATION

Quite apart from any question of the substitution of roadless traction for existing railways and waterways in the supply system, mechanical transport is certain to be introduced to the next large field army in considerable quantities for many purposes, such as the haulage of guns and transport, the provision of daily supplies and quite possibly for the carriage of infantry. This development is likely to affect present ideas on troop movement in at least two directions. First, there is the problem of the transport to the theatre of war of the large number of vehicles with their spare parts and repair shops; and secondly, that of the supply of an army which, if fully equipped with mechanical transport, may move with greatly increased mobility.

To deal with the first of these, assuming that the docks selected for the disembarkation of the army have adequate facilities for unloading mechanical vehicles, the point to be considered is that of railing mechanical transport. During the last war in France it was the practice to send by rail tanks and heavy tractors and to send other mechanical transport to the front by road. In a future war, there may be differences. Tanks may be of a light fast-moving type, with a life of many thousands of miles. In that case they

will hardly require to be entrained on landing, unless the front is very distant. Heavy tractors will probably be required to move by rail for any but very short distances. On the other hand, the front in a future war may be hundreds of miles from the base, or, quite apart from distance, it may be separated from the base by a belt of country devoid of fair roads, through which a railway does exist. In such a case the whole army transport may have to be carried up by rail. Looking at all possible theatres of war, it is safe to predict that it will be necessary to be prepared to entrain large quantities of mechanical vehicles of all varieties.

It is doubtful whether as at present visualized the transportation Service has either the material or the training to compete rapidly with the movement of what may be a completely mechanized army. Thus the supply of mobile ramps, and training in their use with all military trains, requires attention. The detraining of a trainload of tanks can take half an hour, or hours, according as the train crew are familiar or not with the working of mobile ramps. The most economical composition of a mechanical-transport-carrying-train requires, too, to be studied and tried out practically. The proportion of stores and repair shops to accompany a definite number of vehicles affects the composition of trains. For instance, the 180 tanks which moved up with the British Army to the Rhine in 1919 required over 1,000 tons of maintenance stores to accompany them, and the composition of a strategical tank train at that time was 12 tank wagons, 2 mobile ramps, 1 tool van, 2 coaches for *personnel* and 12 covered trucks for stores.

As regards the second point, the problem of supplying an army that moves very rapidly, it may be necessary to calculate on a small mechanized army moving up to a hundred miles a day. Assuming railways are used for supplies, this will affect the present transportation organization to a considerable degree, for it will not be at all easy to predict the position of troops twenty-four hours ahead. While a hundred miles is perhaps a light matter normally to a train, in the zone of operations trains do not move fast, and time is required to switch trains from an intended route on to an entirely new one in order to reach an army which has moved. It would appear that the present daily pack train method of supply to divisions in the field will require revision, in favour perhaps of some system of replenishment by bounds.

* * * * *

From the foregoing discussion it seems not improbable that in order to enable it to do its work at all, the transportation service

will require a number of radical alterations in the methods of waging war on land. The interests of transportation are likely to require:—

(a) A small army in the field ; (b) bases and lines of communication strongly defended against air attack ; (c) the army to be based upon numerous and small landing-places and dépôts ; (d) the primary means of movement within range of strong hostile air attack to be by cross-country traction ; (e) the troops to be trained to rapid entrainment with all their mechanical transport ; and (f) a new system of supply not having as its basis the daily pack train.

These requirements, or most of them, represent such considerable changes, that much emphasis needs to be placed upon them in the years of preparation for war if our Army is to be ready and correctly organized when war comes.

As regards a small army in the field, though most nations to-day have only small armies, such armies are regarded rather as cadres for hordes that will be enlisted, than as entities in themselves. It is true that we ourselves possess a self-contained Expeditionary Force ; but that is intended for use in a comparatively minor emergency, and for a great land war thoughts turn at once to the 14 Territorial divisions, with 14, 28 or perhaps 42 divisions to follow. Probably not until another war has shown the impracticability of large armies in the face of strong air forces will the popular mind accept a truth which was dawning in 1918.

The Army and the Royal Air Force are already prepared to place considerable anti-aircraft resources upon the lines of communication ; but it is doubtful whether the proportion of the whole resources which will be needed for that task is fully realized.

Landing-places and base dépôts stand their only chance of concealment if they are situated amongst larger and similar civilian establishments. The idea of a landing on an open beach with the subsequent establishment of a base there must be abandoned in future, if within a range of strong hostile air forces. Expeditionary Force plans will need adjustment to fall in with such requirements.

The use of cross-country traction as the primary means of movement, possibly from the base onwards, will require considerable preparation in time of peace. The principal difficulty will lie in securing sufficient numbers of the type of vehicle required in the time available. There is no prospect of cross-country traction being extensively used in Great Britain, possessed as she is of the best roads in the world. Its use in the Dominions and Colonies is, however, probable, and is to be greatly encouraged from the military point of view.

If a revision of the daily pack train system of supply is necessary, it will affect arrangements in every unit and every formation, from the base to the front. It were well that such changes, if coming, be made during peace, for it is far more difficult to carry out a sudden change in organization in time of war.

Finally, the prospect of road and roadless traction taking first place over other alternative methods of transport on the lines of communication re-opens the important staff duties question of the control of this type of transport. It is evident that if there are various alternative means of transport available for certain tasks, there must be one central authority to decide which is the most suitable for any particular task. In the last war the D.G.T. (Director General of Transportation), working in close touch with, but independently of, the General Staff and Q.M.G. Staff, decided, for instance, whether stores were to be dispatched by rail or by water. These were then the two main alternative channels of heavy movement. But when a question arose of whether a movement of men should be by rail or by mechanical transport, the D.G.T. was not competent to carry out the wishes of the General Staff, for the D.G.T. had no control over mechanical transport in general, which was in the hands of the Q.M.G.

If mechanical transport is to become the chief suitable channel of movement, supplemented by rail and water transport, it is obvious that its control must be in the hands of the D.G.T.

Since the war, it has been decided that the D.G.T. in future is not to be independent of the Q.M.G. in the field, but that supplies and movement shall once again be placed under one head. Clearly from the point of view of unity of control of all means of transport under the D.G.T. this is a move in the right direction, for the Q.M.G., who formerly controlled mechanical but not other transport, can hand over to the D.G.T. as his subordinate, the control of mechanical transport. There remain, however, problems to be cleared up such as the relations of the Directorate of Supplies and Transport to that of Transportation; the responsibility for maintenance of vehicles, if the D.G.T. is given control of the movement of mechanical transport; and the demarcation of the forward limit of control of mechanical transport between the D.G.T. and commanders of fighting formations.

The problems put forward in this article are, none of them, insoluble. The danger lies rather in a possible failure to appreciate in time the effects which scientific developments will have upon the present transportation methods.

MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY LLOYD

ADVENTURER AND MILITARY PHILOSOPHER

BY COLONEL J. C. F. FULLER, D.S.O.

IN spite of our dearth of military writers, each great war in which we have been engaged during the last two hundred years has produced at least one soldier writer of note : after the South African War—Colonel Henderson ; after the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny—General Hamley ; after the Napoleonic Wars—William Napier ; after the War of American Independence and the French Revolutionary Wars—Robert Jackson (an army surgeon) ; and after the Seven Years' War—General Lloyd.

It is with the last-mentioned soldier writer that I intend to deal ; for, though he served in foreign armies and wrote mainly of the wars of Frederick the Great, he was a British subject, and one of the first of our military students who attempted to place war on a scientific footing. In his day, and for many years after his death, his writings were studied by foreign generals, notably by Napoleon, who makes several references to him in his "Correspondence." His scheme for the defence of these islands was accepted by the British Government, but he appears to have been little considered by the officers of our Army, and, to-day, I doubt whether one in a thousand realizes that he ever lived. Yet he was a truly great soldier and a very remarkable man, whose military writings contain much that is of permanent value.

According to the French translator of the first volume of General Lloyd's "History," Henry Lloyd was born in 1729, but this date is probably a misprint for 1719.* He was a Welshman, the son of a small but respectable farmer, who, despite his poverty, gave his

* This contention would seem to be proved on the evidence of a statement made by John Drummond, a kinsman of Lord John Drummond, who met Lloyd in France in 1744. He says that at that date Lloyd appeared to be between twenty and thirty years old.

son a good education. The boy always wished to become a soldier,* but, as he showed a natural bent for philosophy and literature, it was considered that his calling was the Church.

He became a lay brother in some religious Order in France, and travelled in France, Italy, Germany, Portugal and Spain. At Gibraltar he met General Eliott who, fascinated by his intelligence and knowledge of military engineering, offered to obtain for him a Commission in the Army at home; but this offer was refused, and in 1744 Lloyd was engaged to attend John Drummond and his brother, who in the following year joined the French Army under Marshal Saxe.

With the Drummonds Lloyd was present at the battle of Fontenoy. During this battle, the sketches he made of the village of Fontenoy brought him to the notice of Marshal Saxe, who permitted him to don the uniform of Lord John Drummond's Regiment "of Royal Scotch," and also to receive pay as a sub-ensign. John Drummond then tells us that, "When the expedition to Scotland was set on foot, Mr. Lloyd was appointed *third engineer*, with the rank of Captain, by a Commission from the Pretender." From Nantes he set sail for Scotland, and was in constant attendance on the Prince until he arrived at Carlisle.

From Carlisle, Lloyd went to Wales to rouse certain friends of the Prince, and, dressed as a priest, he journeyed round the coasts of Wales and the south of England, watching for the arrival of the expected French Fleet. He examined all the coastline from Milford Haven round the Bristol Channel, to Bridgewater and Barnstaple Bay; thence he continued his survey to Plymouth and Dover, and from Dover to Margate and London.

In 1746, he was arrested in London, but, luckily for him, it was not discovered that he had been with the Pretender. The following year, John Drummond, who met him in London at "Carrington's, the messenger, in Jermyn Street," through the influence of "a noble Duke" obtained his release, and "then employed him under the denomination of a tutor, seeming never to have known him before."

This same year Drummond and Lloyd proceeded to France and were present at the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, where Lloyd

* But, if his French translator is to be believed, he had no inclination to enter the English army, because he saw that if he did so "he would have to obey old dunderheads, who, never having studied their profession, were bewildered by an antiquated routine which they mistook for experience . . . spent their time in ridiculing and scoffing at genius, which they hated for fear of having to acknowledge it superior to themselves."

met Marshal Lovendhall and, for his "infinite service in mounting batteries, in choosing ground and exploring mines, as well as in opening of sluices," Lovendhall obtained for him the rank of Major.

In 1748, Drummond's father recommended Lloyd to "the Earl Marshal, who was at that time in great reputation with the King of Prussia." The Earl Marshal in his turn recommended Lloyd to his brother, Marshal Keith. What now happened to Lloyd becomes obscure, but, in 1754, he entered the service of the Duc de Bellisle and worked out for him a plan for the invasion of England. In 1756, his knowledge of the British coast and his genius for spying, induced Bellisle to give him a commission as a field officer in the French Army, and to pay him five louis a day to re-survey the British coast.

Lloyd accepted this offer, and dressed as a small journeyman traveller he journeyed to England and carried out this work. "His report, however, made the French Ministry change their intentions of invading Britain, and the Mareschal Duc de Bellisle was better pleased at being sent to Minorca than to attempt landing at Torbay."

Leaving England in 1756 or 1757, Lloyd, through an introduction of the Prince of Lichtenstein, became aide-de-camp to General Lacy in the Austrian Army. Lacy was Inspector-General, and with him Lloyd had the good fortune of serving through several campaigns, and on one occasion was placed in command of a considerable detachment of foot and horse, "never to lose sight of the Prussian army; which he punctually complied with, and was never unfortunate."

Tiring of the intrigues of the Austrian camp, he resigned his Commission, and being asked never to enter the service of the King of Prussia, he replied: "Born an Englishman, I am free to give to whom I like my sword and my heart, nevertheless, I can assure you that I have no intention of offering my services to Frederick."

In 1760, he became aide-de-camp-in-chief to Ferdinand of Brunswick. Under this Prince he fought two campaigns. Whilst in Brunswick's service he was granted a pension of £500 a year by George III, for having carried out the negotiations which led to the marriage of Brunswick and the King's sister.

At Brunswick's Court he became known to the Empress of Russia, who persuaded him to join the Russian Army as a Major-General. He accepted this offer and was placed in command of an

army of 30,000 men which was to operate against the Swedes and the Finns; peace was declared, however, before this campaign could take place.

At the battle of Silistria, he gave the Turks a sound thrashing, but being deserted by many of the young Court nobles, after the victory he cashiered the lot. One, complaining of this punishment, received the following answer from Lloyd: "*Dites à . . . , que quand je serai à ses ordres, je lui obéirai avec respect et soumission; mais ici je commande seul, et si aucun de ces petits j . . . f . . . * ose reparoître dans le camp, je le ferai jeter jè la rivière.*"

Lloyd became a personal favourite of the Czarina, but the corruption of the Court and the inefficiency, jealousies and intrigues of the Russian nobles and officers sickened him. Once, when the Empress informed him that she would dine at his house, he exclaimed: "*Ah, Madame! . . . Votre Majesté me perd et me met hors d'état de pouvoir la servir;—pourquoi donc, Lloyd, dit la Czarine.—Madame, l'envie ne me pardonnera jamais l'honneur dont Votre Majesté me comble aujourd'hui.*"

Lloyd's rupture with the Russian Court arose out of a request made by certain friends in England for him to return home, so that he might confer with the Government on the question of coast defence. The Court officials at St. Petersburg hesitating to grant him leave of absence, Lloyd, who possessed a sharp temper, at once tendered his resignation and left Russia.

On his way to England he broke his journey at Brussels and visited Prince Charles, the Young Pretender, and on his arrival in London was apparently consulted by the Government on the question of repelling a possible French invasion.

Disgusted with men generally, he bought a house at Huy on the Meuse, in the Bishopric of Liège, and determined to devote the remaining years of his life to writing a history of the wars in Germany. The first volume of this work was published in 1766, and was dedicated to the Duke of Brunswick; the second part of this volume was dedicated to the Prince of Wales, and appeared in 1781; and the second volume in 1790, was published after his death, which apparently occurred at Huy in 1783 or 1784.

Of Lloyd's last years I have not been able to ascertain much. In 1776, he was again in London, and Drummond tells us that, having made peace with the Government, he obtained a pension upon the Chelsea establishment. He was married and left a son named Humphrey. He apparently died at Huy, for the French

* Obviously in modern parlance—"jeunes foutus."

officer who translated the first volume of his history (which translation was published in London in 1784), in a footnote to the last page of the *précis* of his life says : "*Le Général Lloyd n'étant pas Catholique, a été enterré sur le bord du grand chemin ; et de bons Catholiques sont venus pendant la nuit le déterrer, pour voler sa chétive dépouille.*" Robbed of his simple shroud, and possibly also of his old red coat, I will now turn to his writings, which Time, that grimmest of grim robbers, can never rob of their wisdom.

The interest of Lloyd as a military writer mainly lies in the fact that he refused to be blinded by the successes of Frederick the Great. In place of accepting what he saw at its orthodox value, he examined and criticized it boldly, consequently, as a military thinker, he stands apart from his contemporaries, for the age of Frederick was the age of military sycophants and copyists. Further, and still more extraordinary, he was not content with criticism, but, having pulled to pieces the military order of his day, attempted to substitute for it a new order based on scientific and philosophical foundations. It is the moral courage of the man in attacking traditionalism which is so remarkable. "Custom," he writes, "is a tyrant, who governs mankind with more despotic sway than an Eastern monarch. To oppose *him* is treason and rebellion. . . . Few have inclination to investigate their grounds, and still fewer have the capacity to investigate them effectually. Hence they prefer travelling in the known path, to the trouble of inquiring after a new one." The result of this mental inertia is that : "For want of certain and known principles in the constitution of an army, caprice and imitation seem to have been our only guides ; whence innumerable changes and novelties are continually introduced into our modern armies. Error and folly succeed each other like modes and fashion in dress ; what is to-day an object of applause and admiration, is to-morrow exploded and succeeded by some new chimera equally absurd and transient."

This criticism has a curious modern ring about it, when we compare the various changes which have taken place in armies during the last ten years, and the reason is surely the same, even now in 1926, as when expressed by Lloyd in 1781, namely : "that no art or science is more difficult than that of war ; yet by an unaccountable contradiction of the human kind, those who embrace this profession take little or no pains to study it. They seem to think, that the knowledge of a few insignificant and useless trifles constitute a great officer."

Lloyd looked upon the soldier as a "rude, ignorant, untractable

being " who could not be influenced by argument or reason, consequently, error and folly could only be " extirpated by time and favourable circumstances," and of circumstances he considers knowledge of the nature of war as all important. This knowledge he bases on the study of history, especially in so far as it explains the genius of the commander, national characteristics and the moral factors in war. These he considers must be understood before an instrument of war can be fashioned and an organization and tactics laid down.

As regards genius he writes : " Great geniuses have a sort of intuitive knowledge, they see at once the causes and its effect with the different combinations which unite them : they do not proceed by common rules, successively from one idea to another, by slow and languid steps, no : the *whole*, with all its circumstances and various combinations, is like a picture, all together present to their mind ; these want no geometry : but an age produces few of this kind of men : and in the common run of generals, geometry and experience will help them to avoid gross errors."

By " geometry " Lloyd means reasoning and calculating, and by " experience " he means analyzing as well as partaking in. He openly states that " armies are corrupted equally by good and bad success " ; therefore a general must understand the nature of success or failure, and not merely copy one or shun the other. He must not halt there, but must understand the influence of success and failure on human nature, so that he may " know how to calm the fury, as well as raise the spirits of his men." The art of command is based not only on reasoning but on attaining an " ascendancy over the soldiers," and this can only be acquired by " being free from vice " and by the commander showing " by his words and actions, he is as much superior in merit as in rank." He must possess courage and self-control, because " in any very great danger, the soldier looks up to his officer, and if he perceives the least sign of timidity, anxiety, or doubt, he concludes all is lost, and generally consults his safety by flight." He must show no favouritism, since this vice " deprives him of the support of good men." He must be generous in his praise for what is good and right, for " rewards should go rather beyond, and punishments below the mark," since " no man is infallible, and errors must be forgiven."

Having laid down the qualifications of the general, which are largely related to the instincts of the soldier, Lloyd turns to the army and shows that its discipline must be founded on the instincts of the nation. " Discipline," he writes, " should be founded on

national character . . . but as those who have the formation and conduct of armies, seem wholly unacquainted with human nature in general . . . they find themselves incapable to form a code of military laws, founded on national characters ; and are therefore forced to destroy these, and establish it, on the weak, uncertain and slavish principle of Fear ; which has rendered our armies much inferior to those of the antients, as appears evident from the history of mankind."

Having laid down this principle, he examines national psychology. For example : " The French are gay, light, and lively," they are governed by transitory impulses, " their sensations, from the nature of their climate, are very delicate ; and therefore objects make a very strong impression, but momentary ; because a new object producing a new impression, effaces the former. From whence follows that they are impetuous, and dangerous in their attacks ; all the animal spirits seem united, and produce a sort of furious convulsion, and gives them a more than ordinary degree of vigour for that instant ; but it exhausts the whole frame : the instant following they appear languid and weak, and changed into other men. . . . Wherefore it should be a maxim, in making war against the French, to keep them continually in motion, especially in bad weather, always attack them, never permit them to follow their own dispositions, force them to observe yours ; their impatience will soon reduce them to commit some capital error : if their leader is wise and prudent, and refuses to comply with their unreasonable requests, they will treat him with contempt, grow turbulent, and desert."

From this examination of national characteristics, Lloyd deduces the principle that the military discipline of an army must be based on national instinct and character, just as commandship and leadership must be based on human instinct and sentiment. Concerning his own countrymen, he says : " The present ministry endeavours to introduce the German discipline among them (*i.e.* the soldiers), without considering the difference there is between their national characters, and I doubt whether it will produce the effects they expect from it : nature must be improved, not annihilated."

Given command which can control human nature, and discipline which expresses national character in place of suppressing it, Lloyd next turns to the moral qualities of soldiership, or, as he calls them, " the passions." For once danger threatens life, it is these which control the actions of the soldier.

" Fear of, and an aversion to pain, and the desire of pleasure,"

he writes, "are the spring and cause of all actions both in men and other species of animals." Animal fear arises from the apprehension of some danger, and as man like other animals instinctively avoids danger, he can only be restrained from flight by superior fear or by qualities which are superior to fear. Lloyd's ideas on this subject are extraordinarily modern, so I will quote them in full. He writes :

"Animal wants always produce action in some degree or other. Extreme fear and pain, arising from want, produces extreme exertion ; it is dangerous to contend with man or other animal animated by such powerful motives.

"When the soldier really is, or thinks himself, placed in a dangerous situation, without a possibility of escaping, everything may be expected from him ; placed between death and victory, he becomes a hero ; but if you expose him for a long time to great danger, and there remains a possibility of avoiding it by flight, he will fly ; because the idea of present danger will prevail over the fear of a more remote punishment, which he may hope to elude. Moreover a considerable body of troops are not susceptible of the fear of punishment, because they cannot be all punished, and individuals suppose each in particular is, that they are not to be sacrificed* : hence it appears, that fear is not a powerful nor effectual principle of exertion, unless extreme and desperate ; whereas the desire of gratifying our wants is ; I am therefore surprised to see generals act upon the contrary system ; they suppose fear the only principle of action in the soldier, as if he were an animal of a different species ; for, surely, they will not acknowledge it as the motive of their own actions."

For fear, the impelling force of Frederick's system of war, Lloyd proposes to substitute honour, for, as he says : "Honour proceeds from a desire to gain the public esteem ; shame from the fear of losing it." To him honour is an all-embracing quality. An honourable man is not only esteemed by his fellows but by himself. His sense of honour creates a mutual civic obligation between society and the individual. If the soldier is looked up to as the guardian of civil liberty and justice, then he will be placed under such an obligation by his fellow men that in war he will face death to gain their praise and gratitude.

The soldiership which Lloyd proposes is founded on citizenship. First and foremost the soldier is a citizen, and only secondly is he a fighting man ; and because of his civic rights and the esteem he commands as a fighting man, honour is the force which urges him to face the enemies of his country, the security of which is not

* This is Lloyd's English. What he means is : In a crowd of men each individual feels secure since no one in particular can be selected for punishment, and it is unlikely that the whole will be punished as severely as would be the case if an individual could be picked out for punishment.

merely the concern of the Government, but his concern, for he is no mercenary, but an armed and honourable citizen.

I know of no military writer who so clearly grasps this civic foundation of soldiership as Lloyd does. He writes :

“ When the principle of honour and a sense of shame are firmly established in the human heart, they operate more forcibly than the fear of death, and are the source of all great and heroic actions : the more elevated the class to which a man belongs, and his position in it, the greater will be his exertions to gain the esteem of the public. A man buried in obscurity is little affected by honour or shame ; the desire of pleasing ceases, and he degenerates into a savage, and approaches to the state of animals : hence it is that gentlemen are in general more anxious and delicate in what they suppose concerns their honour, than members of other classes ; instead of depressing that class of men called soldiers, as we do at present, every method possible should be used to raise and exalt it : as the difference of classes produces more or less activity in the pursuit of those objects which are peculiar to them, so does that of government, which stamps on the whole nation a certain character different from that of others ; some tend to promote honour and virtue, others to depress them.”

In brief, Lloyd's philosophy of war was one of supreme common sense ; he refused to accept the current opinions of his day, and in place relied on a close study of human nature. He saw that though human instinct is much the same everywhere, nations differed in character, and that, consequently, it was not sufficient to organize, train and lead an army on a stereotyped system, as organization, training and leadership do not depend solely on the national and individual characteristics of the soldiers of any particular army, but equally on the national and individual characteristics of the enemy they are fighting against. To him, war was not merely a contest between two armed forces, but between the instincts of two nations.

Having laid down a philosophic foundation, Lloyd turns to the instrument of war—the army, and examines its organization. He writes : “ Few have inclination to investigate their grounds, and still fewer have the capacity to investigate them effectually. Hence they prefer travelling in the known path, to the trouble of inquiring after a new one.” Lloyd, as we have seen, was no copyist, and as in his philosophy of war he goes straight back to human nature, so also in his science of war he never loses sight of the supreme fact that “ war is a state of action.” To him, “ an army is the instrument with which every species of military action is performed : like all other machines it is composed of various parts,

and its perfection will depend, first, on that of its several parts ; and second, on the manner in which they are arranged ; so that the whole may have the following properties, viz. : strength, agility, and universality ; if these are properly combined, the machine is perfect."

Thus Lloyd lays down three principles of organization. By strength, as he himself says : " I do not mean that force which arises from numbers," but, instead, their organization and armament, which must be such that the army can attack or resist attack, and can operate in all types of country. By agility he means rapidity of movement, and by universality—"the mode and form in which the troops are ranged," so that they can move in all directions. Agility and universality are but developments of strength, and express what may be called the principles of freedom of movement and freedom of action.

If these three principles are the properties which render an army perfect, then " it is evident that the arms made use of, the manual exercise, and the different evolutions in which the soldier is to be instructed, ought to be analogous to these principles, and whatever is not conformable to them should be exploded as vain and insignificant at least, if not as very often happens, dangerous and impracticable."

Thus, from these three principles Lloyd deduces the necessity of three species of troops, namely, " infantry, cavalry and light troops." The first to provide " strength," the second " agility " and the third " universality " to an army.

Having arrived at these simple principles, Lloyd next severely criticizes the existing theory of war, especially the organization of military force, after which he replaces it by a new one.

Unless the various parts of an army can act in harmony, numbers only clog activity, a failing that was noticeable in the three-rank formation of the infantry of his day. Also, as regards cavalry, it is useless attempting to add " mass and solidity to the velocity of the horse," because the " peculiar property of the horse " is activity, which must suffer if cavalry is ranged in a compact order. The object of the charge is not to ride over an enemy, but to pass through him, and then, by wheeling round, to attack him in rear, whilst his ranks are disordered. " Velocity is everything in the cavalry," and " if you are deficient in this, your cavalry is not worth keeping."

Not only does mass impede velocity in battle, but also movement before battle. Not only does deployment take up much time,

"but several days are employed in examining the position of the enemy, which might be done in five minutes"; and this is due to the fact that masses of men, by slowing down physical movement, simultaneously slow down mental movement, since the time taken wherein to manœuvre is so extensive that there is no incentive to cultivate rapidity of thought; thus caution takes the place of audacity, because solidity takes the place of velocity.

Once "the mode of attacking is at length fixed," in nine cases out of ten it must be altered, "because the enemy, while you lose your time in preparing yourself, have materially altered their position." This leads to another vicious theory, namely, that the enemy's position must be bombarded, not only to cover changes in formation, but to prevent the enemy from conforming to these changes. The theory is unsound, because no distant attack will prevent his moving, and it also demands that the bulk of the artillery has to precede the infantry on the line of march, and, consequently, must impede its progress. Further, if the enemy is active, a grave risk is run of losing the guns before the infantry can deploy to protect them.

This, however, seldom takes place, because both sides are obsessed by the same theory. For each, "his army is like a set of china-ware on a chimney-piece, it must not be touched or moved, for fear of breaking it," until the bombardment has lasted several hours. Then, the advance begins, and, as a triple line several miles long is extremely unwieldy, "you are sometimes several hours in getting over a mile of ground, which ought to be executed in a few minutes." At length, if the position is taken, the troops are so exhausted that "they are unable to move," consequently, the light troops are sent forward, but, as these are normally a rabble of untrained men, they are "attentive only to plunder." "Such have been the victories I have seen, and such the consequences, which I can attribute only to the natural slowness and inactivity of our armies, which proceed . . . from the use of firearms, and from the consequent mode of ranging the troops"; by which Lloyd means that in place of using manœuvre, surprise and rapidity of movement, sole reliance was placed on fire-power. To the traditional soldier of his day, there was but one means of gaining a victory, namely, by destroying the enemy; therefore every weapon which could be used must be used; therefore the attack formation must be an unbroken line, and, as the maximum number of ranks which could fire was three, it must be a three-deep line. "Indeed," writes Lloyd, "our battles . . . are commonly nothing more than

great skirmishes ; and therefore . . . wars are not now, as formerly, concluded by battles, but for want of means to protract them."

Such was the art of war in the days of Lloyd, and I will now turn to the suggestions he put forward in order to advance the art.


"We can by no means determine whether or not our troops are properly ranged, till we have carefully examined the nature and effects of firearms." This is Lloyd's starting-point. "The musket," he says, "is a long-range weapon which prevents or delays men closing ; it is not so dangerous as the pike, which urges men to close. Amongst the ancients battles were decisive, amongst the moderns—prolonged and less bloody. Armies are separated by considerable distances and the "two lines very rarely join." In fact, "the musket is the resource of prudence and weakness ; hand weapons are the arms of valor and vigor. . . ." It seems, therefore, that to render an army perfect, and adequate to every purpose of war, it should be provided with both kinds of weapons. "And, in whatever order it is ranged it must possess strength, activity and universality."

Turning to the "offensive arms," Lloyd puts forward many novel suggestions. The musket he considered should be shortened "by ten or twelve inches," and "made much stronger towards the breech." The bayonet should be replaced by a four-foot lance which could be used as a hand weapon or fixed on to the barrel of the musket. Three-fourths of the infantry should be armed with these two weapons, and the fourth part with a twelve-foot pike, a sabre and a pair of pistols. Cavalry should be dressed in every respect like infantry, except that they should wear boots instead of half boots. They should carry a seven-foot lance, a four-foot sabre and a pair of pistols.

The battalion was to consist of five companies, one a light company, the former being one hundred and twenty-eight and the latter two hundred strong. The formation of the heavy companies was to be in four ranks on a frontage of a hundred yards, so that they could use their arms freely, the pikemen forming the fourth rank.

A regiment of cavalry was to consist of four heavy squadrons and one light, the former one hundred and sixty and the latter two hundred strong. A small and highly efficient body of cavalry was required, and not a great number of horsemen, because, "an able general at the head of a good infantry can do anything, and wants but a small cavalry," for as Europe is "a close country . . . ten

campaigns may pass without an opportunity for your cavalry to come to a general action."



(a) Heavy infantry ; (b) Light infantry ; (c) Pikemen ; (d) Cavalry ; (e) Artillery

LLOYD'S ORDER OF BATTLE

Lloyd's six battalions occupy a frontage of 2,500 yards, the normal frontage of six battalions being 1,200 yards.

Lloyd's suggested order of battle is an interesting one, and is reminiscent of the order made use of by Marshal Saxe. Battalions were to be drawn up in line at intervals of a hundred to a hundred and fifty yards, these intervals being the corridors through which the light infantry could advance and retire ; in these intervals were placed field guns and howitzers. These weapons were to cover the advance and retirement of the light infantry, who were to "act how and where they pleased," to aim at their leisure and to cross their "fire along the enemy's whole front."

In Lloyd's day the flanks of the infantry line were usually protected by heavy masses of cavalry, but he will have none of this, as he considers the "flank of the cavalry much weaker than that of the infantry." In place he suggests using a battalion of pikemen, supported by light infantry on each flank, and the cavalry distributed in two lines of squadrons in rear of the infantry.

Lloyd considers that this arrangement was far stronger, far more flexible than the old rigid line of battle, and "that every species of troops, infantry, cavalry, light infantry, and artillery, support and assist each other : so that the total quantity of action produced by my line is greatly superior to that of the enemy, and consequently must conquer."

In place of the parallel and "solid" order, Lloyd points out that a man or a body of men can only defend themselves in front, and that consequently, "if you can attack them on either, or both,

flanks, you will easily beat them, and much more so if you come upon them in the rear." The rear, therefore, becomes the decisive point of attack, for, if threatened from this direction, an army is seized by panic; therefore, when possible, the distribution of an army should permit of such an attack being delivered.

From this Lloyd deduces that the grand tactical formation is not the line but the semicircle. He says: "If you can *form in a portion of a circle*, whose branches project beyond his flanks, and the enemy persists in advancing within that circle, or remains in a line as usual while you extend yours in a curve, so that you come on either or both his flanks, it is evident that if you attack him in that disposition, he must be beat." He proposed, therefore, to divide an army into five divisions, three in the centre, which form the main body of his force, and one advanced on each flank, which were to operate like arms to this central body.

In conclusion, I will now briefly summarize his main ideas.

To appreciate the wisdom of Lloyd as a military thinker, it must be remembered that he lived in the age of Frederick the Great, a military age inhuman in the extreme. In spite of these surroundings, Lloyd is mentally stimulated and never morally obsessed by brutality, and although he fully appreciates the mechanical side of war, he sees that, for its efficiency, it must rest on a moral foundation. Thus he divides war into two spheres—human nature and human action.

His starting-point, as was that of Bacon and Descartes, is to accept nothing at its face value. Never copy, always analyze and discover the reason of things. Discover why a certain action succeeds and another fails; this demands an analysis of the conditions in which the action took place. Then, understand the influence of success and failure on human nature, for the instrument of war is a human one.

To do so, we must understand humanity, not only as one great brotherhood, but as a collection of races, of separate nations, each possessed of certain national as well as human instincts. National instincts vary. There are moral as well as physical theatres of war, and both must be studied.

A nation is the foundation of its army, but an army is made up of individuals each controlled by certain "passions," instincts and emotions, which give tone to action according to circumstances. What are these emotions, what are these circumstances? If we know them and understand them and can learn to control them, we can act efficiently; if not, then all we can do is to gamble.

To control these "passions," the traditional system aimed at terrorizing the soldier ; if the man feared his officers more than the enemy, fear, it was thought, would impel him forward. This was the axle pin of Frederick's system. Lloyd will have none of it ; fear to him is anathema ; it is honour and love of country which fire the soldier's heart, and for a soldier to be proud of his native land he must not only be an armed but an honourable citizen.

Given such a man, Lloyd next turns to action. He first lays down three general abstract ideas, or principles, and never loses sight of them. Not only must the weapons themselves allow the soldier to express these principles, but so also must the formations he is working in. These, in their turn, are but a means of attaining an end, and are never an end in themselves. The end is economical and rapid victory.

To attain victory, the enemy must be struck at some one point, not everywhere. Where is this point ? It is the rear of the enemy's army, or, failing the rear, then the flank—that is a point close to the rear. As this is so, then the problem is how to create a formation which will allow of a rear attack being delivered. Lloyd proposes a semicircular formation, a formation resembling the human body. The centre is the trunk, the two flexible wings are the arms. In his day, the normal procedure was to stretch out the arms in line with the shoulders and push the enemy over by volleys of musketry. Frederick improved on this system, by bringing the trunk of his army obliquely against his adversaries' left or right fist. Lloyd leaps ahead of Frederick and says : No ! Fight like a man, not like an automaton. Use both your fists, guard with the one, punch with the other ; keep them well in advance of your trunk, but never detached from it. Do not hit at your adversary's chest or fists, but at his jaw, or at the nape of his neck. Two rapidly moving fists operating from one strong body, this is Lloyd's formation.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH OCCUPATION OF TOGOLAND, 1914

(With Map)

BY A. J. REYNOLDS

It would be as well, before proceeding with the true object of this article, to give a short description of an interesting country which has ceased to exist as a separate unit, as a result of the Great War.

Togoland extends northward from the Gulf of Guinea, for a distance of 300 miles, as far as the Plains of Southern Gurma. Its width averages 120 miles, and it covers an area of about 33,700 square miles. It is bounded on the west by the Gold Coast Colony, and on the north by the provinces of Upper Senegal and Niger, in French West Africa; and on the east by Dahomey. Togoland is traversed by a low range of mountains running from the south-west to the north-east, the north-west region consists of low lands, drained by the rivers Oti and Daka. The south-eastern region is made up of a low-lying coastal district in the south, and an interior plateau, geographically a westerly continuation of the Dahomey Plateau, in the north.

The coastal region consists of a practically unbroken bank of sand a few feet above sea-level, only a few hundred yards in breadth, and of a zone of marshes, lagoons and rivers ramifying into numerous channels. Behind this lagoon zone extends an undulating plateau about 330 feet above sea-level, stretching towards the north and cut by a number of rivers.

In the south the inhabitants mainly belong to the Ewes tribe, which has spread across the central parts from the south-west end, and has absorbed practically all the older races, whose speech remains only in a few "ethnological islands." North of the Ewes is a mixed zone, and north of that again is a group of Sudan people. In the Ewe language the name Togo, means "Behind the Sea," and it was extended to the whole country by the Germans, owing to the fact that Dr. Nachtigal's first treaty in 1884 was made with the Chief of Togo.

The desire for colonial expansion for the development of their trade took possession of the Germans about 1882, although Bismarck

was only gradually persuaded to listen to the demands of the trading community. It was about this time that the Senates of Hamburg and Bremen, which were interested in the West African trade, demanded the dispatch of a German warship to Togo, and, as a result of this demand, the *Sophie* arrived at Little Popo on the 30th of January, 1884. It moved along the coast, collected hostages and obtained from the chiefs a written petition asking for German protection against England.

In the year 1911 I was stationed at Akuse, in the Volta River District, Eastern Province, of the Gold Coast Colony, when we were electrified by the news that the German Government had sent a gunboat to Agadir in Morocco. This action on the part of the Germans caused our military authorities to turn their attention to the Eastern Province, adjoining the German Colony of Togoland, as a future field for army manœuvres.

Towards the end of December, 1912, I first made acquaintance with the officers of the Gold Coast Regiment. They were passing through the Eastern Province for their first manœuvres near the Togoland border, when I joined them. These manœuvres were to prove useful as they were conducted close to the country which was to become, within the space of eighteen months, a belligerent.

During August, 1914, I was stationed in the same district, when the news of the outbreak of war with Germany arrived by Reuter's Agency. The same day I received orders from the Colonial Secretary at Accra to join Captain Barker at Keta, the nearest point to Togo. After a launch-journey of 70 miles down the Volta River, and a ride of 34 miles, I joined him at 5 o'clock on the evening of the 5th of August. The same evening a telegram was received from the Acting-Governor of Togo, suggesting that the Gold Coast and Togo should remain neutral. A reply was sent, intimating that no answer could be given without instructions from the Secretary of State and the telegram was transmitted to the Colonial Office, London. On the 6th, a reply was received to the effect that His Majesty's Government was unable to entertain any such suggestion ; and this answer was at once communicated to the Togoland Government.

On the 6th of August, a request received from the officer commanding our troops at Addah to raise native levies was refused, in view of the danger of collision between Awunas and Aggravis, which the Acting-Colonial Secretary considered might ensue, and also as information from Togoland did not indicate that similar action

was being taken by the German authorities. On the same day Captain Barker paid a visit to Lome, under a flag of truce, with a demand for the surrender of Togoland.

The day following Captain Barker came back to Keta, and returned to Lome at seven o'clock that night to receive the Acting-Governor's answer. On his arrival in Lome, he found the place abandoned by the Acting-Governor and troops, and he received from the District Commissioner the surrender of the town and of Togoland for a distance of 180 kilometres from the sea.

This surrender was not effected without a little bluff on our part. Captain Barker told the Acting-Governor of Togoland that we had three strong columns ready to cross the western frontier of Togoland, and one strong French column ready to cross the north, and two French columns ready to cross the eastern frontier. Twenty-four hours' armistice, during which no movement of troops was to take place, was granted, with the result already narrated.

Instructions now reached Accra for the movement of two further companies and two guns from Kumase by the shortest land route to Lome, and the establishment of a base there with the object of an attack on Kamina. The advance on Kamina was ordered not to be made without further instructions.

On the 8th of August, news was received of the occupation of positions in the vicinity of Little Popo and Mono by the French, and proposing cooperation. The French force consisted of 450 *tirailleurs*, 8 officers, 20 European non-commissioned officers, and two mountain guns. The same day Major O'Shaughnessy with a detachment, succeeded in cutting the cable connecting Lome with Monrovia, and Duala in the Cameroons. He also landed at Lome 40 miles of telegraph line, and sufficient instruments for eight stations.

On the 9th of August, instructions were received at Accra, sanctioning operations against Kamina, and, on the night of the 11th of August, Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Bryant, the officer commanding the Gold Coast Regiment, left Accra by the S.S. *Elele*, with two companies and two 2.95 guns. He arrived at Lome on the 12th of August without mishap.

The French meanwhile were busy in Haut Senegal and Niger, a force of 500 auxiliary cavalry and 50 *gardes cercles* moving against Sansanne Mango, in Northern Togo. This force, with a company of 180 *tirailleurs* in support, was due to reach its objective about the 15th of August, and was to be held in readiness for a forward movement in cooperation with the British troops.

But it was not until the 14th of August that our first train was able to move towards the front. On the 15th, contact was first established with the enemy. Our casualties were slight, but the Germans lost a train and, on the 16th, two European prisoners were brought in, one of whom proved to be Baron Codelli von Fahrenfeld, the designer of the wireless station at Kamina. Our advance to Agbelufoe by rail and road continued, the enemy destroying the bridge at Agbelufoe as he retired.

On the 16th of August "I" Company Gold Coast Regiment moved on Tsevie, and the remainder of the force moved to Togblekove, where the wireless station had also been destroyed. On that evening Captain Potter, in command of "I" Company, reported that Tsevie was clear of the enemy, and that he was advancing towards Agbelufoe, which place although no longer actually occupied by the enemy's troops, might be considered as their railhead. On the morning of the same day the main body moved on Kolokofe from Togblekove, and when it had reached a point about a mile south of Dawe, natives brought in information that in the early morning a train full of German soldiers had come into Tsevie, and opened a wild fusilade on the railway station. Luckily this place was empty at the time as our troops had moved by road.

The whole force pushed on to Lilikofe, where, at about 3 p.m., touch was gained with the enemy. As we were advancing towards the bridge over the river Lili, it was blown up by the enemy, who then retired to a ridge about half a mile in rear, where he took up a position to delay us. Owing to the thick and difficult nature of the country, our advance could not be continued until 4.30 p.m., by which time the enemy had been driven back. But owing to this delay the original intention of joining hands with "I" Company about Agbelufoe that evening could not be carried out, and our main force bivouacked at Ekuni, about seven miles south of that place. On the railway bridge at Ekuni, we found a train of twenty vehicles smashed to matchwood. This was the train which had raided Tsevie station that morning, and on its return journey it was derailed by Lieut. Collins, of "I" Company, as we learned later.

We again gained touch with the enemy at Gani Kofe ; from that point onwards there were signs everywhere that the enemy had beaten a demoralized retreat, arms, equipment, bicycles, ponies, etc. having been abandoned. On approaching Agbelufoe we heard the sound of heavy firing, and about a mile south of Agbelufoe we found that a second German train which had run down to Ekuni had been captured by Captain Potter and "I" Company together

with two engines, sixteen Europeans, one maxim together, with arms and ammunition. This success had been achieved in the following manner. At about four o'clock that morning, "I" Company was halted on the road close to Ekuni, when a train was heard to pass down the line going in the direction of Tsevie. Lieut. Collins, and one section of "I" Company, guided by a local Hausa man, went by a bush track to the line, where they piled stones on the railway line, 200 yards north of Ekuni bridge. Leaving that section in readiness, Lieut. Collins then moved down the line to Ekuni Bridge, where he took up a loose iron rail and laid it diagonally across the line; he then brought his section down and concealed them about the bush. In the meantime, the rest of "I" Company hurried on at full speed to Agbelufœ. After some time another train was heard coming down the line. This train was pulled up by the stones, Lieut. Collins formed up his section and prepared to charge it, but when his men were within about ten yards of it, the train started to move back in the direction of Agbelufœ. Captain Potter had heard this train and took up a position to intercept it, but it ran through at full speed. Agbelufœ station was then occupied, and put in a state of defence, and early that evening the enemy attacked from the south, but was driven back. He renewed the attack during the night in a vain endeavour to break through to the north. Early the following morning the advance of the main body began to make itself felt, and the German force fled back to its train, surrendering to Captain Potter.

One of the most important results of this action was that the railway for 30 miles north of Agbelufœ fell into our hands intact. So hasty was the enemy's retreat that he had no time to blow up the important bridge over the river Haho, 7 miles north of Agbelufœ.

On the 16th, 17th and 18th of August we were compelled to rest the troops, who had had a most trying time, and also to get up ammunition and stores. On the 17th of August a strong officer's patrol, however, which had been pushed up the line to seize the Haho bridge, reported that the enemy was advancing in strength. It so happened that the next day a French force of 150 *tirailleurs* with 3 officers under Captain Castaing, arrived from Anecho. This force was directed to move immediately on to the Haho bridge. The same day a post named Adakakpe, 4 miles north of Haho bridge, was occupied by a half company of the Gold Coast Regiment, the repairs to the bridge at Togblekove were completed, and our railhead brought up as far as the demolished bridge at Lilikofe.

The following day, the 19th of August, we moved as far as

Nuatja, and messengers were sent to inform Major Maroix, commanding the French column at Tchetti and also the commander of the British northern column, that we intended to be on the Amutschi river on the 26th of August, and requesting them to be within two days of Kamina on that date. The next day our whole force was concentrated about Nuatja, with advance troops in and in front of Kpedome.

On the 21st of August the enemy was reported to be holding a very strong position at the village of Chra, 400 yards north of the railway bridge over the Chra river. This bridge was blown up and two mines were exploded on the line as our patrols advanced under the fire of two hostile maxim guns.

We held our position during the night, and, at the first flush of dawn, firing broke out on both sides. Our main body, which now consisted of 3 weak British companies, 120 *tirailleurs* and 3 guns, advanced in two columns along the road and railway. "I" Company was ordered to find a way round the enemy's right flank, while half "C" Company held the enemy in front. The Pioneer Company was sent to hold the railway line and to support an attack by the French and a part of "G" Company on the enemy's left flank. The attacking force encountered great difficulties. Owing to the nature of the country, communication between the various units in the attack was practically impossible, while the inability of any of the units to watch the progress made by the other units resulted in a lack of mutual support. The officer in command of the operation could not be kept informed as to the course of events, while the guns were of little value, owing to the absence of positions, the impossibility of observing the result of fire and the small amount of ammunition available. The French worked right round through the bush on the enemy's left, but could not break through his entrenched position. They actually worked their way to within 50 yards of the enemy, but after fighting with extraordinary bravery were compelled to retire. Meanwhile "I" Company had managed to turn the enemy's right flank, having been under fire the whole of the way, but, owing to the nature of the bush, no support could be sent to the Company, and it was unable to continue its advance. At nightfall the "I" Company withdrew to the river, 300 yards west of the village, and the men entrenched themselves. The force on the enemy's left was then ordered to dig itself in, whilst half of "G" Company and the Pioneer Company were sent to reinforce "I" Company with a view to attacking the enemy's right.

At dawn the next day everything was in readiness for a fresh

attack, when patrols sent out by " I " Company reported the village unoccupied, the enemy having abandoned their positions during the night. At eight o'clock that morning we occupied the village of Chra, evacuated the wounded and buried our dead. Our casualties amounted to seventeen per cent. of our total force.

During the course of the next two days we sent out patrols to Gleï and the Amu river, where the enemy were reported to have rallied. During the nights of the 24th and 25th of August loud explosions were heard in the direction of Kamina, and at 8 a.m. on the 25th of August, the masts of the wireless station, which had been clearly visible the previous evening, were no longer to be seen.

The same day we occupied Gleï with our main body, while our advanced troops were on the Amu river, where both rail and road bridges had been blown up. During the afternoon a Major von Roben came into Gleï under a flag of truce, with terms of capitulation. Lieut.-Colonel Bryant replied that the surrender must be unconditional, and that he was advancing at once with all his force on Amutschi.

We at once occupied the north bank of the Amu river, in front of the road bridge which had been destroyed, with two weak companies, and the French, under Captain Castaing, were ordered to do the same in front of the railway bridge. During the night of the 25th-26th, the Amu river came down in spate, and the passage of the column with its baggage presented great difficulties, but foot-bridges were constructed, and by midday the whole column had crossed in safety. We reached Amutschi on the 26th of August, where we were met by two German officers bearing a letter of unconditional surrender.

From the very outbreak of hostilities the enemy had been misled as to our numerical strength, yet, even so, it was extraordinary that no serious attempt had been made to bar our progress until Tsevie and Agbelufœ were reached. The action at the latter place must have had a most demoralizing effect on the enemy. His line of retreat having been cut once, he became extremely nervous about it afterwards as he was entirely dependent on his railway communications.

The wireless station at Kamina was completely destroyed, a mere mass of burnt buildings and wrecked and twisted metal. There were nine masts in the installation, covering an area of one square mile. A couple of the masts were 150 metres high, and could transmit as far as Newfoundland.

The enemy was well supplied with ammunition, but this did not

prevent him from using all kinds of sporting ammunition against our men, which inflicted the most dreadful wounds imaginable.


The number of Europeans who surrendered amounted to 206, and among them was Major von Doering, the officer in command and Acting-Governor, in the absence of Duke Adolf Friedrich zu Meclenburgh, who was at home on leave at the time. Major von Doering was arraigned on the charge of using ammunition which did not comply with the conditions agreed to in the Hague Convention. A great proportion of the ammunition found on the German prisoners consisted of bullets which were enclosed in a nickel case which did not wholly cover the core. Major von Doering admitted the use of this ammunition, and stated that it was not issued by the German Government, but was private property, and that, owing to the distance from headquarters, it was difficult for him to call in this ammunition.

This defence could not be sustained, as all the Europeans captured by us were operating along the railway line with Kamina as their base, so that the exchange of ammunition presented no difficulties. An order found at Kamina, dated the 10th of August, proved that Major von Doering was perfectly aware that Europeans were in possession of private ammunition. As a matter of fact, a large supply of this ammunition was found in a pond at Kamina, but it was proved that it had been put there after the enemy had decided to surrender.

The expedition was a highly successful one, for within a fortnight of the landing at Lome the operations had been brought to a conclusion by the unconditional surrender of Togoland to the British Government.

The late German Colony of Togoland is now being administered under the mandate of the League of Nations, about 13,500 square miles lying on the eastern side of the Volta river having been entrusted to Great Britain, and the remainder to France. The French mandatory zone includes Kamina, but it is not France's intention to repair the immense wireless installation. The French have an *administrateur de cercle* at Atakpame, about 2 miles from Kamina, who is in charge of that district. The League of Nations has prohibited the importation of spirits into their zone of administration, and the first report issued by their Commissioner proved that the lack of spirits was not missed by the natives.

The general impression seems to be that the natives were pleased at the change of masters, and I have never witnessed a more enthusiastic throng than the gathering at Kamina and Atakpame, to witness the hoisting of the British Flag.



[To face p. 322.]

THE ANATOLIAN REVOLT

TRANSLATED FROM THE TURKISH

(*With Map*)

BY C. A. HOOPER

PART II

The Southern Front.—By the end of October, 1919, the French had occupied Marash, Aintab and Urfa, and had increased their activities in the Adana district. The occupation disturbed the inhabitants of our southern vilayets, and, in particular, the fact that Armenian organizations existed among the French units awakened the hostility of the Islamic population.

Meetings were held in every district, at which the inhabitants protested against the occupation, and decided that, if necessary, the French were to be expelled from the country by force. They informed both the commander of the French forces of occupation, and the President of the Representative Assembly at Sivas, of this far-reaching decision. As time went by, the animosity and hostility against the French increased, and active fighting took place.

As a result of the heroic defence of the Nationalists at Urfa, Aintab, Marash and Adana, several organized French divisions, provided with ample technical equipment and military necessities (in spite of the participation of thousands of Armenian *fedais*), were hopelessly defeated.

The 11th Division,* which had its headquarters in Nikdeh, and was connected with the Adana front, afforded help and assistance of every nature, to the Adana Nationalists.

The incessant activity and zeal displayed, both behind the lines and on the fronts, by the leaders of the Cilicia Central Committee, who were in touch with the division, caused the highest hopes to awaken with regard to the salvation of Adana.

* I took over command of this Division at the beginning of April, 1920.

The successes of the Adana Nationalists began with attacks and assaults on Hatch Kiri, Kelebek and Belemelik, in turn, the French suffering considerable losses. More than 200 French prisoners, for the most part composed of Armenian soldiers, and very much booty were captured (April, 1920).

The successes obtained increased the patriotic feelings of the people of the Adana northern front, who are, in fact, celebrated for their intrepidity and courage, and the assault on Bozanti was accelerated. But to have attacked Bozanti, which the French had completely fortified and strengthened with barbed wire, without guns and machine guns, would have meant the slaughter of our self-sacrificing compatriots, and so four heavy and two field guns and some machine guns were sent to the Nationalists.

The bombardment of Bozanti from three sides was begun on the morning of the 8th of May, 1920. The Nationalists, who could not remain inactive while the reports of our guns, placed in dominant positions, echoed from the Taurus mountains, immediately attacked. But since it was found impossible to destroy the barbed wire, the attack had to be postponed.

I think that mention of the fact that a large number of notables and Ulama, rifle in hand, took part in this attack, gives sufficient idea of the extent of Nationalist determination and faith in this district.

The fire of rebellion which was gradually spreading in the Duzja and Boli district, obliged the 11th Division rapidly to leave the Bozanti area.*

In the cypher instructions which had been received from Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Grand National Assembly and containing orders for the rapid departure of the 11th Division, I was ordered, "in view of the fact that important forces have been defeated in the Boli district, and that signs of rebellion have been remarked in Konia, to give up the attack on Bozanti and to move rapidly with as many troops as possible."

Our forces in the neighbourhood of Kiva, under the orders of

* The attempt at a sortie carried out on the 27th of May, 1920, by the French, who were besieged in Bozanti, failed. The commander and his officers, guns and machine guns, and more than 800 French troops, were captured. It is remarkable that the number of our Nationalist heroes who captured this important French force did not exceed one hundred. The rôle played by Khadija Khatun in this affair, however, was very important. Khadija Khatun, who came from the village of Panzin Chukur in the *nahieh* of Göl, was the wife of Hassan Agha, and rendered services to the country in the Nationalist forces of Emin and Dervish Aghas, by giving false information to the French, who were leaving (the town) in the direction of Tarsus, whereby they lost their way in the very difficult Kar Boghaz, Khadija Khatun informing the Nationalists.

Ali Fuad Pasha, engaged in serious warfare with the " police regiments."

The units of the " Army of the Caliph " which dominated the Duzja and Boli district, extended their area of occupation in the direction of Mudreni and Angora.

A battalion composed of selected officers and men of the division, together with the 127th Regiment and one field and one mountain battery, assembling at Konia on the 11th of May, 1920, moved towards that town by train. After Konia, the trains moved to Eskishehr, and thence to Sariköi station. The units which were disembarked at Sariköi moved to Mudreni from Mikhalijjik Uzreh and Nalli Khan.

Some 200 *Zeibek* cavalry, who had come from the Nazilli front under the command of Staff-Major Nazim Bey ; the 189th Infantry Regiment ; the detachment of Cholak Ibrahim Bey, composed of the Nationalist detachments of Eskishehr ; and the Nationalist detachment of Ali Bey of Maghnisa, which arrived with the units of the 11th Division, assembled at Mudreni. These forces were commanded by Colonel Rafet Bey, who had come from the Smyrna front.

The attacks of the " police " units, which tried to penetrate towards the south from the Kiva sector, were checked, and Ali Fuad Pasha, who counter-attacked with the help of our Nationalists that were arriving from all quarters, obliged the opposing and hostile forces in question to retreat in the direction of Ada Bazar and Ismit.

The mobile forces pursuing Anzavur entered Ada Bazar, and, moving eastward from that place, arrived at Khandek.

The rebels, who were in danger of being surrounded on all sides, proposed a truce through our deputy, Khosrev Bey, who was a prisoner in Duzja. This proposal was accepted. The next day, the forces of Nazim Bey ; the units under the orders of the 11th Division ; and the Nationalist detachments, moved in two columns to Duzja. The left flank column, which proceeded by the mountain road, in heavy rains, encountered very serious difficulties, coming under the fire of the despicable rebels, who failed to keep their word.

Our units arrived at Duzja on the 25th of May, 1920.* The mobile forces had previously entered Duzja, and had executed certain officers and officials belonging to the " police " units, including Lieut.-Colonel Khairi, the chief of the staff of the Minister of War, Shefik, together with leaders such as Sefer, Kotch and Abdul

* The Turkish text gives 1919 in error. (Note by Translator.)

Vehab. The chief of the rebels, Maan Ali, succeeded in escaping. These death sentences were carried out by the mobile forces, as they were not aware of the truce which had been concluded. Meanwhile, the revolt which had broken out in Zileh and Tokat, at the instigation of Nazim of Erzerum and Sheki Mustafa, extended considerably, and revolutionary outbreaks occurred at Yozghad at the instigation of Chian Oghlu.

With a view to the pacification and extinction of the rebellion in question, troops and Nationalist forces were dispatched from Sivas and Amassia ; and the mobile forces in Duzja, and the detachment under Cholak Ibrahim Bey (which had been converted into cavalry), were moved rapidly in the direction of Yozghad. Colonel Rafet Bey also, with a number of cavalry, moved in the direction of Keredeh and Akdagh.

The First Greek Attacks.—Our foreign enemies—in the north, the British and the “Army of the Caliph”; in the south, the French; and in the west, the Greeks—were watching their opportunity.

The *fetvas* and propaganda which had been issued against the Nationalist uprising, had been the cause of a great deal of excitement and treacherous behaviour in the interior, and, rebellion breaking out in various parts of the country, a great deal of blood had been shed. Propaganda which had been carried on by the Greeks and the adherents of the Padishah—such as : “The Greeks have been sent by the Padishah. They will only seize the leaders of the Nationalist forces. They will not cause harm to anyone else. The Padishah has made peace. He does not wish for war,”—excited the minds of the people and spread to the various fronts. This succession of rebellions against the Nationalist cause, and the harmful propaganda shook the nation to an appreciable extent, and was the cause of the weakening of the Nationalist fronts, and particularly of the Smyrna front. The Greeks, who did not fail to profit by this opportunity, attacked from the Smyrna front with superior forces on the 22nd of June, 1920.

The dispositions on the Smyrna front were as follows : (a) Balikessir (Northern Smyrna front) : commander, Colonel Kiazim Bey (Kiazin Pasha, Minister for National Defence); (b) Salihli (Eastern Smyrna front) : commander, Cherkess Edhem (a considerable portion of these forces was in the Yozghad district); and (c) Nazilli (Southern Smyrna front) : commander, Demirji Mehmed Efeh.

As a result of the Greek attack, Balikessir, Alashehr, Nazilli, and, shortly after, Brussa, were invaded by the Greeks. The occupa-

tion with ease of a large part of Western Anatolia by the Greeks in a short time, and the unhappy sight of a flood of refugees moving towards the east, caused a revulsion of public opinion, and greatly excited the population.

This retreat without resistance, and the fact that our richest towns, which possessed the resources vital to the success of our war effort, and the possession of which would encourage and strengthen resistance, were left to the invader, had a depressing effect upon a large number of our most enlightened supporters, and caused a feeling of hopelessness to set in. I think, however, that a serious resistance against superior enemy forces, thereby causing our effectives to be gradually defeated and destroyed, would not have served the object in view. There can be no doubt that a gradual and orderly retreat towards the East—provided it did not result in confusion—by our Nationalist and military forces in Anatolia, which induced the enemy to move as far as possible from his base, was a sound military policy.

Upon the commencement of Greek activities on a large scale in Western Anatolia, Ali Fuad Pasha was appointed to the command of the western front, with a view to the organization of the whole operations. The entire military and Nationalist forces in Western Anatolia were placed under his orders.

Brigadier-General Kiazim Pasha (of Diarbekr) was appointed deputy commander on this front, in order to organize the supplies and base services, and, in case of need, to assume the post of deputy Commander-in-Chief. Upon the fall of Alashehr, and upon Ushak being endangered, the units of the 11th Division in Duzja were speedily moved to Ada Bazar, and were thence dispatched by train to Ushak.

Upon its arrival at Ushak, the division was ordered by Ali Fuad Pasha to fortify and to defend the Ineh ridge. Since the enemy was advancing on Brussa, however, the division was again sent by train to Karaköi, and thence to Pazarjik. While the units were on the move, they were halted on the Nazif Pasha ridges, to the west of Pazarjik, on account of the fall of Brussa, and measures were taken for defence. The Nationalist detachment, under the orders of Major Said Bey, was sent to Inegöl. At this point, the 70th Regiment was incorporated in the 11th Division. The 24th Division covered the region Yenishahr-Bilejik.

The Greeks, who occupied Brussa on the 8th of July, 1920, endeavoured, a week later, to advance in the direction of Inegöl with their advanced units, but as a result of the heroic resistance

of the force under the orders of Major Said Bey,* they were held up on the Doma ridges. In this battle, a large number of Nationalist heroes were killed and wounded.

The Greeks, who were advancing in the direction of Ushak, captured that town, and for the third time an internal armed rebellion on a large scale broke out in Konia.

In view of this situation, the 11th Division moved from Pazarjik to Eskishehr, and an infantry regiment, with one battery, was sent by train to Ilghin. A composite cavalry regiment, two guns and four machine guns, under the command of Captain Avni Bey, were moved from Angora to Konia, and a Nationalist detachment under the orders of Ali Bey of Maghnisa, and another Nationalist detachment, under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Dervish Bey, arrived at Konia from Aziziya. The Minister of the Interior, Colonel Rafet Bey Effendi, who had been charged with the pacification of the Konia revolt, now dispersed the rebels after fighting, and in a short time succeeded in restoring order.

The Nationalist Forces and Regular Organizations.—Peace was established in the country upon the removal of the great scourge of Anzavur, the quelling of the internal rebellions, and the check to the Greek invasion. The administrative machine of our Nationalist Government also began to work regularly (August, 1920).

During the months of September and October, with the exception of the battle of Demirji, with the Greeks, fought by the mobile forces, and the attack on Gödüs, made by the 11th and 61st Divisions and the mobile forces, complete peace reigned in Anatolia. In the East, the operations in Armenia were continuing with complete success, Sarikamish and Kars being captured.

The Grand National Assembly definitely decided upon the rapid formation of a trained Regular Army, in view of the necessity in future of meeting organized hostile armies. The salaries and allowances of the regular units were increased, and sufficient quantities of equipment and clothing were ordered.

Besides three Regular divisions, formed by the determination and energy of Ali Fuad Pasha, commander of the western front, a start was made with the formation of some new divisions.†

* This force consisted of a mixed unit under cavalry Captain Avni Bey, of Kharpüt, and the "White Flag" detachment and the Inegöl local forces under the command of reserve Lieutenant Ahmed Mukhtar Effendi.

† The five divisions under orders on the western front at this time—the divisions which formed the basis of our new army—were as follows: 24th Division, commander, Lieut.-Colonel Atif Bey; 11th Division, commander, Mehmed Arif Bey; 61st Division, commander, Eddin Bey; 23rd Division (partially formed),

The shortage of clothing, equipment and military supplies hindered the rapid formation of Regular units. Nor did a sufficient number of staff officers and leaders exist. Regiments, even divisions, had to be entrusted to the command of majors. Consequently, it was necessary to retain the detachments of the Nationalist forces for a short time, and gradually to convert them into Regular forces.

Certain improper action and behaviour of the Nationalist detachments, in which it had been impossible to maintain discipline, as understood in the Regular units—both before and during the formation of the Grand National Assembly—had been tolerated, as being inevitable, in the interests of the nation and country. But after the formation of the Nationalist Government and the establishment of tranquillity and order in the country, it was, of course, impossible to continue the indulgence hitherto shown to the Nationalist forces.

Our Nationalist Government, which had decided on the formation of Regular armies, was obliged, before all, to assure and to maintain discipline. It was impossible to reconcile the conception of a Regular army with the "Nationalist forces" born of the revolution period.*

The recent experiences with regard to the Nationalist detachments, or in other words, the Nationalist forces, had strengthened our opinion with regard to the necessity and importance of a Regular organization. In fact, it had been made perfectly clear that while the Nationalist forces were very useful and effective in quelling internal rebellions and also in the defence and protection of the Smyrna, Eskişehir, Adana, Marash, Aintab, and Urfa districts, as well as of their own homes, it was not possible to obtain the maximum result from them beyond the limits of their own districts or in organized fighting. As time went by, the Nationalist forces, which had originated in a sacred hope and desire, were—owing to the abuse of certain self-interested bands—gradually converted into (bands of) marauders. For this reason, it was urgently necessary to increase the Regular formations and to enforce a stricter discipline.

commander, Major Khalis Bey; 4th Division (in process of formation), commander, Nazim Bey.

Apart from these, there were a Regular cavalry regiment, a Nationalist cavalry regiment, several Nationalist detachments, and a Nationalist cavalry division with the title of "mobile forces," under the orders of the western front.

* It was impossible to supply the Regular units with sufficient clothing and equipment and to pay them regularly, the pay itself, moreover, being very small and inadequate. On the other hand, the members of the Nationalist forces received a large amount of money, were perfectly clothed, and rode the finest horses.

The soldier of yesterday who deserted from his unit in tattered clothing, was now loaded from head to foot with cartridges, carried a mauser on his shoulder, had a silver-handled whip in his hand . . . ! This was the situation in which, while remaining Nationalists, they had to become soldiers.

The adherents of the Nationalist forces, who did not wish to fall in with these requirements and conditions, naturally were not pleased with this decision.

Meanwhile, certain changes were carried out by the High Command. Among others, upon the appointment of Ali Fuad Pasha to be Ambassador Extraordinary to Moscow, the western and southern fronts were created (November, 1920). Colonel Ismet Bey Effendi (Prime Minister Ismet Pasha) was appointed to the command of the western front. Colonel Rafet Bey Effendi (Rafet Pasha) was appointed to the command of the southern front. At the same time, Brig.-General Fevzi Pasha, Minister for National Defence, undertook the duties of Chief of the General Staff. Several of the detachments of the Nationalist forces were converted into Regular troops.

The detachment of Cholak Ibrahim Bey, deputy for Ertoghrlu, was called the 3rd Cavalry Division, the detachment of Sari Efendi (Edib Bey) was called the 33rd Cavalry Regiment, and the "Blue Flag" detachment was called the 61st Infantry Regiment.

The First In Öni.—The greater part of our Army having left the fronts, the Greeks, who had increased the number of their own effectives, seized their opportunity, and made a serious attack from the Brussa front, and a feint attack from the Ushak front.

This plan was well conceived, because the Greeks would have occupied Eskishehr with speed and ease, and would have obtained a dominant position on the Anatolian railways.

If the Turkish Army advanced against the Greeks, the mobile forces, whom they thought to consist of thousands of horsemen, would attack the army in the rear and on the flanks, and in this way, the forces of the Grand National Assembly would either be completely captured or destroyed, and thereafter the National Assembly and Government would of course be dispersed.

When the Greeks, who attacked from the Smyrna front with an army corps consisting of three divisions, came into touch with our covering units on the 6th of January, 1921, in their positions on the Nazif Pasha ridges to the west of Pazarjik and Köpri Hissar, the greater portion of our Army was at a point between Derbend and Gödüs.

We had a prepared and partially fortified position at In Öni, and these positions were prepared to the west with a view to the defence of Eskishehr. The distance from Pazarjik to the In Öni positions was approximately 30 kilometres. The enemy could have covered that distance in a day. As a matter of fact, our units in

the neighbourhood of Gödüs were obliged to make a forced march of 70 or 80 kilometres to Kutahia (Alayond) and (including entraining and detraining) to take the transport an eight to ten hours' journey by railway. According to calculations, the Greeks—a day before us—must have arrived at In Öni, and gained a position dominating Eskishehr. The situation was a critical one. Upon the arrival of information on the morning of the 6th of January, 1921, concerning the Greek attacks, the following decision was come to at a late hour, as a result of meetings and discussions which took place at Effendi Köpri.

(The units of the 61st Division and one cavalry brigade were to be left in the Kutahia neighbourhood, with a view to destroying or preventing the escape of the mobile forces, which had begun to collapse on account of desertions *en masse*, the true nature of which had been made clear as a result of small skirmishes and forward movements continuing for a week, and the remaining forces were to be moved to the fronts, *i.e.* it was decided that the 11th Division should move to In Öni, and the Cavalry Division and the 8th Division to Dumlu Pınar.)

It was considered probable that the Greeks would make serious attacks in the direction of Afium. Finally, when it became evident that the enemy would not advance from Islamköi, the cavalry and infantry forces of the southern front were again directed to the north.

The 58th Regiment of the 4th Division, which was in process of formation in Angora, together with a mountain battery, under the personal command of divisional commander Major Nazim Bey, had been sent earlier by train to In Öni.

The 11th Division, which had been ordered to move off without delay to In Öni, left the sector between Derebend and Gödüs at dawn on the morning of the 7th of January, 1921. In spite of a week's exhausting work, our units, by continuing the marches by night, arrived on the morning of the 8th of January, at Kutahia, thus covering a distance of 70 kilometres in a day.

The 11th Divisional headquarters, the 70th Regiment, and a field battery, were detrained at In Öni station on the morning of the 9th of January, having been transported by train after endless difficulties (due to the fact that the Christian railway *employés* had placed every obstruction in its way), and the march was begun in the direction of Kavalja without a pause. The formations which were to arrive by train after the division (the 127th Regiment, the artillery battalion and attached units), were also to follow in the same direction. The sound of machine guns was

heard from the direction of Kavalja. The 58th Regiment, commanded by Nazim Bey, then deployed on a front of about 10 kilometres, and got into touch with the Greek outposts.

On our arrival at Kavalja, we were suddenly exposed to the artillery and rifle fire of the enemy. It was announced that the 58th Regiment, the left wing of which was weak, had fallen back in a north-easterly direction, and that the enemy had occupied the Kara Aghach ridges (Arif Bey Hill).

Meanwhile, our 70th Regiment, which was occupying Kolbashisi and Kavalja, immediately occupied the ridges to the west of Kavalja, and the battery, taking up position, opened fire. On the left flank the battle raged until nightfall, and the enemy's attacks were repulsed.

The night of the 9th-10th of January passed quietly. But work was carried out up to the morning in placing the guns in position, fortifying certain important points and strengthening the fronts. The remaining forces of the 11th Division joined up. The battle, which began the next day, 10th of January, in the morning, in foggy weather, gradually increased in severity, and after mid-day, at various points on the front, and particularly at Nazim Bey Hill, resulted in bayonet fighting.

Colonel Ismet Bey Effendi, commander of the western front, who arrived at In Öni during the course of the day, was closely concerned in this exciting and bloody battle.

Eskishehr.—The Greeks, who had suffered great losses in the southern area of the Bozouyuk railway—in spite of their having been successful to the north of the railway and even, for a time, having gained ground up to In Öni station—were unable to continue the battle, and on the night of the 10th-11th of January decided to retreat.

The Greeks confessed that they had come in contact with organized and trained units, and not Nationalist forces, and expressed their appreciation of the skill of our gunners, and their amazement at our use of fifteen-centimetre heavy guns, which did not exist in their own armies.

Our forces in the neighbourhood of Kutahia attacked all the rebels returning, and held up their dispersal with great firmness, and the cavalry forces under the personal direction of Colonel Rafet Bey Effendi, commander of the southern front, pursued them up to the Greek lines. Parti Pehlevan Agha, who was not disposed to side with the Greeks, separated from the rebels and took to the mountains; and certain officers and men, with their guns and rifles, who, for various reasons, had not been able to separate from the rebels, [now] joined our Army.

Our new [young] Army, by defeating our internal and foreign enemies at one and the same time, thus succeeded at its first attempt, in demonstrating its military capacity, and effectually proved, by its remarkable actions and achievements, the wisdom of creating organized forces.

The first In Öni was the day of the first military victory of the new Turkey. The Greeks, who had invaded Western Anatolia, received their first shaking from our troops.

After the military successes of the first In Öni and Kutahia, discipline was restored and order established. The units of the 24th Division, on the northern sector of the railway, which fell back for certain reasons, were unable to take part in the battle of the 10th of January. The cavalry brigade, which arrived on the day of the 10th, and the depôt regiment, consisting of two battalions, were also unable to take part in the decisive phases of the battle.*

Continued Victories.—In the year 1921, the revolutionary period came to an end, and its place was taken by the conception of an organized State.

The nation and the Grand Assembly having decided to drive the Greeks at all costs from our country, leaving all other considerations on one side, devoted their efforts as one united whole to a single object: that of saving the country. The allocations for national defence were increased, and steps were taken to obtain supplies and war materials from the interior and abroad. Meanwhile, our Nationalist Government had been invited to the London Conference, and a delegation was dispatched under the presidency of Bekir Sami Bey, deputy for Tokat, in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At the same time, a commission was sent on behalf of the Constantinople Government, under the presidency of the Grand Vizir, Tevfik Pasha (February, 1921).

At the conference, Bekir Sami Bey stated that the Constantinople Government had no right to take part in the discussions, and Tevfik Pasha left the matter of discussion to the delegates of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In this way, the Government of the Grand National Assembly was officially recognized as alone being sovereign, and having full powers with regard to the fate of Turkey.

Besides this, the Allied Powers agreed to regard the question

* The forces which actually took part in the battle of the first In Öni were as follows: from the 11th Division: 70th Regiment, 127th Regiment, shock battalion, engineering company, artillery battalion, fifteen-centimetre heavy battery; from the 4th Division: 58th Regiment, shock and engineering companies, mountain battery.

of the discord which had arisen in Anatolia, as being a purely Greco-Turkish question. No definite and clearly defined proposals were made at the London Conference, which met on the 22nd of February, 1921. But the evacuation of Anatolia, Thrace and Constantinople was agreed to in principle, although the application of a special administration was suggested by Mr. Lloyd George for the Smyrna central Kaza. Apart from this, the right of possessing a Regular Army, which was denied by the Treaty of Sèvres, and in case of necessity, the transport of troops into Rumelia, was agreed to.

Should these proposals, which were made at the Conference, be deemed worthy of acceptance by Angora, *i.e.* by the Grand National Assembly, our delegates would again be invited during August or September of 1921. As a matter of fact, the Greeks attacked while our delegates were still travelling. The second In Öni and Dumlu Punar battles now took place. The Greeks, in spite of being in superior numbers, divided their forces into two, and attacked simultaneously in the directions of Eskişehir and Afiun-Kara-Hissar. Our Army obliged the Greeks, who advanced at the outset with the majority of their troops in the Eskişehir direction, to retreat defeated at In Öni and neighbourhood (21st of March). Later, advancing with their main forces towards the south, the Greek troops in the neighbourhood of Afiun-Kara-Hissar were obliged to retreat, and were driven out of their positions at Dumlu Punar (11th of April).

It was thought very probable that the Greek forces in the south, which were advancing in the direction of Afiun-Kara-Hissar, by moving towards the north, would endanger the flanks and rear of our positions in In Öni, as by this movement it appeared possible that the separated Greek forces would be able to unite their efforts at the most critical period of the battle. The Greeks, however, at the second battles of In Öni and Dumlu Punar, acted separately and without coordination.

The Greeks, retreating defeated from the second In Öni, were pursued by our cavalry in the direction of Brussa, and the 4th, 11th, 5th, and 24th . . . Infantry Divisions, moving towards the south, the Greek forces in the neighbourhood of Afiun-Kara-Hissar, fearing that their line of retreat would be cut off, were obliged rapidly to retreat and to give battle in the Dumlu Punar positions.

After the victories of the second In Öni and Dumlu Punar, great care was bestowed upon increasing our military forces day by day, making good the shortcomings of our Army, paying particular attention to the instruction and training of the units.

Since the number of the divisions had been increased, group formations were resorted to, supreme importance being attached to the western front. The southern front was abolished, General Rafet Pasha being appointed to the Ministry of National Defence.*

The greatest importance was attached to the fortifying of the western front, and during two or three months, immense fortifications were brought into existence.

The Greeks, however, with the object of winning at all costs, and destroying the Turkish Army, displayed a feverish activity, the King leading them. An army of 100,000 men, armed and equipped in accordance with the latest technical regiments, attacked in the Eskishehr, Katahia and Afiun directions on the 9th and 10th of July, with various columns. Fierce fighting occurred in the neighbourhood of Kutahia and in the Altuntash sector. Our Army, having made a short counter-attack against the Greeks in the neighbourhood of Eskishehr, succeeded in retiring across the Sakharia in a freer manner. In carrying out a retreat of some hundred kilometres, it naturally suffered considerable material damage. It also lost the railways, which assured the most important necessities of life. But as the Greeks were obliged to advance still farther from their base . . . certain military advantages were obtained, and our hopes of success were increased.

The Grand National Assembly, appreciating the importance and delicacy of the situation, unanimously agreed to entrust this important and difficult duty to the hero of the Anafartas, who had demonstrated his military skill on various battle fronts.

The assumption of the High Command by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who had accomplished such brilliant military exploits at the Dardanelles, in the Caucasus and in the deserts of Sinai, increased the moral and material power of our Army to an appreciable extent. The main part of our forces was concentrated in the basin of the Sakharia. The second group, under the orders of Colonel Selah Eddin Adil Bey; the 5th Division, Lieut.-Colonel Kenan Bey, and the 9th Division, Lieut.-Colonel Khairi Bey, moved northward with speed and skill, and joined the Army of the Sakharia. Every one believed that the Greeks would be bottled up

* These groups, each consisting of two to three divisions, were placed under the direct orders of the commander of the western front, General Ismet Pasha :— First group : Colonel Iz Eddin Bey. Third group : Colonel Mehmed Arif Bey. Fourth group : Colonel Kemal Eddin Sami Bey. Twelfth group : Colonel Kiazim Bey.

Besides these, a second group was formed on the southern front, against the French, under the orders of Colonel Selah Eddin Adil Bey; and there was also a fifth group (cavalry) under the orders of Colonel Fakr Eddin.

in the Sakharia. This belief was completely realized (13th of September), after twenty days' fighting by our Army, which commenced the battles of the Sakharia on the 23rd of August. The Greeks, who had suffered severe losses and terrible disillusiones, retreated and buried their great hopes in the Sakharia.

The Greek plan of attack, which had been very cleverly and carefully organized, aimed at surrounding the left wing of our Army, occupying Angora by the shortest route, and cutting off the whole line Angora—Sivas. This plan, which King Constantine and General Paponlas wished to carry out with such assurance, had not eluded the vigilance of our Commander-in-Chief, and the famous Greek plan, in the face of his rapid and firm decisions, was completely frustrated.

The battle of the Sakharia, which is most suitable for giving lessons in military strategy and tactics to our future commanders and military staff, is filled with heroic actions of such a nature as everlastingly to bring glory to the Turkish nation and Army.*

Upon the victory of the Sakharia, which definitely assured the revelation in the face of the whole world of our right to life and independence, the Commander-in-Chief, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was awarded the title of Ghazi, and the rank of Field-Marshal, (19th of September). The victory of the Sakharia satisfied the Greeks and the whole world that there was no probability of the Turks being defeated.

After the battle of the Sakharia, Army Corps and Army organizations were instituted on the western front, Ali Ihsan Pasha, and later Nur Eddin Pasha, being appointed to the command of the First Army, Yakub Shevki Pasha being appointed to the command of the Second Army.

The Greeks did not know what to do to efface the sting of the defeat of the Sakharia. At one time it was rumoured that they would shorten their line altogether; as a matter of fact shortly afterwards they began to carry out important fortifications of their fronts and strengthened their barbed-wire defences. At another time, they reinforced their troops in Thrace, with a view to occupying Constantinople. They even proclaimed the autonomy of Western Anatolia, and endeavoured to recruit troops from the local population!

This state of affairs was significant of Greek confusion and

* I mention the praiseworthy efforts of the Turkish railwaymen, who displayed extraordinary zeal and activity, and who, while being without coal, and even without wood, assured the regular dispatch, along a single line of railway, of the ammunition and food supplies for an army of 100,000 men.

BLACK SEA



indecision. From time to time, news arrived concerning the appearance of rebellion among the Greek units.

One thing is true, however, and that is that politics had taken a firm hold of the Greek Army, tension having been produced between the partisans of the King and the Venizelists. Discipline in the Greek Army began to be destroyed.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which had repeatedly manifested its pacific aims, gave full powers to the Minister of the Interior, Fethi Bey Effendi—who was proceeding to Europe on leave—to make known our minimum demands to the European Powers. He was, however, unable to obtain any definite results. The certainty was felt without exception by everyone that there was no possibility of coming to an understanding with the British and the Greeks, and that it would only be possible to find a solution for our National cause at the point of the bayonet : it was hoped that this salvation would not be long postponed. It was now our turn to attack. Everybody felt and manifested his desire in an unmistakable manner. The fact that thousands of our emigrants did not wish to be removed—even by force—from behind the front, and were waiting for our attack, was a decisive proof of this opinion.

Divine justice, which was revealed toward the end of August, 1922, in the shape of final punishment for the Greeks, who, in spite of the endless atrocities which they had committed, still nourished their treacherous designs, and the British, who made no attempt to turn them aside from their evil paths, provided a brilliant conclusion, in the form of a glorious great victory, to the history of our rebellion, 9th of September, 1922.

Our heroic Army attacked, and destroyed the cruel Greek Army. Smyrna, Brussa . . . and the whole of Anatolia was cleared of the enemy. A short time after, we greeted Constantinople and our Adrianople once again. The Turkish nation had obtained and been blessed with liberty and independence. There was no further obstacle in our way. Merely providing that we continued on our march, we could have gone to the farthest limits of the boundaries of the National Pact. But we stood fast : and we only stood fast in order to prove to the world by deeds that we were animated by pacific considerations. In October, 1922, the Mudania Armistice was signed. Later, our delegation, under the presidency of Ismet Pasha, proceeded to Lausanne. After encountering several difficulties, the Peace Treaty was finally accepted and ratified by us on the 23rd of August, 1923.

(Concluded)

MARSHAL SAXE'S MULE; OR, PRACTICE *v.* THEORY

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL BAIRD SMITH, D.S.O.

How many old soldiers have chuckled over Maurice of Saxe's famous jest, while secretly hoping that it had no application to themselves! Few, however, have failed to understand its true meaning; not that long military service has a pernicious effect on the brain, but that it is possible to be a very old campaigner, and yet remain a fool.

Probably to the end of time, or at least until war is abolished, the ancient dispute between theory and practice, between amateur strategist and hard-shell professional, will run its indecisive and fluctuating course. Hope springing eternal, there will from time to time arise fresh expounders of these irreconcilable points of view, whose voices will only be stilled by the clash of arms. The confidence of some disputants may even be based on neither theory nor practice, but merely on native obstinacy. As an example of this frame of mind, which all interested in the discussion would surely wish to avoid, the following true anecdote may not be out of place.

A good many years before the end of the last century, a Scottish Volunteer battalion was taking part in a field-day. One of its subalterns had posted his half-company in a very conspicuous position, devoid of all cover. In vain did his captain entreat him to move to a more sheltered spot; but as, in those far-off days, an independent spirit, resentful of "orders," reigned in the Volunteers, these entreaties produced no effect. At length an umpire, a narrow-minded Regular, rode up and put the subaltern and his men out of action. Even then, as he drew off his men towards the beer cart, the subaltern had the last word. Turning away, more in sorrow than in anger, he remarked audibly—"I ken weel noo how battles are lost!"

It is sometimes difficult to counter another kind of opponent,

who insists, so to speak, on "having it both ways." He will cite some famous soldier to prove a part of his case, ignoring the fact that this witness equally disproves the remainder. For example, it may be argued that a sound theoretical knowledge of past wars is far more valuable to a commander than actual experience of war, and long professional service; even that these two last are a hindrance to originality of military thought. In support of such a postulate it would certainly be necessary to call on some learned and gifted general of the past, whose conspicuous success, compared with the failure of his professional rivals, should be known to all. But as the number of such prodigies is, historically, limited, and as a startling proposition of the above nature needs a cloud of witnesses to make it convincing, the proposer has often to fall back on very doubtful evidence.

Thus Oliver Cromwell certainly took to soldiering late in life, and can be quoted, therefore, as a good example of the amateur commander whose mind was not trammelled by a narrowing routine; but there is no evidence to show that he had ever studied war in any book, save the Old Testament.

Perhaps the proposition is different: namely, that armies suddenly improvized are not, on that account, inferior to Regular troops, whom, on the contrary, they have frequently defeated. Here again it is not a few cases that will suffice for proof; so whole wars are laid under contribution, notably the American War of Independence, and the second South African War. In the first case the result certainly was victory for the rebel colonists; and yet, nevertheless, until they obtained the help of a French Regular army, their levies were invariably beaten in encounters with the British. In the second instance, it is often overlooked that thousands of amateur soldiers took part on both sides, often with surprising results; but the real causes of delay in attaining ultimate victory were two: first, the idea that infantry, and not cavalry, were needed; and second, the desire of the British Government to avoid losses—on both sides.

Sooner or later the great Napoleon will be called as a witness, in this evergreen controversy; a most dangerous witness, if too much reliance is placed on his "maxims." Already in the short space of a century, a series of legends surrounds the great Captain; and a whole book of "Apocrypha" is attributed to his wisdom. What he thought or said, and what his worshippers thought he meant, and said for him, can never again be thoroughly disentangled. It may be granted that he did recommend the practice of his own

youth, the study of the campaigns of the famous generals of the past ; or that he may have said that this was the only way to learn the art of war ; yet this meant no more than if he had pointed out that the models of the great masters should be studied, in order to learn in what the secret of their art consisted. The same Napoleon is credited with saying, " I never had a plan of campaign " ; or again, describing how tactics are applied in battle, " one engages the enemy everywhere, and then one sees." This did not mean stopping to think what Cæsar, or Frederick would have done in a like situation ; but using inborn genius, or even ordinary brains, to solve the problem that immediately presented itself.

In the course of the argument, out of which the name of Napoleon, like " King Charles' head," can hardly be kept, reasons for the Emperor's later disasters and downfall will be advanced, differing according to the bias of the disputants. It is frequently alleged that, for various causes, he was no longer the heaven-born general of earlier days ; that his eye had lost its piercing vision, and his brain its clearness and rapidity of thought. It is even suggested that the first triumphs of his genius, in the Italian campaigns, were superior to any of his subsequent achievements ; which show, to the careful inquirer, a steady deterioration in technique. At the time many of his adversaries believed that he was wearing out, his " star " growing dim. In this confidence, and the confidence of vastly superior numbers, with their newly acquired knowledge of war, dearly bought from him they now determined to destroy, the Allies invaded France in 1814.

The " Campaign of France," Napoleon's last campaign but one, can confidently be pointed out as a refutation of the alleged deterioration of his generalship. Still more so may it be quoted against the curious theory that mental elasticity decays with the growth of practical experience. " Fighting, and plenty of it," does not debase genius ; the born leader remains a leader, in the same way that Marshal Saxe's mule remained a mule.

The study of past campaigns should be discriminating. The days have long since gone by, when history of any kind was accepted at the historian's own value ; criticism and verification now supply his deficiencies, whether these are due to lack of authorities, carelessness or mere bias. In no type of histories is the tendency of the author to be one-sided, to exaggerate, or to pronounce *ex-parte* judgments, greater than in the chronicles of past wars. The historians, for the most part, are not soldiers themselves ; and even

when, as in the case of Napier, they are relating events in which they themselves took active part, they are not always free from prejudice. But at least the military historians do not fall into the common error of attributing all war's results to generalship ; they realize that a great many other things go to the winning of battles, besides strategy and tactics.

Knowledge of these many things is often, of course, beyond the historian's reach ; so that perforce he has to ascribe the victory to the superior manœuvres of one side ; not knowing, for example, that it was equally due to the empty stomachs of the other. Details of weather conditions, fatigue of the troops, and faulty commissariat are perhaps obscured by the mists of time. Even the orders issued on the eve of battle, or the plans of the rival commanders, are, it may be, imperfectly known ; while the extent to which they were aware of each other's movements and designs must nearly always be guessed. Explanation, then, of the battle and its result becomes a process of deduction, in which a more or less accurate map plays the chief part. Again, the importance of a victory, or the completeness of a defeat, is apt to be estimated in terms of guns captured and losses inflicted ; exclusively military results, about which the historians of the two sides are in violent disagreement. The minimizing of their countrymen's losses, and the magnifying of the enemy's is by historians as systematically pursued as in any modern General Staff *communiqué*. Not content with this form of glorification, the actual fighting is often described in terms reminiscent of Homer's *Iliad*. Multitudes of honest Britons have consequently been taught to believe that, in the past, the flower of foreign armies has never been able to survive the withering blast of British valour. To them no explanation of their victories was needed, beyond the stock phrase—"the enemy broke and fled." At the same time, in spite of these easy triumphs, genius of the highest order is ascribed to the British commander ; fortunate, indeed, in being endowed at once with a master mind, an irresistible army and a feeble foe.

Past wars cannot, of course, be profitably studied in this way. To read such stories may be gratifying to pride, and even stimulating to courage or ambition ; more probably they will implant false ideas, and furnish deceptive standards. It may well be said that this lack of materials for complete analysis of past wars, does not hinder the study of the greatest war of all. Its history, when completed, will no doubt supply many future generations of soldiers with all the precepts, example and inspiration that they seek : so

that it almost seems that all other war-histories become academic and superfluous.

In weighing justly the merits of past commanders, the criterion of success should not be too rigidly applied. Nor should the unlucky adversaries of the great leaders of history be dismissed indiscriminately as notorious blunderers. The margin between defeat and victory has often been so narrow, that a mere chance has decided which general shall wear the victor's laurels. A misunderstood order ; a momentary wavering in a portion of an otherwise steady line ; the fall of a trusted leader ; or the spreading of an inexplicable panic ; any of these things sufficed to ruin the best-laid plans, to blast the general's career, and to leave his reputation to the mockery of ignorant fellow-countrymen, or the sneers of self-sufficient historians. Remembering these things, it behoves all soldiers to treat the memory of their gallant, if unfortunate, fore-runners with charity and discrimination ; and not to pronounce on them sweeping judgments, born of the wisdom of after-knowledge. Is there a more touching story, in all our fighting annals, than that of poor Braddock, dying in defeat and shame, and yet gasping out these brave words, " We shall know better another time " ?

There have been some few commanders so fortunate as to keep the confidence of their countrymen, in spite of repeated misfortune. Of these, the best example was Blücher, old " Marshal Vorwärts." It might have been said that his chief equipment as a leader was the one word chosen for his nickname. At first sight, his career might offer a good analogy of the effect of campaigning on a mule ; in other words, of how long war-experience could not make, out of an average divisional general, a successful commander of armies. Napoleon defeated him many times ; notably at Lützen, at Champ-Aubert, and finally at Ligny ; but it should be remembered that Blücher failed, where his adversary was Napoleon himself, in good company. With other opponents, as at the Katzbach, and at Laon, he could give a good account of himself ; and something in the tough quality of the old soldier's character and of his bodily frame (at Ligny he was ridden over by the contending cavalry), was unconquerable, and brought him triumphantly through to Waterloo.

Another notable instance was Ulysses Grant. From Shiloh in 1862, to the Wilderness, Chickahominy, etc., in 1864, his battles with the Confederates appeared to result in mutual slaughter, and nothing else. Had the standard of success, so confidently used by

historians, been applied at the outset to Grant by his superiors, who can say that his name would not now be cited, to share the obloquy of McDowell, Pope and Burnside ?

The controversy, naturally, is not always restricted to the respective merits of commanders, whether they be amateur or professional, theoretical or practical soldiers ; it even embraces the qualifications of Regular officers, as such, to pose as authorities on the difficult business to which they have devoted their careers.

The rise of the amateur soldier dates in this country from the first Volunteer movement, during the Napoleonic wars ; when all that was required of our gallant Fencibles was to wear an attractive uniform and to carry arms, at musters, in a manner at once gratifying to beholders, and, it was hoped, discouraging to would-be invaders on the other side of the Channel. In the meantime, so long as the soil of their country remained inviolate, these patriotic citizens did not offer to interfere in the business of beating the French in other parts of the world ; and when peace was declared, they hung up guns and sabres over their chimney-pieces, and put away their martial clothes with regret tempered by relief. The nightmare of invasion was gone—apparently never to return. But their descendants were not destined always to sleep quietly in their beds. The second Volunteer movement of the mid-Victorian period, owing its inception to fear of the hereditary enemy, was destined to merge into the Territorial scheme, to prepare against, and in the end to supply armies to fight quite another foe.

Along with the Volunteer movement proper, the end of the century saw a still further expansion of amateur soldiering. Corps like the City Imperial Volunteers, Roberts's Horse, and other units of a similar kind sprang into being, and were hurried into the field to tackle a job for which there were plenty of Regular soldiers available. Naturally, those Regulars who were bottled up in far-off Indian and colonial garrisons, watched with mixed feelings these haphazard proceedings. They agreed that if these new levies were second line troops, they should have been set to hold depleted garrisons, while the first line concentrated on finishing the war. Officers in these garrisons, after a time, were able to go home on the usual leave, but only on giving their word not to proceed to South Africa. As for their men, many of whom were time-expired, and had even reached a port of embarkation, they found themselves prisoners in India and elsewhere " for the duration."

These incidents made a deep impression. As one young officer, whose civilian brother had gone to the war, while he remained

perspiring in the Plains, angrily remarked, "One imagined that by going into the Army, one would see some fighting; but it seems one would have done better on the Stock Exchange!"

From these days may be traced whatever jealousy of outsiders exists in the minds of Regular officers. The Army, too, at that time was poorly paid, and not very highly considered. Not long before, officers had been described by one demagogue as "gilded popinjays"; which term expressed the general idea that they were both idle and rich. Accusations of "stupidity" were freely bandied about, at a time when even the man in the street had discovered that there was a difference between frontal and flank attacks. Scarcely anyone who, it may have been from effrontery rather than merit, could command the public ear, forbore to lecture and instruct generals, officers and men in the art of war, as applied to the South African veldt. Later on, while the shadow of the German menace grew blacker and blacker, an incident at the Curragh served, like a flashlight, to reveal the old hidden contempt and dislike of "the military." But then followed the Great War; in which it was truly said that "the regimental officers came into their own."

The regiments to-day are, however, full of new blood; and the nation full of old soldiers and veteran officers, with a unique experience of war behind them. What is now apt to be overlooked is the fact that, after their recruit training, and entry into the field, all these individuals, whether styled "temporary" or otherwise, became Regular soldiers, in as strict a sense as the term can be applied. Their training was on Regular lines, by Regular instructors; and the new units into which they were formed were modelled on the old Regular battalions, whose names they bore, and whose spirit and traditions they adopted as their own. When this is remembered, it is difficult to see what useful purpose can be served by any discussion about the relative merits of Regular and amateur in the Great War. The nation was in arms, for the first time in its history. But for the fact that the bulk of the "temporary" officers were quite young, and that even the older ones had, in many cases, to learn the business from the beginning, there is little doubt that they could have filled many vacancies in the higher commands. The practice, however, of both the German and French General Staffs, in the matter of allotment to such commands, was the same as our own; namely, that so long as the supply of properly trained regular staff officers lasted, those that had proved capacity should not give way to others whose attainments were problematical. It is an abuse of terms to describe this ruling as professional jealousy.

It is true that in wars, such as the American Civil War, fought by armies of amateurs mainly commanded by the same, many capable leaders have come to the front, by a process of selection and elimination ; which, if the only possible one to adopt, has usually been extremely costly. In a great crowd of learners, men with training and experience, like Lee and Jackson, have usually come to the top, at an early stage of the campaign.

As a side issue, the noted leaders of guerillas are sometimes cited as witnesses on the side of the amateurs ; but obviously not as " theoretical " soldiers, or deep students of history. Their methods were their own ; and their adoption of the form of " little war " was due to poverty of resources, either in men, money or material. When, as sometimes occurred, as with Tantia Topi and his ally, the Rancee of Jhansi, they found themselves in command of respectable armies, sentiment and expediency compelled them to adopt the ordinary methods of war ; with the result that at the first shock of a Regular adversary, their undisciplined hordes were scattered to the winds. But to lurk in ambush, in jungle or mountain pass, to pounce on weakly held communications, or to plunder camps and baggage, was a business these brigands thoroughly understood. Achievements such as those of the famous De Wet, embarrassing to the enemy's generals, and demoralizing to their troops, never yet decided a campaign ; and merely prove that successful guerilla chiefs must have enterprise and quick wits. Their possession of such qualities can hardly be ascribed to their being " amateur " soldiers ; since " amateurs " have had an almost complete monopoly of this class of warfare. Nor need examples be sought from among another set of self-styled guerilla leaders ; whose notions of war consisted in pistolling unsuspecting people in the back, or murdering them in their beds.

A last point in the argument is the alleged narrowing influence of a life begun at a public school, continued in a military college, and in a regiment. This narrowing is usually taken for granted by one side, and reluctantly conceded by the other ; but there is in reality no such inevitable result. Leaving on one side the fact that the public schools turn out hundreds of " amateurs " to tens of professional soldiers, and that the difference between a Military College and a University is mainly one of hard work and discipline, in favour of the former, it may be asked what career the future amateur soldier is to adopt, that will not be narrowing in the sense here implied. A great many careers, mercantile, business, banking, law or medicine demand a settled domicile, much sedentary work

and a good deal of preliminary drudgery. At a time when the youthful subaltern may be taking himself, his uniform-case and his hopes of glory to some out-of-the-way corner of the world, his schoolfellows or contemporaries are learning to know tube and 'bus, and the lowering effect of the "quick lunch." Success for them looms in the far distance ; for the subaltern, it is awaiting him in the first campaign—or so he imagines. At any rate, his mind can dwell on that prospect, and fill itself with the impressions of strange lands, and the might of the Empire. His men, though they come and go, are always a personal responsibility ; from his seniors in rank he can learn many things, in sport, games or war ; and all Society is open to him, if he conforms to the regimental standard. In a word, he sees the world ; he is not boxed up in an office or counting house, tied to a telephone or sweated at a desk. Of course there remain his contemporaries of the leisured class ; granted that they spend a large part of their leisure, not only in military study, but in as much practice as a Territorial officer can obtain, there is no reason why they should not attain a broad outlook on military affairs. But there will not be a great many of this class so self-qualified ; even if there were, to compare their breadth of view favourably with the "narrowness" of professional officers, argues either prejudice, or scant knowledge of modern military conditions.

THE FUEL PROBLEM

BY LIEUT. H. J. COOPER, R.A.S.C.

"The present day has no value for me except as the eve of to-morrow: it is with to-morrow that my spirit wrestles."—METTERNICH.

THE problem of fuel supply is one which has for many years exercised economists and geologists who from time to time make endeavours to place a time limit on the supply of solid and liquid fuels: so far, the gaseous forms of fuel have not been seriously considered except as products of the former. It is with liquid fuel that the military forces of the nation are primarily concerned, since the advance of science has made it easier to procure, easier to transport and easier to burn, either in fireboxes or internal-combustion engine cylinders, than either the solid or the gaseous form.

Upon liquid fuel depends the conduct of war; it is one of the chief strategic commodities, the supply of which each nation must assure to itself if it is to be successful in war. Without it troops can neither be mobilized nor transported to a theatre of war, nor there maintained. The chief liquid fuel used by the Army is known as petrol—the ordinary grades are a mixture of the distillates of crude petroleum known as hexane, heptane and octane. It is procured by fractional distillation from the crude oil, which latter exists in many localities at varying depths throughout the world. The most well-known fields are situated in the United States of America and it is said that the most prolific are to be found to the south of the Great Bear Lake in Canada. Of the world's output but about four per cent. is found within the British Empire: this figure is increasing owing to the improved methods of well-sinking and to the fact that new fields are being discovered. The fact that so little liquid fuel is found in the Empire is a matter of some concern, more especially when one reflects that during the last war there was practically a petrol famine in commercial circles in Britain in spite of the fact that the Western Powers had gained "command of the sea": thus was the whole of the world's output available for the Allies, less the Russian, Rumanian and Galician resources. It

is not reasonable to suppose that such conditions will again obtain ; the conditions under which future wars will be conducted will be influenced by political, economic and military factors all combining to form a problem which resembles but faintly previous situations : moreover, with the increase in the mechanization of armies the petrol/man ratio is continually increasing, and the daily number of gallons which is necessary to keep a man in the front line will reach a formidable figure in war.

The chief sources of petroleum at the present time are the United States of America, Russia and Mexico—the actual percentage production is continually altering owing to the exploitation of other fields and to the discovery of new fields : thus is it patent that the Imperial forces may be reduced to comparative impotence by the failure of these sources of supply. The plight of the Empire would in this case be worse than that of the Central Powers in the last war when their normal oil stocks were exhausted soon after the commencement of the war in 1914. The area in which their Navy operated was much restricted and their need for oil fuel was thus much smaller than that of the British Fleet. Upon supremacy at sea overseas trade in war depends and the maintenance of sea lines of communication becomes a matter of impossibility without it ; thus upon stocks of oil in the first instance, and upon the possession of adequate potential reserves ultimately, the issue of war may depend.

The general problem is—how may the Empire become more self-supporting in the production of liquid fuel ? A sketch of the principal liquid fuels will be of assistance in elucidating the proffered solution.

Crude oil—the Seneca oil of the Seneca Indians—was first used as an emollient ; its lighting capacities were then exploited and when it was subjected to the process of distillation and the lighter components separated from the heavier, multitudinous uses were found for the distillates. Chief among these were lighting by oil lamps, the production of power in the internal-combustion engine and the ultimate secondary production of power by burning the fuel in a firebox to raise steam.

Benzol is a by-product of the coking of coal ; formerly it was separated in only small quantities, but now its production exercises a large industry and every possible precaution is taken to increase the yield. In the pure state it freezes at 42° F. and thus in this state is useless.

Shale oil, which is obtained from the distillation of bituminous shale, has a great fuel value and yielding on distillation the lighter

fuel oils, lubricants and paraffin wax. A large sulphur content renders the use of some oils impossible, owing to the offensive smell of the exhaust : purification is a matter of some difficulty.

Alcohol is produced by the distillation and fermentation of vegetable matter of all descriptions. It is of a low heat value and is subject to Excise regulations which prohibit its extensive use as a fuel.

Around the question of liquid fuel supply there cluster many others more or less intimately connected with it—to mention a few. How long will the present crude oil supply last ? That it is not illimitable is certain ; how long a period will elapse before the world becomes fuelless is unknown, it is but the exercise of a perverse ingenuity to attempt to foretell. Under what combination of circumstances the British Empire may find itself denuded of practically all its petroleum supply it is comparatively easy to estimate. Thus in order to ensure that the Imperial services of transportation, both civil and military, are unaffected by political *rapprochements*, defensive alliances and pacts, it is necessary to place dependence on other sources of liquid fuel than those afforded by the world's oil fields. They are two : the mines in which bituminous products—coal and shale—are found and the growing vegetable kingdom.

During the years immediately preceding 1914 considerable strides were made in the production of benzol by various industrial processes. The circumstances of the war period made it imperative that the production of benzol should be increased in every way, and it was estimated that in 1919 the output was at the rate of 44 million gallons per annum. This amount is negligible when it is remembered that the present rate of consumption of oil fuel is in the neighbourhood of one thousand million gallons per annum. In this connection it has always to be remembered that the depletion of the available coal supply for the production of benzol may not be possible and that complete reliance on this fuel for assuring the mobility of the fighting forces cannot be justified. A further source of fuel supply must be found to strengthen our position because not only does history show that wars in which we engage are primarily wars of alliances but also that we are usually the predominant financial and economic partner in them. Thus is a double burden laid upon us—that of supporting our own military forces as well as those of our allies. Nor is this apparent digression without value as it adds to the importance of the problem under discussion, more especially in view of the activity displayed by the French and Belgian and, what

is more remarkable, the American and Russian Governments, in the matter of substitution fuel research.

It is to the vegetable kingdom and its limitless possibilities in the production of alcohol that all eyes are turned.

Whatever may be the source of our present oil supplies—we have no part in the disquisitions of the petroleum technologists—there is no doubt that all other fuels are of vegetable origin. The cycle of Nature has enabled energy to be rendered latent during the life of the plant and stored in the substance of the leaves and stalks which with the passage of time and the influence of temperature and pressure have resulted in the formation of coal, peat and lignite. Energy which was stored in the plants is liberated when their present form is burnt: the fuels familiar to the present generation are not being formed at anything approaching the rate at which they are being used. Vegetation, to be converted into coal and its lower allotropes requires conditions of growth and of ultimate temperature and pressure which it is impossible now to attain. Timber will not grow at a sufficiently great pace to allow of its being considered as a substitute in spite of arguments to the contrary. It is to other forms of growing vegetation that an Empire in danger of lacking fuel must turn for its liquid fuel supply.

It is impossible in a discussion of this vital problem to avoid all technicalities, but, in skating nimbly over the thin ice covering the scientific depths, an occasional glimpse of a crack is not to be avoided and one such glimpse must now be taken. Fermentation is the process by which growing vegetation could be converted, after harvesting, most readily into a form that would enable it to be easily used for the production of heat.* The ground-work of all vegetable tissues is cellulose, the hardest timber and the newest shoot all contain it—cellulose is their chief constituent. It exists in many forms, the most important of which is starch; this latter has a granular structure which is essential for germination, by which process there is a substance, diastase, formed which is capable of effecting changes similar to those of fermentation. By further stages the last process is the production of alcohol by vinous fermentation. Starch is found in potatoes, wheat, rice and maize. The percentage content in the three former is twenty, sixty and eighty-three respectively. There are two other prolific sources of alcohol—cane sugar molasses and refuse, and beet molasses. Alcohol is obtained from these also by vinous fermentation: the sugar during the process breaks down into alcohol and carbon dioxide.

* See "Liquid and Gaseous Fuels," by V. B. Lewes.

The yield of alcohol per ton of these substances in gallons is—

Potatoes	25-28.
Cane Molasses	69
Beet Molasses	63

thus it is seen that it is more profitable from a fuel point of view to grow cane sugar and beet than potatoes.

What has now been emphasized is the fact that the original problem is resolved into another, namely, that of producing sufficient vegetation for the production of alcohol.

In spite of the many reasons adduced to show the injurious effects of the use of alcohol in the type of engine which now mainly uses mineral-oil fuel, many millions of gallons of alcohol are used in Europe for power production. After treatment with denaturants in some form to render it unfit for human consumption, it is used either alone or in combination with either petrol or benzol : some fuels consist of a mixture of the three substances. The technical arguments affecting the relative output of engines using a vegetable as opposed to a mineral fuel are beyond the scope of this article and are of no practical use to the soldier. What, however, is of increasing importance to him is the study of the means whereby alcoholic fuel can be produced in adequate quantities for military requirements.

In England the meagre attempts to deal with this important question have ended in failure as they have been commercially unsuccessful, indeed they have only been made by the generosity of public-spirited and far-seeing men. Some years ago in Berkshire a man who was able to take a larger view than his fellows grew beet for a dual purpose—the feeding of cattle and for the production of commercial alcohol. His attempt was abortive because it was a commercial failure just as first line transport cannot yet be mechanized as the required vehicle is not at the moment commercially successful. Alcohol as a fuel is not a commercial possibility owing to existing legislation : its use is restricted. A repetition of the example of the brake of legislation applied to scientific development which was given early in the last century in the action taken by the Government of the day with regard to mechanical traction. If the future of mechanical road and rail traction is to be dependent on legislation which has for its primary object the personal probity of the nation, it would seem that a definite check has been given to this form of progress : a flank attack by science must then be given

by the introduction of a denaturant that is not removable by distillation or other physical means.

On the Continent efforts to produce alcohol on a commercial scale have for years met with considerable success, but it is to be remembered that it has been with the aid of State subventions that progress has been made. The necessity in France and Belgium of maintaining some balance between the industrial and agricultural population has led the several governments to encourage the production of power alcohol. In Russia, too, prior to 1914, and to a limited extent to-day, much alcohol was used for power production. France and Belgium have gone so far as to avow that a *carburant national* is essential to the existence of the nation as in the case of war the price of mineral oil would of itself reduce them to penury and prejudice their existence before the nation could be armed. Colour is lent to this by the fact that research along the lines of an alcohol substitute for mineral oil is being greatly encouraged even by the American Administration.

It is shown that in France alone there are always under beet cultivation about twenty-five hundred thousand acres, which produce about four hundred and fifty-five million gallons of alcohol. It is a significant fact that a near neighbour can in normal circumstances produce a quantity of potential fuel within its borders equal to half the annual imports of mineral oil fuel into Britain.

Another reason of cumulative importance is the fact that internal-combustion engines for rail traction are being more widely used : in regions where solid fuel and adequate water are economically impossible and electrification also impossible, then oil engines are used to provide motive power. For instance, the adaptation of road vehicles for use on the Sudanese railways in the past few years, the use of the internal-combustion locomotive in Germany at the present time, in Tunis between Tunis and Hamman Lif and in Russia—this is all an indication of the increasing importance of the liquid fuel question emphasizing the need for a fuel of vegetable origin.

Great Britain is not pre-eminently an agricultural country, and there are many reasons why the acres now cultivated for the production of corn and vegetables and those which are still fallow should not be given to the production of beet. The Empire is widely scattered over the face of the globe, and it is vital that its future development be directed along lines which will enable each part to be self-supporting in the matter of food and liquid fuel production that in cases of extremity the normal business of each part shall suffer

the least possible dislocation. To ensure this it becomes necessary that a portion of the vegetation now existing which is renewed perennially by solar energy in each part of the Empire be converted into liquid fuel. If the existing vegetation is insufficient then more must be grown, in which case that form most suited to the soil and climate must be planted and harvested with due regard to its alcohol-producing properties.

In every part of the Empire there are vast quantities of vegetation which could be reduced to alcohol by suitable processes aided by effective machinery, whilst, if vegetation has to be grown specially it has been amply demonstrated that beet and sugar cane are the most prolific sources of the fuel we require.

It is certain that in addition to alcohol which is a secondary or even tertiary product of vegetation there are many vegetable oils, cotton seed, palm, rape, copra and "beurre de Karite," which are primary products of the simple process of milling. Again stations can be erected in the centres of the districts and electric power distributed over wide areas with comparative ease.

Without entering into the controversy surrounding the acceptance of La Place's theory of the formation of the earth, it has been demonstrated that synthetic mineral oil can be made by treatment of metallic carbides: this is, however, at the moment only in the experimental stage.

In British possessions in Africa and in Australia there are boundless opportunities for farming suitable vegetation—and the production of alcohol is not its only use—that will in a large measure help to increase the independence of the British Empire on others for liquid fuel.

THE VALUE AND ORIGINALITY OF "THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCE OF WAR" *

READING my copy of the *Army Quarterly* for April I was first astonished, then perplexed, to discover a review of Colonel Fuller's latest book phrased in terms which seemed more suitable to an electioneering platform than to a serious review of a scientific book. The review implied that the author suffered from "insanity," that the book was a "danger." Such a violent onslaught was perplexing, for having read the book I was prepared to hear complaints that it was difficult reading, but not to find that it had aroused animosity or passionate attack. When a writer criticizes institutions or orthodox practice he must be prepared for resentful counterblasts, and in past years when Colonel Fuller was preaching mechanicalization to a then unconverted world, when he was pouring scorn on obsolete arms and methods, it would have been natural to find angry retorts. But on the whole those earlier efforts received most generous treatment. His initial proclamation of the new gospel in 1919 was awarded the Gold Medal of the Royal United Service Institution. His "Reformation of War," a crushing attack on orthodoxy and tradition, was most favourably received, and nowhere more so than in the *Army Quarterly*. Yet when he turns from the concrete to the abstract, from denouncing old methods of war and proclaiming new to a philosophical investigation of methods of thought, he becomes a target for violent assaults. A strange world. Reading "The Foundations of the Science of War" I had thought that here at least was a book, unlike his former ones, removed from the plane of controversy, one which might be criticized but could not be attacked, because it dealt with thought and not with practice. The curious sequel led one to reflect upon the possible grounds for a criticism so bitter. Perusing the review it became obvious that the attack was directed not so much on the book as on the author, a series of lapses from the impersonal to the personal. This is both tedious and irritating to readers, whose first demand of a review is

* The latest work by Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O., author of "Sir John Moore's System of Training," "The Reformation of War," etc., etc.

that it shall be a guide to purchasers by giving an epitome of the book and its theme ; in this case the reviewer covered four and a half pages without affording the mystified reader the least hint as to Colonel Fuller's subject-matter.

The substitution of criticism by personal abuse, however, provided a clue as to the cause. Colonel Fuller says that " in a small way " he has attempted to follow in the footsteps of the author of the " Origin of Species "—surely an admirable model to follow—and do for war what Darwin did for natural history, on which the reviewer remarks, " Oh lor' ! " The comparison led one to look up what the reviewers said of Darwin in his day—and to discover that the " Origin of Species " was also met not by considered criticism but by personal abuse. Of the " Quarterly Reviewer " Huxley said that he dealt " with Mr. Darwin as an Old Bailey barrister deals with a man against whom he wishes to obtain a conviction . . . by endeavouring to create a prejudice against the prisoner in the minds of the jury." After this, Colonel Fuller should feel flattered by the *Army Quarterly* review. One might almost think that the reviewer is subtly trying to show that the mantle of Darwin has fallen on Colonel Fuller.

Such a method of criticism is not only mean but futile, as it tells us nothing of the book and its argument. To say that Darwin is a son of Satan or to imply of Colonel Fuller that he is insane and has little personality is scarcely informative of their theme. It is mean because whilst an author can defend his ideas he cannot bear impartial evidence as to his character. And the fact that this method has ever been the last resource of those who defend the failing strongholds of a lost cause is no excuse. " If you have no case, abuse the plaintiff " may do for lawyers but not for soldiers. Instead of analysing the book, the reviewer returns to the days of Archimedes who, if my memory does not play me false, invented machines by which putrid corpses and other offal were hurled at the besiegers of Syracuse.

He begins with a misstatement. He says that he is older than Colonel Fuller and that, consequently, in Colonel Fuller's opinion he must be a " dud." If he had read his author more carefully, he would have discovered that Colonel Fuller has clearly stated that physical age means little, that moral and mental age are the real tests. Thus if a soldier has nerves so frail that he is shell-shocked by the first smell of burnt powder, then morally he is too old for war. Similarly, if his brain cannot grasp a new idea, then mentally he is senile. The reviewer gives the impression of moral decrepitude

by summoning a second lieutenant and a "captain of parts" to support him. Incidentally, they sound like phantoms of the reviewer's brain, for not only must it have been an unusual Sandhurst cadet who knew "The Hunting of the Snark," but it must have been a miracle for three people to read the one copy in the brief interval between publication and the date of the *Army Quarterly* going to press. But there is nothing unconvincing about the innuendo contained in the quotation from "The Hunting of the Snark." To imply that Colonel Fuller's words are inane and that he is insane casts a slur not so much on him as on the distinguished officers who have personally selected him as their assistant at the Staff College and on the Imperial General Staff respectively.

The reviewer is hardly more happy in his next jibe: "He who can, does; he who cannot, teaches." Is Colonel Fuller, the Staff College, or the whole body of instructors in the Army, the target? As the primary rôle of most regimental officers in peace time is that of instruction, it may well be read as an attack on the value of the general system of training and the emphasis attached to it in the post-war manuals. But the following phrase—"It is of the greatest interest to be given a glimpse of the manner in which the 'Brain of the Army' is trained, and to taste the condensed food on which it is nourished"—makes it appear that the review is hitting at the Staff in general, and the Staff College in particular. It would hardly seem applicable to Colonel Fuller, for even the reviewer must know his record as a "doer" before he became a teacher—his work for the Tank Corps, the fact that the original tactics of Cambrai were mainly of his devising, also the tactical plan for the 1919 campaign. Perhaps the fact that this plan was adopted by Sir Henry Wilson and Marshal Foch, both tarred with the Staff College brush, condemns it in the reviewer's eyes.

After this initial smoke-screen, does the reviewer turn to the book? No, he just mentions it and complains of "paradoxes and funny epigrams necessary if a teacher of little personality is to keep the attention of his hearers." He follows this up by saying of Colonel Fuller that "in most of his published work he is irremediably bound to the past, can at best only think in terms of the last war; and that he seems to have misunderstood, regarding it as a case of normal warfare, whereas, from first to last, it was a siege." One is afraid that here the reviewer is either too subtle or too foolish for most of his readers. Most people who have encountered Colonel Fuller would regard him as having too much rather than too little personality—spineless individuals do not adopt the unpopular

rôle of a reformer. As for terming him a "die-hard" conservative, this will be news to the upholders of the established order, and to the readers of the "Reformation of War." It is true that Colonel Fuller does not invent a bacteriological or metaphysical war—Staff College teaching on these lines would be a little impracticable. It is equally true that he founds his future on the past, and all history supports his method. What does the reviewer mean by a normal war? The French and Germans fought a war in 1870; the Russians and Turks—a war in 1878; we fought two wars in 1897 and another in 1899; the Russians and Japanese went to war in 1904, and the Balkan States in 1912. Between all these wars there were profound differences, yet a very steady course of evolution, and the tendencies of the Great War could have been predicted from the experience of its forerunners. So in turn may a further advance come by building on the experience of 1914–1918. Colonel Fuller may have his head in the stars, but he keeps his feet on the ground, instead of dreaming of death rays on the one hand or cavalry charging down machine guns on the other. On the soundness of his line of deduction one prefers to the opinion of an anonymous reviewer that of General Buat, late Chief of the French General Staff, who not only issued to all units in the French Army a translation of Colonel Fuller's R.U.S.I. Gold Medal Essay, but declared it "an exact vision of the future."

What then does the reviewer mean by a "normal war"—Creçy and Poitiers? Incidentally he calls 1914–1918 a siege. Economically this was so, but hardly in a military sense. One thought that opinion had died with the wartime "experts" who were always calculating that the besieged Germans had used up their last men, only to find that they were making a meal of another of the Allied Armies while a fraction held the Western Allies in check. A curious sort of siege, militarily, where German strategy dictated the course of operations for four years. Having thus far, as he supposes, torn the author to shreds, does the reviewer then turn to the book? No, he concentrates his catapults and corpses on the diagrams. There are nineteen in all, and all but six are of simple tactical and strategical moves. Though he states that he is "all right" and "a moderate abstainer" (a clumsy oxymoron) he mistakes four arrows for four snakes, and with somewhat regrettable taste indulges in a parody of the "Book of Revelation." As unlike the reviewer, I could not discover any difficulty in understanding the diagrams, I looked up other reviews of the book—by civilians, who might more reasonably be confused. I found that one stated

"Not the least part of its value lies in the diagrams, which are much more comprehensible by the layman than is usually the case in works of this description"; and another's comment was: "a large number of diagrams make it easy for the reader to follow the author's ideas." If civilians find them so easy and helpful, the reviewer would seem to be classing the military intelligence rather low. After a series of similar irrelevant criticisms and epithets about the author's "common nonsense," the reviewer plumbs the depths with a charge that two or three typographical errors show Colonel Fuller's "lack of higher culture," whatever this may mean. Even so carefully edited a book as the "Official History of the War in France" has attached to vol. ii a list of several score of corrigenda for vol. i—slips and misspellings which anyone realizes are due to the proof-reading, not to the author.

Not until the very end of the review do we reach a relevant criticism. It concerns the last section of Colonel Fuller's book, namely, "Maxim for the Ignorant," (in the circumstances an appropriate title). The reviewer implies that Colonel Fuller lays claim to a discovery rightly due to another, because Colonel Foch twenty years ago suggested that "guard, move and hit" were sound maxims. They are certainly not patent to Colonel Fuller, nor are they patent to Colonel Foch. A little wider historical knowledge might have revealed that they are derived by both from Napoleon's maxim, "The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack." If the reviewer had known and understood this maxim, his audacious "offensive" might have been launched from a more circumspect and better reasoned base of pen and ink operations.

Feeling ill-nourished by this critical "soap-bubble" I determined to search for more substantial commentaries, and, perhaps also a little uneasy as to whether the fault lay with my judgment, to discover the opinion of other reviewers. I quote the result, not to advertise the book, but on the principle of arbitration between the opposing individual views of the reviewer and myself.

From the *Observer*: "A book arresting, vivid, powerful, original, and the work of the most thinking soldier of our time"; from the *Spectator*: "His searchlight is brilliant, far-reaching and well-directed"; from the *Times*: "There is here the work of one whose enthusiasm and intellectual boldness will assuredly not go to loss in his profession"; from the *Referee*: "I would class it with von Clausewitz' 'On War'"; from the *Civil and Military Gazette*: "The book is one which must become a text-book, for the serious

study of every officer who takes his profession seriously"; from *The Fighting Forces*: "No one who seeks to study military history, and for that matter political history and social psychology, can afford to suffer this exhaustive treatise to remain unread. . . . 'The Foundations of the Science of War' is likely to rank beside Maine's 'Ancient Law' and Darwin's 'Origin of Species' in being, not the final evidence upon military science, comparative jurisprudence, and evolution respectively, but in promoting original methods of approaching a subject, creating new ideas, and in forming fresh controversies without which no branch of science can be in a healthy condition." If other critics, several of them laymen, can grasp Colonel Fuller's argument while the *Army Quarterly* reviewer finds it cabalistic, is it because they have been accustomed to read philosophical and scientific works, while he has narrowed his mental horizon to "field-work filters"? These important opinions led to reflection on the value of Colonel Fuller's contribution to military thought, and on the question of how his teaching differs from, and improves on that of other great military writers. The first point of originality is that Colonel Fuller applies the method of science to the study of war, whereas practically all modern writers—Foch, Colin, Henderson, to mention but a few—have employed the historical method of approach. Some earlier writers, Clausewitz notably, made use of a philosophical method, which helpful as it is in widening the horizon of the mind, tends to be unduly abstract for the normal student, and lacks the scientifically balanced classification of ideas and values which both hardens the mental grip and is a practical instrument in thought.

Let us frankly confess that the historical method is far more readable, and that it is intelligible to the untrained mind whereas the scientific and philosophical methods require training and extreme concentration to follow the argument. Let us even admit that Colonel Fuller is a clearer thinker than he is a writer, that his brilliancy is apt to be a little dazzling, where a more diffused light would illuminate the path better. But neither excuse justifies a refusal to profit by the new method. There is undoubtedly a tendency among soldiers to shy at "hard reading" which any undergraduate would undertake in the normal course. The hallowing effect of age has made Clausewitz a symbol to conjure with, but I wonder how many soldiers could honestly say that they have read him throughout. But as war becomes ever more closely interwoven with science, it would seem essential that soldiers should accustom their minds to the reading which any science student takes in his stride,

instead of demanding that it shall be diluted for immature digestions. Colonel Fuller, even Clausewitz, at their most abstruse are simple compared with the average scientific textbook.

Another essential difference between Fuller and his predecessors is that in the "Foundations" he deals primarily with methods of thought whereas they dealt with methods of warfare. The latter he has treated in his past writings, and if we reflect for a moment on the difference between the military outlook of 1920 and that of 1926, on the growing trend towards mechanicalization apparent on every side, we are compelled to realize that the change is primarily due to Colonel Fuller as the first prophet of this new order. Almost unrealized by many of the converted his views have permeated and transformed military thought. The fact should at least incline us to give him an attentive hearing when he sets out on a new mission. When a man has given proof of his calibre by such practical achievements as the Cambrai tactics and the conversion of military authority to mechanicalization, critics who speak of his inanity proving his insanity only make themselves look foolish in the eyes of impartial readers. They can justifiably disagree with a new suggestion but they cannot pretend that he is a "wind-bag."

The question now arises as to the need for and value of an effort to develop methods of thought upon war. Hitherto the great military writers have sought to improve on the actual methods of conducting war rather than to deepen our knowledge of its causes and elements in the abstract. Such a hand-to-mouth policy served passably well so long as military evolution moved slowly, so long as a little adaptation of existing means by a clever artist was adequate to ensure victory, and so long as States were so relatively unorganized and loose in their composition that the gashes due to uneconomic waging of war did not permanently impair the fabric of the State. But when the current of invention so quickened up the rate of change in warfare that evolution almost became revolution, the system broke down—for want of any intellectual means of recomposing, instead of merely readjusting our military values.

As Colonel Fuller points out, this imitative method was never more marked than in 1914—"the Germans were copying von Moltke; the French were trying to discover how to copy Napoleon." Forty years of study by the highly cultivated War Colleges had merely the result that the Germans were obsessed with the dream of repeating Sedan—or Cannae, the French of repeating Jena. "Then, before the war was six weeks old, these stupendous imitations dissolved into thin air." M. Bloch, the Polish banker, gauged

the reality more nearly than the combined wisdom of all the General Staffs. "What was the difficulty? It was that soldiers possessed no means of analysing facts; they saw things as cows see them, and they were unable to work scientifically." If Colonel Fuller's comparison is a little unkind, it is no more severe than many of the comments I have read in the *Army Quarterly*, during these last few years, on the conceptions of the rival commands.

Colonel Fuller's three-fold order, which is too symmetrical for the reviewer's taste, at least provides us with a clearly constructed mental weighing machine by which we can balance and coordinate our thought upon war. It may be imperfect, but the attempt is surely justified when we reflect upon the muddled strategical decisions which dissipated our efforts in the Great War, and the muddled tactical decisions taken even in the last manœuvres—for want of any organized method of thought. I do not mean that his system is a cure-all, or that it can be strictly applied in the rapid solution of any problem. At the first reading, indeed, many readers will be left somewhat bewildered, yet with an insensible broadening of their outlook and with a number of ideas impressed on their mind. But the full benefit of this book will only come to the man who soaks himself in it, for one of its cardinal values is that it is not a military "crib," but an education; not a tabloid remedy for a particular ill, but a course of treatment—of military Pelmanism if you will—by which the mental system as a whole is expanded and invigorated.

One further feature of this book is the distinction between, yet reconciliation of, the mental, moral, and physical spheres.

With due respect to Clausewitz, Ardant du Picq, Foch and others, it cannot be gainsaid that the physical sphere has predominated hitherto in war studies, and even where discussed the mental and moral spheres have been ill-defined.

In the "Foundations" Colonel Fuller has shown that he is the reverse of an extremist in thought, whatever he is in expression. Instead of swinging from the physical to the other extreme, he holds the balance evenly between the three spheres, and establishes as no one has yet done their interplay and reaction upon each other.

These three original features—the method of science in approaching the subject, the organization of thought, and the balance of the three spheres—make the book not only a foundation for further research, as was the author's declared object, but a landmark in military literature, still more in military philosophy.

THE "OFFICERS' STRIKE" IN BENGAL, 1766

OF recent years the extensive and successful use of the strike weapon by the working classes as a remedy for industrial injustice—real or imaginary—in such matters as hours and conditions of work and rates of pay has suggested to more than one champion of the harassed and impoverished "middle classes" that they too should adopt this method, if it be found in any way applicable, for the redress of their own grievances. There has not, however, yet arisen in military circles any serious proposal to form an "Officers' Union," nor is it likely that there ever will. Nevertheless, history records at least one instance of such a Union, and one occasion on which British officers "downed tools," as we should say to-day, simply for the purpose of preventing a cut in their pay which threatened to reduce their standard of life. The story may perhaps be of some interest in these days of Labour movements and widespread industrial unrest.

In the spring of the year 1765 the East India Company had just acquired, as a result of the brilliant military work of Lord Clive, and a band of extremely able young commanders of his school, the undisputed control of the whole province of Bengal, and had vindicated their title to possession by a series of striking victories, culminating in the decisive battle of Buxar. But this splendid outward triumph veiled a perilous rottenness within. The whole body of civil officials in Bengal had for years been unceasingly and unscrupulously "on the make," and had stopped at nothing, however discreditable, where the lining of their own pockets was concerned. From 1757, when the victory of Plassey had raised to the throne of Bengal the puppet Meer Jaffier, the Company's officials had in practice had a free hand in the administration of the province, the people of which they proceeded to squeeze mercilessly and without shame. Many of them, despite the wretched smallness of the salaries paid to them by the Company before Buxar, came home with huge fortunes, and their successors were in hope, indeed in confident expectation, of being able shortly to follow their example.

But unknown to them, the Company's directors in England decided that it was time to cleanse the Augean stable, and the man chosen to carry out this distasteful and unpopular task was Clive himself.

As far as personal qualities and ability were concerned, no better could have been found ; but in some respects at least the selection was not entirely a happy one. For Clive, during his first tenure of office in Bengal, had managed to reap a financial reward for his services which, if not perhaps in excess of his deserts, was certainly a princely one. Not only had he received after Plassey a lump sum of over £230,000 from the grateful Meer Jaffier, but also a life income of £30,000 a year derived from land in Bengal was also settled on him a few months later ; while the method by which he secured these sums could hardly be held up even by the standards of the times as a model of probity or equity. Clive must, therefore, have felt himself to be in the position of a poacher turned gamekeeper and must have been aware that the majority of those into whose conduct he was instructed to inquire so considered him.

Naturally these gentlemen, who were not prepared tamely to surrender their prospects of future wealth, hampered and opposed the new Governor by any means in their power. Their resistance, however, merely induced him to exercise with ruthless severity the extensive powers which had been conferred upon him. He removed his predecessor and several members of the Council from their posts, with the result that the civil staff soon realized that if they were not to suffer a similar fate *en masse* they must find allies. They decided, therefore, to enlist the aid of the Army which, they imagined, even Clive, in view of its recent achievements in the field and of the situation on the frontier of the Bengal Presidency, might hesitate to antagonize.

A pretext was easily found. After the battle of Plassey, Meer Jaffier had bestowed on all officers of the Company's service as a tangible proof of his gratitude a monthly sum equivalent to the *batta* or field allowance drawn by them when on active service. The Court of Directors at home, naturally indignant that mere soldiers should share in the harvest of Indian riches, which properly belonged only to civilians like themselves, had for some years past issued repeated instructions that this payment should cease forthwith and the sum thus saved be paid into the Company's Treasury.

But the officers of the Army protested that the cost of living was too high to allow of their "subsisting decently" and in a manner suitable to their station without it, and as it seemed advisable to

consider their feelings somewhat while the safety of the Company's territories depended entirely on their exertions and devotion to duty, the matter was not pressed. Now, a strong man having arrived in Bengal and complete victory in the field having been achieved, the time had clearly come for the Directors to fling away any foolish considerations of gratitude or magnanimity, and to consider their own balance sheets and the pockets of themselves and their friends—such as Clive himself—before everything else. Accordingly, on the 1st of June, 1766, the double *batta* was by orders of the Governor withdrawn from the whole Army, with the exception of the 2nd Brigade, which was permitted to enjoy it temporarily, while acting as an army of occupation in Oude.

The officers naturally protested and not, it seems, without good reason. It involved a general diminution of pay of about 40 per cent., ranging from 775 rupees (over £50) out of a total of 1,860 rupees (£124) per month in the case of a colonel of infantry, to 93 rupees (£6) out of a total of 236 rupees (less than £16) in the case of an ensign. Moreover, those officers serving with units stationed in garrison within the Presidency, who formed a large proportion of the whole, lost much more than this, being left nothing but their bare pay—310 rupees (£20) for a colonel, and other ranks in proportion down to the ensign's paltry 50 rupees (£3 6s. 8d.).* According to a very temperately worded memorial forwarded by the spokesmen of the officers to the Governor of Bengal at the time when the reduction was first mooted, the monthly expenses of a captain in the field, apart from any capital outlay on the purchase of a horse, a palanquin or a tent and from incidentals such as replacement of lost or damaged uniform or equipment, amounted to 313 rupees (£21 nearly). The withdrawal of his double *batta*, therefore, meant that when this had been paid he would be left under the most favourable circumstances, slightly out of pocket. The reply of the Directors was to contest the figures as to the cost of living—apparently on the sole ground of their inconvenience; to point out that the annual cost to the Company of the grant of the double *batta* amounted to 210,000 rupees (£14,000)—less than half Clive's annual salary; and thereupon arbitrarily to close the discussion.

Nevertheless the decision was received without a murmur—until the civilians began to foment discontent. A series of

* These figures are calculated at the rate of 15 rupees to the £1 and despite the changes in the value of money as between 1766 and the present day, give a fair idea of the proportionate loss to the sufferers

anonymous letters were written, some of which were afterwards traced to various highly-placed officials in Government service, adjuring the officers to "act with spirit," terming them "a dastardly set," and pointing out that "if he, Clive, gets the better of this" the consequence "will be eternal slavery and bondage, and with shame to you all." A more tangible proof of the interest taken by the civil side was the promise of a contribution of 140,000 rupees * for the support of those officers who should be unfortunate enough to lose their livelihood as a result of any action taken.

This, however, would probably have been inadequate to foment widespread indiscipline, had it not been unexpectedly reinforced from quite another and more responsible quarter. The 1st Brigade was at this time commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher, an officer who, though of some military talent, was apparently by nature incapable of subordinating himself to the demands of discipline and constituted authority. One evening at a dinner party he outlined to his fellow guests a scheme whereby the officers might now recover what had been unjustly stolen from them. Let them all, he proposed, on a given date simultaneously hand in their Commissions. Sympathy for them would be universal; Clive and his coadjutors would be helpless; a fund could be raised which would keep them going for a few weeks; and they would finally, no doubt, be asked to return on their own terms. His own staff, he added, would be among the first to set the example; but he was careful to refrain from promising that he would do so himself; as a matter of fact, nothing would appear to have been further from his thoughts.

In a very few weeks the idea had been widely adopted. In each of the three brigades a committee of correspondence was set up which collected the Commissions of practically all the captains and subalterns in the Army, some two hundred in all; every participant was sworn to secrecy and also took an oath to defend the life of any fellow conspirator who might be sentenced to death for participating in the joint action; while a penalty of £500 was decreed to be forfeit from any individual who should, after resigning his Commission, accept it again on any conditions short of the full restoration of the double *batta*. The raising of the suggested fund was pushed forward, and the 1st of June was fixed upon as the date when the Commissions should be handed in.

The secret appears to have been admirably kept, for right up to the middle of April no rumour that any untoward movement

* About £91,000.

was on foot seems to have reached Clive, or any other of the superior officers of the Army. But then two accidents suddenly brought the whole matter prematurely into the light of day. There were one or two officers in each of the three brigades who, whether for reasons of enlightened self-interest or from purer motives, refused to join in the proposed combination, and for that reason become subject to what in later years would have been termed "peaceful picketing," but which in those days was known as "everlasting Coventry." The adjutant of one of the regiments of the 2nd Brigade resenting the attempts of his comrades to force his hand, a free fight ensued one night after dark ; in the confusion first one bungalow and then a number of others caught fire ; and by next morning half the station lay in ashes. Sir Robert Barker, the brigade commander, ordered an inquiry, whereat were divulged enough details of the cause of the affray to induce him to write post haste to Fletcher, asking if anything similar were on foot in his brigade. The latter, by what can only be considered from his point of view as a serious error of judgment, replied to his colleague making light of the whole affair, but at the same time forwarded copies of the correspondence to Clive, with a covering letter in which he stated that the matter was a serious one, and that his officers seemed fully resolved to hand in their Commissions on the 1st of May—that is, in six days' time. And in fact the leaders of the recalcitrants had, on hearing that some breath of suspicion was in the air, resolved to put the time for exploding their mine forward to that date.

Clive, who was at the moment at Moorshedabad, received Fletcher's bolt from the blue on the 28th of April and on the morrow other proofs of the conspiracy came into his hands, in the shape of two anonymous letters to members of his staff, requesting them to join in the movement. The prospect was one well calculated to appal the stoutest heart. The whole of Bengal was seething with discontent ; a strong Mahratta force was advancing against the western frontier of the province ; and within two days the Army was to be deprived of all its lower officers and a deadly blow struck at discipline and the prestige of the Government.

Moreover, there was grave peril that the movement might spread to the rank and file of the Army, and especially to the native troops, who less than eighteen months before had shown serious signs of disaffection, some units having actually mutinied in the presence of the enemy.

But Clive, whatever his faults, was never the man to flinch before a concrete physical peril that could be faced and grappled with.

His resolution, energy and self-confidence were never more highly displayed than at this juncture. On the 29th of April he summoned a special committee of three, presided over by himself, which resolved to resist the illegal demands of the officers at all costs. No one of those who actually took the extreme step of resigning his Commission was ever to be re-employed and the places of all officers who were involved in the strike were to be filled as soon as possible by substitutes whom the Madras and Bombay Governments, then at peace, were to send to Calcutta in as large numbers as possible. All three brigadiers were ordered to publish these decisions to those under their command, and also to arrest and to bring before a court-martial any officer whose conduct was such as to render him liable to a charge of mutiny.

But the matter had gone too far to be thus easily dealt with. On the 1st of May the whole of the officers of the 1st Brigade at Monghyr and of the 3rd Brigade at Bankipore resigned their Commissions. With their grievances outlined in a letter signed by forty-three officers of the 1st Brigade it is impossible not to feel considerable sympathy. "We find," it ran, "we cannot live upon the present allowances, but must every month run into debt, as long as we have any credit. We have applied for redress in the humblest manner and it has been refused us. We seek to live by our services, never to hurt our masters. Some of us have eaten the Company's salt for some years; we can no more do it with honour."

The officers of the 3rd Brigade who placed their Commissions in the hands of the adjutant for transmission to the brigadier numbered between fifty and sixty. The 2nd Brigade was, at the moment, too far off to hear of the alteration in the original date for "downing tools," being encamped in camp at Surajpore on the western frontier of Oude; nevertheless, despite the news of the approach of a large body of Mahratta horse, all the officers on learning of the action of their comrades wrote to Colonel Smith resigning their Commissions as from the 6th of May, and their example was followed by those in garrison at Allahabad.

But long before news of these disasters could reach him, Clive was travelling post haste up country. He authorized the brigade commanders to accept all resignations tendered them and to send all the delinquents down to Calcutta without delay; but the reports both from Barker and Fletcher seemed to indicate that the discipline of the officers had not spread to the troops, nor was it likely to do so for the present. In so writing Fletcher at all events was either deceived or deceiver; for on the 12th of May two officers

of Clive's staff on their arrival at Monghyr found the European regiment and the artillery in a state of the utmost disorder, and on the next day they broke out into open mutiny and prepared to join the officers who had already left the barracks. They were prevented from so doing by the presence of the Sepoy battalions, arrayed under arms to prevent their passage, and by the appeals of the remaining officers, among whom Sir Robert Fletcher exerted himself with particular energy and success. Next day Clive in person came on the scene, harangued the troops on parade, and sent out orders for the mutinous officers, who were now in camp outside the city, to leave at once for Calcutta. As a Sepoy detachment followed the messenger to enforce compliance, these gentlemen had no choice but to obey. By calling upon the few faithful officers and one or two more who had been sent up by the Council, Clive collected enough to carry on with the regular duties of the station, and having, in the course of two strenuous days, placed the officers of the 1st Brigade on a satisfactory footing, left Monghyr for Bankipore. Here his task was easier; the officers of the 3rd Brigade, who were the least disaffected of all and had committed no further act of disorder, and had also heard of the measure meted out to their comrades at Monghyr, readily offered their submission and mostly received pardon for their offence. Thus the 2nd Brigade on the frontier alone remained to be dealt with. In view of the serious results that might ensue from any possible defection on its part, Clive had given authority to Colonel Smith, its commander, to negotiate with his insubordinate officers in case of urgent necessity; but all efforts at conciliation were rejected. There ensued, therefore, a correspondence between the brigadier and the ringleaders of the movement which on both sides speedily became intemperate and acrimonious to the last degree. Smith stigmatized the conduct of his officers as "foreign to anything that has the least connection with honour" and reproached them with having forgotten, not only "what they owed to the public service," but also "the respect due to him."

The officers in their reply characterized their Commander's aspersions as "unmerited, ungenerous and unjust," charged him with "attempting to brand them with infamy" and expressed themselves as surprised by "the temerity of an order of this kind." The only effect of Smith's somewhat unskilful attempts at a diplomatic handling of the case was that the rebels, who had originally promised to continue in their posts as volunteers until

the 1st of June, decided to leave for Calcutta a fortnight before that date; and though he finally succeeded in inducing them to return to their original scheme, a further disagreement followed, owing to his refusal to comply with their request—a somewhat unreasonable one admittedly—to dismiss his adjutant because he had refused to go to quite such lengths as his comrades.

Smith then proceeded to vindicate his authority in the full light of day by placing all the malcontents under arrest and compelling them to sign an apology before release. A few of the more turbulent were dismissed the Service and sent down to Calcutta, and thereupon the mutiny fizzled out as quickly as it had begun. Most of those who had expressed repentance were speedily restored to favour; and when Clive arrived at the camp occupied by the 2nd Brigade he found everything running smoothly and normally.

The Governor, with considerable judgment and self-restraint, showed himself as ready to forgive as he had been to punish and to restore order. Within the next few months practically all those who had not openly distinguished themselves as leaders of the mutiny had been pardoned and reinstated in their rank, though not without considerable loss of seniority, owing to the influx of officers from the two other Presidencies to fill the gaps left by their resignation. After a somewhat longer lapse of time a number of the prominent mutineers were also allowed to return to the service, but it was two years before the Court of Directors thought it wise to proclaim a general amnesty for all those who had taken part in the movement. That this was so long delayed was no doubt due to the irreconcilable conduct of two or three of the most turbulent spirits; one of them planned in all seriousness to assassinate Clive; others, on being ordered to England, resisted those who were sent to apprehend them, and on arriving home brought action in the Civil Courts for the restoration of their lost Commissions and pensions.

It is, however, satisfactory to learn that Sir Robert Fletcher, who may fairly be regarded as the arch-villain of the piece, did not long survive to profit by his unskilful attempt to run with the hare and to hunt with the hounds. Certain suspicious facts as to his part in the "strike" having come to Clive's ears, he was sent for trial by court-martial. He put up only a lame defence and was sentenced to dismissal from the Company's Service. This, however, did not end his interesting military career, for within a few years we find him back again, this time as Commander-in-Chief at Madras, where his kidnapping and incarceration of the Governor, Lord

Pigot, showed that his hand had considerably improved in cunning during his period of rustication.

Clive himself, though his courage and energy throughout the crisis merit high praise, cuts a singularly poor figure in the affair—an unpleasing combination of Pecksniff and Gradgrind. After all, he was engaged in preventing others from following within their limits his own example, and denying to their necessity what he himself had never grudged to his own superfluity. One would be inclined to stigmatize this line of conduct as unworthy either of a gentleman or of an honest man, were it not that throughout Clive undoubtedly had eyes and thoughts for nothing but the very real peril to the State—a peril which he was in position to appreciate all the more clearly because there was here no question of the interposition of the usual obstacle hindering the vision of a public man—his own self-interest.

As for the officers themselves, whilst one may well feel some degree of sympathy for their grievances, it is impossible to regret the failure of their attempt to remedy it or to regard it as anything but inevitable. That the ultimate evil occurring from the success of such a thing as an officers' "strike" would far outweigh any temporary benefit, must be clear to every thinking man—certainly to every soldier. As regards its prospects of success, now as then, such movements require talent for conspiracy, a considerable degree of corporate selfishness—nowadays politely termed "class consciousness"—and of treachery, for which no officer corps worthy of the name need regret its incapacity. In fact, it seems to have been the uneasy workings of the individual and mass consciences which made moral cowards of the officers of the Bengal Army in the summer of 1766, so that they proved but hesitating and unsatisfactory tools for the full execution of the nefarious designs of Sir Robert Fletcher and his fellow rebels, both military and civilian.

HORSES, L.D.

BY EX-YEOMAN

AT about 2 p.m. on a Sunday afternoon in a recent year a battery commander of Royal Field Artillery, Territorial Army, stood on the platform at a station in the west of England awaiting the arrival of his battery by train for their annual practice camp.

His mind was preoccupied with the question of "horses, L.D." for he remembered that for the previous year's training in their own county his unit had relied on the War Office to supply "boarded out" Government horses for the guns of his battery. He had accepted this offer to the tune of fifty horses and they had been supplied. But they proved to be enormous mammoths covered with thick black hair, about seventeen hands high, capable of pulling the dome off St. Paul's at a walk, but a danger to themselves and all connected with them at any faster pace.

"Well," he soliloquized, "we shan't have that trouble this time, for have I not personally seen Mr. Chewstraw, the contractor, and has he not assured me, calling his Maker to witness, that he will supply me with horses of the right stamp, all of which, or most of which, will have done this job before, and are those same horses not waiting even now across the way ready to be harnessed and hooked in?"

With that the train arrived and the battery commander, having seen the *personnel* detrain, walked across with his captain to the horse-lines in a neighbouring field.

The first animal he saw there was a stout pony about the size of a pig. The next was an extremely herring-gutted sixteen-hand horse in an attitude of great dejection. A cursory glance round was enough to show very clearly that the nice "punchy" horse L.D. of which the battery commander had dreamt was not going to show up very strong in numbers on this occasion.

The next hour or two was spent in an endeavour to discover in this mass of horses some which could be made to look reasonably like a team when put together.

After which, all hands assisted in getting the harness on to those horses.

And after that a great deal of time was spent in taking the harness off those horses to which it was most obviously an entirely new experience to have it on, and moreover an experience which they most heartily resented.

About sunset the scene baffled description. The road outside the station was a fine specimen of the most glassy kind of "tarmac." It was full of hot and tired men, of guns, of wagons, of horses, some on their feet, some down, some on the road, and others harnessed up with those on the road but themselves over the fence at the side.

A veil must be drawn over the subsequent proceedings; it is sufficient to state that after eight and a half hours of most strenuous endeavour the last vehicle of that battery—not by any means the last of the brigade—was in camp less than three miles from that railway station. The casualties included three drivers more or less concussed, one officer kicked, and about forty horses ditto.

At no time during the succeeding fortnight could the battery commander feel any certainty that his battery could move off the gun park without a "scene" with one or other of his teams, nor any certainty that more than half of his battery could move two miles without a bad attack of jibbing somewhere.

And at the end of that training he swore that it must never, never happen again.

The battery commander before the war had been a yeoman. He had always heard that the artillery, Territorial Army, met with very great difficulties. It was now obvious to him that this was the case.

He made inquiries and found that such scenes as those described were a commonplace. He was astounded that men should be found willing to adventure their lives year after year in the endeavour to make six mad and quite untrained horses pull a gun on a macadam road, and still more astounded that officers could be found willing to try and cope with this sort of thing at the same time as they were coping with the intricacies of modern gunnery. He determined that it must never, never, never happen again to him if any way out could be found.

But it will happen to others until some one of consequence in the military or social world is killed, as may very well occur, on some such occasion as this, or unless some reasonable steps are taken to avoid these happenings.

It is not a question of expense. The thing could be done cheaper than it is and without danger to any one's life. The problem

is merely this : to provide a number of trained " horses, L.D." at practice camps for use by the Territorial brigades which practise there. In cases where brigades do not go to practice camps, but train in their own counties, there is time to devote to training horses in draught if the powers that be wish the annual training of the batteries concerned to take that form. In cases where batteries are practising, it is perfectly iniquitous to expect officers and men to be hampered by the complications introduced by incapable and untrained draught horses. Can the difficulties in connection with practice camps be overcome ? Certainly—and with ease.

The problem is confined to draught horses. All units can hire a sufficiency of " riders " of a fair quality. It is the trained draught horse that is required.

Territorial brigades train in succession at the practice camps, but with " overlaps " in periods. Hence it would be necessary to provide draught horses for two brigades. But, on the other hand, the establishment of Territorial batteries is now so small that after allowing for unavoidable absences from training it is probable that there are very few batteries in the country which can comfortably man a four-gun battery complete.

It is certain, also, that four trained horses would pull any guns far better than any six horses of the type at present in use. To take the maximum figures, four guns and four wagons require forty L.D. horses. Four batteries require one hundred and sixty, add ten for the signal section of a brigade and you get a hundred and seventy L.D. for a brigade. Three hundred and forty horses would be required, therefore, for two brigades, but, considering the average strength of these brigades, three hundred and fifty horses would probably be more than enough to horse them complete, even allowing for casualties. In other words, three hundred horses would do the job in actual practice, if a four-horse team instead of a six-horse team were allowed for in some cases.

Under the present system the Government may have to pay for all these horses at £6 apiece, and, further, it pays this sum to every brigade. Six brigades at a practice camp, therefore, would require $£6 \times 170 \times 6 = £6,120$.

The Government can buy these horses for £35 each. The capital outlay for three hundred and fifty would thus be £12,250 and would be repaid in money saved over two trainings of six brigades, or one training of twelve brigades.

All very fine, says " Finance," but what about the months during which practice camps are closed ?

If "manœuvres" are to be regularly held, these horses could be utilized for them, and in the winter a good proportion could be boarded out as hunters or for light draught purposes, especially in Wales and the West of England, and it is possible that a small fee could be successfully charged for the use of them by boarders out. The balance, not otherwise disposed of, would not take harm if they were merely roughed up and allowed to run for the winter loose in some of the milder parts of the country with a small hay ration to keep them going in the event of hard weather.

There is one battery of Field Artillery, Territorial Army, which now possesses forty horses of a type which is not too heavy to hunt and yet can do L.D. work in battery, at all events far better than the type of hireling that the battery in question was able to obtain from contractors.

These horses are boarded out in a country where horse transport is being killed by light Ford vans.

Yet it has been found possible to board these horses out on a basis of £10 fee per horse per annum, the unit having the call on them free of charge for fourteen days' annual training, and the hirer owning the horse after five years' consecutive hiring.

It is submitted that the scheme of Government purchase for practice camps outlined above would be financially sound and practically a godsend to Territorial battery commanders.

But if something cheaper is desired, horses cast—for age and not for vice—from the Regular Army might be utilized in place of newly bought horses, or the horses might be bought and resold annually, although, it is admitted, the latter course would probably entail a small annual loss.

Another very effective use for the horses during non-training periods would be to loan them to County Associations for winter use, but this would involve the building of stables and some riding schools. Very few riding schools exist, and more are necessary, but "Finance" would probably object even though a good case could be made out for the necessary expenditure on the basis of savings effected on the "Horses for Drills" grant.

These suggestions are thrown out by our friend the battery commander in the hope that something may be done.

The sight of an average battery of the Territorial Army turned out on parade at a practice camp to-day is enough to drive a horse-man or horse-master to despair. Horses of every shape, size and age, having only this in common, viz. that they are unsuited for the work and most reluctant to do it. Apart altogether from the horses, it

is most grossly unfair to ask the Territorial driver to tackle the job of training those horses in seven or fourteen days. The writer not long ago saw Regular drivers at a Territorial training endeavour to cope with a team which, on the whole, was not by any means the worst he had seen. The Regulars succeeded in driving the off-wheel of the limber on to the back of the off leader of a team of four, a performance unique in the writer's experience. As usual, no one was hurt, but the Regulars had a most illuminating experience of the kind of thing which faces the Territorial driver annually at the commencement of training, and developed a respect for the Territorial driver which did not exist so fully before this incident.

The existence of the difficulties described above is recognized by the War Office, but, so far as the writer is aware, the only attempt to cope with it takes the form of endeavouring to tighten up the form of contract with a view to compelling contractors to provide a suitable type of horse. This is sheer waste of time. Some contractors will sign anything and trust to providence or an adequate loophole in the law to get them out of an awkward place. Others will refuse to sign a contract which they cannot perform, and the fact is that, with the best will in the world, no contractor in the country can produce three hundred and fifty horses trained to work in teams of six. For such horses do not exist in situations where contractors can get at them.

Many contracts contain a clause providing for the replacement of horses found unsuitable. In the example we have quoted, such a clause existed, but what was the use of such a clause to the battery commander? He would have "scrapped the lot" under it when called upon to parade a battery next day to shoot. To replace the horses would have required two or three days, and the only certainty was that the fresh horses would have been on the average as bad as the original lot.

What is required is an adequate number of horses trained to artillery draught. Age, looks, and even to some extent manners and soundness, are not of primary importance; it is the training for draught in teams that matters.

There are certain objections sometimes urged against interference with the *status quo*, as, for example:

(1) That County Associations are by law responsible for the provision of horses. But surely they might be allowed to delegate this authority to the Remount Department. But, in any case, this objection is a legal technicality.

(2) That County Associations are very jealous of War Office inter-

ference and would never agree to the scheme outlined in this article. Speaking as a member of one, the writer agrees that the County Associations are rightly jealous of undue War Office intermeddling in their own spheres of influence, but a County Association exists for the benefit of the Territorial soldier, and it is a fact that the suggestion made above was recently ventilated at a meeting which included six or eight secretaries of County Associations, all of whom were of opinion that such a scheme would receive the whole-hearted support of his particular Association.

(3) That it is unwise to discourage unduly contractors who maintain a supply of horses, and especially those must not be discouraged to whom units look for the supply of "Horses for Drills" in winter and spring months outside the period of annual training.

But surely these men could still supply the riding horses required at annual trainings and possibly all horses at trainings outside practice camps? Most of the large contractors sell off their own horses at the end of the annual training season, and there is a vast system of sub-contracting. The big contractors are usually little more than middle-men, and their absence would be felt much less than is generally supposed. In any event the provision of draught horses only by the Government would not have the effect of knocking out the large contractors, and they are not the men who provide the "Horses for Drills." These are provided by local livery stable-keepers or dealers in the county concerned, and it is more than likely that with those very dealers would be found homes for the L.D. horses during the winter if Associations would guarantee that winter hirings should be made from boarders-out of Government L.D. horses in preference to others.

(4) That "Finance" would not approve—and this, of course, is the great objection, because "Finance" is very hard to move. It is common knowledge that under the present system contractors do very well. They cannot fail to. The writer has no hesitation in saying that the cash value of a large percentage of the horses at present supplied stops short of £10, and there is probably hardly a horse supplied which could not be bought for £20. And many of these horses are hired, fed and groomed free by the Government for the whole training period from mid-April to the end of August, say, eighteen weeks at £3 a fortnight, *i.e.* £54 per horse per annum. The only result of this expenditure is the provision of a thoroughly unsuitable stamp of bad and untrained horse, the imperilling of the lives of some of those who have to deal with them, and great

and continuous interference with the adequate training of units, whose available time is already far too short.

The system is so perfectly outrageous and the remedy so simple that the only wonder really is that "Finance" is content to let it continue without inquiry.

To any lover of horses, and to any man who considers the comfort and the safety of the Territorial driver, some change seems most essential. It is the writer's hope that a change is now becoming possible, and, if any of the suggestions here made should happen to arouse the interest of individuals having power to act, there is certainly a work to be done which would at least ensure the cordial appreciation of a large proportion of the Territorial Artillery.

REMINISCENCES OF RUSSIA, 1917

BY MAJOR E. E. CHARLES

IN the beginning of July 1917, I was appointed to instruct the Russians in the 60-pounders with which we were supplying them. On the day of my arrival in Moscow I went out with Major P., from whom I was taking over, to see the stores and batteries. A car was attached to our mission, and was an absolute necessity, for the stores where the 60-pounders were was about five miles out of the centre of the town. The effects of the Revolution were still very noticeable, and I found everything in the most hopeless state of chaos—guns, limbers and wagons alike, most of them rusty and in a shocking condition. The officers had very little control over their men, who came on parade or not as they chose.

The first thing to do was, to get the guns cleaned ; and I found that if one took a great deal of personal trouble, one could get the men to do something, but unless pressure was continuously applied the guns and vehicles soon returned to their former state.

There were three divisions of artillery at Chakeesova, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th. The last division had left for the front shortly before I arrived. Each division consisted of three batteries of four guns each, and there was one spare battery in the store which was not complete, as some of the guns and vehicles had not arrived from Archangel. I found that all the wagons and guns had been stripped of their lynch pins, adjusting collars, and, in some cases, drag washers ; in nearly every case, too, all the leather work had been removed. The metal work had probably been removed by German agents in order to put the vehicles out of action. The leather work had no doubt been seized by the Russians for boot leather.

On the 31st of July I heard that the 2nd Division was going to a practice camp before proceeding to the front. I found none of the springs of guns had been examined since their arrival, and with difficulty persuaded the commanding officer to get the men to take all the springs down and thoroughly grease and clean them. I used to make a daily inspection of the harnessing of the batteries, and

found this was being done in the most extraordinary fashion. Surcingles were never put on the saddles, but always behind them. Girths (which were always too large for the small horses with which the batteries were equipped) were fastened up with several wrinkles and folds on each side, which of course galled the animals in a very short space of time. There was a great shortage of grease or dubbin for all purposes ; and consequently the harness, which was left lying in the rain, mud or dust, very soon got in a most terrible state. Training was practically impossible, owing to the difficulty of getting the officers to do anything with their men, or the men to do anything for the officers ; and also owing to the number of *prasniki* (the Russian word for holiday), of which they have about three a week.

On the 9th of August the Russian Inspector-General came down to inspect the 3rd Division. This inspection was one of the most extraordinary performances I have ever attended. I drove down in a *droshky* to the parade with the colonel of the 3rd Division. The colonel appeared in no hurry to get to the parade ground and we arrived shortly after the general himself. The colonel and I both said good-morning to the general ; the colonel then mounted his horse, which was there waiting for him, and, after he had ridden rather quickly up and down the ranks of the battery with the general, the parade started to file past him. Some of the men were sitting on the trails, at least two with each gun. Some guns had twelve horses and some ten ; those with twelve all stuck and one wagon pole was broken. In one case a horse of a wagon team got his leg over the traces, and very effectively kicked everything within reach. However, nothing (not even the large crowd of small boys who surrounded us) appeared to upset the general.

On the 22nd of August I arranged with the officer commanding the 3rd Battery of the 3rd Division to take me out and let me see his battery come into action. He mounted me and I rode out with the battery a short distance from the barracks, where there was a small field.

First of all the battery and all the wagons galloped round and round the field, and eventually formed up under the direction of the officer commanding, who personally directed each vehicle to its place with the help of a great deal of shouting. The guns were then unlimbered and the limbers were halted in line about twenty yards behind the guns. Next the wagons drew up alongside the guns, the limbers were unlimbered, and the horses and wagon limbers took up positions alongside the gun limbers. The wagon body was then man-handled round by the gun detachment. After about

three-quarters of an hour's shouting of orders the guns were given parallel lines.

A lady then appeared on the scene and the B.C. spent another three-quarters of an hour talking to her. Eventually, I managed to get hold of him and suggested he should go on with the drill, and pointed out to him that his method of going into action was quite useless. He gave out a few orders to the battery and I went along the line of guns to watch the men doing the drill. Meanwhile, the B.C. again forgot that he was on parade and resumed his conversation with the lady. As I had another appointment I do not know how much longer he remained there, but the incident gives a very good indication of how the work was carried on.

Shortly afterwards, Major P. returned from the Riga front, whence he had just managed to escape in a cattle-truck. Everyone in the division with which he was knew that the Germans were going to make an attack, but no effort was put forth to meet it. The batteries of the division had not even got their guns into action, although they had been on the ground for some days previously and knew that an attack was imminent any moment; in fact, the commanders of some of the batteries had gone away either to Petrograd or to Moscow, and the artillery general of the army or corps whom Major P. interviewed had no idea where the ammunition supply for these batteries was located.

Shortly after this, I left for Kiev, and on the 15th of October, in the afternoon, I took a friend to see the gunnery school. The general in charge of the gunnery school was absolutely helpless in every way. Although we explained the necessity of applying corrections when shooting, he persisted in saying that they were quite useless and that the Russians had given up using them some time ago. I do not think that he was popular with his own people, who apparently realized that he was incompetent. However, the 6th Howitzer Battery of the 5th Division which we visited later made an excellent show and made a good impression upon us. A lot of trouble had been taken in keeping the guns clean and the men were smart.

On the 7th of November I went to lunch with the French, Rumanian, Belgian and Serbian representatives at Kiev. This meeting was suggested by the commandant of the French forces there, as he thought that it would be a good thing for the representatives of the different Allies to meet weekly in order to talk over the situation.

On Sunday, the 11th of November, I went to tea with General Sheideman (Inspector-General of Artillery) and his family. While

we were there a report came in by telephone that the 5th Division 6-in. howitzers had mutinied, the men having got hold of some liquor, but before we left we heard that the rioting had been quelled by troops of the 2nd Division. I had arranged to go and see the 3rd Division the next day, and asked the general before I left whether he thought that it would be all right for me to do so ; and he saw no reason against it. The next morning, however, just as we were going to start I received a letter from the General's A.D.C., asking us not to go.

These two divisions, the 5th Division 6-in. howitzers, and the 3rd Division 60-pounders, were the two best divisions we had there. There was fighting all day and night in the town, but we were not worried. On the 13th of November the fighting was still in progress, and there was a good deal of firing in our street ; but we slept soundly and did not know anything of it until it was described to us the next morning.

The Ukrainian Government took charge on the 14th of November, and we went to see Commandant Parlier, the *Chef de Mission* of the French at Kiev. He told us that he was going to stay on as he had a large number of men in the town, two hospitals and a lot of material, but that the other French officers in similar jobs to ours would leave. I then went with *Chef d'Escadron Pierrat* to see General Sheidemann. We found that he had been moved from his office, where everything was in the most perfect order, to some temporary offices near his own house ; and here everything was in the most extraordinary state of chaos. Ukrainian Bolshevik soldiers were sitting and standing about everywhere smoking, the furniture was piled up anyhow, and there were only two Russian officers present in addition to the general. Sheidemann had changed greatly and appeared very old and worried. He told us that it would be a relief to his own conscience if we and our men left for a few days, and suggested that we should go to the British armoured cars at Kursk until things settled down a bit. Finally, I decided to stay on with S., who spoke Russian fluently, to keep the British flag flying at Kiev ; and next day I sent off T., K. and four warrant officers to join the British force of armoured cars at Kursk.

When they arrived at the station they met H., a King's Messenger, who was trying to get from Jassy *via* Mogileff (Stavka, the G.H.Q. of the Russian Armies) to Petrograd. Apparently the train in which he was coming up had passed through Kiev the night previously and had been stopped just on the borders of the newly constituted Ukrainian Republic, where all the Russian officers had

been turned out of the train, and their epaulettes torn off them, after which the train had been returned to Kiev. He, however, and some French officers who were travelling with him had not been interfered with.

After the departure of my friends I went to see General Sheidemann, whose office we found in the same state of chaos as on the previous day. We had a few words with him and then went to see his wife and family, and understood from her that he was leaving as soon as he had handed over ; he did not wish to leave Kiev before placing his command in the hands of some representative of the Ukrainian Government. The Chief of the Staff had bolted on the opening day of the fight.

On the 26th of November I went to see the Minister of War of the Ukrainian Government ; his name was Petlura and he was a ballet dancer at Kiev. He spoke very fluently and, so far as one could make out, seemed to be quite genuine in his ideas and intentions, and did not wish to make a separate peace. However, one never knew how much to trust these people.

A few days later Major F. arrived. He had been Military Attaché in Rumania, and joined S. and myself at our flat.

On the 1st of December General Tabouis, the French general at the headquarters of the staff on the western front of the Russian Armies, who had come into Kiev to take charge of the British there, went with F. to see the heads of the Ukrainian Government. He delivered a kind of ultimatum roughly to the effect that, if the Ukrainians continued to fight they would receive good support from the Allies generally and from the French in particular. However, the Government was undecided whether to make terms with the Germans, the Bolsheviks or the Allies.

On the 3rd of December there was an enormous Jewish demonstration to the British Consul, whose house was just opposite ours ; there must have been 40,000 people in our street. The demonstration seemed to be an organized one ; all the banners had been elaborately prepared and appeared, so far as one could see, to be pro-British.

On the 8th of December all the Allied representatives at Stavka, Russian G.H.Q., arrived in a special train. They had left the day on which General Dukhonin was murdered, and I went down to see our representative at the station and brought him back to Kiev.

On the 12th of December F., who had gone down with a French officer to interview Kaledin, returned. He told me that he found Kaledin a very frightened old man, entirely different from

what he had expected, as he had the reputation of being a fine dashing cavalry leader. F. was informed by Kaledin that he did not intend to do any fighting; all he proposed to do was to reorganize the Cossacks. Kaledin also stated that the young Cossacks were not to be trusted and were becoming much imbued with Bolshevik ideas—a statement which afterwards turned out to be quite correct. F. found several different parties attempting to organize units in the Don—Alexieff, Kaledin and also a Czech officer who spoke French. The latter appeared to be doing the most work, but each leader seemed to mistrust the others and all were apparently working solely for their own ends.

Mr. W. arrived from the Embassy at Petrograd to find out all he could of the Ukrainian situation. A letter which I had written some days previously from Kiev to our general, and which was sent up by a French officer, was the first information the British Embassy received about the actual state of affairs in Kiev, and it was in reference to this letter that W. came down.

On the 21st of December F.'s brother and S. arrived from Jassi. The following day S. and I received a wire to leave for Kursk. On the 23rd of December we left the house for Kiev II, *i.e.* the station where the trains were made up. My companion and I had the greatest difficulty in getting into the train, and it was only through the good nature of one of the train conductors, who locked us in his own small compartment, that we managed to get seats. This was about 9.30 a.m. We arrived at Kursk at 7.30 p.m. the next day. The usual time for this journey is, I believe, eight hours.

On the 24th of December, after waiting from about 7.30 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. at the station at Kursk, we managed to get a car from the Naval Armoured Car Division, and eventually got taken up to the officers' mess—about two or three miles away from the barracks in which the men were quartered.

On Christmas morning, as we were dressing, the chief petty officer of the British Armoured Car Division arrived at the Officers' Mess with the chief of the revolutionary committee and a soldier (who was on his staff), to inform us that the Bolsheviks had occupied the barracks by force. We invited the chief Bolshevik to join us at breakfast and then we went down with the chief of the revolutionary committee to the barracks. We found about two hundred Bolsheviks, with rifles and bayonets, wandering about all over the place.

Apparently about 6 a.m. on Christmas Day three or four of them

had entered behind the sentry, overpowered and disarmed him, and then gone into the guard-room. After they had disarmed all the guard they went to the barracks of the men, most of whom were in bed. Then they went up and informed Warrant Officer K. that they had commandeered the cars and wished them handed over. He naturally said he could do nothing without instructions from his officers and picked up the telephone beside his bed to ring up the Officers' Mess. They immediately cut the wires, however, and he was quite helpless. Fortunately, he and all the rest of the men kept their heads and no fight took place. The Bolsheviks had evidently been expecting a tussle, as they had brought up a large force ; field guns and machine guns had been posted to cover the entrances to the barracks.

The armoured cars were quartered in a large barracks, which apparently was also occupied by other troops, and there were numerous entrances into the large courtyard round which the barrack buildings were situated. Consequently, there was a continuous passage of Russian soldiers, and the arrival of any such parties would arouse no suspicion in the mind of the sentry ; no doubt the overpowering of the man on guard was thus an easy matter.

On our arrival at the office we had an interview with the chief of the revolutionary committee, who appeared to be a very nice fellow and quite reasonable in every way. He showed us his instructions from Moscow, to the effect that he was empowered to commandeer all the armoured cars, machine guns and war material.

After a good deal of talk with this man, Commander S. pointed out that naturally, as they had commandeered them, they must have them ; we did not wish to fight with Russians ; we had come out to fight for them and not against them and did not intend to take any political part for either side. S. also informed the head Bolshevik that we had a large supply of food and did not intend to part with it, and he promised to give us a guarantee that the food should not be touched. We made it clear that we could give them no information or help in any way whatsoever in either repairing, putting in order, or starting any of the armoured cars or guns, nor would we part with any petrol. At the same time S. pointed out that all the officers and men there were only a " repair " staff and that practically all the fighting material, guns and cars were out of action.

Eventually, Commander S. and two other officers went down with the Bolshevik to his own office to draw up the contract. I

remained in the barracks walking about among the Bolsheviks, my main object being to maintain the peace. After about an hour S. returned, having signed the agreement, and all the Bolshevik soldiers with the exception of a guard providing three sentries were ordered to leave the barracks. We were in no way interfered with by these guards, but we were not allowed to touch any of the armoured cars or machine guns ; we, for our part, had agreed that we would in no way damage any of the existing fighting material—most of which (although the Bolsheviks were not aware of it at the time) had previously been put out of action.

Next morning, the 26th of December, all was still quiet, and the commander of the Bolshevik guard, corresponding to a sergeant, came with a rather comical report to Commander S. He stated that he and his men had not had any drink or relief for twenty-four hours ; Commander S. accordingly gave instructions for them to be fed, and they received a good supply of tea, bully beef and biscuits. The next day several of them said that they wished to join the British Army and fight for us !

The president of the local revolutionary committee was a well-educated, intelligent man and quite easy to deal with. He appeared to be extremely worried by everybody and to find his job rather a bigger one than he cared about ; for, owing to the want of discipline, it was very difficult to make any of his underlings comply with his instructions. He told us that he had been for the last three nights talking on the telephone, and taking part at conferences, as the Bolsheviks were expecting to be attacked both by the Cossacks and by the Ukrainians.

That evening a party of soldiers arrived and asked for some petrol. One of them spoke English with an American accent, and we informed him that we had made an agreement with the president of the revolutionary committee, one of the terms of which was that we would not supply any one with petrol, and therefore we would not do so. The individual who spoke English then said to his companions :

“ Oh, they have said they will not supply us ; that ends the matter ! ”

This incident was an excellent proof of the Russians' respect for an Englishman's word. In fact, before the war, “ I give you the word of an Englishman ” was, I believe, the most binding form of promise in any business contract.

Commander S. then telegraphed to Petrograd to inform our authorities of what had happened ; and the next day I received

a telegram from General P. to say I was to return with my party to Petrograd. However, owing to the difficulty of getting a train, and the serious obstacles in the way of any kind of travelling—especially with the large quantities of luggage which we had—I telegraphed to say that it was impossible ; and a few days afterwards Commander S. received word to the effect that he was to be prepared to evacuate all the men and as many stores as he could at an early date to Murmansk, whilst I and my party were to go with them.

Before the end of the month the Bolsheviks tried to remove some “Austin” lorries, but, although they made several attempts to start them, they were unable to do so. The temperature most of the time was about 20 or 30 degrees below zero and all the cylinders naturally were frozen. The so-called experts whom they sent were certainly not skilled mechanics, their usual method being to turn a blow-pipe on to the cylinders.

On New Year’s Eve we had a charming letter from our Bolshevik guard. It was a genuine expression of the men’s gratitude to us for supplying them with rations. The translation is as follows :—

“ Dear Allies and Comrades,

“ In the name of our Comrades and Allies we send you our friendly soldiers’ thanks for your kind attention and your thoughtfulness towards us.

“ We will try our best in future to live on the most friendly terms with you.

“ Our heartiest thanks once more and we wish you every success and welfare.

Signed, Your Allies and Comrades, the Russian Soldiers.”

We also had a letter from the twelve Austrian prisoners who had been attached to the Armoured Car Division for fatigue work. These men, with one exception, had never given any trouble whatever and had always been very willing and hard workers. The letter wished us a Happy New Year and a victory over our enemies and a safe return to our dear country. These sentiments from prisoners belonging to a country with which we were at war were, to say the least of it, rather amusing, and their employment by the British Armoured Car Division was a very good form of propaganda—as, indeed, was the whole of our stay under Bolshevik control at Kursk.

After about ten days another party of Bolsheviks, most of whom spoke German, suddenly arrived at the barracks. This party was a very truculent one and its arrival nearly led to a disturbance.

The men told us that a certain number of armoured cars and machine guns were to be handed over to them at once and put in order, and that they would shoot us if this was not done. Commander S. took them to his office, although at first they refused to go. In the office their leader was offered a chair, but refused to sit down. However, Commander S. insisted, and gave him a cup of tea, after which the discussion was proceeded with. Our visitor was told in very plain language that his was not the way to deal with British officers and men. He was then taken down to the president of the revolutionary committee, who denied all knowledge of him or his party, and gave him instructions to leave at once.

Apparently he and his party agreed to do this on condition that the revolutionary party, under whose protection at the time we were, supplied him with a lorry.

This second detachment came from Moscow and were real Bolsheviks. The party which were guarding us was not really Bolshevik. It was composed of Social Revolutionaries, as we discovered afterwards. They did not believe in Lenin and Trotsky and considered that these worthies were doing a great deal of harm to the country. I believe that in their opinion the Germans should have been allowed to take Petrograd and the Northern part of Russia where there were no food supplies, and that the front covering Ukraine and the southern part of Russia, whence all the food supplies came should have been held. They wished to have a Republic and opposed the return of the Czar ; but otherwise they seemed to be a fairly conservative in their ideas.

The common soldiers belonging to each of these parties had no idea for what they were fighting, and were ready to follow any one who talked to them and appealed to their imagination—and fed them.

Some time before we left, all the sentries of the guard posted over us had taken to saluting the British officers. They would not pay this compliment to any Russian officers, none of whom, of course, were allowed to wear the signs of rank ; nor did they salute any of their own people ; but they were always quite ready to do so to any of us, and we were perfectly convinced, that—if one could have got the soldier and peasant class completely away from any outside influence, and have fed and clothed the men—one could have made a very fine army out of them and have led them anywhere. They were composed of some of the finest material, though at that time, of course, they were absolutely hopeless and useless.

After the arrival of the last Bolshevik party from Moscow I

suggested to Commander S. that he should telegraph to Petrograd at once, pointing out that the situation was becoming even more strained than it had been previously. As we had no code we disguised the telegram as follows :—

“Recommend immediate change of climate.”

This message apparently arrived fairly soon at Petrograd, as about ten days afterwards we received a telegram ordering us to proceed at once to Murmansk, taking all our *personnel*, all possible stores and six weeks' supply of food. We were also to make arrangements to sell all the Government stores which we could not take. This, of course, in the actual state of the country, was quite an impossible thing to do, as we could not openly advertize the fact that we were going to sell Government stores. If we had done so, they would naturally have been commandeered immediately by the Bolsheviks, or probably a raid on the barracks would have taken place.

Nevertheless, with the help of our Russian interpreters, certain individuals at Kursk were approached, and they stated they were willing to buy the stores. We could give them no guarantee, however, as to when we could deliver them, or whether they would ever be delivered : We explained, therefore, that, until we actually left, nothing could be handed over. These conditions not unnaturally made any terms very difficult to arrange. The sale of the food-stuffs fell through altogether ; these, however, were eventually commandeered by the Bolsheviks. The medical stores were sold to local doctors and chemists and were removed the day that we left. These, I believe, obtained very good prices.

Lieut. I. and I went down on the morning of the 9th of January to the station officials, and tried to arrange for the requisite number of coaches and trucks. After a good deal of talking and discussion we found out that there was a hospital train, and the railway authorities thought the permission of the president of the revolutionary committee might be obtained for it. This was duly arranged for, and the railway authorities promised to have the train round at the station by 6 a.m. the next day. To our surprise they kept their promise, and early on the 10th of January, we started loading up the train.

Our journey up was more or less uneventful. Once or twice people tried to get on our part of the train, to which a certain number of passenger coaches had been attached behind, but the sentries whom we had placed at the doors impressed them with the fact that there was “nothing doing.” At one of the stations, where we

had rather a long stop, we heard a good deal of noise outside ; and on going out to see what was the matter, we found a large number of the soldiers shouting at the guard and engine driver. They were threatening to shoot the driver if he did not go faster. It was only when we had pointed out that, if they shot him, they probably would not go at all, that they quietened down a bit, admitting that they had not considered that point in the least.

We eventually arrived at Petrograd on the 18th of January and reached Murmansk about a week later.

We left Murmansk on the 29th of January on the armed boarding steamer H.M.S. *Tithonus*, not altogether sorry that our trip to Russia was at an end.

TERRITORIAL FIELD ARTILLERY AND MECHANICAL DRAUGHT

AN EXPERIMENT WITH FORDSONS

BY CAPTAIN O. T. FRITH, R.A.

Introductory.—A few innocent remarks on the subject of mechanical draught led to great argument. Fate being in a smiling mood, it chanced that one of the party owned a farm and a couple of Fordsons. Furthermore, this individual was friendly with the local Fordson agent ; and the result was that the argument led to a succession of trials with an 18-pdr. attached to a Fordson. In due course various alterations were made to the tractors, and a full-dress trial was held, attended by the Territorial battery commander, the adjutant of the brigade and a gunner major from the Staff College. The test course was “ uphill, down-dale, thoro’ bush, thoro’ briar,” not to mention Essex clay ; the results were so encouraging that the time was felt to have come for a large scale trial if sanction could be obtained.

The first obvious difficulty was the fact that the brigade to which the battery commander and adjutant belonged was a “ Yeomanry Brigade,” and as such presumably a “ last-ditcher ” where mechanization was concerned. As a matter of fact, there was no difficulty, as all ranks without exception showed immediate enthusiasm for the experiment, provided that officers and non-commissioned officers were allowed to bring their own out-riders as usual. It must be borne in mind that many farmers in this country own tractors, and that many farmhands consequently know how to drive them.

As the brigade was due to practise at Okehampton, it was felt that the difficult terrain of Dartmoor offered a golden opportunity for a thorough trial, far more valuable than would have been obtained on the easy turf slopes of Larkhill. Accordingly, the questions of supply and finance were attacked and a definite proposition was put up to Higher Authority. To cut a long story short, sanction was obtained just in time to allow one battery of the brigade to go to

camp with Fordsons while the other utilized horse draught. The question of finance will be discussed later in this article.

Equipment. (a) Weighted wheels.—It had been found during trials that extra weight was essential on the back wheels of the Fordson to enable the machines to get the necessary grip, and so to allow them to utilize their full power. To effect this, the driving wheels were filled up solid with reinforced concrete, somewhere about half a ton in each wheel. As a rough, ready, cheap and efficient method of obtaining extra weight it is difficult to devise a better scheme. It is, however, obvious that a more valuable cargo than reinforced concrete could be carried. An obvious alternative for war purposes would be armour for engine and driver, and possibly anti-tank and anti-aircraft armament. Two recesses were left in the concrete for the insertion of the bolts and nuts to hold the road bands. After a fortnight's very rough work at camp, the concrete showed no sign of breaking up.

(b) Mud Guards.—These proved to be indispensable for the following reasons: (1) they protect the driver from being jolted against and hurt by the wheels when going over rough ground; (2) they provide a safe stand and handhold for No. 1 or instructor when on the move; and (3) they act as an extra anti-rearing safeguard, as the rear portion of the mudguards would have to be completely buckled up before the tractor could come over backwards.

These guards had not been ordered, and they involved an unforeseen difficulty in fixing the road bands, as the top inner recesses in the concrete were now inaccessible. A simple cure would be to cut hand holes in the inner side of the guards.

(c) Draught Attachments.—Bent wrought iron "girder type" poles were supplied to replace the ordinary limber and wagon poles. The front ends of these fitted between two horizontal plates bolted on to the drawbar cap of the tractor, where a pin fastener was provided. This is unsound as it allows no turning movement between tractor and limber; and it resulted in several broken drawbar caps and one bent pole. A swivel attachment should be easy to devise and cheap to produce. The extension plates on the drawbar cap were useful in giving extra turning clearance, as the mudguards restrict this somewhat.

(d) Pendulum Anti-rearing Device.—The Fordson is often accused of coming over backwards on to its driver. In fact, it is sometimes possible by dangerous driving to turn one over. To make certain of avoiding such a disaster, anti-rearing devices were fitted, but it is doubtful whether they were necessary. The tendency to rear, due

to the inertia of the weighted wheels, is largely neutralized by the drawbar pull of a heavy load. Also, before a tractor can come up on end, it must break the drawbar plates, which would then be on the ground, and it must also buckle up the mudguards.

The pendulum switches which were utilized were first set to cut out the engine at about 30° . This was found to be too timid a setting, as they made the engine miss going up steep hills or over rough ground. A setting to cut out the engine at not less than 45° was found to be better. In practice it was found that the front wheels had a tendency to lift slightly when in heavy draught, which made steering difficult at times; possibly a small extra weight in the front wheels (say 2 cwt.) might usefully be carried. This would be an additional anti-rearing safeguard.

Before allowing any of the battery drivers to handle the tractors, they were thoroughly tested by fastening them to a gatepost, starting the engine, letting in the clutch and jumping off. The pendulum switch cut the engine out in each case as soon as the front wheels came up in the air. A more humorous development arose when two Fordsons were fastened back to back and started. This time the rope broke. One machine made straight for a battery busy at gun drill, the other straight for the nearest bog, each with an agitated officer running after it and trying to climb into the driving seat.

(e) *Road Bands and Strakes*.—One undoubted disadvantage of the Fordson is the necessity of fitting metal road bands when in draught on roads. The tractors will not pull their loads cross-country with the road bands on, and they do more damage than can be permitted on roads if the bands are off. Some such solution as fitting rubber blocks between the strakes, with a quick attachment should be easy to devise. Various endeavours are being made to produce a dual purpose wheel for commercial purposes; but those which the writer has seen combine inefficiency with high price. Some solution must be sought if the Fordson is to be used for artillery draught.

(f) *Silencers*.—The battery on the move made more than a little noise; and it was very difficult to pass orders except by means of a humorous code of signals invented by the battery commander. The standard Fordson silencer is not expensive, but it was not tried, so that it is not known to what degree it would improve matters.

Organization.—Ten Fordsons were taken to camp, one for each gun, one for each ammunition wagon and one spare for each section.

This proportion of spare tractors is considered indispensable, both to replace engine and other casualties and to form a reserve of draught-power if any vehicle gets ditched. On this particular occasion all the machines were new and no case of engine trouble was suffered throughout the fortnight. This cannot be expected when Fordsons are hired from farmers or are used for a succession of camps and through a succession of years.

Throughout camp all tractors were driven by yeomanry *personnel*, the majority of whom had no experience of motor-cars or tractors. Within three days the battery could move as such, though not in very polished fashion. To achieve this we had more assistance than could usually be expected. The Ford Company sent down three very expert and capable instructors, while the Colchester Ford agent furnished two more. These five carried out all the early individual driving instruction. Normally, there should be no need of so much help. Fordsons are easy to borrow or to hire in most parts of England, they are very easy to drive; every battery must possess officers and non-commissioned officers who could instruct drivers in their own drill stations. It was only lack of time which prevented some such scheme being put in hand before camp in this particular case. As things were, however, officers and Nos. 1 were free to concentrate on other training. Nos. 1's chargers were dispensed with; the Nos. 1 travelled on the tractors where they could control and direct the drivers.

Performance.—A knowledge of Okehampton is needed to grasp the degree of success which the tractors achieved. Really steep hills, rock-strewn peat, rock-bottomed fords are the rule, easy going is the exception. In these conditions practically all movement had to be made in ploughing gear and occasionally in bottom gear. On these terms a Fordson cannot trot, but on the moor roads it could—and did—draw away from a horse-drawn battery at a walk. By the end of the fortnight the drivers were keeping their intervals and distances as regularly as with horses. The normal speed appeared to be about three miles an hour; as this can be done in ploughing gear, for which the machine is primarily designed, the engines can run without heat or strain at the marching pace of infantry.

No time was available for trials on good roads, but the Fordson is fitted with a road gear which enables a speed of 10 m.p.h. to be reached on the ordinary road if the guns are required to move by themselves or in an M.T. column.

In actual performance it was considered that the Fordson tractors fully proved that "they can pull an 18-pdr. practically anywhere

that horses can." * Trial was made over good roads, bad roads, steep gradients, rocks, fords and boggy ground. In no case was the tractor in trouble where the 6-horse team would not have been equally embarrassed. Even when the tractor was bogged right up to its tummy it was found an easy matter to run a spare tractor on to solid ground and pull out Fordson and gun with a length of rope. For those who know Okehampton, Cullever Steps may be quoted as a fair test. The whole battery came through the double ford there in column of route without any hitch or hesitation.

As regards drill, the tractors were handier than horses and very quick as regards coming into and out of action. There are two minor points worth mentioning. A tractor is no higher than a man on his feet, which allows them to drive nearer the crest than a horse team. They can, therefore, generally reverse on the gun position and bring the gun into action rear, saving time and labour in man-handling. Secondly, a tractor can reverse, which a 6-horse team cannot do—an invaluable labour-saving gift in limbering up.

Economy of Time and Labour.—With the two batteries alongside each other, all one's preconceived heretical ideas of the wastefulness of the horse stood out startlingly clearly. Twenty horses were taken to camp which were looked after by the battery staff and spare drivers. The tractor drivers only were responsible for cleaning and refilling the tractors. The remainder of the battery were whole-time soldiers. For once in a way battery gun drills could be carried on without interference from stables, watering, feeding, exercise or harness cleaning. The battery commander's estimate was that 100 per cent. more time was available for training. The amount of gun drill which his battery was able to put in was very noticeable. Further, his officers were available for work or instruction far more than was the case in the horse battery. A shortage of men during the last week of camp did not appear to throw any great strain on the remainder. This leads to the question of establishment in a mechanical battery, but this is too big a question more than to notice in passing as a possible way of saving money in these hard times.

Turning away from camp to the rest of the training season, it is obvious that the actual driving is easier to learn with one Fordson than with six horses. No untrained men could possibly have achieved the same results in a fortnight with horse teams, as they were able to achieve with Fordsons. In the writer's opinion there is a great economy possible in this direction during the drill season.

* See "Mechanical Draught and Field Artillery," by Captain O. T. Frith, R.A., *Army Quarterly*, October, 1925.

At the worst, the horse grant would cover the hire or even the purchase of Fordsons for drill purposes.

Finance.—Ten Fordsons were hired for fourteen days and one Ford truck (which replaced two G.S. wagons) for twenty-one days for £310 delivered free at Okehampton station. In addition : one pair of new back wheels filled with reinforced concrete, one pendulum anti-rearing switch, and one draught connecting bar, were provided for each Fordson. These actually had to be bought, as hire and purchase prices were the same. They cost £26 10s. per vehicle. The total expenditure was, therefore, £575, of which sum £310 was spent in hiring and £265 for extra fittings.

The services of sixty horses were dispensed with. They would have cost £630, their hire at £6 per horse coming to £360, and their travelling expenses at 4½d. per mile to £270.

Owing to the fortuitous distance of our home from Okehampton, it will be seen that the whole transaction was carried out inside the normal horse grant. This would not have been the case for a unit living near its camping ground. A large part of the expenditure, however, was really a capital and non-recurring charge, which was met out of ordinary income in this case, and remained in existence as an asset at the end of camp.

The Ford truck also did a great deal of work for the advanced and rear parties and saved some £20 which would have been spent in lorry hire if it had not been there.

Forage v. Petrol.—Under the contract, the contractor found his own lubricating oil, but used Government petrol. At the current rates during camp, forage for 60 horses would have cost £80. Against this, 497 gallons of petrol were used costing £28 19s. 10d., a saving of £50. Petrol was in no wise stinted. During the first few days of camp, all engines were even kept running for long hours on the gun-park so as to run them in.

Miscellaneous.—The opinion is often expressed that the mechanizing of the Territorial Field Artillery would have a very adverse effect on recruiting. This trial has certainly had no such result inside the battery in question : in fact, all ranks are enthusiastic in wishing to proceed with the experiment. Furthermore, since camp there has been a tremendous interest evinced throughout the county ; garage owners and their hands wanting to know whether the scheme is to go on and whether they can join if it does.

No claim is made that the Fordson is the best tractor for the purpose. A very definite claim is made, however, that it is in the same class as the horse as regards draught work for Territorial

Field Artillery, that it is available in case of war, together with spares and a large number of men all over the country who know how to drive and maintain it. It is also claimed that no cheaper form of draught can be discovered. Admittedly, small improvements are needed which can be designed by private endeavour, but which would come better *ex cathedra*.

As a Territorial battery commander I should have no hesitation in thinking the substitution of Fordson tractors for horse teams a great advantage. The training of a field battery embraces so many and such varied subjects that it is very difficult in the Territorial Army to achieve a high state of efficiency in them all. The elimination of one large subject—horsemastership—together with the labour entailed throughout a battery in being good horsemasters, means a large gain in time available for learning gunnery, fire control and fire discipline, the actual business of a battery of artillery.

WAR-GAMES ON SAND MODELS

(With Sketch)

BY MAJOR R. H. DEWING, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.

SOME useful notes on exercises which can be carried out on a sand model were published in the *Army Quarterly* in April, 1923.* The following note on how a miniature war-game may be conducted on such a model may therefore be of interest.

The method to be described is a modification of that used at the Small Arms School at Hythe, and it will be convenient, therefore, to explain the Hythe war game first. In it two identical models are made up on standard six by five feet sand-tables. These two tables are placed at either end of a barrack hut, and are separated from one another by a curtain hung across the middle of the room. A group of, say, five players (a platoon commander and his four section commanders), whom we may call the attackers, play at one table, and a similar group, the defenders, occupy the other, playing from the opposite end of the model from their opponents.

The situation is described to both parties by the officer conducting the game, who acts as umpire. The two groups decide on their dispositions and place the pieces representing their troops in position on their own tables.

The commander of the attackers then issues his orders to his section commanders, who in turn tell the umpire what action their sections would take. The umpire judges what movement, if any, would be visible to the defence, and informs the defenders accordingly. The defenders then decide what action they would take. The umpire thus passes backwards and forwards between the two tables, and is continually informed what action either side is taking; he is able to describe to each group in turn the enemy's movements which they would be able to see and the fire to which they would be subjected.

In this way the battle can proceed until the umpire judges that

* "Training by Sand Models (with Diagrams)."

one side or the other has proved successful, or until the troops have come to such close quarters that the game cannot usefully be carried further. The umpire then sums up the lessons which can be drawn from the conduct of the game.

Though with the facilities available at Hythe the method described is excellent, various practical difficulties arise when it comes to using it with a unit. It is not always easy to provide two sand-tables. It is very difficult to make up the two models to be identical in every detail; and because of this difficulty, once two models have been made there is a natural reluctance to scrap them and undertake the labour of making fresh landscapes. There is also the point that movement of the tables is liable to upset details of the contour of the ground and to necessitate careful checking and remodelling before further use; so that in practice the tables must occupy their positions permanently, and this amounts to devoting a room exclusively to them.

All these drawbacks can be avoided by playing the game on a single sand model. The idea of the game remains the same, but instead of each playing on a separate model the two opposing sides come in alternately to make their moves from opposite ends of one table, while their opponents are for the moment kept out of the room. To avoid either side being able to observe the pieces of the enemy too easily, screens are hung across the table at either end as shown in the sketch. These screens can easily be improvised. Old maps suspended from a string made fast on either side of the model to the iron trestles of an ordinary barrack table have been found to serve well enough. The screens are hung so that their lower edge is a couple of inches above the model; in this way the players view the landscape in a realistic manner with their eyes about the level of the "ground," and are denied the "aerial" view which can normally be taken of a sand model.

As the troops work forward the screens can also be moved towards the centre of the table, giving the players a fuller view of the ground.

The necessity for the players being alternately banished from the room is a disadvantage, but, if decisions are taken quickly, as they should be, it has not been found in practice to be a very serious one.

The element of competition which is introduced into exercises by the expedient which has been described seldom fails to increase interest, and the games nearly always bring out useful lessons in minor tactics.



TO THE
LIBRARY

ENSIGN, CORNET AND BRIGADIER

BY COLONEL H. ROWAN-ROBINSON, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.

THE two most delightful titles ever borne in the British Army were those of Ensign of Foot and Cornet of Horse. There is a ring of martial youth in the sound of them. They revive memories of the trappings of war now few and scanty, of sacred colours and prancing horses. They were abolished in 1871, and in their stead, the commonplace, complicated, continental title of Second-Lieutenant was introduced. The French subaltern ranks are *Lieutenant* and *Sous-Lieutenant*, the German—*Ober-Leutnant* and *Leutnant*. The British Army alone possessed distinctive terms for these ranks. It is sad to have dropped them. Ask any boy at school whether he would prefer to be a Second-Lieutenant or an Ensign of Foot. Ask any mother which she would like her son to be. Ask any young woman whether she would rather dance with a Second-Lieutenant or a Cornet of Horse. The answers are not in doubt. Great value indeed lies in a name. There is at the moment no great enthusiasm for soldiering at our public schools. Reintroduce the old titles, sanctified by many a glorious episode of former wars, and they will be eagerly sought by the best of our youth. And when they come let a man be known not as "Mr. X." or "X., Esquire," but as "Ensign X." or "Cornet X."

A plea may at the same time be entered for the introduction of the title of Brigadier for the commander of a brigade of cavalry or infantry. The title is expressive, it is military, it is short. The public will understand it as will the soldier. What matters it that the French *brigadier* is a lance-corporal? that is their affair, not ours. The expression Colonel-Commandant has always possessed, and still possesses, the meaning of Honorary Colonel. The Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers have a regular establishment of Colonels-Commandant, all senior general officers, some on the active, some on the retired list. It is therefore most confusing to find the comparatively junior brigade commander similarly described. And

as a title it is exceedingly clumsy. Former holders were addressed according to their rank as general ; the new type of holder similarly is addressed by his permanent rank of colonel ; but, whereas in the first case the appointment of commandant lies in the background, in the second case it stands very much in the foreground to define clearly the executive duties of the holder. Consequently with the latter there is always confusion as to the mode of address whether personal or in correspondence private or official. My proposal, therefore, is to substitute for—

Colonel X.

Colonel Commandant —th Inf. Bde.

the address—

Brigadier X.

Commanding —th Inf. Bde.

The Brigadier would be addressed as “Brigadier” in all circumstances.

It was certainly sound to abolish the title of Brigadier-General, for officers of that rank abounded literally in hundreds during the late war, thus rendering the title of general too cheap ; but the change should have been made simply by dropping the word general.

Under the proposed system any officer who has completed a year in command of a brigade should, if retired in colonel's rank, retain the honorary rank of brigadier.

NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

THE most interesting books of the quarter are the reminiscences of the American General Bullard; de Nogales' "Four Years under the Crescent," an extraordinary vivid account of life with the Turkish Army; and General Reinhardt's detailed description of a small battle, Longuyon—Noërs. The notices of these books will be found at the head of the reviews.

U.S.A.

Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (New York: Doubleday, Page, 5 dollars), by Major-General Robert Lee Bullard, U.S. Army (retired), has received no notice in England, although it is of considerable interest. General Bullard commanded the 2nd Infantry Brigade, the 1st Division, the III Corps, and the American Second Army. His book, which is a combination of extracts from his diary and reflections, is very outspoken, and gives a good idea of the difficulties experienced by the American Army. These were due mainly to President Wilson refusing for nearly three years to allow any preparation for war to be made, to the inability of the War Department to realize the magnitude of the effort required, and to the attempts of the French to make the Americans follow their system.

General Bullard served under French generals, and had French divisions under him, was always alongside or with the French, and never had to cooperate with the British, so he has not very much to say about us. The French, he found, had little offensive spirit, and did not want to fight offensively. He complains of their constant change of orders, and their dislike of suggestions from others. Like ourselves, he found the sectors that he took over from them quiet—he remarks:

"*En passant*, why should the British continue to fight [in the last half of 1917] and the French not? The state of exhaustion seemed about the same for both. I believe the answer lies in one word, discipline,"

and he adds on the same page:

"Any enemy order of battle map of the time will show the enemy about twice as strong on the British as on the French front."

American troops,

"before, at and after Soissons, quite regularly declared that the French lagged, failed to keep abreast in attack."

At first General Bullard was sceptical,

"but the uniformity and number of these claims carried some conviction of their truth. . . . The French went through the form of executing an attack, but they put no fight in it."

He disposes of the popular public impression that in the American Army there were no

"dead-beats and deserters, evaders of battle and danger."

He shot perhaps a dozen. Similarly, he mentions that there was failure and laxity in battle or duty amongst higher officers, and that major-generals and brigadier-generals lost their commands :

"This, of course, is hardly believable, as we read only American histories of our fighting in France."

He has no affection for the Germans, and remarks that the politicians who make treaties

"should be required to visit and see the country which German ambition and savagery have desolated. It would harden their hearts and exact justice from these barbarians."

He was surprised at

"the great stores and apparent plenty, of happiness, food, clothes and what not" that he saw in Germany.

"Germany," he continues, "has had no great hardship in the war, and she can and should be made to pay *heavily* for all the destruction she has caused in her fever of megalomania and world rule. *She should be made to pay.*"

He devotes a whole chapter to the 92nd (Negro) Division. When he took over the Second Army, he found that the Division had twice run away, a number of negro officers were under trial for cowardice, and many more had proved useless, whilst a number of men had been found guilty of rape. The negroes were "husky, vigorous soldiers, well-equipped," but he never succeeded in the

slightest degree in getting even a successful raid out of them. In three weeks 27,000 negroes captured one German. The Division could hardly take care of itself, and was a failure. He got the Division sent home; it continued its ravishing propensities en route and at the port of embarkation. Being first home, it was received with great glorification by the American public. The Army was well quit of it at that price, says General Bullard, and it was a great relief to him to know it had gone.

The most striking opinions of General Bullard have been selected, and do not fairly represent the general pleasant and genial character of the book. It leaves the impression that the author was a thorough good soldier, intent first on doing his duty; a man of energy and thoroughness, who did his best to work smoothly with those above and below him.

TURKEY

Vier Jahren unter dem Halbmond (Four years under the Crescent), by Rafael de Nogales (*Berlin : Hobbing, 14 marks*), is written in the vein of Baron Marbot, and though it treats of Armenian atrocities and the war, is from the point of view of a human document, a most entertaining book. The author, a Venezuelan officer, was educated in Europe, and received his first wound in the Spanish ranks in Cuba in 1898. He tried at the outbreak of war to take service in succession with the Belgians, French, Russians, Montegrins and Serbians, and, being refused by them, was, through the influence of German friends, accepted by the Turks.

Composed in Spanish, the German translator of the book says that he had toned down the "richly coloured" language of the original; but, as it is, some of the adventures of the author seem almost incredible; but they are backed up by signed photographs presented to him by General Liman von Sanders and other German officers, photographs of scenes in the theatre of war, evident signs of a very intimate knowledge of the Turkish Army and a soldierly grasp of the operations in which he took part. Further, where his story touches the British forces, it has an accuracy which is convincing.

It is what he relates of the Turks and the German officers who tried to run them, that makes his book of special value to the military student. Arrived in Constantinople in January, 1915, he was sent to the staff of the Third Army. He took just four weeks to reach Erzeroum, 650 miles from Constantinople, which gives some idea of the nature of the Turkish lines of communication. On

the Caucasus front all was quiet except for "occasional gun fire and outpost skirmishes." A German Lieut.-Colonel named Guse really commanded the Third Army, and he kept it in being until he contracted typhus and was invalided. The Turks were far more interested in massacring Armenians than in fighting the Russians. Detached to a Gendarmerie division in the Van area, Nogales was an eye-witness of organized murder and massacre. Barely arrived at Adeljivaz on the northern shore of Lake Van, he heard shots and was told that the old fortress was being attacked.

"Great was my astonishment as I perceived that the police not the Armenians were the attackers."

He tried to stop the atrocities, and was shown by the senior officer a written order, signed by the Governor of the Province, directing that all males over twelve years of age should be killed. He managed to collect seven living Armenians, whom he took to the Kaimakan. This gentleman imperturbably thanked him in the name of the Government for saving the town, and pledged his honour to protect the seven men : at night, with 43 others discovered hiding, they were slaughtered and their bodies thrown into the lake. The author witnessed many other scenes of like character, and on the small island of Aghtamar saw the bodies of the Armenian clergy lying on the steps and in the body of the church.

His first military duty was to assist in the management of the artillery at the siege of the Armenian capital, Van, and there again he saw with his own eyes the *gendarmes* collecting and driving into the town all the women and children of the surrounding districts, so that hunger might force the Armenians to surrender before Russian help could arrive. He learned the horrors of a Turkish hospital : instruments never disinfected, food brought up in carts that had removed the dead. Later in the book, he goes so far as to say that the Turkish medical officers were not interested in keeping patients alive, as dead they drew their pay and rations. In June he took part in the disastrous retreat of the Turks, the occasion of course for more massacres. At Sairt he saw on a hillside

"thousands of corpses, half naked, covered with blood, lying in confused heaps . . . whilst here and there a limb moved convulsively, and dogs and birds hurried to the feast."

Nogales managed to get away to Aleppo, on grounds of a medical certificate, but Halil and other Turks made desperate efforts to get him back, in order to put out of the way, as he thinks, such an

inconvenient foreign witness. By the good offices of Bronsart von Schellendorf and Enver he was, however, appointed to organize the line of communications in the Mamoureh sector of the railway between Adana and Aleppo.

Here he found plenty to do. As he says, the Young Turks were not experts in railway management, and everybody was trying to make what he could out of the war. For a labour battalion of 2,000 men, 6,000 rations were drawn, the officers sold animals and stores, and no private traffic on the railway was possible without heavy *bakshish*. There again he saw atrocities, columns of deportees deliberately led into the wilderness to die, after they had been plundered of all their belongings, including their womenfolk.

In Aleppo he met General Kress von Kressenstein, whom he describes as a thorough good fellow, beloved of his officers. The easy-going manners of his headquarters, earned it the name of "Wallenstein's Lager." Nogales managed to get a joy ride to the Palestine front, in a first-class carriage, lousy and filthy.

In December, 1915, having been too active on the L. of C., he was sent to Field-Marshal von der Goltz at Baghdad. He found relations between the Germans and Turks very strained, as the Field-Marshal was too old and amiable to assert himself; he gave way to the Turks on every occasion. Halil was doing everything he could to isolate Goltz and get rid of the Germans. He appointed a violent Germanophobe, Nuri Bey, as inspector of communications; forbade the German doctors to handle wounded men and restricted their duties to attendance on plague patients; he ignored Goltz, and went to the extent of preventing him getting rations, and openly spoke of him as an old *cretin*. Finally, Nogales was deprived of his appointment of instructor given him by Goltz, and informed that the latter's authority was not recognized. He states it as his opinion that in January, 1916, if General Townshend had made a sortie with only 3,000 to 4,000 men, he would have caused a panic flight. On the evening of the 13th of January, when he visited the Turkish lines at Kut, there were "only two or three line battalions, decimated with typhus, and the remains of the 45th and 51st Divisions, altogether, I believe, not 4,000 rifles."

Returning to Aleppo, the author was now sent to the L. of C. in Palestine at Ramleh. There he found "a perfect system of robbery," and typhus rampant, and he is moved to the conclusion,

"Wherever the crescent rules, it spreads the seed of plunder-lust; which is legalized and sanctified by the Koran."

Now speaking Turkish fairly well, by the good offices of General Nikolai, the German artillery inspector of the Fourth Army, he was given command of the 12th Infantry Regiment, pending a vacancy in the cavalry. The regiment was "badly clothed, worse fed and miserably trained," the officers were apathetic and did as little as possible. He began reorganization by training one company and making the others imitate it. In December, 1916, he took the regiment to Es Salt, but on the 1st of January, 1917, was summoned back to Gaza. He found the defences laid out by Major Tiller nearly ready :

"the troops were certainly old soldiers, but very broken by disease and want. . . . The enemy's fire left them no rest, but they suffered more from the devilments of the L. of C. administration, which made away with their clothing, supplies and medical stores, than from the attacks of the enemy."

The author puts the total strength on the Palestine front as 30,000 combatants, 30 field batteries and 5 or 6 5·9-inch guns. He thinks that Sir Archibald Murray must have counted the Arab irregular corps, and that if he had not been bluffed might have ended the campaign in six months.

Almost immediately after his arrival, he was transferred as staff officer to the 3rd Cavalry Division at Beersheba. It was actually a new formation, as the original division bearing that number had been wiped out by disease and neglect in the Caucasus. During the first battle of Gaza the Division remained at Tel el Sheriat as a bluff to prevent the main position being outflanked ; towards evening it was moved westward to fall on the rear of the British right, which had swung round Gaza ; but too late, as the troops had been withdrawn at dusk.

At the second battle of Gaza it is claimed that the 3rd Cavalry Division, mainly by its artillery fire, drove back British cavalry near Tel el Sheriat. An attempted pursuit at night, noted in the British records, under extraordinary difficulties and full of adventures, failed to catch it up.

Here again after a time he discovered that the Turks did not trust their German comrades. There was a spy on Kress von Kressenstein's staff, who had to

"report every movement and conversation of Kress and his officers of German nationality in the minutest detail. He made use of Colonel — and other Turkish officers, who were Germanophobe. All this was no secret, at least among the higher Turkish officers."

Nogales was on the 10th of May, 1917, sent with a party on camels to collect information and to destroy wells in the Sinai desert—he gives his route on the map—proceeding from Beersheba to El Hafir, which he made his base. He led a party of volunteers to damage the railway near El Arish, and, according to his account, they fired four charges and set Magdabah (south of El Arish) on fire.

On leave in Constantinople, Nogales was actually in Haida Pasha when the first explosion took place which destroyed the great dépôt of stores assembled by the Germans for Falkenhayn's campaign in Mesopotamia, and had to ride for his life. He attributes the disaster to careless handling of ammunition. Whilst at the capital he learned that the Turkish War Office had against his name that he was not to leave Turkey alive. Returning to the front in October, 1917, he eventually accompanied Falkenhayn back to Constantinople, and was there when the Armistice came, and, by the assistance of an English friend, got away in a British ship.

WESTERN FRONT

Since Meckel's "Summernight's Dream," in which he described what he saw as a company commander at Wörth in 1870, there has been no such detailed account of experiences in action as in General-leutnant Ernst Reinhardt's *Des Gefecht bei Longuyon—Noërs am 24 August, 1914* (Pforzheim : Vaterland Verlag, 2 marks). Wounded as a battalion commander in this early fight, he had opportunity of discussing it with other wounded and thinking it over, and next year was able to visit the field whilst his memories were still fresh. The narrative thus compiled is a most valuable picture of fighting in open warfare and its extraordinary difficulties.

The author's command consisted of

"the 5th and two-thirds of the 7th, 11th and 12th Companies of the 121st Infantry Regiment, and the 9th, 10th and 12th Companies of the 122nd, under its own major."

They belonged to the 51st Brigade of the 26th Division in the Fifth Army.

On the night of the 23rd of August, after another battalion in the advanced guard had had a small skirmish with French stragglers, his men reached Longuyon in the deep valley of the Chiers south of Longwy. After six march days, including three fighting days and five bivouacs, they were dead tired.

"Thus it happened that, there being large quantities of wine in Longuyon, it did not fail to have effect on our people."

The advanced guard had gone on to Noërs, the next village, three kilometres ahead, but had cleared out of it when fired on, and spent the night deployed for action. Reinhardt's men were ordered to assist it to drive the enemy off, joining them at 5 a.m. It was a foggy morning, and a few shots falling in Longuyon, whilst the men were falling in, there was a panic. Encouraged, however, by receipt of a divisional order, that the enemy was in "retreat that resembled flight," they did not expect serious resistance, still less that the French would attack, as they did before continuing their retreat. "Very instructive" such information paragraphs of higher commanders, says the author. Orders were now given by the map : his companies were to advance against Hill 296.

"As it was dark, it was rather difficult to settle which hill this was."

However, the first thing the battalion knew was that it was under heavy enfilade machine-gun fire.

The long story of the fight cannot be followed here. It will be sufficient to quote some phrases and incidents :—

"There was no question of a purposeful conduct of the fight. No higher staffs were at first on the battlefield, not even a liaison officer : as the troops came on the field, they came into the fight."

Four other regiments are mentioned, so over a division was engaged. The artillery hung back, unwilling, apparently, to come across the valley of the Chiers ; so, in spite of reiterated appeals, the infantry got no support from guns, and knew only that it was under enemy shrapnel fire, with a concealed enemy in woods in front of it, 800 to 1,000 metres away.

There is almost a refrain in the narrative "our artillery did not fire," "our artillery was silent." Losses increased, and the men began to come back. "On one shelled reverse slope were men of nearly twenty companies." Some parties, led by officers, worked ahead, but they did not go far.

"The officers, almost without exception, took part in the course of the fight with rifle in the hand, in order to encourage the wavering, partly retiring sections that had pressed on too boldly."

As a result, the major of the 122nd was killed, every company commander, the battalion adjutant, and two-thirds of the other officers fell. Major Reinhardt found himself alone ; his adjutant he had sent to bring up medical assistance, his sergeant-major to

get more ammunition. No information came back from the firing line and he had no one to send to collect it. Picking up a rifle, he went himself to the front line, found all officers near were casualties, and the men lying still under cover. By his example, he was able to lead the line a little farther, but was knocked over by machine-gun fire whilst firing, kneeling in the high grass. In the confusion and difficulty of keeping direction, some Germans, according to the author, fired on each other. One party, under a lieutenant, on being fired on at 80-100 metres range by a dozen Frenchmen, lost all control of themselves ; some bolted, the rest crept into a ditch, and could not be persuaded to go on. In spite of having to pass a shrapnel-swept zone,

“ a stream of stragglers of all arms rolled across the water meadows back to Longuyon.”

It was safer to go forward, as some found. Towards 2.30 p.m., nine hours after the fighting had begun, the divisional commander and his staff appeared on the field, and shortly after the divisional artillery arrived, in time to help to repulse a French counter-attack. Then the Germans dug in and waited until night for another counter-attack, but “ contrary to expectations, the enemy had departed.”

Short service infantry seem to be of little use once their officers have fallen

Le VIII^e Corps en Lorraine, Août-October, 1914 (Paris : Berger-Levrault, 12 francs), by its former commander General de Castelli, is in the first place an apologia, but it is also valuable historically as a very detailed account of the operations of the corps in the early months of the war. Originally the left flank corps of the French First Army, and connecting link with the Second, it had an important rôle, and fought at Blamont, Sarrebourg, La Trouée de Charmes, La Mortagne and Forest of Apremont. The narrative throws a great deal of new light on the obscure period during which the St. Mihiel salient was lost.

The deployment position of the VIII Corps placed it covering the centre of the Trouée de Charmes, the space left open between the frontier fortifications of Epinal and Toul, and led to its receiving the brunt of the German attack directed towards the passages of the Meuse. The Corps was left practically without information, and was permitted only to study, not to execute, such works of defence

as seemed necessary on the eastern and northern exits of the Forest of Charmes.

In the offensive that began on the 14th of August, 1914, after a successful night combat at Blamont when the records of the I Bavarian Corps were captured, de Castelli's Corps fought its way to Sarrebourg; but in the general action of the 19th, owing to General Dubail's prudence, the First Army did not suffer the severe defeat that the Second did at Morhange; in fact, only the VIII Corps was engaged *à fond*, and of this Corps, only the 16th Division.

That the fronts of the First and Second Armies after their retirement formed a marked re-entrant angle was an accident. Fortunately it was into this angle that the German main attack was pushed (battle of Charmes); if it had been made at either end of the line it would probably have succeeded. After its failure, the two opposing forces remained on the line of the Mortagne from the 28th of August to the 12th of September under trench warfare conditions, neither side being able to move the other.

The further employment of the VIII Corps shows the hesitation of the French higher leading. On the 14th of September (battle of the Aisne period), the VIII Corps was shifted by rail from Charmes to St. Mihiel from the First to the Second Army—at whose headquarters, we are told, there was an atmosphere very different to that of the First, where plenty of blame and no praise was the rule. The Hautes de Meuse had hardly been guarded at all during the battle of the Marne, and, detrained by the 16th, the VIII Corps was ordered to go north on the 17th to secure them. The order was countermanded by G.Q.G. and the Corps kept near its detraining points. On the 18th of September, General de Castelnau and the Second Army staff were ordered away to form a new Second Army on the Arras front, in the Race to the Sea, and, on the 19th, the VIII Corps was to pass to the Third Army. But on the previous day, the 16th Division was sent forward from St. Mihiel towards the Côtes de Meuse, and came into action with the Germans. Notwithstanding this, by G.Q.G. order, the whole Corps was withdrawn—the 16th Division breaking off the action at night—and sent by train to St. Menéhould, leaving the Hautes de Meuse dangerously exposed. On the 20th and 21st the Corps was on the railway, the 22nd it was kept waiting at its detraining stations, and on the 23rd ordered back to St. Mihiel. Too late. For the Hautes de Meuse, being defended only by the three Reserve divisions, the Germans on the 24th captured St. Mihiel, and, on the 25th, the Fort des Romaines.

Then came the usual dislocation of forces ; the divisions and brigades of the VIII Corps were on arrival used as reinforcements and the Corps Commander left with nothing but his heavy artillery and pontoons. Eventually reassembled on the Apremont front—which it was to hold for two years—it was employed by order of the Third Army in a continual series of useless attacks, without sufficient guns or ammunition to give success or any hope of success. When General de Castelli asked for a two-days' pause and permission to proceed by the gradual and progressive methods of siege warfare, he was, on the 10th of October, removed from his command as

“ too exhausted by the hardships of the campaign to continue in exercise of his functions,”

and was made the scapegoat for the loss of St. Mihiel.

General Castelli claims some of the glory of the battle of the Marne for the First and Second Armies ; for had they not stood fast as a pivot the wonderful counter-stroke of Joffre's centre and left could never have been made.

La Division du Dragon (164^e), by Général de Division Gaucher and Capitaine Laporte (*Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 20 francs*), is a divisional history, of which the general who commanded it for the whole of its existence, November, 1916, to January, 1919, is one of the two authors. It is interesting as being a definitely military history, which gives clearly the information available, situations, problems set the division, and how it solved them, and a number of operation orders. The 164th Division obtained its name from its capture in June, 1917, of the Dragon Grotto near Hurtebise on the Chemin des Dames, a huge excavation in the chalk over 150 yards long, with a mean width of 60 yards, the roof supported on many columns left for the purpose. It is somewhat curious to note that the French General Staff had no information as to it or its size. It was occupied as a shelter by the Germans, who in the Nivelle offensive issued from its many exits, as from the ground, and shot down the French infantry. Its southern exit was then secured, and an attempt made to expel the enemy by gas ; but there being no idea of its size, so small an amount was released that it had no effect.

The 164th Division was also engaged in the Vosges, at Verdun and in 1918 at Château Thierry, and did not come to Flanders until September, when, sent to Langemarck, it took part in the final offensive with the Belgian Army.

Lieut.-Colonel Bujac has put together in *Namur, La Bataille-la Retraite, Abût, 1914* (Paris : Chiron, 5 francs), the complete story of the defence and fall of the " Position Fortifiée de Namur," which, as he says, has too long been left in deep shadow. That it fell so rapidly after five days' bombardment, 21st-26th of August, was, he maintains, the fault of the politicians. They would not pay the money to bring it up to date ; and in the Chamber it was agreed that as a *fort d'arrêt* and pivot of manœuvre it was sufficient, and a fortress was not required. In 1913 and 1914 the Commandant received definite orders from the Minister of War not to ask for funds to improve it. Considering its means and strength, the garrison did all that could be expected of it. Without the 4th Division which was assigned to it and left so as to escape being caught and besieged, it could not defend the intervals between the forts. The delay of five days it provided might have given the French time to join up with the Belgian Army ; in fact, if General Lanrezac's advice had been taken when he first gave it, his troops might have been at Charleroi on the 17th instead of the 21st, and Sordet's cavalry, which arrived just in time to see the investment of Namur completed, might have been in time to interfere with the German operations.

There are fifteen sketch maps. The author is to be congratulated on getting a publisher to produce the book for 5 francs.

Stellungskrieg (Trench Warfare), 1914-1918, by F. Seesselberg (Berlin: Mittler, 24s.), is a beautifully got up and expensive book. The binding, with its gilded crown of thorns hung on a cruciform sword, which in somewhat doubtful taste adorns the cover, indicate that it is addressed to a well-to-do public. The author according to the German " Who's Who," is a doctor of philosophy, teaching in Berlin ; he was an infantry officer in France, and later employed in the " Scientific Commission " of the Prussian War Ministry, and has had access to official records. For the most part, the book is an excellent description—with many illustrations—of the apparatus of trench warfare, a regular encyclopædia of information as regards trenches, defensive positions, obstacles, dug-outs, shell-hole positions, strong points, camouflage (which was only cultivated in the German Army after aerial photography had made progress), mining, aeroplanes, tanks, gas, etc.

There is a very interesting chapter on the provision of trench stores, with diagrams showing the enormous increase in the consumption of cement, waterproof paper, corrugated iron, barbed wire, etc. The author, *inter alia*, gives it as an opinion that the German

steel helmet exhibits the "artistic superiority" of his nation to all others. His taste evidently inclines to the massive, and he can never have seen a French helmet.

In addition to all this interesting technical information, the book is a work of propaganda, with chapters on psychology, war economics and the German spirit. Herr Seesselberg does not attribute the loss of the war to a "stab in the back," but to British intrigues and Socialist activities begun long before 1914. He blames his political opponents for preventing the substantial increase of the Army in 1911-1912, ignorant of the fact that Falkenhayn, later War Minister, has stated that the additions could only be carried out slowly, from lack of cadres. Next to the Socialists as enemies of the *Reich* come the British. Their statesmen kept the proletariat quiet by "sport-idiocy." Hunger-blockade was the most effective weapon, but he accuses us of using "dum-dum" bullets throughout 1914-1918 and also in the South African War. His view is that trench warfare killed the proper spirit in the German homeland because the public thought they were safe behind the fortified positions, and that they need make no further effort.

There is an interesting chapter on German nerve-power, with statistics. The highest percentage of soldiers suffering from nervous diseases was attained in the war year August, 1915-August, 1916; 1914-1915 comes next. Similarly, 1915-1916 stands highest for suicides, with 1916-1917 next. It is pointed out, however, that the "front army" gradually cleared itself of the unfit, and the percentage naturally fell, whilst on the L. of C. where no such winnowing out was possible, the percentage remained much the same throughout.

Kartenbild der Grenzschlachten im Westen im August, 1914 (Map Picture of the Battles of the Frontier in the West in August, 1914), by Colonel von Mantey (*Berlin: Mittler, 3 marks*), is issued as a supplement to *Wissen und Wehr*. It is a case containing nine maps on the 750,000 scale showing in three colours the advance of the Germans up to the 27th of August. The maps will be very useful to lecturers, but do not give great detail. There is a pamphlet of 37 pages enclosed, which gives a succinct account of the operations.

The success of Ernst Jünger's two books: *In Stahlgewittern* and *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis*, in which he described his thoughts and sensations during the earlier part of the war, has induced him to publish a third, *Das Wäldchen* 125 (*Berlin: Mittler, 5 marks*)

continuing the process into 1918. It is, like the others, a typical German sentimental effusion, describing in great detail the author's feelings under fire, and the effect he thinks the war has had on German psychology. We shall only extract the few details of interest : *Wäldchen* 125 is a tiny wood, and we deduce from the text—for nothing is stated very definitely in it—that it is the one marked on the French 1:80,000 map between Pusieux au Mont and Gommecourt with "125" on the road just south of it. Here the author went into the line on the 1st of July and stayed till the 10th of August, 1918. He found the dug-outs poor, mere corrugated iron dens under the parapet, with only six feet of earth over them, very different to "the safe cover we previously had of 30 feet and more." "Welfare officers" arrive to keep the men's moral up by lectures on "German industries, our world position, our threatened interests in East Asia or the Baghdad railway. . . . It is all too remote for most of our people, already overburdened ; but they go to listen as they would to any other duty." The rations are poor ; even of the officers' coffee, "there is not much good to say." "A sort of pap made of crushed meal fibre is delivered with the bread : at any rate it is better than the yellow fat, called by us 'monkey grease,' formerly issued, and popularly supposed to be derived from herrings' heads."

EASTERN FRONT

Ludendorff sur le front Russe, 1914-1915 (Paris : Berger-Levrault, 6.75 francs), by General Camon, contains studies of Ludendorff's strategy, which have appeared in *La Revue Militaire Générale*. They deal with the strategy of the campaigns of Tannenberg, Masurian Lakes, Lodz, Augustovo and Wilna (September, 1915), and show how the Germans tried to imitate the Napoleonic method of getting on the enemy's rear.

Die zweite Einschliessung der Festung Przemyśl (The Second Investment of the Fortress, Przemyśl), by Major F. Stuckheil (Vienna, 2s.), is disappointing, as it only gives an account of the sorties made from the Fortress.

AIR

Die heutige Wehrlosigkeit Deutschland im Lichte seiner Verteidigung gegen Fliegerangriffe im Kriege, 1914-1918 (The present defenceless state of Germany in the light of her defence against air attacks in the war, 1914-1918), Lieut.-Colonel von Keller (Berlin : "Offene Worte,"

1 mark), is another of the many books and pamphlets designed to incite Germany to disregard the limitations imposed on her as regards air defences by the Versailles Treaty. Colonel Keller is, however, an authority on the air defence of Germany during the war, for he was the senior executive officer concerned with it, first as Inspector of Anti-Aircraft Defences in the Homeland, and then as commander of the Home Air Defences.

To exhibit how helpless Germany is against a sudden attack—such as she carried out against Belgium and France in August, 1914—Colonel Keller shows that it took eighteen months in 1914–1915 to organize air defence; that then practically only the Rhine valley was exposed to attack, now half Germany is open to hostile fliers; and though a rising of the people might be able to deal with a land attack, it can do nothing against the air.

In the opening phase of the war air defence was left to the commanders of the army corps districts; and, with the help of captured guns, the local guards of communications and dépôt troops, they organized some sort of system. It was not until May, 1915, that an Inspector of Anti-Aircraft Defences (the author) was appointed to coordinate the work of the corps areas, but only in an advisory capacity.

Though much was done to improve the system for conveying warnings of an air raid, for training observers and anti-aircraft gun crews, and a staff officer for air defence was detailed in each army corps area, it was not until the raid on Karlsruhe on the 20th of June, 1916, when 110 persons were killed, that really serious attention was given to air defence. The first orders as regards screening lights at night were then issued and a definite corps for air defence was formed. In October, 1916, a commander of the Home Air Defences (the author), under the commander of the Air Forces, was appointed. The frontier was divided into ten sectors, with an eleventh for the Luxembourg—Lorraine industrial area. Only in the spring of 1917 were an aeroplane squadron and a weather bureau allotted to home defence.

The book is disfigured by ravings about “a downtrodden slave nation,” “revenge,” etc., but is an interesting account of the slow progress of a German war organization which had not been thought out in the leisure of peace.

Der Luftkrieg (War in the Air) (Berlin: Koehler, 12 marks), by Captain Hans Ritter, the author of *Kritik des Weltkrieges* (1920), one of the most illuminating criticisms of the war, is equally a work

of merit, and one of the best expositions of air warfare that has appeared. His object is to remind his countrymen of what happened in the air during the war, and to keep them up to date in air matters. He makes no bones in his introduction that Germany will fight again—

“ the German race, nearly eighty millions in number, cannot be kept defenceless for ever . . . no treaty and no enemy will ever hold in slavery for more than a couple of decades a nation willing to be free,”

and he regards air warfare as the main feature in “ the inevitable next war.”

In the opening chapters he clearly relates the gradual development of the air forces during the war, dealing with strategy, tactics and technical matters. Originally intended only for reconnaissance, aviators soon adopted photography and wireless, then began bombing, and were forced to fighting in the air, first with combats of single aeroplanes and then in formation. With a little more enterprise in bombing of communications, the author thinks that the Germans might have captured Verdun.

He sums up the state of the air forces of the principal belligerents at the close of the war, and progress made since. He declines to believe that any war will be decided in the air, any more than at sea. Air forces cannot be destroyed, although their aerodromes and factories can. There can be only two main objects in war, the destruction of what is on land and what is on the water, and the air forces can only cooperate. He regards the organization of a separate air force independent of army and navy as a step in the wrong direction (*abwegig*).

GAS

Der Kommende Giftgaskrieg (The Coming Poison Gas War (*Liepzig: Oldenburg, 1½ marks*), by a lady, Dr. Gertrud Woker, President of the Laboratory for physico-chemical biology in the University of Berne, is an appeal to stop the horrors of the use of gas. The author does not consider it a humane weapon, and claims that it is forbidden by the Hague Rules. The book is, however, only noticed here because it states several times, on the authority of a Polish lady doctor serving with the Russian forces, Dr. Budezinka-Tilinska, that the Germans used poison gas against the Russians as early as December, 1914, that the latter suffered horribly, and 90 per cent. died. According to German authorities, it was not used before April, 1915.

GENERAL

A very interesting official account of the administrative services of the Württemberg Army during the war, compiled by the Military Intendant of the XIII (Royal Württemberg) Corps, Privy Councillor and War Councillor (retired) A. von Haldenwang, has been published under the title of *Feldverwaltung Etappe und Ersatzformationen im Weltkrieg, 1914-1918* (Stuttgart: Berger, 5 marks). It covers supply and transport, including transport of ammunition, clothing, pay, administration of justice, chaplains' services and field post of the six active and reserve, and three *Landwehr* divisions raised by Württemberg, their reinforcements, and the L. of C. services, and hospitals and prisoners' camps in the homeland.

The great difficulties of supply occurred in the earlier days of the war, when the trains could not get up to the troops. This to some extent was compensated for by requisition; large quantities of wine, corn (which had to be ground), cheese, tobacco and hay being obtained in this way.

Special economy was not insisted on until the winter of 1915-1916, when the number of rations demanded by units was carefully scrutinized, and the meat ration was cut down from 500 to 320 grammes. It was later reduced to 250 (0.55 lb.), with one meatless day a week, and extras such as eggs and wine, reserved for troops in the front trenches, and special occasions, "like the storming of the 'Dump' (*Doppelhöhe* 60) in June, 1916."

The organization of the exploitation of local reserves and the sending back of all raw and old material are dealt with. The organization of supply, etc., during each battle is described, including a central tea-making dépôt of the 26th Division at Saily during the battle of the Somme, which furnished 6,000 litres (10,564 pints) of tea daily. Other establishments of a corps mentioned are supply magazines, bakeries, forage dépôts, corn-collecting points, slaughter dépôts, horse-slaughter dépôts, *Sauerkraut* factory, sugar factory, *Kadaververwertungsanstalt* (at Naves), refuse utilization establishment, material dépôt, coal central dépôt, coal sub-dépôts, including a briquette factory.

In April, 1917, the bread ration was cut down from 750 to 500 grammes, and only an Army commander could authorize an increase in exceptional cases.

For March, 1918, a special scale of rations was drawn up (the weights are in grammes—1,000 grammes = 35.27 ozs.):—

Bread : 600 ; for 60-80 per cent. of troops in front line, 750.

Meat : 250 fresh, three times a week ; 150 preserved or 400 fresh fish, three times ; one meatless day.

Vegetable : 125 rice or 250 peas, or 450 *Sauerkraut*, or 1,500 potatoes (but only 300 available).

Drink : Coffee (5 beans, 5 maltcoffee, 6 chicory), or 1 tea or 15 cocoa ; brandy only on medical certificate.

Fat : 55 butter or 125 sausage, or 100 cheese, or 125 marmalade.

Sugar : 25-35.

Salt : 25, and spice.

Tobacco : 2 cigars, 2 cigarettes or 1 cigar and 4 cigarettes for non-commissioned officers and men only.

The book closes with a "War Army List" of the principal officials of the administrative services, who in Germany have not even honorary combatant titles. The title of the author, for instance, was Field Corps Intendant ; his subordinates were field intendant councillors, field intendant secretaries and field intendant assistants, and substitute intendant officials, with field magazine directors and inspectors, war paymasters, war legal councillors—all names which describe the duties attached to them.

General Arthur Boucher, formerly head of the Operations Section of the French General Staff, in *Les lois éternelles de la guerre. Les Doctrines dans la Préparation de la Grande Guerre* (Paris : Berger-Levrault, 8 francs), traces the evolution of military doctrine in France and Germany in the peace between 1871 and 1914, and particularly of the French plan of operations, and shows the influence of Generals de Miribel and Bonnal and Colonel de Grandmaison. He adroitly skates over the thin ice of 1911 by omitting mention of General Michel, the only Chief of the General Staff who foresaw and tried to prepare for the German operation through Belgium. He merely says that de Grandmaison, then head of the operations section, "gave the greatest publicity to ideas on the war [the offensive at all costs] which the general whom he would be called on to collaborate with before the enemy did not share." The Minister of War, Messimy, solved the "anarchy" by removing General Michel, and

"the General Staff of the Army became in reality the General Staff of the Minister, that is of a politician, a passing visitor (there were four of them that very year)."

In the concluding portion of the book, General Boucher imagines the reappearance on earth of Xenophon, who, after reading all the books on the subject, concludes that

"the principles laid down by the soldiers of the XIX and XX centuries are the same which guided the generals of former days."

The "Younger Turks" will hardly agree with this former "Young Turk" of the French Army. Possibly General Boucher prefers to count himself a "Young Greek," for some three years ago he wrote a book entitled *L'art de la guerre il y a vingt-trois siècles*, in which he investigated the art of war of the ancient Greeks.

Zur Geschichte der Nachrichtentruppe, 1899-1924 (Berlin: Preuss, 6 marks), by Oberleutnant Thiele, is an illustrated history of the German Signal Service. After gradual development of military telegraphs by the engineers, who provided two mobile field telegraph sections for the Danish War as long back as 1864, in 1899 the Telegraph Troops—then 3 Telegraph battalions of 3 companies each—were transferred from the Engineers to the Communication Troops (*Verkehrstruppen*). The various branches: wireless, optical signalling, telegraph and telephone, were experimented with, and the service gradually augmented. The great increase, from 20 to 40 peace companies, came with the expansion of the German forces in 1912-1913 in anticipation of war.

"The army of 1914 had only two chief means of communication, telephones and wireless."

On mobilization the Great Headquarters were provided with those two means, Armies had in addition a telegraph detachment; corps only a telephone detachment; divisions—nothing at all, but Reserve divisions had a *Reserve division telephone detachment*, nothing being provided for the Reserve corps. The inadequacy of the Signal Service is claimed to be one of the reasons for the disaster of the battle of the Marne.

A corps telephone detachment, the real unit of service at the front, consisted in 1914 of five sections, each of four groups, about 300 men with 250 horses in all. Each group had ten kilometres of cable and four sets of instruments. Thus a German corps possessed slightly less cable and apparatus than a British corps, with its two divisional signal companies and a cable section, viz. 120 miles of cable against 128, and 80 instruments against 84. There is no mention of the German units having motor or push bicycles, or despatch rider horses.

There was no important reorganization until 1916, when of the five sections in a corps, two were allotted to each division, one remaining with the corps. All the sections were gradually increased;

so that in 1917 each division had three sections (one with signalling apparatus), and later a wireless section with small wireless sets.

In 1917 there was a further reorganization. The names telephone, telegraph and wireless sections were dropped, and the units received the name of Signal Service (*Nachrichtentruppe*) with a hierarchy of commanders and staff officers, and divisions received eight earth telegraph apparatus.

Each division of the *Reichswehr* now has a signal detachment consisting of a signal staff and two companies, each provided with "all chief means of communication"—particularly telephone, wireless (heavy, medium, light and small) and Blick apparatus (that is, daylight lamp signalling).

There are accounts of signal work in various theatres of war; a list showing the allotment of the new companies carrying on the "tradition" of the old war units; coloured pictures of uniforms and portraits of heads of the service. Major-General Wetzell, Ludendorff's strategist, is the present head of the Signal Service.

The German "innocency" offensive is now well under way. A very heavy battery employed is *Privateigentum im besetzten und unbesetzten Feindesland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Praxis des Weltkrieges* (Private property in occupied and unoccupied enemy territory with special reference to the practice of the world war), by Dr. Franz Scholz, Member of the German International Law Society (*Berlin : Liebmann, 25 marks*).

The general line taken is that owing to Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey by the outbreak of war not having ratified the "Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War of 1907," although they were parties to that of 1899, the 1907 Convention was not binding. He omits mention of the fact that both in 1899 and 1907 Germany bound herself to issue instructions to her troops in conformity with the Convention—the Conventions themselves did not apply to the troops—and she never did so. The British carried out their agreement by publishing Chapter XIV. of the Manual of Military Law. Next the learned author argues that as Great Britain broke all international law by the "blockade" of Germany, the latter was absolved from any international agreements, and anything she did contrary to them was of the nature of reprisals. This can hardly be pleaded for the entry into Belgium.

The excesses against foreigners, even ambassadors, in Germany at the outbreak of war are excused by

"the popular violence against German subjects at the outbreak of war—France, Belgium, Russia and England,"

(he puts us last), but he does not enumerate any acts of violence.

The firing on Rheims cathedral and other churches are justified because it is alleged that there were hostile observation posts in them. But how artillerymen five or more miles off could know this is not explained. The excuse for the destruction of museums is that hostile troops or warlike stores were accommodated in them. Dr. Scholz points out the moderation of the Germans in not destroying "shameful" memorials in 1815—the Vendôme Column, cast of captured Prussian guns, and the Paris bridge named after Jena; but he forgets to say that it was the Duke of Wellington who prevented Blücher from carrying out these acts of vandalism.

The destruction of the wireless stations in the German colonies and the cutting of submarine cables is condemned,

"because it had no compelling grounds of military necessity and was therefore illegal,"

and robbed Germany

"of the possibility of justifying herself in the eyes of the world, and left her weaponless, exposed to the Allied campaign of lies."

On the other hand :

"the German system of taking possession of private property in hostile territory to provide for the wants of the homeland is justified, and without any shadow of doubt Germany is not liable to pay for reparations on this account."

The author is particularly annoyed that England seized or cancelled "intellectual property" of Germany—the patents, licences, designs, patterns and trade marks of her citizens.

It is a book of venomous spite and impotent anger, without a scrap of fairness or sign of judicial mindedness from first to last, and further proof, if anything were required, that German mentality is different from ours.

Hindenburg (Berlin : Koehler, 9 marks), by Alfred Niemann, is a popular life of the German President. It is interesting as containing portraits of Hindenburg at all ages—the flowing moustache first attaining luxuriance when he is a major—also of his father and mother, four grandparents, and paternal great-grandparents, his son and two grandchildren.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

On England. By STANLEY BALDWIN. Philip Allan & Co., Ltd.,
London. 1926. 12s. 6d. net.

FOR more than a hundred years there has been a traditional connection, though somewhat intermittent, between literature and the Prime Minister of England.

If Lord Liverpool wrote only on official, or quasi-official topics, Mr. Canning was a versifier and a man of letters. If Lord Melbourne seldom put pen to paper unless he was obliged—like Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell was a biographer and essayist. Lord Salisbury was a journalist, and Mr. Disraeli wrote novels. Mr. Gladstone was an enthusiastic amateur on subjects so diverse as Homer and religious fiction. Lord Balfour wrote and still writes on philosophy. Most of the writings of these great men is dead. We still read a few of Disraeli's novels, still know a verse or two of Canning. But who digs up Lord Salisbury out of the *Saturday Review*? And who reads the articles of Mr. Gladstone, which Henley described as "ornate, imposing and absolutely insignificant"?

It may safely be said that this unpretentious volume of Mr. Baldwin's approaches more nearly to true literature than most of the writings of his predecessors in the high office he holds. Almost every speech or essay shows homely wisdom, sound common sense, witty persiflage, wide reading : the whole informed by directness of purpose and, above all, by intense love of England. There are speeches on Scotland—and though he is half Scotch he writes as an Englishman ; on Ireland, of which as the speech shows (and as he would be the first to admit) he knows nothing and takes an English view ; on Wales, which he makes an excuse to dwell on his own Border counties of Worcester and Shropshire. Even when he writes on the classics, he ends on the note of England, with the story of an English bell, heard at Florence, which made him sick for home. And in the essays collected under the title "Great Men" tribute is paid in each case—Bonar Law, Curzon, Milner—to what they did for England and for the Empire. For, though he possesses that

intense love of England, and of the particular corner of it from which he sprang, he lays stress, in talking of Curzon and Milner, on the greatness of the Empire and on the work of those statesmen in trying to develop the bonds of sympathy and of commerce, between this island and the countries of which it is the head. As a sound Tory, "Empire," the English conception of Empire, is good enough for him; and he is pleasantly acid about the new-fangled title "Commonwealth of Nations," which the *Round Table* and the highbrows affect to substitute for it.

And, what may be of most interest to readers of the *Army Quarterly*, he is sound on the matter of disarmament—a most dangerous subject for the enthusiast. For, though every soldier wants peace, the ignorant blather of peace-at-any-price is apt to make the thinking soldier distrustful of the whole idea: those who preach it often lose sight of the wholesome doctrine of "safety first." With Mr. Baldwin as Prime Minister we are safe in knowing that the security of England and the Empire will not be sacrificed to the cranks and pacifists; and, in showing how the dreams of former idealists came to nothing, how the aims of the Congress of Vienna were just as lofty as those of the League of Nations, he warns us to beware of sentiment uninformed by knowledge. We have learnt to-day, by bitter experience, how right he was in saying that international pacifists stand for class war.

History of the Great War based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918. Vol. III. By Brigadier-General F. J. MOBERLY, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* H. M. Stationery Office, London. 15s. net.

Although the third volume of the history of the Mesopotamian Campaign has been written at the same high level of efficiency as were its predecessors, it can hardly be claimed that the narrative of our successes in 1917 is equal in dramatic interest to that of the earlier operations. For few military stories are more exciting than the daring, perhaps too daring, attempt of Nixon and Townshend to rush a tiny force to Baghdad; and they were within an ace of success when with a sudden turn of her wheel fortune overwhelmed them with disaster. The third volume is, nevertheless, likely to be more widely read than the others; for their hard practical work, and the contemplation of the novel problems of the future, oblige officers now to be utilitarian in their studies; and this volume contains the greater part of "the campaign of the British Army in Meso-

potamia in 1916-1917, under General Maude, from his accession to command until his death," and in April, 1927, this will be one of the subjects of examination for promotion.

The first part of the book is not the least instructive, for here one sees that, like every other man, a general is to a large extent a creature of circumstances ; and boldness that can be shown by Nixon becomes impracticable for Maude, whose initiative, owing to the calamities that overtook the troops who had been under the former, was hedged in by severe conditions. Also it appears to be as hard to change a military policy as to check a boulder that has started down a steep slope. *Il n'y a que le premier pas qui coute*, said a witty woman when told that St. Denis, the Areopagite, after being beheaded, walked with his head under his arm for a distance of six miles ; and it seems that the same comment may be made of the operations of war.

It was perhaps against their better judgment that the British, in 1915, were attracted towards Baghdad. Failure to reach it, and the subsequent fall of Kut-al-Amara, produced an inevitable reaction, and, at the end of April, 1916, Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake, then commander of the force, was informed that " at present our policy in Mesopotamia is defensive and we do not attach any importance to the possession of Kut or to the occupation of Baghdad. . . ." Intermittent discussion on policy took place, however, throughout the summer of 1916, because, as is always the case, the problem was one that constantly faces those who are in high authority : namely the separation of what is essential from what is merely important or desirable, and the paramount necessity of subordinating the smaller objects to the greater. Even in September the balance still inclined towards the limitation of the scope of the operations in Mesopotamia, for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, then telegraphed that : " Because of the drain on our resources and the poor return promised, Mesopotamian operations have always caused me great concern and anxiety. . . . We must concentrate all possible strength in main theatres. No appreciable effect on the war would be produced even if we later occupy Baghdad. . . . I am therefore considering withdrawal to Amara. . . ." But it was pointed out by the men on, or nearer to, the spot that political and military disadvantages would follow on retirement, and soon afterwards it was decided, therefore, that the force was " to be kept as far forward as is feasible." Reinforcements, however, were not to be expected. " On the contrary it may become necessary to withdraw the 13th Division " (a wholly British

formation). If to retire is likely to be disadvantageous, it is equally evident that it may be demoralizing for a force that is as far forward as is feasible, in fact in close touch with the enemy, to adopt a passive attitude; particularly when "it is the desire of His Majesty's Government, if and when possible, to establish British influence in the Baghdad vilayet." As soon as the administrative reforms that had been begun by Lake and were perfected by Maude were nearing completion, a limited offensive, therefore, was sanctioned; a mere "move forward of Maude's left to the Hai." But an offensive that is successful and promises "far-reaching results" cannot easily be limited. And since reliance was also placed on the cooperation of Russian forces that were in North-Western Persia, the attack went on, Baghdad was taken, and Maude was told to develop his recent success to the fullest possible extent and to adopt a more offensive rôle in general." Soon afterwards, however it was estimated that the Turks could "by efficient management maintain 200,000 men on the Tigris," and that "the security of the North-West frontier and the tranquillity of India depended largely on our maintaining our hold on Baghdad." The 13th Division consequently remained in Mesopotamia, as did the units from India that were to have replaced it, the Russians went out of the war, and from first to last the British Empire used 900,000 men in Mesopotamia.

The victorious campaign began in the middle of December, and so strongly did the enemy, the XVIII Turkish Corps, resist that between 9,000 and 10,000 casualties had been suffered by the 55,000 British before the Turks, who certainly had the worst of the exchanges, were hammered from the right bank of the Tigris. It seems that, owing to the physical and climatic conditions, and perhaps also to the restrictive character of the instructions that were given to General Maude, this bludgeon work was inevitable; for no one understood better than he did the value of manœuvres; and it had for 1,000 years been known that, when surprised, the Turks are apt to lose heart and to think that Allah is angry with, and is punishing, them.

General Moberly is careful to meet the enemy's criticisms by explaining the reasons why certain delays took place in the pursuit. And, although in this and the subsequent operations Maude kept his subordinates perhaps too tightly in hand, the pursuit was on the whole admirably vigorous; and much may be learnt by comparing the methods that are advocated in the Field Service Regulations with those that actually were used by the British seamen and soldiers and by the Turks.

As General Moberly truly says, many advantages were gained by our occupation of Baghdad, but even so some will wonder whether, in the long run, better results might not have been obtained had the British adhered to the policy of April, 1916. However this may be, the fighting was by no means over when they reached Baghdad. The bulk of the XIII Turkish Corps, which had been opposing in Persia the advance of weak Russian forces on Baghdad, was cleverly withdrawn to Mesopotamia, in spite of the attempts of the British to defeat it; and the XVIII Corps only fell back just out of their reach up the Tigris. The Turks then made some half-hearted attacks and Maude tried to use his superiority in numbers and position, for his forces were concentrated while those of the enemy were some distance apart, to "take advantage of the enemy's temerity" and "destroy" them in detail. But the Turks, who fought stubbornly, were able to avoid decisive actions, for the great heat, and difficulties in regard to the movement of water, prevented the British from holding them in a close grip.

The volume is provided with good maps and an adequate index, but there is no table giving the composition and armament of the "gunboat flotilla."

The Perils of Amateur Strategy as exemplified by the Attack on the Dardanelles Fortress in 1915. By Lieut.-General Sir GERALD ELLISON, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., late Headquarters Staff of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, 1915, with a Prefatory Note by the Rt. Hon. Viscount ESHER, G.C.B., G.C.V.O. Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., London. 1926. 5s. net.

There can be no question that General Ellison has written a most interesting book, as well as a brilliant and vigorous indictment of the policy that sent large forces in 1915 to fight the Turks on and round the Gallipoli Peninsula; even though he relies rather on the journalist's expedient of heavy type than on strength of argument to give force to his statements and opinions, which, as he himself says, are "emphasised to the full extent of the printer's powers."

The story that General Ellison has to tell is painful; and, as is pointed out in his epilogue, "if that story was to be told at all, it had to be told fully, fearlessly and impartially. This I have endeavoured to do."

The facts, which are endorsed by numerous quotations from the reports of the Dardanelles Commission, and other works, are well known. An able, impetuous, and self-confident Minister induced

the War Council to decide that : " The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February (1915) to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective." The service representatives, who were present at the meetings of the Council, did not express their opinions. " The naval experts . . . who all along were in favour of a combined attack, but not of action by the fleet alone, (then) continued to press their view urgently and incessantly." And it seems that, although " the problem throughout was military and not naval," the seamen thought that, at worst, not much harm would come to the British if the bombardment were a failure, and that success could only be obtained with the help of the Army. Lord Kitchener, on the other hand, had agreed to the attack on the Dardanelles " on the express condition that it should be a naval operation only."

On the 19th of February the Fleet bombarded the outer defences of the Straits ; on the 22nd " a leading article, clearly inspired," appeared in the *Times*, " intimating in unmistakable terms that an attack of major importance had been opened, and that military assistance would be required " ; and, on the 24th of February, Lord Kitchener said : " There could be no going back. The publicity of the announcement had committed us." In other words his hand had been forced.

Other expeditions have been abandoned, such as that against Rochefort in 1757, when :

" We went, we saw, were seen, like Valiant Men
Sailed up the Bay, and then—sailed back again."

But at Gallipoli there was no going back ; and at one time we were deluged with statements indicating how nearly success was gained, and how, with a little more daring, a grain or two of good luck, victory must have been secured. Sir Gerald Ellison, who has recently walked over the ground, will have none of this. Gallipoli, he says, was a fortress " on both its sea and land fronts . . . as formidable a system of defence as anywhere in the world," and " to besiege and assault " it was " not a feasible operation of war." It was like Port Arthur, which held out for 154 days, but there the " strength of the besiegers was consistently maintained at 100,000 men ; before the end of the siege the Port Arthur garrison was less than 20,000 strong." And at Gallipoli " throughout the campaign the defence kept the upper hand in point of numbers." It may, in parenthesis, be pointed out that, according to the British Combined Official Account, the fighting strength of the Third Japanese Army

would, if its units had been at their full establishment, have been from about 57,000 to 80,000, and that of the garrison of Port Arthur, excluding sailors and volunteers, was from 42,000 to 25,000.

The author is equally severe on the assumption that, if the British Fleet had arrived at the Turkish capital, a revolution would have ensued ; and he considers that " the underlying idea of the whole plan was Utopian in the extreme," and that, " like Admiral Duckworth's squadron in 1806 (actually the year was 1807) those of our battleships that had survived the forcing of the Straits would, after a short interval, have had to fight their way out as best they could."

A wilful man needs to be very wise, and no man is so wise but he has a little folly, and it is in order to curb such future folly that General Ellison insists on the need of an inquiry into the

" most efficient method of conducting operations of war under a democratic form of Government. . . . In the first place a clear definition of functions is above all things necessary to salvation. A line of demarcation, as distinct as possible, has to be drawn between policy and strategy, between supply and operations, between the purse and sword, between administration and command. . . ."

Because Mr. Churchill has written that : " The distinction between politics and strategy diminishes as the point of view is raised. At the summit true politics and strategy are one." " Ergo," says General Ellison " quite obviously, the politician is fully qualified to deal with strategy. Hence Amateur Strategy? Hence Gallipoli ! " He adds that : " Politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart from one another. Strategy begins where politics end." And in his prefatory note Lord Esher says that he sympathizes with General Ellison's " broad conclusions."

On the other hand, it must be stated that a great authority, Clausewitz, supports Mr. Churchill's view, and, in the chapter of his book on war dealing with the influence of the political object on the military subject, lays down that : " In one word, the Art of War in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes." And indeed one would like to know whether it was policy or strategy that induced the Elder Pitt to decide to attack the French in Canada in 1758, and Castlereagh to send a British force to the Spanish Peninsula in 1808? And which of the two, policy or strategy, caused the British Army to go to France in 1914, and not, let us say, to the Baltic?

Marshal von Hindenburg, another Teutonic authority, with

great experience of the conduct of war, who is quoted with approval by General Ellison in a different connection, writes what seems to be good sense in regard to this matter, namely that :

“ It will be allowed that the border-line between politics and the conduct of operations cannot be drawn with exact precision. The statesman and the soldier must have cooperated previously in peace time, as their different spheres unconditionally demand mutual understanding. In war, in which the threads are inextricably intertwined, they have to be mutually complementary the whole time. This complicated relation can never be regulated by definite rules.”

Is it not along this road rather than by trying to draw distinct lines of demarcation that improvement should be looked for ?

The problem as regards supply and operations is equally intractable. One of the most distinguished of our leaders in the late war has stated that, when trying to solve a problem of strategy, his method was to sit with a map in front of him and think and think ; and when a solution had occurred to his mind this was referred to the staff with the words, “ Can I do it ? ” In his victorious advance on Baghdad in 1917 General Maude also was obliged, on the 27th of February, to ask his Inspector-General of Communications—

“ for how long he wished the halt to be made and received the answer that, if the advance was delayed until the 5th March, he (the I.G.C.) was prepared to give assurance by then of a sufficient and constant supply for as long as he (Maude) wanted to go.”

“ The strategist,” says General Ellison, “ must have power . . . power to plan without undue interference . . . power to act swiftly, secretly, and decisively.” But here again there is something to be urged on the other side, and it is not impossible that an equally eloquent book could be written on the evils that come from too much military power, as exemplified by the actions of the Germans on land in 1914 and on the sea in 1917. Everyone knows, but most people are apt to forget, that a little learning is a dangerous thing, and that when either politicians or service experts meddle with things that they do not thoroughly understand they are fools who rush in where angels fear to tread. Is not the conclusion, then, that it is not power that is needed but mutual confidence and mutual aid ?

There has been much talk since 1918 among both victors and vanquished about how the war could have been shortened or won, and General Ellison adds his share by telling us, in heavy type, that :

"Taken in conjunction with Lord Fisher's strategical plan (to envelop from the Baltic Germany's north-western flank), with which it in no way collided, a determined attack (in 1915) on the Baghdad railway, from the Gulf of Alexandretta, would almost certainly have shortened the war by years."

It may be so, but one remembers that the Baltic plan was severely condemned by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Commons in 1916-1917. And, as regards the Alexandretta project the following remarks were made in a paper that was prepared in October, 1915, by the General Staff in consultation with the Admiralty War Staff: "The Admiralty would be unable to undertake their share of a joint expedition to the Gulf of Iskenderoon while the Dardanelles operations are in progress"; and therefore it may be presumed also if operations had been going on in the Baltic. It was added that:

"The combined staffs . . . are satisfied . . . that it (landing at Iskenderoon) could not be undertaken by a force of less strength than 100,000 men, and that an even larger army would probably be necessary. They are moreover satisfied that if this army were once committed to the enterprise, it would cease to be available for action against the one enemy whose overthrow can bring this war to a successful conclusion—Germany."

The correctness, therefore, of General Ellison's views is also in this particular open to challenge.

Nevertheless, every soldier who would know his business ought to study a book that is so stimulating to thought, and from which so much that is of vital importance to the army is to be learnt. For arms are of little avail abroad without good counsel at home.

The History of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. Vols. I and II, from 1755 to 1914. By Colonel H. C. WYLLY, C.B.
London: Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., Ltd.

The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry are "indebted to Lieut.-Colonel H. W. B. Thorp, D.S.O., for having generously paid the author's fees and other expenses connected with the preparation of the history of the 51st and 105th from 1755 to 1924." And it is this generosity that has enabled the history of the Regiment to be so written as to emphasize its actions, while providing enough of the general background to ensure that their connection with national history may be understood. The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry is also fortunate in that Colonel Wyllly's labours and

researches have unearthed graphic diaries, narratives and correspondence that tell of much of the intimate life of the Regiment ; and there is in addition a Regimental Journal of the 51st, which was started as long ago as 1874. A store of information of priceless value is therefore provided from which officers can give interesting lectures to their men, and also add zest to the schemes for practical training. But the background suffers from its maps, or lack of them, at any rate in the opinion of a reviewer who has searched in maps for places that are not marked, or looked in vain for plans to illustrate actions.

In its earliest days the 51st was noted as being " a good regiment " whose officers had " greatly exerted themselves in bringing the New Corps into so good order," and similar opinions are invariably expressed by all under whose command the Regiment served right down to 1914.

The 51st went on service to Rochefort, in 1756, shortly after it was raised. More serious work was soon to come, and, two years later, it was sent to Germany, and, in 1759, was one of the " corps that most distinguished themselves " at Minden by breaking " through three lines of cavalry ranked in order of battle."

" On the 2nd of March, 1776, an officer was gazetted to an ensigncy in the 51st of whose connection with it the Regiment has always been very proud. This was John Moore who . . . was at this date no more than 14½ years old." Moore obtained command of the Battalion when only 29, and then was given the wish of his heart for, in 1793, he took it on service to Corsica. He left soon afterwards and did not again meet the 51st until in January, 1809, at Lugo, during the retreat to Corunna, he rode up and " addressed them in glowing words. . . ." In the following June the " Regiment was made a Light Infantry Regiment an honour conferred . . . partly as a memorial of Sir John Moore."

Whether Moore's memory, " one of the brightest characters," as Napier says, " that ever adorned the country," is as greatly cherished as that of Lieut. Joseph Dyas seems, however, to be doubtful. We are told of Dyas, who, on the 6th and 9th of June, 1811, led the storming parties of the 51st during the unsuccessful siege of Bajados, that :

" He frequently volunteered his services for the most arduous and hazardous duties, and ' Dyas and the stormers ' was the toast of the most distinguished campaigners of the day. This toast was revived in the 1st Battalion . . . about 1908, and is honoured weekly on Band Nights in the Officers' Mess standing and in silence."

After serving to the end of the Peninsular War the 51st was at Waterloo, where 42 were killed or wounded, and where the men "acted fully up to their former high character." But the Battalion did not see service again until 1852, in the second Burma War.

In 1881 the 105th, formerly of the East India Company's service, was linked with the 51st, and to the former the Regiment owes the praise won on the Punjab Frontier in 1898, where "the stubborn tyke in dogged silence met his baptism of fire"; and, together with a company of Mounted Infantry from the 1st Battalion, the honours gained in the South African War.

The second volume contains a very interesting record of uniforms, etc., by the late D. Hastings Irwin, and also lists of the weapons, colours, and medals of the Regiment. And, to mark the regimental character of the History, there are accounts of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Battalions.

The 3rd (King's Own) Hussars in the Great War (1914-1919). By Lieut.-Colonel WALTER TEMPLE WILLCOX, C.M.G. London: John Murray. 1925. 18s. net.

In the Army of the United States of America there is an officer on the establishment of every unit officially shown as the historian: such an appointment in our Army would be redundant, as the many histories (whether dating back to the raising of the different regiments or dealing only with their recent services), which have recently been published show that the British Army is lucky in having many officers gifted in setting forth events of great historical, as distinct from merely personal, interest in a manner that makes their work of considerable value. Of the numerous histories of this nature, that under review is by no means the least valuable. The Regiment is fortunate in having found as its historian an officer who served with it throughout the war. He is well able to sift the essential facts and as a result he has produced a very well put together account of the Regiment's share in the campaign. The whole of its service was passed in France, and the author is at his best in his account of the opening months, at which time the fog of war was very thick, and the disentanglement of movements and action taken by squadron and troop leaders must have been most difficult. We all know how limited is the knowledge of any individual of the general course of any action and still more of movements leading up to action: even the best diaries and letters deal for the most part with the personal experiences and feelings of the recorder and are apt to show more

interest in the quality of a billet or the punctual issue of rations than in the general scheme ; add to this the eliminations due to censorship and it can be realized that the piecing together of the various records into a coherent whole is a work of great labour. With Colonel Willcox it was clearly also a labour of love and his work will always be of interest, no less to the historians than to all ranks, past, present and future, of the 3rd Hussars. The book is not overloaded with illustrations, and the maps chosen to elucidate the text achieve the object aimed at by the author, who may be heartily congratulated on the result of his work. Without dogmatizing, he brings out clearly the point of view of that considerable school of thought which holds that the day of Cavalry is by no means done, and his clear and concise history may well be considered a type of what these works should be.

Elementary Tactics, or the Art of War, British School. By Major R. P. PAKENHAM-WALSH, M.C., *p.s.c.*, Royal Engineers. London : Sifton Praed.

The implication, in his title, of a peculiar elementariness in the British study of war does not appear to be intentional, for Major Pakenham-Walsh treats his subject with full respect. His book is an orderly, succinct and comprehensive review of the subject-matter of the textbooks of the British Army, and it presents clearly and cohesively their mass of information about its equipment and organization, and the methods and principles which rule its training and employment.

The author has divided his book into three parts. Part I deals with the principles of war and discusses the characteristics of the fighting troops and the organization and administration of the Army ; Part II expounds the employment of this mechanism for the attainment of tactical ends ; and Part III " illustrates the practice of the art of war according to the rules of the British school " in eight schemes for the smaller formations and units, to whose problems official solutions are given.

Such a book as this does a real service to the junior officer, or indeed to any officer, in assembling in a single theme the burden of a score of text-books. It is, moreover, very well done. But the more acceptable its explanations, the more necessary is it to protest against some of its implications. For instance, on page 16, Major Pakenham-Walsh writes :

" These eight principles of war must be absorbed by every student of

war and remembered in the solution of every tactical problem. A useful mnemonic is to take their initial letters, which will be found to give a somewhat unusual spelling of the great Hebrew leader, duly decorated—MOSCES, M.C.”

Now reflexion, self-criticism and determination are not nurtured by maxims or mnemonics. Why do nearly all military writers insist on overstocking the cart instead of feeding and training the horse? We are not yet out of the age of the examination-room and the servitude of method and information. Yet the conclusion of the whole matter is, as it always has been, to see clearly what is demanded of you, never to cease to see it, and to stick at nothing in carrying it out. Clear thinking, about facts before you—not of rules behind you—and indomitable will are the stuff of the art of war, British or foreign, and there is no room there for scholastics. Information and ways and means will always be at the beck and call of such qualities, and except when utterly subservient to those qualities they are a delusion and a fog. This true principle of training is in danger of being suffocated under the growing mass of specious knowledge.

The War-God Walks Again. By F. BRITTEN AUSTIN. Williams & Norgate. 3s. 6d. net.

Mr. Britten Austin's book is recommended in a short introduction by Sir Ernest Swinton: appropriately, for it is in essence "Ole Luk-Oie's" "The Green Curve" brought up to date. The reactionary Commander-in-Chief, his more intelligent Chief-of-Staff, and the transcendent enemy commander are as true to type as any of Æsop's beasts. The fox is always foxy, and the lion always brave, but a little stupid. It is a satisfactory world which results, where the reader, secure in his over-world of wisdom, can watch Nemesis march upon her delinquents with the precision of the goose-step.

In these six stories we see the condign punishment of a nation which disregards the possibilities of full exploitation of the tank, gas and aeroplane. The weakness is the degree of official blindness in which we have to believe. In the naval battle story "Goliath," for instance, the possibility of the use of gas does, when action is imminent, occur to one comparatively junior officer, but "he banished the thought with a reassuring recognition of its wild improbability. Thank Heaven, the insidious treachery of poison gas had no place in naval warfare." But although stupidity such as Mr. Britten Austin postulates does not exist in our high places, our

preparations, through other causes, are sometimes as inadequate as if it did ; so perhaps little harm is done by his exaggeration. The value of these tales is not a demonstration of official obtuseness, but that the possibilities opened by modern invention, especially the possibility that an unready combatant may be deprived of the chance of eleventh-hour organization, are embodied in readable and even exciting yarns—in a form, that is, acceptable to a far wider public than will listen to mere argument.

Mr. Austin does not only work out his problems in terms of technical invention and organization : in " A Battle-piece, Old Style " he exploits, in the same fabulistic way, the interplay of small-mindedness and selfishness in the several grades from trenches to Cabinet. Though the characters, as we have said, are personifications of characteristics rather than the characterization of life-like persons, these stories, in short, deal very interestingly with real problems of war. They should be read by very many with pleasure, and by few without profit.

Conway Morgan, 1885-1915. A Memoir. By his Mother, C. LINDA MORGAN. Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.

Conway Morgan, the only son of the late Master of Jesus College, Cambridge, was killed at the Hohenzollern Redoubt in 1915, at the age of thirty. Mrs. Morgan's book is largely composed of the reminiscences and tributes of a great number of friends, and of her daughters, with extracts from Morgan's letters home.

Though a great many who knew him felt that he was destined for very high honours in the legal profession and in politics, there is little, at first sight, to commend this book to a general public. Rather is it one which gives the reader an uncomfortable feeling of unwarranted intrusion into a private grief—an impression not lessened by an exaggerated anonymity observed throughout even the most casual and harmless references being veiled by X, Y, or A. To the student of the Great War it has, however, an indirect interest. The reader is left with the impression of a very pleasant and conservative home life, so far removed in outlook from the present that it leaves a strange sense of other-worldliness. The early campaign was fought by an England which has passed away, and Mrs. Morgan's gracious and simple memoir of her gifted son breathes the air of that past so naturally that one is startled to a fresh realization of how completely it is gone. It is in such a book as this that the historian of the future will recapture it.

1944. By the EARL OF HALSBURY. London: Thornton Butterworth. 7s. 6d. net.

Lord Halsbury spent a long vacation, he tells us, in writing this novel: we would pay him the compliment of believing that he still had time for more solid pleasures. The Great Powers of 1944 are Russia, which has assimilated Germany, under another and greater Napoleon who drenched Western Europe with a new gas dropped from twenty-thousand aeroplanes, and China, which is also happy in the possession of a super-man. The two Napoleons, after reducing all save a modern English Noah and his arkful of the elect to barbarism, are fortunately mutually destructive, so that Noah & Co. are enabled to sail back to a depopulated London and set themselves to build a better world.

To the author's style this quotation is not unjust—(Pierre believes his daughter Sylvie, the immaculate heroine of the book, to have perished in the holocaust): "The fortitude with which Pierre bore outwardly the news of Sylvie's absence was marvellous. Only his wife saw, when he was alone with her, that most terrible of all sights, a strong man sobbing as if his heart would break." And this in a book which lightly recounts such minor terrors as the destruction of millions of panic-stricken civilians by poison gas, the rapid reversion of most of the survivors to barbarism and the perversion of some to cannibalism, and the almost consummated violation of the heroine by several Cornish cannibals who evidently intended subsequently to eat her—a fate which had already overtaken another woman!

The Siege of Vienna by the Turks in 1683. Translated into Greek from an Italian work published anonymously in the year of the siege. By JEREMIAS CACAVALAS. Edited with English translation by H. F. Marshall. Cambridge University Press. 10s. net.

This is a very interesting Greek MS. of 1686, now in the British Museum. The rare Italian book of which it is a translation appears to have been completed on the 9th of October, 1683 (the siege only ended on the 12th of September), and was published in Venice in the same year.

The account of the siege itself will be especially interesting to the many who find pleasure in the cheerless spectacle of history repeating itself. The authentic note of trench warfare will at once be recognized in the following and many other passages:

Page 59. "On the previous day they had exploded a mine at the edge of the same bastion with success, and after that advanced to the assault

with sword in hand and war-cry, accompanied by the bombers, musketeers and archers in fives on either side. These caused arrows to rain incessantly on the Christians . . . (who threw the enemy) . . . back bravely with the musket, until they were forced to return though unwillingly to their first position.

Page 61. "General Starhemburg, finding an opportunity among the ruins of the Palace, stationed there four hundred huntsmen and musketeers, so that as soon as they saw any Turk lift his head above the trenches, they at once shot and killed him.

Page 63. "On the 24th the cannon, bombs and grenades played vigorously on either side. Though these were innumerable and fell in showers on the houses, no one was injured."

An account follows of a successful "booby-trap" set by the Turks.

The siege, the complete failure of which shattered Turkish prestige in Europe, began on the 14th of July. The vivid account of the attack by the relieving forces from the north, with a feint, or holding attack, from the west, is particularly interesting, and shows John Sobieski without, and Starhemburg within, the fortress exploiting success and maintaining the true objective with great energy and clearness of vision. The pursuit was less admirable. It was probably impossible to begin it in force on the 13th of September, but the further delay, until late on the 15th, seems to have been due only to politics.

The editing is, as would be expected, scholarly and helpful. The notes might have given a little more guidance in the matter of dates between the 10th and the 15th of September; and a general map, in addition to, or even instead of, the sketch of the fortress already given, would be a great improvement. With a little trouble, however, most of the text can be followed in the *Times Atlas*.

The political bias of the authors and the refreshing exuberance of statement, proper to such a contemporary work, are not such a disadvantage as might be thought: for the spirit and sincerity of the account are most convincing and much curious information is to be gathered. The work appears never to have been used by historians, and Mr. Marshall has done a service in making accessible a record upon which a very interesting monograph might be written.

The Broken Trident. By E. F. SPANNER. Williams & Norgate.
7s. 6d.

The author of this interesting book has strong and well-thought-out views on the policy of national defence; but he prefers us to take the powder of propaganda concealed in the jam of fiction. His message is that we must not put our money into the big battle

ship and battle-cruiser at the expense of the air arm, and he tells an humiliating tale of what the results of such a policy might be.

He places the next war in the year 1931, when Germany, having built up an overwhelming air force in secret, launches from several secret aerodromes thousands of aeroplanes armed with new weapons and employing new tactics. To Great Britain comes disaster upon disaster. Her inferior air force is annihilated, her fighting fleet disabled, her docks and harbours severely damaged, her food repositories threatened with destruction, her munition works destroyed. Fortunately she is offered a peace which is as magnanimous as the attack was dastardly.

A retired member of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, Mr. Spanner writes with great technical knowledge and, presumably, without prejudice. In such a struggle as he describes the Army can hardly have part. He has written a book which is bound to be a great subject for discussion in many a wardroom and Air Force mess.

The United States as a Neighbour, from a Canadian Point of View.

By Sir ROBERT FALCONER, K.C.M.G. The Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.

This is an expansion of the Sir George Watson chair lectures delivered by the author, who is President of Toronto University, in the United Kingdom last year. The Canadian view of the United States not only touches the question of our relations with the Republic, but is also of assistance to us in acquiring a just appreciation of Canada. It is well, therefore, that these lectures should be introduced to a wider public.

There is no space here to dwell upon the many aspects of the case which are so dispassionately surveyed by Sir Robert. In explaining the growth of Canadian nationalism he says :

"To-day the American of Anglo-Saxon stock does not talk to his Canadian neighbour about annexation. He has discovered that Canada has a real individuality. He admired her action in the war . . . and he is pondering as never before what her destiny may be. That is not to say that he yet understands her position ; he has hardly grasped the meaning of autonomy within the Empire."

In the concluding chapter is considered the part which Canada may play in the future to further a *rapprochement* between Britain and America.

"When the American turns to Britain as interpreted to him by the Canadian no longer does he discover the England of the nineteenth century, but a Britain cooperating with and leading young nations in a Commonwealth."

Disarmament. By Professor P. J. NOEL BAKER, Cassell Professor of International Relations in the University of London, late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, etc. The Hogarth Press. 12s. 6d.

In offering to the public the results of his very careful examination of the difficulties in the way of general disarmament Professor Baker has produced an interesting book. His proposals—more or less definite—for overcoming these difficulties will be held, by many, to reveal the academic mind; and comparatively few will share the Professor's optimism as to the outcome of the discussions shortly to begin in the Preparatory Disarmament Committee of the League of Nations.

It is, of course, quite obvious that armaments are a great economic burden and that the element of competition increases them and breeds a dangerous rivalry, whilst the signatories to the Covenant of Nations certainly appear to be morally bound to make a serious effort towards a general reduction of armaments. There follows an excellent chapter devoted to the difficulties arising from modern conditions: conscription, which has its virtues, but which inevitably creates large reserves of trained men; the progress of invention; the adaptability of weapons to peace-time uses; and the fact that the well-organized peace industries of a nation become a tremendous asset in the event of war or prospect of war. The author also emphasizes that the disarmament plan must be accepted by all, "or nearly all," the members of the community of States and that it must cover, so far as may be, all the factors of their military strength.

Enough obstacles are here indicated to occasion no surprise that so many disarmament proposals have been unsuccessful. On the other side, the writer can only adduce the successful treaty between five South American republics which concerns land and air forces only; for the disarmament of Germany as insisted upon in the Treaty of Versailles should not be cited as a case of voluntary agreement though its details are of technical interest.

In suggesting principles of land disarmament Professor Baker rather encroaches upon the whole field. If armies are to be used, as he says they must be when occasion arises, for "the enforcement by common action of international obligations," then naval and aerial forces are liable to be needed for the same purpose. He advocates a limitation of standing effectives and would deal with reserves by severely circumscribing staffs and training cadres. Militia and Territorial forces—as we know them—would be treated

on much the same basis as reserves. As regards armament and ammunition, the author is in favour of fixing annual expenditure under this heading on a scale which would vary with the strength of the standing army. He considers that Powers with colonies should be given special increases of the normal allowance. "If possible," he thinks it should be generally agreed to prohibit "as many as possible" of the modern engines of warfare, such as tanks. He would also try to limit the total army budgets of signatory States. He admits that special arrangements would have to be made for armed police and *gendarmerie*, and has no suggestion to offer regarding the tactical organization of the forces permitted, this latter point being regarded as of minor importance.

Touching the naval side, it is suggested that limitations should embrace total tonnage, size of vessels, calibre of guns, quantity of ammunition, man-power, and total naval budget. "An attempt should be made to secure the total abolition of the submarine as an instrument of war."

In the air the proposals are to limit the total *personnel* and the total budget.

Professor Baker does not presume to put forward any concrete proposals on so technical a subject as the control of chemical warfare. Here he is wise; but he appears to think that a properly constituted committee of experts could come to some workable conclusion.

Two other points—the restriction of weapons and the creation of demilitarized or neutralized zones—are discussed shortly and in neither case is any definite proposal formulated. There remain the "problem of the ratio"—that is the military strength to be allowed to each of the parties to a disarmament treaty—and the right of investigation. The author contends that the "ratio" should vary with the *barème* of the international budget of the League of Nations, and he has an excellent theoretical plan for investigation and mutual control between States.

But Professor Baker is nothing if not an optimist. He sees a great chance of success if the question of general disarmament is taken up now. "Surely a great chance, on one condition: that Great Britain should give the lead. America stands ready, ardent if doubting; Germany, eager for the equality which only our disarmament can bring; France, democratic France, ready to take a risk for reconciliation; Russia, using fair words, fairer than could have been expected; all the smaller powers enthusiastic for results for which they have been waiting long."

A Science of Infantry Tactics Simplified. By Captain B. H. LIDDELL HART, with a Foreword by General Sir IVOR MAXSE, K.C.B. Third revised and enlarged edition. Wm. Clowes & Sons, Ltd.

This is the third edition of Captain Liddell Hart's book which was based upon the lecture delivered by him at the Royal United Service Institution as long ago as 1920. As Sir Ivor Maxse observes in his preface, the author is to be congratulated upon the fact that there is still an insistent demand for it.

Few will differ from Sir Ivor's view—he is, of course, a great trainer of men—that junior officers and non-commissioned officers require something more—or something less—than “Infantry Training” if they are to learn easily and quickly their duties as subordinate leaders, and to train their men up to that standard of initiative and proficiency upon which we have justly prided ourselves in the past. It is Captain Liddell Hart's contention that our official manuals move too slowly and he quotes a distinguished general—“a most capable tactician”—as having woefully confused principles and the methods of carrying them out. In these pages, therefore, the doctrine which governs modern infantry tactics is enunciated in a fashion which, though based upon the official manual, is intended to present a connected framework of principles and to show how these should be applied by the company, platoon and section in attack and defence.

“Simplicity is the key to victory” quotes the author; but it is doubtful whether the average subordinate leader readily grasps the theory and principles set forth in the first part of the book. The gist of the matter is contained in the second part, and the system suggested there of teaching the elements of infantry tactics has obvious practical value. So with the plates; section and platoon commanders who quail at the sight of the “family tree” displayed in the first may well derive great benefit from a study of those which follow—though, if distances and frontages were appended, their value would be enhanced.

The Yeomanry Cavalry of Worcestershire, 1914-1922. By “C.” Mark & Moody, Stourbridge. 21s.

Some Yeomanry regiments can justly pride themselves upon having had more genuine cavalry experience during the German War than fell to the lot of most of their Regular *confrères*. Of such is the Queen's Own Worcestershire Hussars, whose story is ably told by Viscount Cobham in these pages.

The Worcestershire Yeomen went to Egypt in the 2nd Mounted Division and fought their first fight on the Suvla front of the Gallipoli peninsula, where, on the 21st of August, 1915, they took part in the last big attack of that campaign. Thereafter came three trying months of trench warfare and then the return to Egypt and the horses.

In the Sinai operations the actions of Qatia and Oghratina brought sad disaster to the Regiment, although its gallantry and fighting quality were never for a moment in question. Only one squadron was present at Romani.

Thenceforward the Regiment bore its full share of work in the operations which eventually drove the Turk from Palestine and Syria. This meant hard campaigning in almost all kinds of country and in extremes of temperature, and its experience was of every phase of cavalry activity. The second battle of Gaza saw the Worcesters engaged in a full-dress dismounted attack which reminded their Gallipoli veterans of Suvla. Later, in the gallant charge at Huj they showed the real cavalry spirit in shock action ; and by the time they went to work on foot among the mountains of Judæa they were war-hardened and war-trained troopers skilled in reconnaissance, formidable fighters in any tactical situation, and—above all—learned and zealous in the care of their cattle. It is recorded that most of the horses were English, and that they stood up to the work well.

The Regiment took part in the second raid on Es Salt, and spent much of the summer of 1918 in the Jordan valley—a sufficiently trying region even if there had been no Turks to contend with—before joining in the last great advance that at length saw the Yeomen of Worcestershire ride into Damascus.

All these adventures are related in an unpretentious but very effective style. The author preserves what so many unit historians fail to achieve—the real regimental point of view ; and he is gifted with a lightness of touch which makes for easy and entertaining reading.

A real endeavour has been made to supply battle plans which illustrate the principal engagements at which the Regiment was present and the larger maps are good. The admirably reproduced illustrations add much to the value of the book and a goodly proportion of these are of “ domestic ” interest. A roll of all those who served with the Regiment, giving honours, casualties, etc., is included as an appendix. The author's restrained and sensible comment upon the ultimate fate of the Worcestershire Yeomanry—converted into two field batteries in 1922—deserves a word of appreciation.

Essex Units in the War, 1914-1919. Vol. III. The Essex Yeomanry. By JOHN H. BURROWS. John H. Burrows & Son, Southend-on-Sea.

It is difficult to praise too highly the work of Mr. Burrows who, with the valuable cooperation of the History Sub-Committee of the Essex Territorial Association, has set himself to chronicle the history of all the Essex units in the Great War. This, the second volume of the series to be published, is of particular interest, for it contains an account of the military activity in the county during the period of the Napoleonic menace. As a result of much patient research the author has made no mean contribution to the history of the county, and so may be forgiven for exceeding the bounds of his main theme.

There was volunteer cavalry in Essex as early as 1793, when the Essex Light Dragoons was formed ; but the Essex Yeomanry, which fought in France and Belgium from 1915 to 1918, dates from the end of the South African War, when the Regiment was recruited from the four Hunts within the county.

In August, 1914, as in the days of Napoleon, the defence from invasion of Essex and the other eastern counties was regarded as of great importance ; but the Essex Yeomanry was soon sent to France as one of the units selected to expand the Cavalry Corps. The Regiment joined the 8th Cavalry Brigade and served therein with the Royal Horse Guards and the 10th Royal Hussars—very aristocratic company—until it lost its identity in April, 1918.

Though the lighter side of active service is by no means neglected, Mr. Burrows does full justice to the bigger actions at which the Regiment was present. He gives a very stirring picture of the Essex Yeomen in a counter-attack at Frezenberg ridge during the closing stages of the battles of Ypres, 1915. At the battle of Loos in the following September the Regiment held trenches in the village, but was engaged in much fiercer fighting at the Hohenzollern Redoubt in January, 1916. The next great occasion was the advance to and defence of Monchy-le-Preux during the battles of Arras. When March, 1918, saw the launching of the great German offensive the Regiment, together with the Bedfordshire Yeomanry, performed, perhaps, its finest achievement in checking the enemy's advance east of Villers Bretonneux during the last days of the month. It is a pity that Mr. Burrows should fall into the popular error of giving the Australians the sole credit for the eventual recapture of the village.

In the account of these battles is brought out the real fox-hunting spirit with which the Yeomen of Essex fought, and that they were real sons of the county is impressed upon the reader by the

frequent mention of the Chelmsford troop, the Dunmow troop, and other good Essex names.

In April, 1918, the Regiment was ordered to supply a squadron as reinforcements to each unit of the 1st Cavalry Brigade and thus the Essex Yeomanry, as such, does not appear in the "Advance to Victory." The ultimate consequence was a stern fight for the battle honours won during this period—a struggle with the Battle Honours Committee which lasted for two years and a half and was crowned with success as is related in a special chapter.

The appendices give full lists of honours and casualties and there is a wealth of admirably produced illustrations, some in colour. The maps are adequate and the contents of the volume are so well arranged that the absence of an index is not so great a handicap as might be imagined.

A Short History of the British Army to 1914. By Captain ERIC WILLIAM SHEPPARD, Royal Tank Corps. Constable & Co. 14s.

Captain Sheppard explains that, wanting a conveniently short history of the British Army and having failed to discover one, he set himself to supply the deficiency. This admirably written volume is the result, and it will undoubtedly prove of use and interest to a wide circle.

The subject is so vast and may be treated from so many points of view that it is surprising to find so much ground covered in less than 300 pages. We are presented with a brief survey of every campaign in which the British Army has been engaged from the accession of William III to the end of the South African War in 1902; an appreciation of the most prominent British commanders during this period; and an outline of the reforms instituted by Cardwell and Haldane. The evolution of tactics is not followed consistently although typical battles of the Cromwell, Marlborough and Wellington periods are described. As regards the development of armament little is said, so that those readers who wish to trace the history of such important branches of the service as the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers will be disappointed. It is evident that Captain Sheppard was not in want of a book dealing with these branches of the subject.

But let it be said that he writes extremely well and interestingly. His account of the British Army on active service is a model of compression, for an admirable balance is preserved, events are kept to their true proportion, and the arrangement of the various campaigns gives little cause for criticism. If the author's strictures on statesmen and politicians are rather severe neither the soldier nor the

general reader is likely to complain, whilst instances of the non-success of expeditions and leaders are related with a commendable freedom from bias.

Many will consider that the real history of the British Army of to-day commences with the Restoration and that Captain Sheppard's pages which deal with the British fighting men of the period 55 B.C. to A.D. 1660 are rather irrelevant. Certainly it is hardly legitimate to regard Canute's house carles as the first germ of our standing army, but Cromwell and the "New Model" have claims to come into the picture.

In one important respect the book might have been given an added value without encroaching much upon the space available. Nowhere is the name of a regiment mentioned. The reader of any history—short or long—of the British Army is entitled to be told, for instance, who were "the men that fought at Minden." Perhaps, should a second edition be called for, as one hopes will be the case, the author will bear this point in mind.

It would have been wiser to have invested the work with a more definite authority by including a bibliography, though it is clear that Captain Sheppard has read widely and well, whilst the list of books suggested, at the end of every chapter, for further reading is very exhaustive. In a book of this nature maps are rather a difficulty. The one battle plan, that of Oudenarde, is not very good; the rest are small scale maps of theatres of operations. A more careful reading of proofs would have avoided several rather ludicrous errors.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

The Nineteenth Century and After, April, 1926. "The Myths of War," by F. J. P. Veale.

The purpose of this article is to assess the kind of evidence usually available in determining whether stories of atrocities in war are true or not.

The National Review, May, 1926. "The Defence of the Peking Legations, 1900—A Retrospect," by Captain Wilmot P. M. Russell, M.C.

The Nineteenth Century and After, May, 1926. (1) "A Minister of Defence," by the Right Hon. Lord Sydenham of Combe, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G.

In this article the opinion is strongly expressed that a subjection of the fighting services to a single control would court national disaster.

(2) "Correspondence: 'The Myths of War,'" by Edward Anderson.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

- "The War-God Walks Again." By F. Britten Austin. Published by Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 3s. 6d. net.
- "Essex Units in the War, 1914-1919. Vol. III. The Essex Yeomanry." By John Wm. Burrows, F.S.A. Published by J. H. Burrows & Sons, Ltd. 5s. net.
- "The Yeomanry Cavalry of Worcestershire, 1914-1922." By "C." Published by Mark & Moody, Ltd. £1 1s. net.
- "History of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry from 1755 to 1914." By Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B. Published by Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., Ltd. In two vols. £1 10s.
- "A Science of Infantry Tactics Simplified." By Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. Third revised and enlarged edition. Published by William Clowes & Sons, Ltd. 5s. 6d. net.
- "On England and Other Addresses." By the Right Hon. Stanley Baldwin. Published by Philip Allan & Co., Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.
- "Disarmament." By Professor P. J. Noel Baker. Published by The Hogarth Press. 12s. 6d. net.
- "The Perils of Amateur Strategy." By Lieut.-General Sir Gerald Ellison, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Published by Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd. 5s. net.
- "Conflict and Quest." By Francis Seymour Stevenson. Published by Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.
- "Operations Orders Made Easy." By Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Pile, D.S.O., M.C. (p.s.c.), Royal Tank Corps. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd. 3s.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

ROYAL AIR FORCE (ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF).—On the 3rd of March, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Col. Headlam*, the *Secretary of State for Air* announced that the number of officers who had qualified as pilots and were employed in an administrative capacity by the Air Ministry was eighty-one.

IRAQ FORCE.—On the 3rd of March, in reply to a question by *Sir H. Brittain*, the *Secretary of State for Air* informed the House that the health of the R.A.F. in Iraq had been satisfactory and that there had been no undue amount of illness reported during the past twelve months.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE.—On the 10th of March, in reply to a question by *Sir F. Wise*, the *Financial Secretary to the Treasury* gave details of the cost of defence in the years previous to and since the war. The total expenditure for the year 1907-8 was £58,390,000; for 1913-14, £77,099,000; for 1919-20, £620,202,000; and for 1925-26, was estimated to be £123,945,000.

MANŒUVRES (COMPENSATION CLAIMS).—On the 11th of March, in reply to a question by *Colonel Day*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that for last year's manœuvres there had been 1,255 claims for compensation by farmers and stock-breeders in respect of which the

sum paid was £5,300. The amount claimed by local authorities for damage to roads was £1,344.

EUROPEAN MILITARY FORCES.—On the 15th of March, in reply to a question by *Sir W. Davison*, the *Financial Secretary to the War Office* gave the following figures as the strengths of the military forces of five European countries. The figures for the subsidiary forces being approximate only, and comprising troops of widely varying character :—

Country	Standing Army	Subsidiary Forces
France (including Colonial Army)	654,000 (including Air Force)	5,100,000
Germany	100,000	nil
Italy (including Colonial Army) ..	250,000	3,065,000
Russia	634,000 (including Air Force)	8,426,000
Great Britain	159,400	309,000

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1926–27.—On the 15th of March, the *Secretary of State for War* made a statement explaining the Army Estimates for 1926–27. The totals asked for amounted to 159,400 men and £42,500,000. These totals represented a net reduction on the preceding year of 1,200 men and £2,000,000. The reduction in men related partly to certain Indian troops employed by the Air Ministry in Iraq, and partly to the abolition of the Corps of Military Accountants and reductions in personnel in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps. The decrease in expenditure was effected in spite of additional expenditure of over £250,000, due to the fact that war stocks were becoming depleted and replacement was necessary, and of extra expenditure of £137,000 in employers' contributions for soldiers, due to the passing of the Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act. In the course of his statement, the Secretary of State dwelt on the value of last year's manœuvres, particularly in regard to the question of mechanization and the difficulty experienced in finding the right vehicle, such as would be suitable for general commercial as well as for military use. Criticism of the estimates by *Mr. Walsh* was mainly directed against the new form in which they were presented as compared with those of the last six years, owing to the decision to abandon the unit or objective system of accounting, which, he said, would weaken Parliamentary control.

PURCHASE OF HORSES.—On the 23rd of March, in reply to a question by *Mr. Lamb*, the *Secretary of State for War* informed the House that during the year 1925, 1,120 horses were purchased by the War Office in England and Wales and 600 in the Irish Free State.

LIFE-SAVING CLOTHING.—On the 24th of March, in reply to a question by *Colonel Day*, the *Under-Secretary of State for Air*

stated that the recent demonstration of certain flying clothing which would keep the wearer afloat in the water gave promising results, but that a good deal of modification would be necessary before they could be considered fit for service use. Two modified suits had been ordered and would be tested.

TERRITORIAL AIR SQUADRONS.—On the 31st of March, in reply to a question by *Captain Crookshank*, the *Secretary of State for Air* announced that four Auxiliary Air Force squadrons had been formed in conjunction with the Territorial Associations of the City of London, the County of London, and the Cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh.

IRAQ (FRONTIER RAID).—On the 13th of April, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy*, the *Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs* informed the House that a party of Syrian tribesmen crossed the frontier between Syria and Iraq on the 2nd of April and attacked the tribesmen on the Iraq side. The latter were assisted in repelling the invaders by armoured cars and subsequently by aircraft, and the raiders withdrew having lost, it was believed, about thirty killed. The Iraq tribesmen lost one killed and two wounded. There were no British casualties reported.

MILITARY TATTOOS.—On the 19th of April, in reply to a question by *Mr. Hore-Belisha*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that tattoos would be held at Birmingham, from 3rd to 15th of May; Aldershot, from 15th to 19th of June; York, from 30th of June to 3rd of July; Leeds, from 8th to 10th of July; Tidworth, from 31st of July to 5th of August. Other local tattoos were being organized by the Commands. In London there would be no tattoo beyond the Royal Tournament.

WAR HISTORIES.—On the 22nd of April, in reply to a question by *Captain Crookshank*, the *Financial Secretary to the Treasury* gave details of the progress made with War Histories. Fourteen volumes have already been published, eight being naval, five military, and one air history. Six further volumes would, it was hoped, be published during the next twelve months. The history of the Gallipoli campaign would probably be ready at the end of 1927. Probably fourteen more volumes would be required to complete the histories.

ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.—On the 4th of May, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Heneage*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that no steps were being taken at present to mechanize any batteries of the R.H.A., experiments were being made with various types of mechanical vehicles to ascertain which were best suited to artillery requirements.

BERTRAND STEWART PRIZE ESSAY, 1927

Subject selected by the Army Council for the fifth Competition :

“Having in mind the imperative necessity for the greatest reduction possible, consistent with safety, in the annual cost of the three Fighting Services, how can the essential military requirements of Imperial defence best be met? No account should be taken of any international agreement for disarmament beyond that already entered into at Washington.”

RULES OF THE COMPETITION

1. The right to compete is limited to British subjects, who have served, or who are actually serving, as officers or in other ranks or ratings of His Majesty's forces.
2. The term “His Majesty's forces” includes the Navy and the Royal Marines, the Regular Army, the Special Reserve, the Territorial Army, the Militia, and the Royal Air Force, the New Armies which took part in the late war, and also the Naval, Military and Air forces of India, the Dominions and the Crown Colonies.
3. The essays submitted for the prize must not exceed 10,000 words in length; they must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
4. The authorship of the essays must be strictly anonymous. Each competitor must adopt a motto and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with his motto typewritten on the outside and his name and address inside.
5. The title and page of any published or unpublished work, to which reference is made in any essay or from which extracts are taken, must be quoted.
6. The essays, which are to be addressed to the Editors of the *Army Quarterly*, must reach the office of the *Army Quarterly*, 94, Jermyn Street, London, S.W., not later than the 1st of March, 1927.
7. The essays will be judged by three referees—two to be appointed by the Army Council, the third to be one of the Editors

of the *Army Quarterly*. The decision of the Referees, or of a majority of them, will be final.

8. The referees are fully empowered if in their opinion, or in the opinion of the majority of them, no essay submitted to them comes up to a sufficiently high standard of excellence, not to award the prize ; or they may, if they consider such a course desirable, divide the prize among two or more competitors.

9. The result of the Competition will be made known in the *Army Quarterly* in July, 1927, and the prize essay will be published in that number of the Review. In the event, however, of there being two or more prize essays, the Editors of the *Army Quarterly* reserve to themselves the right of deciding which of these essays they will publish.

10. The copyright in any essay which appears in the *Army Quarterly* belongs to the Proprietors of the Review.

11. Neither the Proprietors nor the Editors of the *Army Quarterly* are to be held responsible for the loss of, or failure to return, any essay submitted for the Competition ; nor do they incur any liability whatsoever in connection with the receipt of the essays, any dealings therewith, the judging thereof, or the reports thereon.

MESSRS. LONGMANS & CO.'S LIST

HISTORY OF ENGLAND

By GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, Litt.D., LL.D.,
F.B.A., Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. With 35 Maps.
Demy 8vo. In One Volume, 12s. 6d. net.

This new work is a History of England and its People in all parts of the World from the earliest times to the present day. The author deals with the growth of the Nation and Empire rather than with the reigns of kings, and his main object is to cultivate the historical sense, so that the reader may learn how to apply the teaching of history to present-day problems.

THE PERILS OF AMATEUR STRATEGY

As Exemplified by the Attack on the Dardanelles Fortress in 1915

By Lieut.-General Sir GERALD ELLISON, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
With a Prefatory Note by the Right Hon. Viscount Esher, G.C.B.,
G.C.V.O. With Maps. Crown 8vo. 5s. net.

"The evidence which General Ellison provides in support of his contention is overwhelming."
—Major-General Sir Guy Aston in *The English Review*.

THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF AIR FIGHTING

By Major OLIVER STEWART, M.C., A.F.C.

With an Introduction by Wing Commander W. O. Barker,
V.C., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C. With Diagrams. Crown 8vo. 6s. net.

"Will certainly prove a standard work on strategy and tactics. It is the first technical work of its kind to be published in England."—*Morning Post*.

STONEWALL JACKSON AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

By Colonel G. F. R. HENDERSON, C.B. With an Introduction by
Field-Marshal the Right Hon. Viscount Wolseley, K.P., G.C.B.,
G.C.M.C., etc. 2 Portraits, and 33 Maps and Plans.
2 vols. Crown 8vo. 25s. net.

THE SCIENCE OF WAR

A Collection of Essays and Lectures, 1891-1903

By Colonel G. F. R. HENDERSON, C.B. Edited by Colonel Neill
Malcolm, D.S.O. With a Memoir of the Author by Field-Marshal
Earl Roberts, V.C. Portrait of the Author and 4 Maps. 8vo. 21s. net.

THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice relating to Colonial Expansion

By M. F. LINDLEY, LL.D., B.Sc. (Lond.) of the Middle
Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 8vo. 21s. net.

CONFLICT AND QUEST

By FRANCIS SEYMOUR STEVENSON.

With Coloured Frontispiece. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

This is a poetic tale of love, adventure and spiritual quest, and arises out of the Great War, more particularly out of the campaigns in Palestine and Syria, to which two out of the twelve Cantos are devoted. From conflict in West and East emerges the quest after that which may help to avert future conflict.

THE RISE OF SOUTH AFRICA

By Sir GEORGE CORY, M.A., Litt.D. In Six Volumes.

Vol. IV., 1838 to 1846. 8vo. 26s.

This Volume of Sir George Cory's History covers the period of the Great Trek of the Boers and the Massacre of Retief by Dingaan.

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO., LTD., 39 Paternoster Row, London, E.C.4



Barr & Stroud Binoculars

NONE BETTER—AND THEY'RE BRITISH

SHARP DEFINITION

LARGE FLAT BRILLIANT FIELD

PRISMATIC BINOCULARS

Type	Magnification	Focussing	Diameter of Objective		Angular Field	Field of view in yards at 1000 yds.	Price
			Ins.	m/m			
C.F.1	6	Central	0.9	23	8°	138	£6 10 0
C.F.2	6	Central	1.2	30.5	8°	138	£8 2 6
C.F.3	6	Eyepiece	0.9	23	8°	138	£6 0 0
C.F.4	6	Eyepiece	1.2	30.5	8°	138	£7 7 6

GALILEAN BINOCULARS

Type	Magnification	Diameter of Objective			Interocular Distance	Angular Field	Field of view in yards at 1000 yds.	Price
		Ins.	m/m	Lines				
C.A.2	3½	2.19	55.6	26	65mm.	61°	112	£2 17 6
C.A.3	3½	2.0	50.8	24	63.5mm.	61°	112	£2 12 6
C.A.3	3½	2.0	50.8	24	62mm.	61°	112	£2 12 6
C.A.4	3½	1.75	44.5	21	63.5mm.	61°	112	£2 7 6
C.A.4	3½	1.75	44.5	21	62mm.	61°	112	£2 7 6

Prices include leather cases and straps.

Send for free booklet, "On Binoculars"

BARR & STROUD, LTD. ANNIESLAND, GLASGOW and
15 VICTORIA ST., LONDON, S.W.1.

Telegram:—
Telemeter, Glasgow.

Codes.
5th & 6th Edition A.B.C.

Telegram:—
Relemeret, Sower, London.

RETURN TO → CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT
202 Main Library

LOAN PERIOD 1 HOME USE	2	3
4	5	6

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS

RENEWALS AND RECHARGES MAY BE MADE 4 DAYS PRIOR TO DUE DATE.
 LOAN PERIODS ARE 1-MONTH, 3-MONTHS, AND 1-YEAR.
 RENEWALS: CALL (415) 642-3405

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

NOV 19 1989

AUTO DISC OCT 19 1989

JAN 15 2003

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
 FORM NO. DD6, 60m, 1/83 BERKELEY, CA 94720



U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIE



C022614929

5.
631792

U1

A8

V.12

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

